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Chapter One 
Introduction- Emerging Concern for Traditions in Rights 
Discourses: A Bane or Boon? 
	
1.1 Defining the Problem: Changing Nature of Socio-Legal Discourses in 
India- Emerging Concern for Cultural and Legal Diversity1  
Socio-legal discourses in India, especially those concerned with rights of women in 
the domain of family, have undergone tremendous changes during the past few 
decades. 2 One of the most significant changes is: scholars’ changed understanding 
about the role of law, Uniform Civil Code (UCC) and legal pluralism in women’s 
empowerment, especially in the domain of family.3 An important aspect of the above 
change is: scholars’ changed stance towards pluralistic laws that govern family 
matters of different communities4 and all those customs, practices and diverse ways 
of organizing personal, intimate relationships which have been part of Indian social 
																																								 																				
1  This dissertation draws upon Chicago Style of Referencing for citations. It mainly refers to 17th 
ed. of the Chicago Manual, with slight modifications, especially in using ‘ibid.’ While in its 17th 
edition  Chicago manual discourages use of the term ibid. or ibidem. this document has used ibid. 
when a subsequent note refers to the same author and work. 
http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html.  
2  For a comprehensive account of such changes see Supriya Akrekar, “Theory and Practice of 
Women’s Movement in India- A Discourse Analysis,” Economic and Political Weekly, Theory 
and Practice of Women’s Movement in India, 30, no. 17 (1995): 2–23. 
3  While an important shift can be observed in women and law scholarship in the recent past, it is 
actually scholars from disciplines other than law, such as historians, political scientists, 
sociologists, who have played an important role in initiating important changes in socio-legal 
scholarship in India. Some oft cited examples from other disciplines are: Lata Mani, 
“Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India,” Cultural Critique 7 (1987): 119–
56; Sudhir Chandra, Enslaved Daughters: Colonialism, Law & Women’s Rights (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1998); Maitrayee Chaudhuri, ed., Feminism in India: Issues in Contemporary 
Indian Feminism (London; New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2005). Among legal scholars in India 
pioneers of change have been: Ratna Kapur and Brenda Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist 
Engagements with Law in India, 1 edition (New Delhi; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE 
Publications Pvt. Ltd, 1996).; Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality: The Politics of 
Women’s Rights in India (Oxford University Press, 2001) ; Madhu Mehra, Rights in Intimate 
Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s Rights and the Family 
(Delhi: Partners for Law in Development, 2010), 
http://www.academia.edu/15497286/Rights_in_Intimate_Relationships. 
4  For the purposes of regulation of family matters population in India, since advent of colonial 
rule, is divided into four broad categories- Hindus, Muslims, Christians and Parsis, with different 
sets of laws for each of the category, such as, Hindu Law, Muslim Law, Christian Law and Parsi 
Law. All the communities are governed by a combination of codified laws and customary laws.A 
commonly used term for family laws of different communities is personal laws. 
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and cultural fabric since ages, but which came to be considered as backward and 
regressive since the advent of colonial rule in India.5  
 
Women’s rights scholars in India, till 1990s, advanced two main ideas, firstly that 
religion-based ‘personal laws’ and various customary, pluralistic ways of organising 
personal relationships were major obstacles in the way of women’s march towards 
dignity, equality and empowerment. Secondly, that these laws and practices were 
best eradicated through the instruments of the state and its legal system through a 
uniform set of laws to govern personal relationships of all communities. Basically, 
the argument has been that legal pluralism and influence of religion on family laws 
have been the main causes for denial of rights to women and that women’s 
empowerment requires that the family laws in India should be harmonized by 
promulgating a Uniform Civil Code, which would regulate all family matters 
irrespective of religion, caste or community.6 Pluralistic, religion-based personal 
laws and customs for formation and dissolution of personal relationships were found 
problematic as they, on the one hand, were believed to be the main reasons for 
denial of equal rights in family.7 On the other hand, they were seen to encourage 
what were perceived as anti-women practices such as bigamy (or polygamy) and 
adultery believed to be imposed on women by a male-dominated, patriarchal society. 
As a consequence, imposition of monogamy through uniform family laws (in other 
words, the uniform civil code strategy) or by way of criminal sanctions were, at that 
time (mainly till late 1990s), perceived as progressive steps for saving women from 
primitive androcentric practices.8  
																																								 																				
5  Most common examples of such practices are bigamy, adultery, child marriages, as well as range 
of customary (informal) ways of solemnizing marriages and divorces in different communities. 
While Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 made polygamy as invalid, Indian Penal Code, 1860 also 
makes bigamy and adultery as criminal offences. A legal attempt to control Child Marriages was 
made through the Child Marriages Restraint Act, 1929. The above Act is repealed by the 
Prohibition of the Child Marriages Act, 2006.  
6  The women and law literature till late 1980s and early 1990s explicitly reflected this view. One 
of the most important and representative example of this dominant  view is: “Towards Equality: 
Report of the Committee on the Status of Women in India” (New Delhi: Government of India, 
Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, Department of Social Welfare, 1974).  
7  Amongst legal scholars an important proponent for transferring complete control of regulating 
family matters has been: Archana Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India: Uniform 
Civil Code and Gender Equality (New Delhi; Newbury Park, Calif: SAGE Publications Pvt. Ltd, 
1992). 
8  “Towards Equality.” At pp. 104-110. 
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A singular form of family based on monogamy, with equal legal rights for men and 
women, was seen as a means to restrict freedom of men from establishing multiple 
intimate relationships. At the same time, it was depicted as a way to move Indian 
family laws on a path of progress which was presumed to have been followed by the 
West, thereby empowering women by granting them equal social and economic 
rights. While regulating polygamy and promulgation of the Uniform Civil Code 
remains an important demand in India,9 socio-legal scholars, in recent years, have 
become divided on the issue.10 Since the 1990s, social scientists, including legal 
scholars, have begun to argue that the UCC or the idea of transferring control of 
family relationships, especially of marriage and divorce, to the State is not necessary 
for women’s empowerment.11  
																																								 																				
9  Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “Not Majority vs Minority,” The Indian Express, September 6, 2016, 
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/triple-talaq-islam-muslim-law-board-supreme-
court-muslim-wife-divorce-3015345/; Varun srinivasan, “Need for a United or Unified Code? 
Understanding the Implications of the Uniform Civil Code,” Live Law, July 10, 2016, 
http://www.livelaw.in/need-united-unified-code-understanding-implications-uniform-civil-code/; 
Mukul Kumar Mishra, “Uniform Civil Code: Not to Divide by Religion, but to Unite by 
Nationality,” www.oneindia.com, July 15, 2014, http://www.oneindia.com/feature/uniform-civil-
code-not-divide-religion-but-unite-nationali-1483112.html.; S. Sanal Kumar, “Uniform Civil 
Code or ‘Unilateral Civil Code,’” Live Law, July 15, 2016, http://www.livelaw.in/uniform-civil-
code-unilateral-civil-code/; Upendra Baxi, “Securing the Code | The Indian Express,” accessed 
July 20, 2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/uniform-civilc-code-article-44-
2924463/; Venkaiah M. Naidu, “Why Not a Common Civil Code for All?,” The Hindu, July 16, 
2016, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/union-minister-venkaiah-naidu-on-uniform-civil-
code-why-not-a-common-civil-code-for-all/article8855995.ece. 
10  For an interesting take on Uniform Civil Code (UCC) debate in India see Tanja Herklotz, “Dead 
Letters? The Uniform Civil Code through the Eyes of the Indian Women’s Movement and the 
Indian Supreme Court,” VRÜ Verfassung Und Recht in Übersee 49, no. 2 (2016): 148–74. 
Herklotz argues that while uniform civil code remains a political demand in India, women’s 
movement, even the judiciary (especially Supreme Court of India), have given up the demand of 
Uniform Civil Code. Herkotz argues convincingly that judiciary in India, continues to protect 
rights of women without pursuing demand for UCC. According to Herklotz UCC is now merely 
a rhetorical demand. Herklotz is right to the extent that judiciary in India has undoubtedly played 
an important role in harmonization of family laws of different religions and communities by 
protecting rights of women. However, it is also true that time and again it is the Apex Court 
which has brought attention towards necessity of promulgating Uniform Civil Code in India. 
Latest example of the Apex Court igniting the controversy of Uniform Civil Code has been 
Prakash v Phulwati, 2 Supreme Court Cases 36 (Supreme Court 2016). 
11  Some prominent feminist legal scholars who no longer support the idea of Uniform Civil Code 
are: Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality; Ratna Kapur, “The Citizen and the Migrant: 
Postcolonial Anxieties, Law, and the Politics of Exclusion/Inclusion,” Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law 8, no. 2 (2007): 537–70. Also see Nivedita Menon, “Uniform Civil Code – the Women’s 
Movement Perspective,” Kafila (blog), October 1, 2014, https://kafila.org/2014/10/01/uniform-
civil-code-state-of-the-debate-in-2014/; John H. Mansfield, “The Personal Laws or a Uniform 
Civil Code,” in Religion and Law in Independent India, ed. Robert D. Baird (New Delhi: 
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The last few decades have witnessed a sea-change in feminist scholars’ 
understanding of progressiveness. Progressiveness is no longer equated with 
uniformity in personal laws to govern family matters.12 According to contemporary 
scholars, progressiveness in matters relating to marriage and intimate relationships 
does not lie in making people follow one singular form of organizing personal 
relationships or in imposing monogamy through instruments of law or criminal 
sanctions.13 Progressiveness with regards to personal relationships now lies in: (i) 
allowing every individual, especially women, the freedom to choose or devise 
different ways of organizing personal relationships, different from the ones 
prescribed or sanctioned by their respective personal family laws;  (ii) imparting 
legal validity to these different ways chosen by people; and (iii) having a rights 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
Manohar Publications, 1993), 139–77. Taking cognizance of diversity in India Mansfield 
suggested, 
 With the benefit of intervening experience of a complex and ever-changing Indian society, an 
open-minded approach seems called for, one unconstrained either by the hesitancy of a foreign 
ruler to interfere in the laws and customs of subject peoples, or by a purely theoretical notion that 
a nation-state cannot exist without a uniform substantive law on all subjects. The nation-state that 
India needs is one that is adapted to its special circumstances. (At p. 176-177) 
 For a similar view also see Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Llyod I. Rudolph, “Living with 
Difference in India: Legal Pluralism and Legal Universalism in Historical Context,” in Religion 
and Personal Law in Secular India: Call for Judgement, ed. Gerald James Larson (Bloomington 
and Indiana Pollis: Indiana University Press, 2001), 36–65;  
 For some recent examples of scholarship which does not see Uniform Civil Code as essential for 
women’s empowerment see “In the Name of Women,” Economic and Political Weekly 51, no. 
43 (2016): 7. Shehnaaz Sheikh, “Why I Took on Triple Talaq,” Indian Express, November 16, 
2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/triple-talaq-uniform-civil-code-indian-
constitution-4377532/. 
12  Nivedita Menon, “Women and Citizenship,” in Wages of Freedom, ed. Partha Chatterjee (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998);  Nivedita Menon, Recovering Subversion: Feminist 
Politics Beyond the Law (Orient Blackswan, 2004).  
 Also see Menon, “Uniform Civil Code – the Women’s Movement Perspective,” October 1, 2014. 
Adopting a new understanding of progressiveness Menon writes,  
The following of heterogeneous practices need not be inherently inegalitarian, nor the imposition 
of a uniform law necessarily the opposite. 
13  Flavia Agnes, Family Law Volume 1: Family Laws and Constitutional Claims (Oxford 
University Press, 2011) (At p. x);  
 Also see Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of 
Women’s Rights and the Family.; also Nivedita Menon, “Uniform Civil Code – the Women’s 
Movement Perspective,” Kafila (blog), October 1, 2014, https://kafila.org/2014/10/01/uniform-
civil-code-state-of-the-debate-in-2014/. Vasudha Dhagamwar, “Panch Parmeshwar,” Economic 
and Political Weekly 44, no. 31 (2009): 13–16. For a detailed discussion on issues relating to 
criminalization of polygamy see Cyra Akila Choudhury, “Between Tradition and Progress: A 
Comparative Perspective on Polygamy in United States and India,” University of Colorado Law 
Review 83 (2012): 963–1027. 
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framework to protect rights of women who choose to be a party to different formal 
and informal ways of organizing adult intimacy.14 
   
Scholars in India are accepting, albeit reluctantly, that relationships between 
individuals, especially intimate sexual relations can never be regulated completely 
by the law made by the State.15 It is also being accepted that the limits of the State 
and the Law in regulating lives of people is an issue not only for India, but also in 
Western jurisdictions, where the massive unmarried cohabitation – and now the 
increasingly prominent position of same-sex unions – have raised the agenda of the 
desirability and feasibility of state control of interpersonal relations afresh.16  
 
Keeping pace with the international developments,17 contemporary scholarship on 
rights of women in India is gradually acknowledging that promulgation of uniform, 
																																								 																				
14   The works which emphatically put forward this demand are: Flavia Agnes, Family Law II: 
Marriage, Divorce and Matrimonial Litigation, vol. II (New Delhi: OUP India, 2011); Mehra, 
Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s Rights 
and the Family. 
15  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1; Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive 
and Just Framework of Women’s Rights and the Family. 
16  For a general discussion on the role of the State in regulating family matters see Frances E. 
Olsen, “The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,” Harvard Law 
Review 96, no. 7 (1983): 1497–1578. John Eekelaar, “Family Law and Social Control,” in 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Third Series (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1987), 267; Nadine Taub and Elizabeth M. Schneider, “Women’s Subordination and the Role of 
Law,” in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, ed. David Kairys, third edition (New 
York: Basic Books, 1998). For a proposal for legal recognition of ‘common law marriage 
doctrine’ in the United States see Cynthia Grant Bowman, “A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back 
Common Law Marriage,” Oregon Law Review 75, no. 3 (1996): 709; “Marriage as Contract and 
Marriage as Partnership: The Future of an Antenuptial Agreement,” Harvard Law Review, 
Developments in the Law- The Law of Marriage and Family, 116, no. 7 (2003): 2075–98.; Ariela 
R. Dubler, “Wifely Behaviour: A Legal History of Acting Married,” Columbia Law Review 100, 
no. 4 (2000): 957–1021. For detailed discussion on dilemmas relating to role of the state in 
interpersonal relationships see Tracy E. Higgins, “Book Review: Are Women Human? And 
Other International Dialogues by Catharine A. MacKinnon,” Yale Journal of Law & Feminism 
18, no. 2 (2006): 523. 
17  For different feminist approaches towards role of law and rights discourses in women’s 
empowerment see Karen Engle, “Female Subjects of Public International Law: Human Rights 
and the Exotic Other Female,” New England Law Review 26 (1992): 1509–26. Ann C. Scales, 
“The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay,” The Yale Law Journal 95, no. 7 (1986): 
1373–1403; Martha Minow, “Justice Engendered: Foreword,” Harvard Law Review 101, no. 1 
(1987): 10–90.; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 
(USA: Harvard University Press, 1987). Emphasising the idea of law as gendered, Smart states, 
 There are three phases we can identify in the development of the idea that law is gendered. 
….The first stage is epitomized by the phrase ‘law is sexist’, the second by the phrase ‘law is 
male’ and finally we reach the point of arguing that ‘law is gendered’. (At p. 30) 
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gender-neutral laws and imposition of a singular form of family can neither 
eradicate the influence of religion or traditions from people’s lives nor does it 
necessarily result in empowerment of women, or make them ‘independent and 
autonomous beings’.18  With respect to the polygamous or bigamous relationships, it 
has gradually become clear that legal and/or criminal sanctions neither deter men 
from engaging in such relationships nor empower women with equality.19 There is 
also an increasing yet reluctant realisation that total state control, for example in the 
form of compulsory registration of marriages, is neither going to work effectively 
nor is it going to be favourable for women.20 A growing number of scholars now 
argue that having laws to impose uniform, standard patterns of organising personal 
relationships may have dangerous consequences for women.21  Legal scholars in 
India also are now willing to endorse the fact that modern State and uniform laws, 
far from promoting and protecting autonomy and agency of individuals, become 
means for using the might of the State and the law to impose a particular ideology or 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 Also see Mary Joe Frug, “A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft),” 
Harvard Law Review 105, no. 5 (1992): 1045–75.; Kevat Nousiainen et al., eds., Responsible 
Selves: Women in the Nordic Legal Culture, First Edition (Aldershot, Hants, England; 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub Ltd, 2001). 
 For challenges to the concepts of ‘nation’ and state see Crawford Young, ed., The Rising Tide of 
Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay? (Wisconsin: Univ of Wisconsin Press, 1993). 
18  Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, The Scandal of the State: Women, Law, and Citizenship in Postcolonial 
India (Duke University Press, 2003), Nivedita Menon, “It Isn’t about Women,” The Hindu, July 
15, 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/nivedita-menon-on-uniform-civil-code-it-isnt-
about-women/article; Cyra Akila Choudhury, “(Mis)Appropriated Liberty: Identity, Gender 
Justice, and Muslim Personal Law Reform in India,” Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 17, 
no. 1 (2008): 45. 
19 Many recent feminist works highlight disadvantages faced by women in India as a result of 
imposition of monogamy, for example see, Flavia Agnes, Family Law II: Marriage, Divorce and 
Matrimonial Litigation, vol. II (New Delhi: OUP India, 2011). This realization among scholars, 
on the one hand, is result of increasing number of cases of injustice against women due to 
insistence on formalities by the state and the judiciary for considering a relationship as a valid 
marriage. On the other hand it is result of increasing influence of literature from western 
countries which show how formal equality or state control of personal relationships turned out to 
be disadvantageous to women. For changing perceptions against transferring complete control of 
formation and dissolution of marriage relationships to State also see, Flavia Agnes, “Conjugality, 
Property, Morality and Maintenance,” Economic and Political Weekly 44, no. 44 (2009): 58–64.; 
Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s 
Rights and the Family.  
20  Strong proponents as stated before too are: Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. Mehra, Rights in 
Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s Rights and the 
Family. 
21  Menon, “Uniform Civil Code – the Women’s Movement Perspective,” October 1, 2014. 
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moral standards on individuals and groups of individuals.22 Scholars are now willing 
to recognize that efforts for uniformisation of family laws in the colonial era have 
been responsible for curtailing diversity in family laws.23 It is also being recognized 
that non-recognition of customary practices has been a cause of denial of rights of 
women. 24  Recent streams of women’s rights scholars, therefore, now expect law to 
be sensitive to those individuals, particularly women, who did not or could not find 
it possible to submit to the conditions prescribed by law for establishing intimate 
relationships. In other words, the legal system in India, is now expected to take steps 
to protect rights of individuals, particularly of women, while reducing its control 
over intimate relationships and allowing individuals freedom to engage in 
personal/intimate relationships governed by their choice, customs, traditions or 
religion-based laws. The legal system in India is expected to protect rights of its own 
victims- the victims of those legislations which were once considered beneficial for 
women.25 Women’s rights scholarship expects law to be sensitive to differences 
between women based on religion, caste, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.26  
 
All the above changes- scholars’ demand for more individual freedom to choose 
ways of organizing adult intimacy, new understandings about nature of law and 
																																								 																				
22  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India; Agnes, Law and 
Gender Inequality; Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. 
23  Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality; Agnes, Family Law Volume 1; Menon, Recovering 
Subversion; Menon, “Uniform Civil Code – the Women’s Movement Perspective,” October 1, 
2014. 
24  Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s 
Rights and the Family. Scholars like Mehra have lately taken note of the fact rather explicitly 
that pre-colonial India recognized various ways and forms of adult intimacy and that these ways 
and forms came to demonized and criminalized with advent of colonial rule, in the process of 
introducing reforms in the family laws. For a detailed discussion on this issue also see Agnes, 
Family Law Volume 1; Agnes, Family Law II, 2011. 
25  Menon, “It Isn’t about Women.” 
26  Ratna Kapur, “The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the ‘Native’ Subject in 
International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 15, no. 1 
(2002): 1–38. Ratna Kapur, Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics of Postcolonialism 
(London; Portland, Or.: Routledge-Cavendish, 2005). Choudhury, “(Mis)Appropriated Liberty.” 
For necessity of taking accout of differences between women see Scales, “The Emergence of 
Feminist Jurisprudence.” Scales states, “we must seek a legal system that works and, at the same 
time, makes differences a cause of celebration, not classification.” (At p. 1376); Siobhan 
Mullally, “Feminism and Multicultural Dilemmas in India: Revisiting the Shah Bano Case,” 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24, no. 4 (2004): 671–92.; Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Sex 
Equality under the Constitution of India: Problems, Prospects, and ‘Personal Laws,’” 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 4, no. 2 (2006). 
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changed expectations from the State and its legal system, skepticism towards 
Uniform Civil Code as the means of women’s empowerment, increasing concern for 
differences among women- appear to be very important. Consequently, current 
streams of scholarship undoubtedly looks very different from the discourses in the 
pre-1990s phase wherein scholars perceived promulgation of a Uniform Civil Code 
or substituting religion based laws with set of secular laws as a rather ‘magic wand’ 
to neutralize influence of religion or traditions from women’s lives, and thereby to 
resolve all issues relating to denial of rights to women. With all the above changes 
socio-legal discourses in India have also been able to keep pace with culture and 
rights scholarship in international arena.27  
 
While above described changes in socio-legal discourses is an important 
development, some important questions that need consideration are: what is the 
significance of these changes for the cause of women’s rights, and also for an old, 
but highly contentious issue of relationship between traditions and rights of women? 
Does above-described shift in stance of scholars and activists actually imply 
challenging colonial era presumptions which were responsible for privileging 
modern law and state as means for protecting rights of women? Do these changes 
signify increasing sensitivity towards non-western traditions and ancient 
phenomenon of cultural and legal pluralism,28 which continues to be a contemporary 
reality in India despite having suffered distortions during colonial era? Does recent 
scholarship actually offer tools for Indian legal system to protect rights of women 
while being sensitive to the differences between women?  
 
																																								 																				
27 Infra section 1.2 
28 For a comprehensive discussion on the concept of legal pluralism see Werner Menski, 
Comparative Law in a Global Context, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006).(Especially chapter 2, At pp. 82-112). Legal pluralism is a concept which has been approached 
in many different ways by scholars, and there does not exist a universally accepted definition of this 
term. Legal Pluralism has also been famously divided into the categories of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ legal 
pluralism. See John Griffiths, “What Is Legal Pluralism?,” Journal of Legal Pluralism 18, no. 24 
(1986): 1–55. (At p. 5). Drawing on the Griffiths’ strong legal pluralism, this study invokes the term 
legal pluralism in a broad way, predominantly to challenge the idea of law as a unified, secular entity 
arising only from the power of the state and administered by a single set of state institutions. It aims 
to use the term to emphasise the idea of law as an entity which exists in close connection with values, 
ideology, religion or culture. 
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This study aims to address the above questions. It undertakes a close analysis of the 
recent changes in socio-legal scholarship concerned with rights of women in India to 
understand the significance of these changes for the cause of women’s rights in 
India.  It aims to explore whether the recent shift in scholarship is about offering 
better tools for the Indian legal system to find a balance between cultural and legal 
diversity and rights of women in India particularly in the domain of family.  
 
1.2  Emerging concern to Rethink the Relationship between Gender Justice 
and Traditions: An International Phenomenon  
The relationship between law and cultural diversity has been one of the most 
contentious issues for anthropologists, human rights scholars and for anybody 
concerned with social change, particularly in non-western countries since the advent 
of colonial era.29 Despite more than a century long deliberations this issue continues 
to pose tremendous challenges for almost all the modern nation states and their legal 
systems even today.  The core issue which has generated heavy disagreement 
amongst scholars has been: whether the instruments of the State and its legal system 
should be used to deal with apparently objectionable culture or religion based 
practices prevalent in non-western societies to aid the process of progress and social 
change.30 A point of disagreement, in other words, was whether the instruments of 
the State and Law should be used to introduce western values of ‘individualism’ and 
‘human rights’ in non-western cultures. Inability to reach an agreement kept the 
scholars and activists divided for many decades into various mutually opposing 
camps such as universalists and cultural relativists; traditionalists and modernists; 
conservatives and progressives; communitarians v individualists.31  
																																								 																				
29  Jane K. Cowan, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, and Richard A. Wilson, eds., Culture and Rights: 
Anthropological Perspectives (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); 
Anthony O’Hear, “Culture,” Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Taylor and Francis, 1998). 
30  In Indian context some of such objectionable practices can be listed as: dowry, bride price, child 
marriages, prohibition on marriage of widows, sati, bigamy or polygamy, unilateral divorces etc. 
Some other practices from other cultures are: female genital mutilation,  
31  For a comprehensive summary of rich literature addressing the issue relationship between culture 
and rights see Henry Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, 
Politics, Morals, 2 edition (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2000). Jane K. 
Cowan, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, and Richard A. Wilson, “Introduction,” in Culture and 
Rights: Anthropological Perspectives, ed. Jane K. Cowan, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, and 
Richard A. Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1–25.; Tracy Higgins, 
“Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights,” Harvard Women’s Law Journal 19 (1996): 
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At the time of promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948  
and also for a few decades after, the anthropologists who favoured protection of 
cultural diversity argued that the human rights discourse with its tenets of ‘legalism’, 
‘rights’ and ‘individualism’32 was of western origin.33 These scholars objected to 
reorganisation of non-western societies around the above three tenets and criticised 
rights scholars for being ethnocentric.34 On the other hand, the rights scholars, who 
perceived oppression of individuals, particularly of women inherent in societies 
which were not organised around the above three tenets alleged anthropologists of 
being insensitive towards oppression and poor human conditions. They advocated 
fundamental re-organisation of the non-western societies through the instrument of 
law even at the cost of erosion of cultural diversity. Legal anthropologists, who 
highlighted non-universality of the concept of ‘law’, pointed it out to the 
development theorists and the rights scholars that introduction of a rule of law 
discourse in Asian and African societies amounted to imposition of a Eurocentric 
viewpoint on the rest of the world and that it would result into eradication of 
indigenous values and indigenous understanding of law. Political theorists who 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
89–126.; Young, The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism.; Jack Donnelly, “Cultural Relativism 
and Universal Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 6, no. 4 (1984): 400–419. 
32  For identification of ‘rights’, ‘individualism’, and ‘legalism’ as three tenets of the concept of 
Human Rights see S. Prakash Sinha, “Human Rights: A Non-Western Viewpoint,” ARSP: 
Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 67, no. 1 (1981): 76–91. Raimon 
Pannikar, “Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?,” Interculture XVII, no. 1 (1984): 
28–47. (At pp. 44-47) 
 It is believed that societies not organized the tenets of rights, individualism and legalism are the 
ones which given preference to duties over rights; which gave central importance to institutions 
of marriage and family instead of individual or which were governed by religion based or 
customary laws instead of being governed by laws promulgated by a secular, modern state. See 
Pannikar., also Sinha, “Human Rights.” Highlighting western nature of the concept of rights 
Sinha states 
 There are three basic tenets that are inherent in the present formulation of human rights. One, the 
fundamental unit of society is the individual, not the family. Two, the primary basis for securing 
human existence in society is through rights, not duties. Three, the primary method of securing 
these rights is through legalism where under rights are claimed and adjudicated upon, not 
reconciliation, repentence, or education. (At p. 77) 
      For discussion on western nature of the concept of human rights also see Nidhi Gupta, “Women’s 
Human Rights and Practice of Dowry in India: Adapting a Global Discourse to Local Demands,” 
Journal of Legal Pluralism 48 (2003): 85–123. 
33  American Anthropological Association The Executive Board, “Statement on Human Rights,” 
American Anthropologist 49, no. 4 (1947): 539–43. (At p.539) 
34     ibid. 
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underscored the importance of community/culture for individuals and propagated 
virtues of multiculturalism disagreed with those who insisted on effecting 
fundamental transformation in non-western communities through law in order to 
introduce the value of ‘individualism’ and secure protection of rights for every 
individual.35  
 
While inconclusive debates about relationship between the east and the west, 
tradition and modernity and about role of law in dealing with cultural diversity 
continue to consume much scholarly energy even today,36 the last few decades have 
led to some significant changes across all branches of social science scholarship.37 
An important change is scholars’ readiness to draw upon the rich domain of critical 
theory and the diverse but interrelated fields of post-modernism, post-structuralism, 
and post-colonialism which have offered rich insights to challenge the binary 
oppositions of culture and rights; east and west; tradition and modernity.38 Whether 
it be anthropologists39 or the rights scholars, legal scholars, sociologists or political 
																																								 																				
35  Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2 edition (Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
36  Susan Moller Okin, “Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions,” Ethics 108, no. 4 (1998): 
661–84, https://doi.org/10.1086/233846. 
37  For dilemmas faced by rights scholars with increasing concern for cultural differences see Tracy 
E. Higgins, “Regarding Rights: An Essay Honoring the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 30 (1999): 225–47. 
38  Ann-Belinda S. Preis, “Human Rights as Cultural Practice: An Anthropological Critique,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 18, no. 2 (1996): 286–315. Preis states 
 In order to avoid that new debates in human rights resemble old anthropology in its “complicity 
with imperialism, a commitment to objectivism, and a belief in monumentalism, a paradigmatic 
shift is therefore needed: the critical 1980s poststructuralist and postmodernist work in sociology 
ad anthropology must now begin to make substantial inroads into the analysis of human rights. 
(At p. 310) 
 For comprehensive and insightful description of change or of the degree of ‘paradigmatic 
transition’ in social science scholarship see Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New 
Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition (New York: 
Routledge, 1995). (especially chapter 1) 
39  In the field of anthropology scholars talk of paradigmatic shift as there is a challenge to 
construction of cultures on the basis of objective neutral description. For example see Ann-
Belinda S. Preis, “Human Rights as Cultural Practice: An Anthropological Critique,” Human 
Rights Quarterly 18, no. 2 (1996): 286–315. Talking of introduction of post-modernist concepts 
like ‘deconstruction’, ‘reflexivity’, ‘experimentalism’ in anthropology Preis points out,  
 During the past ten years or so, volumes carrying titles like "Interpretive Social Science," "The 
Invention of Culture," "Writing Culture," "Creating Culture," and "The Predicament of Culture," 
have signalled a repositioning of anthropology with regard to its object of study. In the process, 
anthropology's conventional use of analytical concepts and theoretical tools has been critically 
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scientists, experts across domains in last few decades have come to accept the views 
that ‘modernity’, ‘rule of law’, ‘rights’ are concepts that have been deployed since 
the colonial era to perpetuate imperialism, to suppress cultural differences and to 
impose white, male, western ideology on the rest of the world.40 One of the major 
concerns of scholars across all the branches of social sciences is to make efforts to 
undo the ideological heritage of colonialism both in colonised and colonising 
countries. Almost every branch involves attempts, whether explicit or implicit, to 
decentre what has come to be addressed as the intellectual sovereignty and 
dominance of Europe. There have been efforts from diverse fields which seek to 
extricate non-western cultures from the history of colonialism, and to strengthen and 
develop the resources of their histories and political and intellectual traditions. 41  
 
The increasing influence of critical scholarship has made support to non-western 
cultures possible with challenges to some of the fundamental premises which formed 
the basis for superiority claims of the colonial rule and which were responsible for 
coming into existence various aforementioned binary oppositions.42  For example, 
post-modernism makes challenge to the above dichotomies possible as it 
deconstructs one of important premises of western superiority- the modernist 
enlightenment ideal of universal true knowledge which could be achieved through 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
reviewed under exotic banners like "de-construction," "reflexivity," and "experimentalism," most 
of which tend to converge in the broader matrix of "post-modernism." This has involved a rather 
self-conscious re-examination of the anthropological enterprise, from the participant-observation 
ideal to the natural, even "style" of (writing) the anthropological account. Many underlying 
assumptions, primarily the homogeneity, holism, and integrity evident in classical 
anthropological analysis, have been scrutinized on the basis of the recognition of an overall 
crisis-the erosion of classical norms-in the social sciences. As the above titles indicate, 
anthropologists have been forced to reevaluate such central analytical concepts in anthropology 
as that of culture, and by extension, the idea of "cultural difference." ( At p. 297) 
40  Karen Engle, “From Skepticism to Embrace: Human Rights and the American Anthropological 
Association from 1947-1999,” Human Rights Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2001): 536–59.; Higgins, 
“Regarding Rights: An Essay Honoring the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.” 
41  John L. Comaroff, “Colonialism, Culture, and the Law: A Foreword,” Law & Social Inquiry 26, 
no. 2 (April 1, 2001): 305–14; Uday Chandra, “Liberalism and Its Other: The Politics of 
Primitivism in Colonial and PostColonial Indian Law,” Law & Society Review 47, no. 1 (2013): 
135–68. 
42  Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity and Intellectuals 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987). 
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exercise of reason by a rational human being.43 It was a colonial claim that European 
society was more civilised because human reason and rationality were inherent to 
European worldview and as a result Europeans, as least some elites within 
Europeans, had access to Universal Truth- to the true knowledge. The colonial 
perception was that reason and human rationality were not given any importance in 
Asian and African cultures, which had kept, as it was believed, these cultures 
deprived of true knowledge.44  It was these claims which had discredited the 
ideological structures of Asian and African societies making them appear as mere 
myth or superstitions. Post-modernism initiated a shift in rights and culture 
scholarship as it opened the possibilities to extricate conceptual structures prevalent 
in other parts of the world and challenged the idea of universal true knowledge.45 It 
																																								 																				
43  Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, “Posmodernism,” Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Routledge, 
1998). Also Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Oxford; Portland, Or: Hart Publishing, 
2000). Talking about postmodernity Douzinas note, 
 In postmodernity, the idea of history as a single unified process which moves towards the aim of 
human liberation is no longer credible, and the discourse of rights has lost its earlier coherence 
and universalism. (At p. 6) 
 Also see Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters. Describing nature of post-modernist discourse 
Bauman states, 
 The post-modernist discourse, on the other hand, is about the credibility of ‘modernity’ itself as a 
self-designation of Western civilization, whether industrial or post-industrial, capitalist or post-
capitalist. It implies that the self-ascribed attributes contained in the idea of modernity do not 
hold today, perhaps did not hold yesterday either. The post-modernist debate is about self-
consciousness of Western society, and the grounds (or the absence of grounds) for such 
consciousness. (At p. 118) 
 Maxine Eichner, “On Postmodernist Feminist Legal Theory” 36, no. 1 (2001): 1–77. 
44  For a discussion on this point see: Chandra, “Liberalism and Its Other: The Politics of 
Primitivism in Colonial and Post-Colonial Indian Law”;  Sally Engle Merry, “Law and 
Colonialism,” Law & Society Review 25, no. 1 (1991): 889–922. 
45  Santos, Toward a New Common Sense. Highlighting exclusion of other forms of knowledge as a 
dominant phenomenon from sixteenth to early twentieth century in natural sciences and also in 
social sciences Santos states,  
 The prevailing model of rationality of modern science came out of the scientific revolution of the 
sixteenth century, and was developed primarily in the domain of the natural sciences during the 
following centuries. Although in the eighteenth century there were already some signs in that 
direction, the model would be adopted by the emerging social sciences only in the nineteenth 
century.  From then on, it is appropriate to speak of a global (that is, Western) model of scientific 
rationality, with some internal variation, to be sure, but one which ostensibly discriminates 
against two nonscientific (hence, potentially disturbing) forms of knowledge: common sense, and 
the so-called humanities (the latter including, among others, history, philology, legal doctrine, 
literary studies, philosophy and theology).  
 The new scientific rationality, being a global model, is also a totalitarian model, in as much as it 
denies rationality to all forms of knowledge that do not abide by its own epistemological 
principles and its own methodological rules. (At p. 11-12) 
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brought home the point that truth, knowledge and reality are all culturally relative 
and that human subjectivity and human rationality are heterogenous and diverse, i.e. 
not universal.46 Postmodernism helped to establish that not only is there a plurality 
of perspectives there is also no way that one perspective can claim superiority over 
the other.47   
 
The insights from critical theory also offered necessary tools in favour of non-
western cultures as they drew attention towards the imperialistic, hegemonic 
tendencies in the colonial imagery of non-western cultures. Colonial imagery of 
these cultures rested on the modernist presumptions that true knowledge corresponds 
to how the world actually is and that exercise of reason made it possible to gain this 
true knowledge. It was based on the presumptions about possibility of objectivity 
and neutrality in description of truth, and in representation of knowledge. Post-
structuralism, highlighting relationship between power and knowledge, between 
power and truth, deconstructed the claims that colonial descriptions of non-western 
societies are the true and accurate description.48 Poststructuralism made it possible to 
raise doubts on the colonial description of non-western cultures and to contend that 
colonial rulers constructed these cultures in negation as a means to perpetuate 
European domination.  
 
Poststructuralist thinkers like Michael Focault argued that truth is whatever we agree 
to call and construct it as such; there is no Archimedean point from which to observe 
the world independently of knowledge and power relations.49 Post-structuralist 
scholars like Jacques Derrida have suggested that scholars should construct the 
underlying meanings that were suppressed in formation of texts that seek to 
																																								 																				
46  Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity (London; New York: Routledge, 1991). 
47  For feminist perspectives on the idea of universal Truth and knowledge see Margaret Jane Radin, 
“Pragmatist and the Feminist,” Southern California Law Review 63 (1990 1989): 1699–1726. 
Emily Jackson, “Contradictions and Coherence in Feminist Responses to Law,” Journal of Law 
and Society 20, no. 4 (1993): 398–411. Minow, “Justice Engendered.” Katharine T. Bartlett, 
“Feminist Legal Methods,” Harvard Law Review 103 (1989): 829–88. 
48  Gary Gutting, “Post-Structuralism,” Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Rochester, NY: 
Routledge, 1998).Also see Gary Gutting, “Post-Structuralism in Social Sciences,” Routledge 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Rochester, NY: Routledge, 1998). 
49  Gutting, “Post-Structuralism.” 
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represent reality, and thereby challenge their meta-narratives and claims to 
foundational, universal truth and knowledge.50  
 
With its deconstructivist claims of universal truth and knowledge, critical 
scholarship makes it possible to challenge another basic premise which formed the 
basis for western superiority- the possibility of fundamental reorganisation of 
society through ‘rule of law’, a concept which was presumed to embody universal 
truth and which had rational human subject as foundation of knowledge. It was part 
of the colonial narrative that progress required presence of law as a unitary 
phenomena, as something objective and neutral, something which is autonomous 
from the society and which is capable of ‘constructing’ the society consisting of 
rational, reasonable and free beings. Postmodernist/poststructuralist thought carries 
relevance for non-western cultures as it refutes the claims of objectivity and 
neutrality in law,51 as it shows that law is integrally related to society and is just one 
discourse amongst many other discourses.  
Critical scholarship has proved to be particularly significant for the cause of non-
western cultures as it resulted in emergence of a branch referred as post-colonialism. 
This stream of thought which draws upon post-modernism/post-structuralism 
discusses cultural and political ramifications of colonialism in both colonized and 
colonising societies. Relevance of post-colonial thought for Asian and African 
cultures lie in the way it challenges our knowledge of Asian and African 
civilisations, their histories, and their political, economic, and socio-cultural system 
																																								 																				
50  Ermarth, “Posmodernism”; Gutting, “Post-Structuralism.” 
51  One of the pioneers of challenge to modern law from feminist perspectives has been Catharine 
A. MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,” 
Signs 8, no. 4 (1983): 635–58. For further discussions see Katharine T. Bartlett, “Feminist Legal 
Methods,” Harvard Law Review 103 (1989): 829–88; Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Reflections on 
Sex Equality under Law,” The Yale Law Journal 100, no. 5 (1991): 1281–1328; Frances E. 
Olsen, “The Myth of State Intervention in the Family,” University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform 18, no. 4 (1985): 835–64. For critique of elements like  ‘objectivity’, ‘neutrality’, 
‘autonomy’ as essentially ‘male values’ see Robin L. West, “The Difference in Women’s 
Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory,” Wisconsin Women’s 
Law Journal 3 (1987): 81–145; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Portia in a Different Voice: 
Speculations on a Women’s Lawyering Process,” Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 39 (1985): 39–
63; Joan C. Williams, “Deconstructing Gender,” Michigan Law Review 87 (1989): 531–58; 
Deborah L. Rhode, “The ‘No-Problem’ Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change,” 
Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 1731. For changing perceptions of legal scholars in general 
towards modern law and modern state see Alan Norrie, “Critical Legal Studies,” Routledge 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (UK: Routledge, n.d.). 
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have been constructed during the colonial period and also in post-colonial periods.52 
It aims to show that dominant, supposedly universal epistemological models, 
theories and concepts that have been used in analysing and explaining Asian and 
African societies are specific to European societies, and that they are Eurocentric, 
and are thus biased and inappropriate tools of analysis.  
 
Post-colonial theory seeks to reveal the inherent falsities and contradictions of 
‘civilising mission’ of European colonialism, and its continuing presence in 
academia and cultures all over the world. It problematises the binaries of 
‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’, concepts that were constructed and interwoven into 
civilisational meta-narratives of colonialism.53  
 
It is perhaps influence of critical theory that culture or tradition, after being 
denigrated for a long time, is now a key factor of analysis for socio-legal 
scholarship. An increasing number of works cutting across different disciplines have 
emerged which perceive diversity as a richness to be celebrated rather than being a 
problem to be solved.54 As Kuper rightly points out, “everyone is into culture now. 
For anthropologists, culture was once a term of art. Now the natives talk culture 
back at them.”55 He further mentions, “the cultural self-consciousness developing 
among imperialism’s erstwhile victims is one of the more remarkable phenomena of 
world history in the later twentieth century.”56 Contrary to earlier perceptions where 
cultures were once considered as an epitome of backwardness in most western 
democracies, the understanding now is that ‘minority cultures empower the weak: 
																																								 																				
52  James Thuo Gathii, “Imperialism, Colonialism and International Law,” Buffalo Law Review 54, 
no. 4 (2007): 1013–66. 
53  Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1996). Also see Nicholas B. Dirks, “Foreword,” in Colonialism and 
Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India, by Bernard S. Cohn (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), ix–xvii. Describing law as site of colonial power Dirks states, 
 One of the sites of colonial power that seemed simultaneously most benign and most susceptible 
to indigenous influences- namely law- in fact became responsible for institutionalizing peculiarly 
British notions about how to regulate a colonial society made up of “others” rather than settlers, 
leaving extremely problematic legacies for contemporary Indian societies. (At p. x) 
54  For a strong support to this view see Menachem Mautner, “Three Approaches to Law and 
Culture,” Cornell Law Review 96, no. 4 (June 11, 2011): 839-868. 
55  Adam Kuper, Culture: The Anthropologists’ Account (Harvard University Press, 1999). 
56  ibid. 
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they are authentic; they speak to real people; they sustain variety and choice; they 
feed dissent’.57 A major concern for scholars in the West in last few decades has 
been to find means to protect minority groups (both indigenous and immigrant) from 
state oppression in what is alleged to be a culture of majoritarianism.58 There are 
voices to save non-western cultures from what are now perceived as the ill-
conceived dichotomies of tradition versus modernity or culture versus rights.59 
 
Having become key factor for socio-legal analysis, culture has finally found a place 
in the feminist analysis as well. Scholars and activists concerned about women’s 
rights in different parts of the world have come to explicitly support the trend of 
increasing sensitivity towards tradition.60 This trend has been particularly dominant 
in the western democracies which are continually facing the challenge of 
multiculturalism.61 Here, some of the feminist authors have come to rally behind the 
																																								 																				
57  ibid. At p. 4 
58  Nathan Glazer, “Individual Rights against Group Rights,” in Human Rights, ed. Eugene 
Kamenka and Alice Erh-Soon Tay (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), 87–103.; Homi K. Bhabha, 
The Location of Culture (London; New York: Routledge, 1994). 
59  Leti Volpp, “Talking Culture: Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of Multiculturalism,” 
Columbia Law Review 96 (1996): 1573–1617. Addressing the issue of opposition  between 
culture and rights Volpp stated,  
 We need to abandon the ethnocentric notion of the inferiority of certain cultures, and to 
understand that all communities are characterized both by patriarchal formations as well as by 
resistance to those formations.  We also must acknowledge that posing multiculturalism as 
antithetical to feminism is a false opposition and one that is predicated on racism.  Further, 
refusing an explicit consideration of “race” or “culture” within our legal system will not result in 
“colorblind” and “cultureblind” meritocratic justice, but in a replication of dominant patterns of 
dispersal of power. These are premises that need to be understood if we want to move forward in 
scholarship examining the relationship of culture and the law. (At p. 1617) 
 Crawford Young, “The Dialectics of Cultural Pluralism: Concept and Reality,” in The Rising 
Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay? (Wisconsin: Univ of Wisconsin Press, 
1993), 3–35. Drawing attention towards changing nature of socio-legal discourses Young states,  
 “A transforming relationship between cultural pluralism and the nation-state is a central drama of 
our times.” (At p. 4) 
 Also see Leti Volpp, “Feminism versus Multiculturalism,” Columbia Law Review, January 1, 
2001, 1181-1218.  
60  Douzinas, The End of Human Rights. Expressing concern for pluralism Douzinas ask 
 Can there be ethics that respects the pluralism of values and communities? Can we discover in 
history a non-absolute conception of good, that could be used as a quasi-transcendent principle of 
critique? (At p. 13) 
61  Jeff A. Redding, “Institutional vs. Liberal Contexts for Contemporary Non-State, Muslim Civil 
Dispute Resolution Systems,” Journal of Islamic State Practices in International Law 6 (2010): 
1–25.; Dominic McGoldrick, “Multiculturalism and Its Discontents,” Human Rights Law Review 
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voices which underscore the inadequacy of a traditional liberal conception of rights 
and concede to the demands of group rights for protection of different communities 
or cultures.62 In this new trend feminist discourses challenge the perceptions wherein 
claims for protection of culture or demands for sensitivity towards religion were 
seen to prohibit the pursuit of universal individual rights, or claiming protection of 
culture implied accepting oppression or subordination of individual to the arbitrary, 
irrational and superstitious demands of traditions or communities.63 Focusing 
specifically on the requirements of minority groups in western democracies, scholars 
advocate the right to religious freedom with the contention that ‘religious traditions 
have also been powerful sources of protection for human rights, of commitment to 
justice, and of energy for social change’.64 In this new wave, scholars seek means to 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
5, no. 1 (2005): 27–56.; Ayelet Shachar, “Two Critiques of Multiculturalism,” Cardozo Law 
Review 23, no. 1 (2001): 253–97. 
62  Jeff Spinner Halev, “Feminism, Multiculturalism, Oppression, and the State,” Ethics 112, no. 1 
(2001): 84–113. Spinner- Halev points out,  
 The justice of ensuring individual rights and equality for all must be balanced against the 
injustice of a state imposing reform upon the group it oppresses. (At p. 85).  
 Also see Jeff Spinner-Halev, “Liberalism and Religion: Against Congruence,” Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 9, no. 2 (2008): 553-572.  
63  Susan Williams, “Democracy, Gender Equality, and Customary Law: Constitutionalizing 
Internal Cultural Disruption,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 18, no. 1 (2011). Also see 
Catherine Powell, “Lifting Our Veil of Ignorance: Culture, Constitutionalism, and Women’s 
Human Rights in Post-September 11 America,” Hastings Law Journal, Georgetown Law Faculty 
Publications and Other Works, 57 (2005): 331–83. Martha Nussbaum, “In Defense of Cultural 
Values,” Idaho Law Review 36 (2000): 379–448. 
64  Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001).Emphasising on the ‘intrinsic value of religious capabilities’ 
Nussbaum writes,  
 To be able to search for an understanding of the ultimate meaning of life in one’s own way is 
among the most important aspects of a life that is truly human. One of the ways in which this has 
most frequently been done historically is through religious belief and practice; to burden these 
practices is thus to inhibit many people’s search for the ultimate good. Religion has also been 
intimately and fruitfully bound up with other human capabilities, such as the capabilities of 
artistic, ethical, and intellectual expression. It has been a central focus of the moral education of 
the young, both in the family and in the community. Finally, it has typically been a central 
vehicle of cultural continuity, hence an invaluable support for other forms of human affiliations 
and interaction. To strike at religion is thus to risk eviscerating people’s moral, cultural, and 
artistic, as well as spiritual, lives. (At p. 179-180) 
 Also see Cheryl B. Preston, Women in Traditional Religions: Refusing To Let Patriarchy (Or 
Feminism) Separate Us From The Source Of Our Liberation, 22 Miss. C. L. Rev. 185 (2003); 
Ayelet Shachar, “Privatizng Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from Religious Arbitration in Family 
Law,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9, no. 2 (2008): 573–607. 
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accommodate and create respect for religious and cultural differences between 
people and expect the state and its legal system to respect these differences.65  
 
Drawing upon insights of critical theory, human rights scholars, speaking for the 
cause of non-western cultures, have highlighted how the human rights enterprise 
based on the Enlightenment philosophy generated the ‘cult of modernisation’, which 
resulted into a ‘dualism between progress and backwardness that has been damaging 
to non-modernising people.’66  Such deconstruction highlights the hegemonic 
suppression of non-western cultures by Europeans during the colonial period and by 
indigenous elites during the post-colonial period.67 Explaining the reasons 
underlying the divide between universalism v cultural relativism within human 
rights discourse, Pollis states,68 
The dialogue between universalism and cultural relativism has been 
hampered by its neglect of an important analytic dimension. For most human 
rights scholars, Western ontology sets the conceptual framework for 
understanding the world. This is the case not only for Western analysts but 
for many scholars from non-western societies who have internalised Western 
thought. Hence the portrayal of social reality and the evidence amassed to 
validate it is filtered through the lens of this framework and its attendant 
paradigm. Albeit an abstraction, the construction of social reality by social 
theorists is inevitably selective and attends to only those aspects and that 
																																								 																				
65  Some prominent examples from such works are: Menachem Mautner, “From ‘Honor’ to 
‘Dignity’: How Should a Liberal State Treat Non-Liberal Cultural Groups?,” Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 9, no. 2 (2008): 609–32.; Anne Griffiths, Review: Remaking Law: Gender, 
Ethnography, and Legal Discourse: Reviewed Work: Pronouncing and Persevering: Gender and 
the Discourses of Disputing in an African Islamic Court, by Susan F. Hirsch, Law & Society 
Review 35, no. 2 (2001): 495–509; Shefali Desai, “Hearing Afghan Women’s Voices: Feminist 
Theory’s Re-Conceptualization of Women’s Human Rights Notes,” Arizona Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 16 (1999): 805–44.; Roger B. M. Cotterrell, The Politics of 
Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy (University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1989). ; Nancy Kim, “Towards a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence 
between Western Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 
25 (1993): 49; Ayelet Shachar, “Religion, State and the Problem of Gender: New Modes of 
Citizenship and Governance in Diverse Societies,” McGill Law Journal 50, no. 1 (2005): 49–88 ; 
Ann Laquer Estin, “Unofficial Family Law,” Iowa Law Review 94, no. 2 (2009): 449-480. 
66  Preis, “Human Rights as Cultural Practice.” At p. 287 
67  Comaroff, “Colonialism, Culture, and the Law.”; Merry, “Law and Colonialism.” 
68  Adamantia Pollis, “A New Universalism,” in Human Rights: New Perspectives, New Realities, 
ed. Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 9–30. (At p. 
13) 
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evidence deemed significant and consonant with its paradigm. Concepts or 
data external to the prevailing paradigm are frequently overlooked. A 
theoretical consequence of this cognitive framework is that Western ontology 
becomes the referent whereby non-western cultures and societies are 
understood and acquire meaning. Using a Western referent has led inevitably 
to the dichotomization between universalists and cultural relativists.69 
 
In their attempt to transcend the opposition between culture and rights, the scholars 
are also willing to acknowledge that lack of understanding amongst social scientists 
about both the notions- the notion of culture as well as of rights- has been 
responsible for, what is now perceived as, the unfortunate and ill-conceived debate 
between tradition and modernity or culture and rights. There is also a wide 
consensus about the requirement of re-conceptualising the notions of culture as well 
as of rights.70  Scholars have argued that labeling of the east as traditional or 
backward and the west as modern or progressive is based on a wrong understanding 
about the notion of culture.71 Scholars now aim to promote the understanding that 
																																								 																				
69  For expression of similar view with respect to law see Masaji Chiba, Legal Pluralism: Toward a 
General Theory through Japanese Legal Culture (Japan: Tokai University Press, 1989). Also see 
J.Duncan M. Derrett, “Translator’s Preface,” in The Classical Law of India, by Robert Lingat 
(USA: University of California Press, 1973), vii–xi. Expressing need for cultural and religious 
sensitivity already in 1970s Derrett noted,  
 The world has awakened to the intellectual value of non-western thought. Non-Christian is no 
longer anti-Christian. The world of ideas as well as the world of space has become perceptibly 
smaller. Asians, whether in Asia or in Europe and Africa and America, make their contributions 
to life and to intellectual endeavour. They need to understand their own culture; and we need to 
understand them. Previously we had the advantage of possessing fluent accounts of Indian 
culture from Indians; but they were couched in language which borrowed far too much from our 
own environment. In order to communicate with us, they borrowed more than our language. (At 
p. x) 
70  Griffiths, “Remaking Law.”; Richard Falk, “Cultural Foundations for the International Protection 
of Human Rights,” in Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus, ed. 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim (Philadelphia, USA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 44–
64. Emphasising the importance of cultural sensitivity Falk states, 
 Without mediating international human rights through the web of cultural circumstances, it will 
be impossible for human rights norms and practices to take deep hold in non-western societies 
except to the partial, and often distorting, degree that these societies- or more likely, their 
governing elites- have to some extent Westernized. At the sametime, without cultural practices 
and traditions being tested against the norms of international human rights, there will be a 
regressive disposition towards the retention of cruel, brutal, and exploitative aspects of religious 
and cultural traditions. (At p. 46) 
71  Preis, “Human Rights as Cultural Practice.” Preis argues that in contrast with the “classic view” 
which posits culture as a self-contained whole made up of coherent patterns, the culture must be 
conceived of “as a porous array of intersections where distinct processes crisscross from within 
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the east and the west or different cultures in the world, all are open and dynamic 
entities, which have constantly been adopting new values and have been learning 
new ways of understanding life from each other.72  
 
One of the most important changes in scholarship in the recent years has been that 
along with cultures, there has also been a great emphasis on the necessity for 
rethinking of the concept of rights.73 Many scholars now suggests that in order to 
transcend the opposition between rights and culture it is important that we also 
challenge the ways in which we have been thinking about the concept of rights.74 
According to some works rights are to be seen as cultural processes.75 Scholars argue 
that an analytical concept of culture which emphasizes process, fluidity and 
contestation can be a particularly useful tool for understanding rights. It has been 
suggested that the pursuit of human rights should be approached as a cultural 
process, ‘which impinges upon on human subjects and subjectivities in multiple and 
contradictory ways’.76 Preis contends that culture is to be seen ‘as a network of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
and beyond its borders” (At p. 298). Sally Engle Merry, “Changing Rights, Changing Culture,” 
in Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives, ed. Jane K. Cowan, Marie-Bénédicte 
Dembour, and Richard A. Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 31–55. 
Merry argues that “far from being homogenous, uncontested, and self-evident entities both 
concepts are historical, fluid and contested and they have been and are continually changing” (At 
p. 31). Therefore, in its re-conceptualised form culture appears as fluid, dynamic, open ended and 
heterogeneous entity as opposed to the earlier vision, often addressed as essentialistic, wherein 
cultures were to be seen as rigid, static, closed, homogeneous and internally coherent entities. 
72  Williams, “Democracy, Gender Equality, and Customary Law.” Also see Volpp, “Talking 
Culture.”; Powell, “Lifting Our Veil of Ignorance.”; Nussbaum, Women and Human 
Development: The Capabilities Approach.; Shachar, “Religion, State and the Problem of Gender: 
New Modes of Citizenship and Governance in Diverse Societies.”; Anne Griffiths, “Gendering 
Culture: Towards a Plural Perspective on Kwena Women’s Rights,” in Culture and Rights: 
Anthropological Perspectives, ed. Jane K. Cowan, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, and Richard A. 
Wilson (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 102–26. 
73  Karen Engle, “International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet,” Michigan 
Journal of International Law 13 (1992): 517–610. Also Dan Danielsen and Karen Engle, eds., 
After Identity: A Reader in Law and Culture (Routledge, 1995). 
74  Douzinas, The End of Human Rights. Offering a critique to the concept of rights, Douzinas 
mention, 
 The use of rights discourse to describe normatively a conflict or a set of claims is a limited way 
of narrativising the situation. It is cognitively inaccurate and morally impoverished: inaccurate 
because it represents a limited way of the world as complete, ……… because it assumes that the 
various claims, interests and specificities of the parties can be translated into one common 
language. (At p. 251) 
75  Merry, “Changing Culture, Changing Rights.” (At p. 39) 
76  Cowan, Dembour, and Wilson, “Culture and Rights,” 2001.(At p. 3) 
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perspectives, or as an ongoing debate.’77 Questioning the hitherto prevalent practice 
of labeling the supporters of human rights as ‘progressive’ and those resisting it as 
‘anti-progressive’ many authors rightly argue that such an impulse to label ‘simply 
obscures a complex contestation within community over its identity and the nature 
of claims that it generate, as well as over tactics and goals’. 78 
 
Most scholars now agree that the opposition between rights and culture can be 
bridged by accepting that the local concerns shape how the universal categories of 
rights are implemented, resisted and transformed. In the same manner rights 
discourse, it is claimed, has the potential to respond to the local norms. As Merry 
suggests that this new understanding of both the concepts can help us better 
appreciate how local human rights activists are struggling to create a new space 
which incorporates both cultural differences and transnational conceptions of human 
rights.79 Criticising the earlier binary framework for understanding rights and culture 
Merry writes,80  
Posing the choices in such a dichotomous way ignores the extent to which 
activists, local people and scholars have negotiated these contradictions and 
redefined both the meaning of rights and the meanings of culture.81 
 
With significant changes in scholarship across different disciplines about concepts 
of culture and rights, most rights scholars and activists do not seem any longer 
interested in making allegations against supporters of cultural diversity for being 
																																								 																				
77  Preis, “Human Rights as Cultural Practice.” (At p. 287) 
78  Engle, “Female Subjects of Public International Law.” Cowan, Dembour, and Wilson, “Culture 
and Rights,” 2001.(At p.10). 
79  Merry, “Changing Culture, Changing Rights.” 
80    ibid. At p. 32 
81  Highlighting the changing nature of human rights Merry points out,  
 Over the past fifty years, the concept of human rights has shifted from its original meaning, 
rooted in liberal theory, of civil and political rights to an expanded notion of collective, cultural, 
and social and economic rights. The present system was born in radical French revolutionary 
thought at the end of eighteenth century, but by the end of the twentieth, the new human rights 
system had become the preeminent global language of social justice. As human rights has 
gradually displaced socialism and communism and it has incorporated some of the features of 
this ideologies, including economic and social rights to work and healthcare. In response to the 
demands of indigenous peoples, among others, human rights now include rights to culture. (ibid. 
At p. 38) 
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insensitive and indifferent towards oppression and suffering. Neither do those who 
favour cultural diversity appear inclined to make allegations against rights scholars 
for perpetuating Euro-centrism.82 The dilemma of whether to introduce the western 
concepts of human rights or rule of law in non-western societies, which consumed 
maximum scholarly energies and resources in the last century, is gradually 
becoming irrelevant for the social science scholarship. Instead, given the fact that 
language of rights is deployed in all non-western cultures no scholars, not even those 
who invoke importance of cultural diversity, want to reject the requirement of legal 
reforms that introduce various rights for women and for individuals. At the same 
time, in the present era of globalisation more rights scholars or activists are reluctant 
to admit explicitly that the State and its legal system should be used to impose 
western values into non-western cultures.83  
 
According to contemporary scholarship, what needs to be given up is the practice of 
tracing the modern concepts of human rights and rule of law to one particular culture 
or civilisation.84 Although there is a divergence of opinions amongst scholars about 
the relationship between cultural diversity and rights, especially women’s rights, 
there has emerged, as it appears from the recent literature, a broad consensus about 
some issues. Most of the contemporary scholars do not want to waste their energy 
and resources in debating the origin of the concepts of human rights or of rule of 
law.  Naming such practices as Eurocentric and hegemonic, the new generation 
scholars, in the increasing globalised world of today, prefer to abandon the 
categories such as the traditional, backward East or the modernistic, progressive 
West.85 Contemporary scholars prefer to build on the understanding that human 
																																								 																				
82  For discussions on emergence of a section of ‘pro-rights anthropologists’ see Engle, “From 
Skepticism to Embrace.” 
83  For a detailed description see, Cowan, Dembour, and Wilson, Culture and Rights, 2001. 
84  Preis, “Human Rights as Cultural Practice.”; Catherine Powell, “Introduction: Locating Culture, 
Identity, and Human Rights,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 30 (1999): 201. 
85  Rebecca J. Cook, ed., Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994). Preis, “Human Rights as Cultural 
Practice.” Suggesting a new approach towards human rights Preis states 
 Just like the notion of development, the idea of (a) human rights practice needs “deconstructing,” 
to use a postmodern term, so that it is seen for what it is- an ongoing, socially constructed and 
negotiated process- not simply the execution of an already specified plan of action with expected 
outcomes. (At p. 313) 
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rights, rule of law are universal values and that all cultures and societies must strive 
to realise these values through a combination of legal and non-legal means. Today’s 
scholars want to dedicate their energies in ensuring that modern States and their 
legal systems protect rights of the people in ways that celebrate a range of 
differences amongst people based on caste, class, sex, religion, ethnicity, and sexual 
orientation. However, the challenge, today, is to find means to localise these global 
values.86 
 
All the above changes in recent scholarship are indeed welcome changes. As the 
above discussion has highlighted there is now rich literature available, which make it 
possible to understand in what sense the concepts such as concept of rights and rule 
of law can be considered as western concepts. There are enough insights available 
which emphasize the necessity of going beyond a western frame of reference for 
making sense of non-western traditions.87  
 
During last few decades there has been increasing support from scholars for the idea 
that the colonial rule had a detrimental influence on non-western societies. The 
changing relationship between law, traditions and rights is now a widely accepted 
global phenomenon, howsoever limited it maybe. Whether it is feminist scholars or 
the rights scholars in general, nobody questions the idea that ‘evolutionary theory of 
progress’88 gave rise to ill-conceived binary oppositions between the tradition and 
modernity or the east and the west. It is also a widely supported idea that the law and 
rights discourse have been means for curbing differences between individuals and 
for perpetuating a colonial hegemony on non-western societies.  
																																								 																				
86  Preis, “Human Rights as Cultural Practice.” 
87  Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, “Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited 
Applicability,” in Humand Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives, ed. Adamantia Pollis 
and Peter Schwab (NY, USA: Praeger, 1979), 1–18. 
88  For a detailed description of ‘evolutionism’ or ‘evolutionary theory of progress’ see Norbert 
Rouland, Legal Anthropology, trans. Philippe G. Planel (London: The Athlone Press, 1994). (Pp. 
19-36). Explaining the term ‘evolutionism’, Rouland mentions, 
 Evolutionism may be briefly described as a theory in which all human societies pass through 
identical stages in their economic, social and legal development. (At p. 24) 
 With respect to traditional and modern societies evolutionism has been defined as, 
 Evolution is a passage from a relatively undefined and non-coherent homogenous state to a 
relatively well-defined and coherent heterogenous state, through successive stages of 
differentiation and integration. (Rouland.) 
Rethinking the Relationship between Law, Gender Justice and Traditions in India: From Hostility to Harmony	
25 
 
Even in countries like India, where some legal scholars have been skeptical about 
the relevance of critical theory for Indian socio-legal discourses,89 it is no longer 
possible to overlook insights which highlight the ‘myth of modernity’90 and offer 
incisive deconstruction to the idea of modern law as a rational, autonomous and 
objective force.91 It is not possible to overlook the assertions that the prevalent 
understandings about indigenous traditions in India, which were considered natural 
and immutable, are result of over-emphasis on one aspect of the traditions in a 
context of civilisational encounter.92 Above assertions are important as they not only 
																																								 																				
89  For Indian scholars’ skepticism towards critical theory in general and critical legal theory in 
particular see Amita Dhanda and Archana Parashar, Decolonisation of Legal Knowledge (Delhi: 
Routledge, 2012). Calling Critical Legal Theory as ‘the scholarship of privilege’  Prashar and 
Dhanda state that  
 the content, style and message of most of the scholarship in critical legal theory are not 
concerned with the issues of most immediate significance in Indian or other non-western 
societies. (At p. xi) 
 Also, Ryan C. Gaglio, “Book Review: Ratna Kapur’s Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics of 
Postcolonialism,” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 17, no. 2 (2005): 517–25. For skepticism 
against critical theory and also for the possibilities of converting postmodernist insights into 
positive feminists legal projects  also see, Eichner Maxine, On Postmodern Feminist Legal 
Theory, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 2001. 
90  Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law (London; New York: Routledge, 1992). 
91  While this faith in law persisted for a long time, the post-colonial scholarship points towards the 
tendencies for Occidental hegemony involved in this projection of law as omnipotent. See 
Fitzpatrick. Offering incisive critique to idea of modern law Fitzpatrick  points out 
 Along with generality of its sanctioning force, law demands ‘that all sectors of society abandon 
their autonomy of legal interpretation (that is, the extent of their obligation) in favour of a single 
interpretative authority’. Thus we have replicated in law the ‘Christian axiom that custom, 
history, tradition, were to be conquered in their effectiveness by the word- and the law’. … What 
is more modern law could re-shape the conquered could release norm-contents from the 
dogmatism of mere tradition and…. determine them intentionally.  … The legal subject emerges 
out of this paradoxical privatism not only as the abstract bearer of legal rights and duties but also, 
…. as the possessor of a specific Occidental identity not unlike that possessed by the subject of 
the Christian god. (At p. 57) 
 Also see Rudolph and Rudolph, “Living with Difference in India: Legal Pluralism and Legal 
Universalism in Historical Context.” Representing an important shift from pre-1990s scholarship 
authors mention, 
 The liberal and progressive dream that it is fate of difference to fade and for humanity 
increasingly to repair to a common mold, and the additional dream of rationalists that it is the 
fate particularly of religion to fade away in face of the triumph of modern science, have receded 
in last two decades not only in India but the wider world. (At p. 56) 
92  For a similar view in the Sri Lankan Context see Radhika Coomaraswamy, “To Bellow like a 
Cow: Women, Ethnicity, and the Discourse of Rights,” in Human Rights of Women: National 
and International Perspectives, ed. Rebecca J. Cook (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1994), 40–57. 
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emphasize the need for questioning scholars’ understandings about indigenous 
traditions, they also open the way for deeper engagement with indigenous traditions.  
 
Theoretical developments at the international level, especially with regards to 
insights in critical theory, carry a promise to acknowledge and rectify the mistakes 
of earlier streams of rights scholarship, in order to better serve the cause of 
protection of rights of individuals, especially women. All the above attempts in 
inter-disciplinary scholarship to rethink the concepts of culture and rights represent 
significant steps forward from a situation wherein options for scholars were limited 
to choosing between one of the mutually opposing camps of culture and rights. 
These insights, if translated adequately into practice, can go a long way in 
addressing the opposition between culture and rights, and eventually in finding 
answers to more specific questions like the limits of the State and its legal system in 
regulating family matters to ensure women’s empowerment.   
 
While emerging concern for rethinking relationship between rights and culture is a 
welcome change, an important question is: what are the implications of this change 
for cause of women’s rights in different parts of the world. In other words, have all 
the new insights about the concepts of law and rights, about the nature of colonial 
rule and its interactions with the non-western traditions have actually remoulded the 
nature of dominant socio-legal discourses in specific national contexts? Has it 
actually become possible for scholars and activists to address the colonial legacy of 
opposition between the tradition and modernity? Is there now available some 
indigenous versions of legal feminisms, which suggests a new “path of progress” 
wherein eradication of influence of traditions from law and social life will not be an 
essential requirement for women empowerment in India?   
 
This study is an attempt to seek answers to the above questions. It uses example of 
changing nature of women’s rights discourses in India and draws attention towards 
scholarly attempts in India to keep pace with changing perceptions towards the issue 
of the relationship between law and cultural diversity at an international level. The 
study undertakes a critical analysis of recent streams of socio-legal discourses 
concerned with rights of women in the domain of marriage and family, to 
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understand the implications of international developments in specific legal contexts 
like India.  While considering the increasing influence of international developments 
on Indian socio-legal discourse as an important change, this study argues that the 
changing perception in scholarly and activists’ discourses towards the nature and 
role of law have not resulted in addressing the colonial legacy of antagonism 
between law, rights of women and traditions.  
 
1.3  Aims and Scope of the Study 
This study is an attempt to address an old but highly contentious issue of the 
relationship between law, gender justice and cultural diversity. A matter of concern 
for legal systems all over the world, the above issue has been a matter of particular 
concern for the legal systems of Asian and African countries, for more than two 
centuries. Using example of India, this study aims to explore ways for the State and 
its legal system to protect rights of women while being sensitive towards cultural or 
religion based differences between them. 
 
In recent times, legal systems all over the world are marked by increasing concern 
about human rights and compliance with international norms. At the same time, 
another massive and difficult challenge is - to protect the rights of women while 
being or remaining sensitive to locally-rooted practices, particularly in family 
matters. While balance between rights and cultural diversity may be a predicament 
in late modern or even postmodern conditions all over the globe today, in ex-
colonial, developing countries like India, the dimensions of this and the extent of the 
resulting tensions are mindboggling. However, in recent years two things have 
become far too clear: that the law, in all parts of the world, exists in close connection 
with values, ideologies, cultures or religions and that seeking separation between the 
law and its cultural moorings may not result into women’s empowerment.  
 
This study aims to understand implications of the realization about the connection 
between law and culture on socio-legal discourses concerned with rights of women 
in India. It aims to explore whether the above-mentioned realizations have triggered 
scholarly efforts to rethink the colonial legacy of antagonistic relationship between 
law, rights of women and cultural diversity in India.   
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This study divides Indian socio-legal discourses into two broad phases- the pre-
1990s and the post-1990s phase. It argues that a main characteristic of the pre-1990s 
phase was: full faith in potential of the State and its legal system in neutralizing 
influence of traditions even from the domain of family and thereby ensuring 
women’s empowerment. In the pre-1990s phase, scholars’ and activists’ demand 
was to transfer complete control of personal, intimate relationships to the State.  The 
post-1990s phase, on the other hand, is about advocating a limited role of the State 
and its legal system in dealing with family matters. An important and specific area 
of change is: the demand for a limited role of the state and for more freedom to 
individuals, at least, in relation to formation and dissolution of personal, intimate 
relationships. Moreover, in the pre-1990s phase, scholars’ and activists’ expectations 
from the State and its legal system was to protect rights of women while being 
neutral towards differences between women based on caste, ethnicity, religion, 
sexual orientation. Adopting a different approach, in the post-1990s phase, the 
expectation is that the state and the law should protect rights of women while being 
sensitive towards differences between women. This study undertakes critical 
analysis of some works from the post-1990s phase with an aim to understand two 
important issues: first, whether recent changes in the scholarship also indicate 
changing perceptions towards ancient traditions and ancient phenomenon of cultural 
and legal pluralism. Second whether these changes have resulted into offering new 
tools for the Indian State to deal with culture and religion based differences between 
women. It uses example of a recent legislation- the Protection of Women from 
Domestic Violence Act, 2005. (The 2005 Act, hereinafter.) A direct consequence of 
lobbying by women’s rights scholars for more giving freedom to individuals in 
personal, intimate relationships, the 2005 Act protects rights of women in those 
relationships which cannot be considered legally valid marriages. Using example of 
the above Act, this study aims to show that recent shift in women’s rights 
discourses, far from offering better tools for Indian legal system to protect rights of 
women while being sensitive to cultural diversity, is becoming more a reason for 
denial of rights to women.     
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Using example of the 2005 Act and socio-legal discourses in India, the objective is 
to challenge the colonial era framework of foregone conclusions concerning law and 
society in India within which the contemporary national and international discourses 
for women’s right seem to be trapped. This framework dictates that women’s 
emancipation cannot be conceived in a society which gives importance to institution 
of marriage and wherein marriage is considered a sacrament. According to this 
framework Indian society is to be seen as backward, highly patriarchal, and 
unfavourably disposed towards women and the issues of women’s rights. It is 
believed that women’s empowerment is a far-fetched dream in India since Indian 
legal system, especially its judiciary, due to strong influence of religion and 
traditions, especially Hindu traditions,93continues to give importance of the 
institution of family and reinforce the idea of marriage as sacrament. 94 This 
framework has always dictated that women’s empowerment in India can be a reality 
only when law and society gives more importance to individual and not to the 
institution of family and when marriage is seen as a contract between two 
individuals and not as a sacrament.  
 
This study makes an attempt to show that different streams of women’s movements 
in India need to break free of this derogatory and limited framework in order to 
promote their stated purpose of enhancing gender justice. It focuses specifically on 
Hindu traditions and Hindu family laws and their relationship with gender justice. 
The study argues that the dominant discourses of Indian women’s rights are 
misguided, and that their struggle is being pursued on the basis of colonial 
misconceptions about Hindu traditions and Hindu society’s understanding of the 
notion of rights and the law, and therefore of its relationship with the state and its 
legal system. Based on crucial misunderstandings of Indian society, scholars and 
																																								 																				
93  It is true that India is a multi-religious country. While all religions are alleged to be 
discriminatory against women, the post-1990s scholarship in India criticizes strong influence of 
majority ‘Hindu  ideology’ as the main reason responsible for denial of rights to women. For 
example, see Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India; 
Ratna Kapur, “The Fundamentalist Face of Secularism and Its Impact on Women’s Rights in 
India,” Cleveland State Law Review 47 (1999): 323–33; Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. 
94  For strong criticism of Indian judiciary and legislators for giving importance to institutions of 
family and marriage see Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law 
in India; Also, Agnes, Family Law II, 2011. 
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activists have been harbouring, perhaps inadvertently (but probably not by accident), 
unrealistic and uncalled for aspirations regarding Indian society. These serve to 
impose colonial, modernist and allegedly universal notions of ‘emancipation’ and 
models of progress, manifesting themselves in law as well as through the 
relationship between law and society, and leading to particularistic understandings 
of rights as the basis of organisation of a developed society. Based on crucial 
misunderstandings, scholars and activists have been imposing on Indian society a 
foreign understanding of the relationship between the State, law and religion. Thus, 
they have been stalling social change by imparting rigidity and inflexibility to Indian 
traditions, which has been foreign to them.   
 
People in India, like in most parts of the world, continue to refuse to succumb to the 
might of the State and its legal system, when it comes to personal or intimate 
relationships. It is high time that the women’s rights scholarship becomes cognizant 
of socio-legal reality in India by moving away from the rather simplistic approach 
that it is within the powers of the state to regulate the field of marriage. Reluctance 
of scholars to appreciate socio-legal reality in India, to take a clear stand on the role 
of the state in regulating personal matters has already led Indian legal system into 
great chaos and confusion. 95   
 
Currently India has laws which create an impression of giving full control on family 
relationships either to the State or to the religion-based norms. There are laws which 
prescribe specific conditions for valid intimate relationships based on religions, 
impose monogamy,96 criminalise polygamous and adulterous relationships97, and 
																																								 																				
95  An important milestone in the legislative history of India which aims to broaden definition of 
marriage is the Protection of Women from the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. While this 
legislation is celebrated as one of the important milestones in the history of women’s movement 
in India, there exists lack of clarity amongst scholars as well as amongst judges, about something 
as fundamental as the meaning of key terms like ‘relationship in nature of marriage’ and ‘live-in 
relationships’. There has not emerged so far any guiding framework for understanding the 
relationship between institutions of the family and marriage and live-in relationships. Amongst 
scholars themselves there is extreme divergence with respect to issues like criminalisation of 
polygamy and adultery or on the extent of state control on formation and dissolution of personal 
relationships. For a detailed discussion see Nidhi Gupta, “Women, Family Laws and Informal 
Relationships in India: The Domain of Confusions and Misunderstandings,” in Quest for Justice: 
Collection of Essays, ed. K.N.C. Pillai (Bhopal: National Judiicial Academy, 2012). 
96  Section 5, the Hindu Marriage Act 1955. 
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which prescribe a particular legal age for sexual intimacy.98 In addition to the above, 
there is still a section of women’s movement in India99 which continues to make 
demands for a legislative enactment which prescribes compulsory registration of 
marriages as a pre-condition for a valid intimate relationship. Quite ironically, at the 
same time there has emerged on the horizon a new legislation- the Protection of 
Women from the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which has been celebrated by 
feminist scholars and activists as a extremely progressive piece of legislation. This 
law is expected, howsoever misleadingly, to eliminate differences between formal 
marriage relationships and informal live-in relationships and legitimise all kinds of 
intimate relationships irrespective of religion, caste or customs. Furthermore, on one 
hand there have been demands for raising the age of consent for sexual relationships 
with an aim to protect young women and there is a statute which makes marriage 
below the age of 18 years a punishable offence.100 On the other hand there are more 
and more cases coming before courts of young (minor, below 18) boys and girls 
eloping or secretively getting married or establishing intimate relationships and 
demanding their right for sexual freedom.  
 
With prevalence of the above contradictions in the Indian legal system the cause of 
women’s rights in India is gradually becoming a completely subjective exercise 
dependent on personal ideologies and moralistic views of judges. 101 It is important 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
97  Sections 494 and 497, Indian Penal Code, 1860 
98  The age of consent for sexual relationships is now 18 years. Various statutes which prescribe age 
of consent are: The Indian Penal Code, 1860; The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006; The 
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; The Protection of Children from 
Sexual Offences Act, 2012. While age of consent for marriage was fixed at 18 years, the Indian 
Penal Code, 1860 by virtue of its Section 375 allowed sexual intercourse with a girl between 15 
to 18 years. However, the above provision was struct down recently by the Supreme Court in 
October 2017 the case of Independent Thought v Union of India, No. W.P.382 of 2013 (Supreme 
Court October 11, 2017). 
99  This demand can be considered more an official demand as it is a strong demand from the 
National Commission for Women, an autonomous but government funded body at the national 
level. 
100  Supra, fn 100 
101  Pooja Badarinath, “The Challenge of Subjectivity Within Courts: Interpreting the Domestic 
Violence Act,” Economic and Political Weekly XLVI, no. 12 (2011): 15–18. Also see Gupta, 
“Women, Family Laws and Informal Relationships.” Despite the fact that the judiciary has 
always been making efforts to deal with pluralistic relationships its approaches are marred by a 
high degree of inconsistency. Thus, at the level of case law what we have is a completely 
confusing series of cases from different High Courts, from judges of the same High Courts, and 
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that socio-legal scholarship focused on India also own responsibility and take 
cognizance of the fact that misunderstandings perpetuated by scholarly writings and 
official discourses about non-western traditions, about the nature and role of law, 
and also about the relationship between law and religion, law and cultures in India is 
one of the important reasons that has led the Indian legal system to the current 
chaos. It is also imminent that efforts are made to re-appreciate the role of the state 
and its legal system in governing personal or family relationships in India. It is also 
perhaps time to go beyond the usual distrust against society, religions, cultures and 
communities, which has been the main characteristic of socio-legal scholarship and 
which has created a situation where the issue of rights of women is about making 
choices amongst evils since we can neither trust the society nor the state. 
 
This thesis argues that the assumptions underlying women’s rights discourses and 
their impacts are designed to create a futuristic society based on a different 
worldview than that held by the majority of common Indians today. Such a 
modernistic vision of society, nurtured and propagated by the majority of Indian 
academics, does not match with the idealistic visions of a good life held by the 
majority of India’s population. Rather than accepting the prominent argument that 
Indian society urgently has to change, main contention in this study is that there is a 
pressing need to modify and diversify academic and elitist thinking about 
postcolonial development in the Asian and African countries. Taking India and its 
Hindu law and traditions as an example, the general aim is to claim a recognised 
space for elements of tradition as part of the present and future, and to argue for the 
constructive application of legal pluralism for the purposes of securing gender 
justice in family matters. The goal is also to show through this study that family 
laws in respect of gender justice cannot be placed on a linear continuum with 
religious or tradition-based laws appearing on one end and statutory reforms 
ensuring equal legal rights at the other end. In other words, while not idolising the 
past, the thesis argues that building a sustainable and gender-sensitive future 
requires not only innovation and modernisation but also continued reliance on useful 
elements of traditional models.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
also from the Supreme Court, which offer deeply conflicting and divergent opinions on the issue 
of rights of women in personal relationships. 
Rethinking the Relationship between Law, Gender Justice and Traditions in India: From Hostility to Harmony	
33 
 
Emphasizing upon necessity of rethinking the relationship of opposition between 
tradition and modernity, this study argues that revisiting this distinction is necessary 
to take cognizance of the fact that scholars’ and activists’ fight against Indian 
traditions has been a fight against an imaginary monster, which does not actually 
exist in the form, it has been imagined to exist. There is a need for realization that 
traditions are not as big hindrances for the cause of women’s rights as they are made 
out to be. There are undoubtedly practices across different religions,102 although 
claimed by many to be integral to their religions or the traditions, which need to be 
addressed through a combination of legal and social measures. However, it also 
needs to be understood that neither can non-western traditions be reduced to some 
specific practices like polygamy, dowry etc. nor legal abolishing of such specific 
practices would not mean making traditions march towards modernity.  
 
The cause of women’s rights has suffered due to the fact that Indian family law and 
the connected scholarship remains mentally imprisoned by the colonial experience. 
Trapped within colonial framework for social change, scholarly and activists’ 
discourses have not taken sufficient account of how average Indians deal with their 
family affairs by keeping a cautious distance from state-centric regulation, 
continuing to follow religious and customary norms to regulate their affairs. Given 
the size of India and the enormity of the challenges this would put for any state-
centric form of regulation, it is now time to recognize that the state ought to stand 
back and let society’s self-regulation be more profoundly recognized. The state may 
play the role of a sensitive supervisor which facilitates growth and development of 
different cultures as well as of individuals, protecting their basic rights, but 
																																								 																				
102  Common examples of such practices for Hindus are: Sati (the practice of women sacrificing 
herself on husband’s pyre), child marriages, dowry, prohibition against widow remarriage. In 
case Muslims much criticized practices are: polygamy, triple talaq- customary practice of 
unilateral divorces by Muslim men pronouncing a word talaq (literally meaning divorce) three 
times. While debate relating to abolition of ‘triple talaq’ is a live debate in India even at the time 
when this study is being finalized, other practices have either been abolished or regulated 
through legal reforms. However, none of the above can be said to have diminished the 
importance of traditional values of considering family as a basic unit in society or perceptions of 
marriage as sacrament at least among Hindus. None of the above legal measures can be said to 
have made Indian society reach a stage where individual is considered a basic unit in society, or 
marriage is seen merely as a contract, or laws made by the state are the only set of laws 
governing family matters in India.  
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otherwise letting them negotiate the conditions of their relationships with others. It 
will not amount to giving unbridled authority to different caste or religion based 
communities over individuals.  It will also not amount to expecting the State to play 
the role of a silent spectator or that of a mere umpire, while letting the multiple 
norms and pluri-centic forums regulate all aspects of family relationships without 
any concern for women’s welfare, women’s empowerment and women’s rights. 
India has a Constitution, which provides the broad framework of benchmarks, but 
just as much as the basic guarantees of this Constitution are not equally effective for 
all citizens of India, they cannot have the effect that all individuals in India, when it 
comes to family relationships, can be on a footing of absolute equality. Instead a 
stand in favour of limited role for the state would permit and ground a policy 
suggestion for more explicit recognition of equity rather than equality, of Indian 
traditions, traditions based institutions of marriage and family in the Indian legal 
system without sacrificing the cause of women’s dignity. 
 
This kind of argument is not a call for a return to medieval conditions, instead it 
permits and grounds a policy suggestion that more explicit recognition of pluri-
legality in the Indian legal system would be good for strengthening the rule of law in 
India. It is time, this study argues, to break free of the shackles of colonial 
presumptions and take note of culture specific elements such as, concept of cosmic 
order, idea of Universe as a self-controlled order, interconnectedness between every 
individual and micro cosmic and macro cosmic orders- which continue to influence 
the legal system in India. The cause of women’s rights requires efforts to appreciate 
concept of dharma as an inherently plural entity or institutions of family and 
marriage as pluralistic institutions. 
 
Taking example of India and Hindu traditions, this work is an attempt to appreciate 
the possibilities so that the state in India can undertake the task of protecting rights 
of women without having to be an instrument for neutralizing the influence of 
traditions and religion from society.  The attempt is to explore the possibility of 
developing a women’s rights discourse which does not perceive traditions, and the 
institutions of marriage and family, as sources of oppression for women. 
Undoubtedly, a women’s rights discourse rooted in traditions will have to be a 
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discourse which goes beyond the comfort of binary categories like family and 
individual, sacrament and contract, religious and secular, custom and law- where 
everything on the left side of the divides can be seen as causes of women’s 
oppression, whereas the elements on the right side can be seen as the solutions to 
deal with oppression. It will have to be a discourse which questions the colonial era 
notions of progressiveness, wherein progressiveness is attributed only to a society: 
which has individual and not the family as basic unit in society; which claims to be 
governed merely by laws promulgated by the State based on individual will and 
strict separation between religion and law, and where legally enforceable rights are 
perceived to be the basis of organization of relations between individuals.  
 
An important contention in this study is that the seemingly irresolvable issue of the 
antagonistic relationship between women’s rights and non-western cultures can be 
resolved only through an acknowledgement of a fact that the concept of rights 
underlying national and international discourses on human rights and women’s 
rights offers only one way of upholding human dignity. Different cultures in world 
have nurtured different ways of upholding human dignity, wherein reorganisation of 
the society around the tenets of ‘individualism’, ‘legalism’ and ‘rights’ is not a 
necessary condition. The study further contends that the cause of cultural diversity 
as well as the scholarly concern for improvement in human condition cannot be 
served either by dismissing the differences between the east and the west or between 
different cultures as mere colonial constructs or by reducing different cultures and 
traditions to sheer ephemeral, open and dynamic entities which are constantly 
undergoing change to abandon old elements and to accept new elements. Instead, 
concrete steps are required to understand different ways of upholding human dignity 
nurtured by non-western cultures which ultimately result into different 
understandings of the notions of law, rights and traditions and ultimately of the issue 
of relationship between law, traditions and social change. 
 
The thesis argues that in the Indian context, as much as in any other part of the 
world now, support for plurality also has to mean freedom to maintain one’s 
identity, to be governed by religion and tradition-based norms, especially in matters 
of personal relationships. For the project of rights of women to become meaningful 
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in India, it is necessary to work out various options so that women can claim their 
rights without having to fight against traditions and religion or without having been 
forced in a situation to choose between their rights and their culture or religion.103 
 
1.4  Chapterisation  
Aiming to address the issue of the relationship between law, cultural diversity and 
rights this study is divided into four major chapters. Taking forward the contention 
that antagonism between law, traditions and gender justice is a colonial legacy, the 
second chapter, after this introduction, draws attention towards the colonial era 
presumptions about non-western traditions in general and Indian traditions in 
particular, and about the concept of law and its relationship with religion, which 
became responsible for denigration of and antagonism towards non-western 
traditions.  It highlights colonial rulers’ perceptions towards the phenomenon of 
cultural and legal pluralism as well as their understanding of notion of ‘progress’. 
This chapter also draws attention towards the key elements associated with Hindu 
traditions- the concepts of dharma and cosmic order- which got obscured in the 
process of making sense of traditions in India during colonial rule. Emphasising 
dharma as an inherently plural entity, this chapter also highlights pluralistic nature 
of the institutions of marriage and family, which has received attention of scholars 
only recently, despite being given due recognition even in a modern marriage code 
for Hindus, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.104   
 
The third chapter aims to draw attention towards the changing nature of socio-legal 
discourses concerned with rights of women in family. Dividing socio-legal 
discourses in India into two broad phases- the pre-1990s and post-1990s phase, this 
chapter describes important changes in socio-legal discourses that have occurred in 
last few decades, as a sign of the increasing influence of critical theory. It shows that 
while the pre-1990s phase was about absolute faith in the potential of law to bring 
about fundamental transformation in India, the post-1990s phase has been about 
challenging the rule of law, enlightenment philosophy, rights discourses, 
																																								 																				
103  Choudhury, “Between Tradition and Progress: A Comparative Perspective on Polygamy in 
United States and India.” 
104 Section 7, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 
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evolutionary theory of progress- everything that has been considered panacea for 
progress since the colonial era. Also, while the main concern for pre-1990s 
scholarship was to highlight the colonial rule as a beneficial legacy, a dominant 
section of women’s rights105 scholarship after the 1990s has been more concerned 
with deconstructing what has been referred to as the progressive modernisation myth 
of the colonial rule. This chapter enlists important changes such as- the changed 
perceptions about the nature and role of the colonial rule and of law in women’s 
empowerment; changing perceptions towards certain traditional practices, which till 
recently were considered backward and oppressive towards women such as 
polygamy and adultery or even customary ways of formation and dissolution of 
marriages; an increasing concern among legal scholars for differences between 
women; changing expectations from the law and the State to become more sensitive 
towards differences between women; shift in perceptions about legal uniformity and 
the role of the State in regulating family matters, especially formation and 
dissolution of marriage or marriage like relationships. It brings to forefront scholars’ 
willingness to challenge some of the well-established understandings of the concept 
of personal laws, and also to question the understandings of dharma as a set of 
immutable rules received from heaven. It draws attention towards scholars’ 
willingness to challenge the colonial legacy of perceiving law as an instrument of 
social change, and for eradicating the influence of culture and religion.  The second 
section of this chapter considers the significance of recent changes in socio-legal 
discourses for the cause of women’s rights in India. It shows in what sense the 
recent streams can be considered to be an advance over the scholarship in the pre-
1990s phase. It argues that the new stream of socio-legal scholarship in its post-
1990s phase is armed with important insights about the relationship between law and 
religion and law and cultural diversity, which can result into meaningful efforts to 
rethink the relationship between law, cultural diversity and rights of women. It is an 
important change that scholars in the current phase are willing to take cognizance of 
the fact that legislative reforms which granted extensive individualistic rights to 
																																								 																				
105 While changing perceptions towards role of the state, law and differences between women is a 
common feature of women’s rights scholarship in India, there have been divergences of opinion 
among feminists scholars about relevance of above changes for India. Chapter three takes note of the 
above divergences in section 3.4.1. infra. 
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women have not resulted into diminished importance of the institutions of marriage 
and family in the Indian society.106  
 
 
While the third chapter considers recent changes in women’s rights scholarship as 
important, the fourth chapter aims to analyse the impact of these changes on the 
issue of women’s rights in India. An important aim of this chapter is to understand 
whether the recent shift actually means efforts by scholars to give up the objective of 
eradicating the influence of traditions from law and society? The first section of this 
chapter undertakes critical analysis of some recent works107 seeking answers to a 
series of questions: whether recent changes in women’s rights scholarship have 
actually meant going beyond the series of binaries which have been responsible for 
antagonism between law and cultural diversity? Have we been able to challenge the 
colonial era presumption that importance to the traditional institution of family and 
the Hindu ideal of marriage as sacrament are the main reasons for denial of rights to 
women in India? Do recent changes mean efforts to devise better tools for the legal 
system in India to strike a balance between traditional values and institutions of 
marriage and family and rights of women? Do we have better understanding of the 
concept of dharma as an inherently plural concept, something which cannot be 
reduced to a set of norms received from a definitive source in Heaven? Do we have 
better understanding of the traditional institutions of marriage and family as 
pluralistic institutions which cannot be reduced to a single form?  
 
Undertaking a close analysis of recent prominent works, this chapter answers most 
of the above questions in negative. The fourth chapter shows that recent changes in 
women’s rights scholarship in India, though important, yet do not go far enough to 
address the colonial era presumptions about the concept of dharma, and about the 
institutions of marriage and family, which were responsible for opposition between 
culture and rights and between law and cultural diversity. This chapter shows 
persistence of the binary opposition between tradition and modernity as one of the 
main characteristics even in those works which otherwise claim the above 
																																								 																				
106	Infra fn. 271, 273.	
107 Infra sec. 1.5 
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opposition as a colonial construct meant for denigration of non-western traditions. It 
is true that post-1990s scholarship in India represents significant advancement over 
earlier streams wherein scholars perpetuated simplistic notions such as replacing 
religion-based laws with secular laws to eradicate influence of traditions from 
society. There are many important changes such as, challenge the idea of law as an 
instrument of progress and to replace it with the idea of law as a process; cognizance 
to diversity of family forms in colonial India; attention to the fact of legal pluralism 
in marriage solemnisation especially among Hindus, something which had found 
acknowledgement and endorsement in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 too.  
 
However, despite being important, the above changes, this chapter argues, are not 
turning out to be beneficial given scholars’ reluctance to  challenge the following 
presumptions: (i) that influence of religion or traditions on all spheres of life, 
including legal sphere is the main cause of denial of rights to women, (ii) that 
women’s empowerment is not possible in a society which gives importance to the 
institution of family and where marriage is perceived as a sacrament; and (iii) that 
role of law and the state is to ensure that the individual not family is a basic unit in 
society and that marriage is treated as a contract and not as a sacrament.  There are 
no efforts to bring to the forefront the concept of cosmic order and associated 
elements such as- the idea of interconnectedness between individual and visible and 
invisible spheres, universe as a self-controlled order, svadharma (one’s own duty)- 
which impart distinctiveness to religions and traditions in India. There are also no 
efforts to challenge the colonial era attempts to reduce Hindu marriage to a narrow 
restrictive definition, wherein legally valid Hindu marriage is reduced to a certain set 
of specified rituals mentioned in sacred books.  
 
The fourth chapter argues that with recent changes women’s rights scholarship in 
India, far from offering better tools to deal with cultural diversity, is fostering a 
situation of increased politicisation of rights of women giving rise to a new binary- 
that of a Hindu majority versus non-Hindu minorities.108 Instead of efforts which 
challenge the ‘anti-women nature’ of traditional institutions of family and marriage, 
																																								 																				
108  Archana Parashar and Amita Dhanda, eds., Redefining Family Law in India (Delhi: Routledge 
India, 2009). (At p. ix) 
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what we have is a scholarship which reduce concepts of ‘marriage as sacrament’, 
‘stability of family’, monogamy to nothing more than oppressive Hindu ideals, 
which were brought into existence by the Hindu majority only during the colonial 
rule and which are prevalent in contemporary India due to the continuing dominance 
of the Hindu majority on rest of the Indian population. When it comes to rights of 
women in intimate relationships, instead of efforts to challenge the restrictive 
definition of Hindu marriage the scholarship ignores legal pluralism in marriage 
solemnisation which has been characteristic of Hindu traditions and which was 
given recognition even under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. This reluctance has 
serious consequences for the cause of women’s rights as has become evident from 
improper functioning of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, a legislation which gives 
evidence of shift in perceptions about limiting the role of the State in regulating 
formation and dissolution of personal, intimate relationships.  
 
The second section of this chapter uses example of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 
to show that increasing concern for ‘plurality’- for differences among women- and 
also for limiting the role of the State in regulating personal matters, instead of being 
beneficial, is becoming a new source for denial of rights to women. Seen as a 
progressive piece of legislation one of the main objectives of this Act was to protect 
rights of women who found themselves in diverse kinds of personal relationships, 
which could not be considered as legally valid marriage. This legislative addition 
has two important objectives: to protect women against violence and to ensure them 
economic rights in intimate relationships, irrespective of caste, religion or customs.  
It also protects rights of women who are victims of the criminalisation of practices 
like polygamy or adultery. However, despite being an important piece of legislation, 
this Act, this chapter shows, is becoming a reason for denial of rights to women in 
absence of actual efforts to (i) take cognizance of dharma as a plural concept; (ii) 
challenge the restricted definition of Hindu marriage which came into existence 
during colonial rule; and (iii) appreciate the ancient phenomenon of legal pluralism 
in marriage solemnisation. The Act deploys the term ‘relationship in the nature of 
marriage’ to protect a wide range of women in intimate relationships. However, 
despite being in operation for more than a decade, there is no clarity about the 
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differences between marriage relationships and relationships in the nature of 
marriage. It has resulted in a situation wherein a relationship between a man and a 
woman which could earlier be termed as a valid marriage, giving a woman the status 
and rights of wife, is now termed as only a relationship in the nature of marriage, 
thereby reducing woman to a ‘mere contractual partner’ to a man, with no clarity 
even about nature of this contract and with much lesser rights than that of a wife. 
Moreover, while socio-legal discourses continue to link women’s empowerment 
with the idea of marriage as a contract, there have been no efforts to deliberate on 
the nature of this contract. There are no deliberations on important issues such as: 
how different is this contract from a commercial contract? What should be role of 
the State in formation, performance and enforcement of these contracts for intimate 
relationships? And, a consequence of the ignorance towards above vital issues is a 
deepening crisis in the Indian legal system and also in women’s rights scholarship 
which is gradually making the issue of women´s rights a completely subjective 
exercise dependent on the personal ideologies and moralistic views of judges.109 The 
Domestic Violence Act, which represents to a large extent changing perception of 
scholars towards differences between women, is expected to substitute the personal 
law systems. Rather than being a legislation which can supplement rights of women 
in traditional institutions of marriage and family, it appears to be a piece of 
legislation which aims to devalue the two institutions. While it gives economic 
rights to women, irrespective of and sometimes in addition to norms based on 
religion, caste, customs or even secular laws, what is missing in scholarship is a 
clear deliberation on some vital issues such as, what should be or can be differences 
between rights of a wife and rights of a partner in a relationship in the nature of 
marriage. There is, thus, a new conflict of laws arena that has been developing in 
Indian family law, between the traditional personal status law systems and the new 
forms of general law regulation in the arena of family law, specifically the Domestic 
Violence Act, 2005.  
 
The arena of family law is thus a deeply contested field of legal rules. It is no longer 
just traditional social norms and religious rule systems are calling the shots, but the 
																																								 																				
109 See Gupta, “Women, Family Laws and Informal Relationships.”   
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modern state, increasingly under surveillance by international law and normative 
expectations from the field of human rights is asked to intervene and prove its worth 
as a regulatory mechanism able to guarantee the basic rights promised by the 
Constitution. In this deeply contested arena, we see now that simplistic calls for 
complete state control are just reflections of exaggerated expectations that 
ultimately, it seems, no state system can fulfill.  
 
It is a situation of great dilemma for the Indian State, because on the one hand it is 
expected to intervene more strongly in the wake of increasing cases of excesses of 
communities and families against individuals, against young men and women in the 
form of “honour killings”,110 or barbaric punishments by caste and community-based 
dispute resolution forums. 111  On the other hand, in contrast to the situation till the 
1990s, the scholarly faith in the potential of the Indian state and the law to deliver 
women’s empowerment in India seems to be diminishing, and the state is 
increasingly expected to play lesser role in regulating intimate relationships.  
 
It has become gradually very clear that in order to ensure better protection of the 
rights of women, something more is needed than mere realisation amongst a section 
of scholars that transferring complete control to the State for regulation of family 
matters is neither feasible nor will it necessarily result in empowerment of women. 
The requirement is to take a well-considered stand with respect to the issues such as:  
to what extent should the state and its legal system intervene in regulating family 
laws in the interest of rights of women and children? Should the state in India give 
up its control on formation and dissolution of personal intimate relations? Should the 
state only intervene when there is a complaint that someone’s fundamental rights 
																																								 																				
110  Brinda Karat, “Honour Killings Are a Separate Horror,” The Hindu, March 22, 2016, sec. Lead, 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Honour-killings-are-a-separate-
horror/article14168010.ece.; Lata Singh v State of U.P., 5 Supreme Court Cases 475 (Supreme 
Court 2006).; “Prevention of Interference with the Freedom of Matrimonial Alliances (in the 
Name of Honour and Tradition): A Suggested Legal Framework.” (Delhi: Law Commission of 
India, August 22, 2012). 
111  “Khap Panchayats,” The Hindu, April 16, 2010, sec. OPINION, http://www.thehindu.com/ 
todays-paper/tp-opinion/Khap-panchayats/article16021026.ece.; Indrani Basu, “9 Things You 
Need To Know About The Khap ‘Rape Order’ In India,” Huffington Post India, September 8, 
2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2015/09/08/dalit-girls-india_n_8095322.html. 
Rethinking the Relationship between Law, Gender Justice and Traditions in India: From Hostility to Harmony	
43 
were violated? Should the state in India continue to recognize cultural and religion 
based laws and dispute resolution forums for regulation of family matters?  
 
The unfortunate situation is that none of the above questions have attracted attention 
of dominant socio-legal scholarship in India so far. It is true that the questions 
relating to the role of the State are not easy to address, nor do they yield to any 
definitive answers. Considering the complex socio-legal realities of Indian society 
there can be no fixed formula to determine when and in what matters the State has to 
intervene and to what extent. But these difficulties are no reason to ignore the above 
questions or to avoid serious deliberations which can lead towards a well-considered 
stand on the role of the State in dealing with family matters. The stage has come 
where there is an urgent need for a fresh analysis on the role of the State in family 
matters in India, and also to make efforts to develop some kind of legal framework 
to determine the rights and obligations of individuals in personal relationships 
irrespective of their form and nature. And a most important step in that direction 
would be efforts to go beyond the usual distrust against society, against religions, 
cultures and communities, which has been the main characteristic of the large 
majority of socio-legal scholarship focused on India. It is thus argued here that this 
negativity against and virtual dismissal of ‘tradition’, ‘culture’ and ‘religion’  has 
been the main reason which has prevented scholars and activists from engaging in 
serious deliberations on the role of the State. It has also been one of the main reasons 
for privileging state and its legal system for protection of rights of women.   
 
An important requirement, therefore, is to challenge the perceptions of antagonism 
between traditions and rights of women. And challenging those perceptions would 
require changing the way the distinctions between tradition and modernity are 
understood. It requires challenge to the understandings that traditions or religions are 
about suppression of human will and human agency and that it is only a modern 
secular State, which can allow human beings to be fully human. In the Indian 
context, changing perceptions towards role of the State and its legal system requires 
efforts to rethink relationship between law and society. And, this is what chapter five 
sets out to do. 
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This chapter aims to suggest some initial conceptual steps which need to be 
undertaken at scholarly level to start addressing the confusions in Indian legal 
system about role of law and state in regulating personal relationships. It argues that 
two important steps for addressing the said crisis are to: (i) rethink our ways of 
understanding distinction between tradition and modernity, (ii) become aware of 
those elements, which render the concept of human rights or women’s rights a 
western concept, and (iii) appreciate those elements which impart distinctiveness to 
indigenous worldviews without making them antagonistic to the cause of women’s 
rights or human rights. This chapter argues that rethinking role of the State and law 
in women’s empowerment needs challenging following understandings: that 
traditions, and traditions based values such as, importance to institutions of marriage 
and family, conception of marriage as sacrament are about suppression of individual 
will and denial of rights to women; that women’s empowerment seems to be a 
possibility only in a society where individual is a basic unit in society, where 
marriage is treated as a contract and where the state and the legal system can be 
shown to be purged of influence of religion and traditions.  
 
It further argues that trapped within colonial era framework of social change, 
scholars have not been able to appreciate the fact that an important difference 
between tradition and modernity is not about accepting or rejecting the very idea of 
rights. In contrast it is about rejecting that idea, where legally enforceable rights are 
the only reason for relationships between individuals. It is about two different 
worldviews: one which perceives a relationship of opposition between family, 
community, religion and individual and rights therein are therefore, means for 
protection of individual against family, community, culture or religion; and the 
other, which perceives a relationship of symbiotic co-existence between individual 
and family, community, religion or culture and rights therefore are means for 
developing one’s individuality while performing one’s duties towards family, 
community or religion. Relationship between tradition and modernity is about 
different understandings of the concepts of law, religion, and rights and of the 
relationship between individual and the Universe/ the Cosmos. Understanding these 
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differences can be the only key for understanding and appreciating legal 
developments in India and can be the only way to address the rights issues in India.  
 
The main requirement, this chapter argues, is to understand those traditional values 
which continue to influence what looks like a modern legal system in India. An 
important requirement is to take note of various elements related to the concept of 
cosmic order, such as the idea of universe as a pre-existing web, the concepts of 
‘interconnectedness’, of universe as a self controlled order, importance of 
svadharma (one’s own duty) in maintenance of order, which continue to influence 
functioning of legal system in India, and which have rendered dharma as a 
pluralistic concept. There is also a need to make efforts to understand in what sense 
the traditional values differ from the values promoted by human rights discourses, 
and what can be the means to protect rights of women or to ensure women’s 
empowerment without having to challenge traditional values. In concrete terms what 
is needed are the efforts to go beyond the series of binary oppositions such as family 
versus individual, duty versus right, sacrament versus contract, religious versus 
secular which have been deployed since colonial era to establish that protection of 
women’s dignity and women’s rights is something alien to non-western traditions 
like India. Resistance to rights in non-western societies is more a result of projecting 
women’s rights and the state as a means to establish family and marriage as 
oppressive institutions which ensures sexual, moral and economic suppression of 
women.  
 
What is needed are the efforts to understand that legislative and judicial 
developments in India relating to institutions of marriage and family, to a large 
extent, have been about finding a balance between upholding sanctity of institutions 
of marriage and family while protecting rights of women. It shows that what needs 
to be highlighted is that in large number of cases emphasis on sanctity of institutions 
of marriage and family has been means to grant rights to women instead of denying 
the same. Need of the day is socio-legal discourses which pay attention to the real 
issues like role of the state in regulating family matters keeping in view specific 
socio-economic conditions in India. What is needed are the efforts to understand the 
protection or the rights available to women in traditional institutions of family and 
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marriage and to what extent it may be possible to supplement these rights with a new 
set of rights. The endeavor has to be to understand how to balance sanctity of these 
institutions with new demands for women’s rights with changing social and 
economic circumstances. 
 
1.5 Methodology 
	
Relationship between culture and rights or between law and cultural diversity is an 
issue which has consumed humungous amounts of scholarly energies in last two 
centuries. While importance of culture or religion for any individual and society is a 
well known fact since advent of colonial era, protection of cultural diversity has 
been a matter of concern only for anthropologists. Increasing interests of rights 
scholars and lawyers in protection of cultural diversity is a recent development. For 
scholars across various disciplines including legal scholars, non-western traditions 
are no longer seen as elements to be neutralised through instrument of law. Neither 
is colonial rule to be seen as a beneficial legacy. The task for scholars instead is to 
extricate non-western traditions from colonial era presumptions and to ensure that 
law can be sensitive to difference between individuals. While above shift, mainly 
concern for multiculturalism, has been highly pronounced in western democracies, a 
section of scholarly writings in non-western countries have also kept pace with 
international developments. Rethinking relationship between law and cultural 
diversity in general and law and feminism in particular has emerged as an important 
concern for scholars and activists. Concern for culture or traditions is now as much a 
concern of legal scholars as it was of anthropologists. Maintaining its focus on 
women’s rights scholarship in India, this work draws attention towards above shift 
in scholarly and activists discourses. As stated above, it aims to understand its 
impact on the cause of women’s rights in India. It aims to explore whether influence 
of colonial era presumptions to make sense of non-western traditions is actually a 
thing of past for the current streams of socio-legal scholarship in India.  
In order to achieve above objectives this work undertakes critical analysis of 
selected scholarly writings in India concerned with rights of women which seem to 
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have moved beyond scholarship in the pre-1990s phase. While legal scholars and 
activists have endorsed above change, initiation for it has come from works from 
disciplines other than law, such as historians, political scientists, sociologists. There 
exists now a rich body of inter-disciplinary literature under the rubric of ‘post-
colonial literature, which is useful in deconstructing the idea of colonial rule as a 
beneficial legacy. This work maintains its focus on some selected works from 
different disciplines, which have challenged the idea of colonial rule as beneficial 
legacy having deconstruction of social reform legislations as a main focus. Some of 
the important works which are under consideration in this study are: Lata Mani, 
“Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India,”; Sudhir Chandra, 
Enslaved Daughters: Colonialism, Law & Women’s Rights; Sangari, Kumkum, and 
Sudesh Vaid, Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial History; Sarkar, Tanika, 
“Rhetoricagainst Age of Consent-Resisting Colonial Reason and Death of a Child-
Wife.” Economic and Political Weekly; Chakravarti, Uma. Rewriting History: The 
Life and Times of Pandita Ramabai; Nivedita Menon, “Uniform Civil Code – the 
Women’s Movement Perspective.” Kafila, October 1, 2014. 
Among legal scholars in India pioneers of change have been: Flavia Agnes, 
RatnaKapur and Brenda Cossman and more recently Madhu Mehra. Agnes has 
produced a rich body of literature. Her three prominent works of book-length which 
are under consideration in this work are: Law and Gender Inequality: The Politics of 
Women’sRights in India; Family Law: Family Laws and Constitutional Claims. Vol. 
I., Family Law II: Marriage, Divorce and Matrimonial Litigation. Vol. II. Apart 
from Agnes, two other authors whose works distinctly represent a shift in women’s 
rights scholarship are Ratna Kapur and Brenda Cossman. One of the most influential 
works of these authors which has been referred to extensively in this work for 
critical analysis is Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. While 
the three authors above have addressed the issue of rights of women in family in 
general, an important work which specifically addresses the issue of polygamy and 
pluralism in intimate relationships is Madhu Mehra, Rights in Intimate 
Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s Rights and 
the Family. 
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Through critical analysis of above writings, this study explores whether these works 
actually go beyond the colonial presumptions which were responsible for 
denigration of non-western traditions.   
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Chapter Two 
Relationship between Law, Social Change and Traditions: 
Colonial Era Framework 
 
Trained by us to happiness and independence, and endowed with our learning and 
political institutions, India will remain the proudest monument of British 
benevolence. 
- Charles Trevelyan 
 
But there are triumphs which are followed by no reverse. There is an empire exempt 
from all natural causes of decay. Those triumphs are the pacific triumphs of reason 
over barbarism; that empire is the imperishable empire of our arts and our morals, 
our literature and our laws. 
         - Macaulay, 
Speech of 10th July 1833 
 
Contemporary social change and rights discourses, in India, as in many other ex-
colonial countries, are a colonial legacy. While nobody denies the above fact, during 
last few decades scholarly discourses on rights of women in ex-colonial countries 
have come to question and challenge the idea of colonial rule as a beneficial legacy 
for the non-western societies.  In recent times the ‘civilising mission’ story of 
colonial rulers has come to be seriously challenged and deconstructed enough. It is 
now more or less common knowledge that ‘civilising mission’ was a justification for 
colonial, imperial rule. Nobody now contests that this mission was rooted in what 
some have called as British intellectual game of creating colonies in Asia and Africa 
in negation to the West.112 The game, rights scholars now acknowledge,113 was to 
establish that the West had Reason, discipline, science, capitalism, in short, 
modernity; and the non-west was home to ignorance, fatalism, low technology, 
feudalism.  
																																								 																				
112  For a detailed discussion on this issue see Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law 
(London: Routledge, 1992). Also Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self 
Under Colonialism, 1 edition (Oxford: OUP India, 1988). 
113  Menon, Recovering Subversion. 
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However, till recently, for example till 1990s, rights discourses concerned with 
rights of women in India did not have too many reasons to doubt or question any of 
the basic presumptions about differences between the West and the East posited by 
the colonial administrators. Scholars were convinced that their task was to use 
instrument of the State and its legal system to push Indian society ahead on that path 
of progress, on which it was set upon by the British rulers.  
 
This chapter draws attention towards colonial era presumptions which explicitly 
dominated socio-legal discourses in India till 1990s, and in fact, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, continue to dominate even the recent streams of discourses. Its 
draws attention towards those presumptions about the notion of progress and also 
about the non-western societies which were central to the framework of social 
change during colonial rule in India, as much as in other colonies, and which laid the 
foundation for understanding relationship between law, rights of women and cultural 
diversity in socio-legal discourses even after independence.  
 
2.1 Colonial Rule, Non-Western Societies and the Notion of Progress  
Faith in the potential of human intellect, as it has been rightly argued by many 
scholars,114 was one of the most important foundation stones of the colonial Empires 
in India, as elsewhere in the world. This faith rested on the perceptions about the 
‘all-human character’ of Europe’s advanced (modern) age. It was based on what was 
perceived as successful experimentation by the ‘enlightened forces’ in Europe in 
realising an absolute rupture from the past- that past, which colonial rulers believed, 
was ridden with superstition, arbitrariness  and dominance of religion. European 
traders and imperial administrators shared a strong conviction that this advanced age 
of Europe was neither a historic co-incidence or nor result of a mere natural 
evolutionary process. Instead, it was an outcome of conscious human (European) 
design which had ‘objective, absolute foundations and universal validity.115  
																																								 																				
114  Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India ; Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters; Fitzpatrick, 
The Mythology of Modern Law. 
115  Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters. Bauman points out the main characteristics of modernity 
as: 
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Europe’s progress, it was believed, was result of conscious human design to relegate 
religion to a private sphere and to set in motion the processes of secularization of 
society through the instrument of law.  
 
For colonial administrators exposure to different forms of life ‘submitted’ to nature 
or to God(s) in different parts of Asia and Africa, was nothing but a grim reminder 
of Europe’s long forgone and dark past. Although  ‘rest of the world’ appeared as a 
reflection of Europe’s remote past, and different life forms therein could be placed 
on the same scale of evolutionary progress’116 that Europe had tread, the colonial 
administrators were sure that ‘rest of the world’ will not be able to usher in the 
advanced age on its own. 117 Colonial authorities were of the view that engulfed by 
superstition, by beliefs in supernatural powers and perils, non-European cultures 
lacked the attributes which were considered essential to seek a break from the past 
and to make transition towards an advanced age- the age of Reason. As Fitzpatrick 
points out, for colonial rulers ‘ the savage ‘mind’ was ‘unfurnished’ with certain 
notions essential for society: these ‘involve the notions of political society; of 
supreme government; of positive law; of legal right; of legal duty; of legal injury’.118  
In colonial view, non-Europeans were ‘typified by ‘lacks’- of law, government, 
husbandry and much else’.119 Yet there was no doubt that these ‘lacks’ could be 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 Its conviction of its own superiority over alternative forms of life, seen as historically or logically 
‘primitive’; and its belief that its pragmatic advantage over pre-modern societies and cultures, far 
from being a historic coincidence, can be shown to have objective, absolute foundations and 
universal validity. (At p. 119) 
116  For a detailed description of ‘evolutionary theory of progress’ see Rouland, Legal Anthropology. 
(pp. 19-36) 
117  Sir Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with Early History of Society and Its 
Relation to Modern Ideas, 12th ed. (Lonon: John Murray, 1888). Convinced that ‘progress’ is a 
characteristic only of English society Maine emphasised,  
 no one is likely to succeed in the investigation who does not clearly realise that the stationary 
condition of the human race is the rule, the progressive the exception.(At p.21) 
 Also see Rouland, Legal Anthropology. Rouland endorses this idea as he cites from an eighteenth 
century author,  
 In 1760 in La Langue des calculs, Condillac summed up the evolutionist thought well, as it was 
perceived at that time: ‘we, who believe ourselves knowledgeable, need go amongst the most 
ignorant peoples to find out how we began to make progress: from it is our beginnings that we 
need to discern; we know little about them because so much time has elapsed since we were 
disciples of nature.’ (At p. 27)  
118  Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law, 1992. (At pp. 78-79) 
119  ibid. (At p. 73) 
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taken care of and that the ‘enlightened’ few, using the same means as had been used 
in Europe, the European political and legal institutions, will be able ‘to remake 
everything- individuals, their needs and desires, their thoughts, their actions and 
interactions, the laws that set a frame for such interaction, those who set the laws, 
society itself’.120    
 
The colonial rulers worked on the presumption that non-western societies had 
remained backward due to lack of faith in the potential of human intellect. It was 
believed that human intellect had been ignored in these societies since demands of 
religion, caste, family, kin-group or community had priority over interests of 
individuals. These demands, it was further believed, had forestalled any possibility 
of emergence of a nation State and an advanced legal order.121 There was a firm 
belief that the progress of Europe in comfort and wealth was direct outcome of the 
liberation of the individual achieved by Reformation through the instrument of 
secular and rational authority of the State. It appeared certain that Europe’s march 
on the path of progress could become possible due to the advanced legal order which 
consisted of following characteristics:     
1) Individual will as the basis: legal system derived its authority from the 
popular will which finds expression through a centralised authority and 
individual was subject only to the laws based on (human) Reason and 
promulgated by the state.  
2) Forward looking and progressive: human basis of laws ensured that laws 
could be changed and modified to suit the changed circumstances.122  
																																								 																				
120  Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters. (At p. 101) 
121  Bronislaw Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul Ltd., 1970). 
122  Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with Early History of Society and Its Relation to Modern 
Ideas. Reflecting on changing yet unchanging nature of customs and customary laws Maine 
mentioned, 
 It is impossible to suppose that the customs of any race or tribe remained unaltered during the 
whole of the long- in some instances the immense- interval between their declaration by a 
patriarchal monarch and their publication in writing. It would be unsafe too to affirm that no part 
of the alteration was effected deliberately. But from the little we know of the progress of law 
during this period, we are justified in assuming that set purpose had the very smallest share in 
producing change. ….. A new era begins, however, with the Codes. Wherever, after this epoch, 
we trace the course of legal modification, we are able to attribute it to the conscious desire of 
improvement, or at all events of compassing objects other than those which were aimed at in the 
primitive times. (At p. 19) 
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3) Certainty: legal order consisted in a body of uniform, written, coherent and 
fixed rules which regulated human conduct actually and imperatively in a 
given locality and period of time, whose origins could be traced to a 
centralised authority, either in the form of codes, statutes or as recognised 
written customary rules. 
4) Impartial and impersonal character: operation of laws did not depend upon 
the personality of judges, and laws ‘in their operation, were free of influence 
of or control from government itself’.  
5) Autonomy: legal order consisted of methods of systematisation, elaboration 
and maintenance of rules of procedure and evidence, which could delimit the 
social context for the legal purposes and mark the rules as legal. 
6) Equality: legal order ensured equal protection of laws and equality before 
law for every individual. Differences between persons on the basis of 
religion, sex, race, origin etc. did not have legal relevance. Aimed at serving 
the principle of equality of human beings and  protecting equally the interests 
of each and every individual through allocation of rights and duties while 
balancing it with common good the legal order consisted in impartial 
adversary proceedings where one party wins and other loses.  
 
The common understanding was that an advanced legal order, as an autonomous and 
self-sustaining system, was the symptom, the cause and the consequence of 
emergence and perpetuation of a new social order in the Europe.  
 
And, in contrast to the above, non-western societies suffered, the colonial rulers 
believed, and remained backward, due to a non-western conception of law, for being 
governed merely by customs, customary laws or the religion based laws.123  It was a 
conception which was completely devoid of the important values that were 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 For a detailed description on ideas of Maine about non-western societies also see Rouland, Legal 
Anthropology. (especially pp. 20-23) 
123  Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law.  Fitzpatrick draws attention towards colonial rulers’ 
views on custom as he stated, 
 [Custom], said Bentham, is ‘for brutes’- written law being the law for civilized nations’. Austin 
followed suit. For him, law as a positive product of the will contrasted essentially with the rules 
that rest on ‘brute custom’ rather than on ‘manly reason’ and were thus ‘monstrous or crude 
productions of childish and imbecile intellect’. ( At p.60)  
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characteristic of advanced legal order- progressiveness, certainty, objectivity, 
impartiality, autonomy and equality. It was a legal order:124 
1) which had not the individual will, but the ‘divine’ will or the given laws of 
nature as the basis, and which required every individual’s ‘submission’, 
willing (passive) or by force, to the dictates of the religion or to the customs 
and customary laws 
2) which, being based on written ‘divine’ laws or age old customs was tied to 
the past  and lacked mechanisms for modifications in laws 
3) which could not ensure any certainty in the interaction of individuals (i) as it 
consisted of confused overlapping categories; uncertain, unclear, unwritten 
norms of conduct or written but religious, unsystematised and superstitious 
rules; and (ii) lacked any definite external authority ( a specific machinery) 
to demand obedience and enforce rules or norms of conduct;  
4) where laws, far from being autonomous, were deeply embedded in social and 
religious context resulting into imposition of religious or moral norms on 
people; 
5) where operation of laws depending on the will and personality of the 
‘judges’ was despotic and arbitrary; 
6) where, given absence of any concern for equality, the laws were aimed at 
maintaining and reproducing inequality, hierarchy, different conditions and 
differences amongst people according to the religion, gender, age, stage or 
status in the society.  
 
Although non-western societies were found to be very different from the advanced 
Europe, still the colonial administrators had the confidence that all the deficiencies 
of non-west could be taken care by introduction of English legal and political 
institutions.  It was considered necessary to seek a break from the past since an 
																																								 																				
124  For Britishers view on conception of law in non-western societies see Rouland, Legal 
Anthropology. (pp. 19-36). Also see Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with Early History of 
Society and Its Relation to Modern Ideas.; Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society. 
Describing colonial rulers’ opinion on non-western societies Malinowski noted, 
 Colonial rulers were of the view that non-Europeans have a thinking which is lawless, 
unsystematic and rhapsodical. (At p. 9) 
Also see Comaroff, “Colonialism, Culture, and the Law.” 
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assumption implicit in colonial approaches was that growth of an individual could 
not be conceived as long as community or family would be the basic principle of 
organization in society.  There was a broad consensus that social progress was 
conducive only to a society governed by advanced legal order, with a system of 
government committed to releasing ‘individual energy by protecting its efforts, by 
freeing it from despotism of custom and communal ownership, and from the tyranny 
of religion’.125 There prevailed a conviction amongst colonial administrators that it 
was only through free trade under mild, liberal and effective government where an 
individual’s property is held sacred126  can any society be set on its path of prosperity 
and progress.  
 
Colonial rulers were of the view that with the  introduction of advanced legal order 
any society could be reorganised into a progressive society with the following 
characteristics: (i) where individual is the basic unit; (ii) where every individual is a 
‘self-sufficient’ and ‘autonomous’ being- a ‘sovereign’ being free from dependence 
on the will of others, a being having exclusive control of and rights in his own 
persons and capacities, for which he owes nothing to the society;127 (iii) where 
																																								 																				
125  Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India. Discussing social change orientations of British 
Stokes noted, 
 Mill was proposing a revolution of Indian society carried solely through weapon of law. The 
purpose of the revolution was the same as the end of all government; it was to release individual 
energy by protecting its efforts, freeing it from the despotism of custom and communal 
owernship, and from tyranny of priest and noble. (At p. 69) 
126  Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law. Highlighting preference for individual property 
Fitzpatrick stated,  
 With primitive common ownership, declared Grotius, men were content to feed on the 
spontaneous products of the earth, to dwell in caves’. They did not constructively tame nature. … 
The savage was a wanderer or related to land in an indefinite communal way, not sufficiently 
removed from the common state Nature placed it in. In either capacity, the savage had no 
sufficiently fixed relation to things to support a legal right to them. Property was the basis of law. 
(At p. 50) 
127  C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1962). Describing conception of individual in original seventeenth 
century individualism Macpherson stated, 
 The individual was seen neither as a moral whole, nor as part of a larger social whole, but as an 
owner of himself.... The human essence is freedom from the dependence on the will of others, 
and freedom is a function of possession. Society becomes a lot of free equal individuals related 
to each other as proprietors of their own capacities and of what they have acquired by their 
exercise. Society consists of relations of exchange between proprietors. Political society becomes 
a calculated device for protection of this property and for maintenance of an orderly relation of 
exchange.  (At p. 3) 
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secular state and its laws assume the obligation to protect every individual’s freedom 
from any relations except those relations which the individual enters voluntarily with 
a view to his own interest; (iv) where every individual is subject to only two duties, 
duty to one-self and duty to state and is free from the diverse constraints of religion, 
caste, community or custom; (v) where state and its laws provided the basic 
principles of human interaction and every individual’s freedom could be limited 
only by such obligations and rules as are necessary to secure the same freedom for 
others; (vi) where religion is relegated to the private sphere from where it can 
exercise no influence on secular and rational public sphere.  
 
2.2  India a Prototype of Non-western Societies 
For colonial rulers although a prototype of non-western societies, India was found to 
have some characteristics distinct from other Asian and African societies.128 It was 
found to be distinct since it was discovered that India consisted of communities like 
that of Hindus and Muslims who were governed by codified laws, that is, the rules 
that could be found written in some specified books.129 India also appeared distinct 
because of its plurality- for co-existence of diverse kinds of communities, that is, 
those governed by different customs and those governed by written religion based 
laws. Apart from above distinction, Indian society appeared like any other non-
western society in Asia and Africa, governed by laws which were meant to impose 
religious beliefs on individuals, with no possibility for exercise of human agency 
and for individual growth and development. India, colonial rulers were convinced, 
lacked inherent capability to become an advanced, progressive society like European 
society. Colonial rulers attributed this incapability to the presumption that the faith 
in human intellect was foreign for these communities where religion dominated all 
spheres of life, public as well private. 130  Being governed by religion based laws, the 
possibilities for change in India didn’t exist. 131  
																																								 																				
128  Bernard S. Cohn, “Law and the Colonial State in India,” in History and Power in the Study of 
Law: New Directions in Legal Anthropology (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 
131–52. (At p. 132) 
129  For a detailed description see J. Duncan M. Derrett, “Sir Henry Maine and Law in India,” in 
Essays in Classical and Modern Hindu Law, by J.Duncan M. Derrett, vol. 2 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1977), 260–75. 
130  Rajeev Dhavan, “Introduction,” in Law and Society in Modern India, by Marc Galanter (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), xiii–c. Drawing attention towards colonial era presumptions 
Dhavan notes, 
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Although Hinduism was observed to be one of the religions in the multi-religious 
country, colonial rulers were of the view that Hindu religion was the source of all 
Indian ills as ‘the great moral force in India was the Hindu form of government and 
law, above all, the Hindu religion’.132  It was suggested that despotism, particularly 
despotism of the priestly class, the Brahmins, destroyed the autonomy of the 
individual will. According to rulers roots of all evils was tyranny of ‘crafty and 
imperious priesthood’ over the minds of people.133 It was suggested that the most 
essential thing was to release individual conscience from the tyranny of the priests. 
It was also suggested that in spite of having advanced over the African societies by 
having developed written texts, the Hindus, due to dominance of priestly class has 
not been able to overcome the ‘appalling depths of bestial superstition and social 
corruption’.134 It was believed that tyranny was maintained because of the ignorance 
of the people and the hold which the vast fabric of superstition exercised over their 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 Although Maine did not provide a sophisticated understanding of whom Indian law serviced and 
why, there is no doubt that Indian scholarship remained trapped in Maine’s metaphors for a long 
time. His characterizations of Indian law were not only the basis of nineteenth and twentieth 
century law reform but also remain a vehicle for socio-legal analysis to this day. Maine’s 
intuition rather than empirical evidence structured future law reform and scholarship.(emphasis 
added) (At p. xvi) 
131  Cohn, “Law and the Colonial State in India.” Drawing attention towards presumptions of 
colonial administrators about Hindus Cohn stated, 
 It appears that Jones believed that even though manners, habits, dispositions, and prejudices were 
not fixed or immutable, the Hindus of India had usages that were fixed from time immemorial. 
Unlike the British with their case law, in which a lawyer could trace changes both in manners 
and in customs as well as in the law, the Hindus therefore lived a timeless existence, which in 
turn meant that differences in interpretations offered by Pundits must have arisen from ignorance 
and venality. (At p. 147) 
132  Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India. As Stokes aptly describes the view prevalent among 
colonial rulers as he stated opinion of colonial rulers, 
 The great moral force in India was the Hindu form of government and law, above all, the Hindu 
religion. Their common character was their despotic nature; and here was the source of Indian 
ills. Despotism destroyed the autonomy of the individual soul and so extinguished the source of 
virtue, since the man ‘who is dependent on the will of another…. thinks and acts as a degraded 
being and fear necessarily becomes his grand principle of action. (At p. 31-32) 
133   ibid. 
134  ibid. Stokes quotes Charles Grant, to demonstrate the mind-set the prevailed among colonial 
administrators, 
 Upon the whole then, we cannot avoid recognizing in the people of Hindostan, a race of men 
lamentably degenerate and base; retaining but a feeble sense of moral obligation; yet obstinate in 
their disregard of what they know to be right, governed by malevolent and licentious passions, 
strongly exemplifying the effects produced on society by a great and general corruption of 
manners, and sunk in their misery by their vices, in a country peculiarly calculated by its natural 
advantages, to promote the prosperity of its inhabitants. (At p. 31) 
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lives. It was believed that these above-mentioned characteristics had persisted in 
India as religion based legal order did not offer any possibility for change.  It was 
also concluded that these religion based laws ordained that the society consisted of 
four hierachical classes or castes (varnas), which in descending order, were the 
priest (Brahman), warrior ( kshatriya), peasent ( vaishya), and serf (shudra). 
Highlighting that law was deeply embedded in social and religious context, it was 
pointed out that it was these texts which provided that family and not the individual 
was to be the basic unit in the society. It was believed that due to influence of 
dharmasastras caste remained the basic principle of organization of society 
restricting the allegiance of individual only to the caste or the group concerned 
without any concern for political or territorial administration, thereby precluding the 
possibility of emergence of State.  
 
Considering Indian society, particularly Hindus to be in stranglehold of this 
priesthood, colonial rulers were convinced that progress of Indian society lay in 
liberation of individuals from the clutches of Brahmins and their dharamshastras. It 
was considered necessary to seek a break from the past since an assumption implicit 
in colonial approaches was that growth of an individual could not be conceived as 
long as dharma- which in colonial view meant- law found written in the religious 
text books- would be the basic principle of organization in society.  There was a 
broad consensus that social progress was conducive only to a society governed by 
‘rule of law’, with a system of government committed to releasing ‘individual 
energy by protecting its efforts, by freeing it from despotism of custom and 
communal ownership, and from the tyranny of religion’.135 There prevailed a 
conviction that it was only through free trade under mild, liberal and effective 
government where an individual’s property is held sacred can India be set on its path 
of prosperity and can finally share community of interest with British. Stokes 
captures the above presumption as he notes, 136  
Cornwallis believed that everything hinged upon the recognition of 
proprietary rights of the Zemindars, the great landholders; and indeed landed 
																																								 																				
135 Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India. (At p. 69) 
136 ibid. At p. 5 
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property is the kernel of the Whig conception of political society. To the 
Whig mind landed property appeared as the agency which affected the 
reconciliation of freedom with order. Itself almost a part of the law of nature, 
there flowed from a system of landed property a natural ordering of the 
society into ranks and classes, ‘nowhere more necessary than in this 
country’, maintained Cornwallis, for preserving order in civil society. 
 
Deriving from their experience in Europe colonial rulers were of the view that this 
break from the past, this fundamental transformation of Indian society could be 
achieved through introduction of English law and English political and legal 
institutions. It was unquestionable that once India was given English political and 
legal institutions along with security of the individual property, progress of India 
society, meaning thereby, erosion of indigenous world view and re-organisation of 
society having individual at its centre will only be a matter of time. For rupture from 
the pre-colonial past of India appeared certain with the introduction of new order of 
things, which should have for its foundation, the security of the individual property, 
and the administration of justice, criminal and civil, by rules which were to disregard 
all conditions of persons.  
 
2.3  Religious Tolerance: A Mainstay of Colonial Policies 
While there was not much doubt that fundamental transformation of India could be 
realised through European political and legal institutions, it is true that colonial 
administrators did take different positions with respect to the desirability and the 
necessity of establishing English political and legal institutions and of realising 
‘anglicisation’137 of India.138 Some amongst the colonial administrators favoured 
that British should be able to perform their ‘duty’ in India leaving, as far as possible, 
indigenous institutions and practices undisturbed. Another section of colonial 
administrators, on the other hand, was in favour of strong state and strict codified 
laws which can regulate all aspects of individual and social interaction. However, 
with strong influence of liberal thinking in colonial administration, the dominant 
view was not in favour of imposing ‘new order of things’ on indigenous population. 
																																								 																				
137 Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India. (At p. 2) 
138 For a detailed discussion on this point ibid. At pp. 1-24 
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The dominant view, instead, was in favour of religious tolerance and non-
interference in the affairs of the ‘native population’.139 Therefore, while utilitarian 
preference for strong and rational legal codes, enjoyed wide support amongst 
colonial administrators,140 this preference was duly conditioned by the awareness of 
the limits of state law in general and under the circumstances of colonial rule in 
particular. Banerjee points out, ‘although Macaulay ‘revered’ Bentham as ‘the father 
of jurisprudence’ and advocated legal reform with a view to making the law more 
effective and rational, he did not seek to use law as an instrument for the 
transformation of society’.141 There was awareness that the task of creating new 
social order in India called for efforts beyond introduction of European political and 
legal institutions. Colonial authorities were aware that the change in attitudes, beliefs 
and opinions- essential pre-requisites for establishment of new social and legal 
order- called for supplementing legal measures with non-coercive social and 
educational efforts. Given strong influence of liberal thinking on colonial 
administration, it was also considered important that the measures for social change 
were grounded in the will of natives. The colonial liberal view considered it 
necessary that natives were made to realise for themselves degenerate nature of their 
society. It was considered necessary that the demand for change must come from 
within the community. It was important to the British that the natives awakened to 
the necessity of seeking ‘assimilation’ with the British civilisation as their sole 
																																								 																				
139  Alan Gledhill, The Republic of India: The Development of Its Laws and Constitution, 2nd ed. 
(London: Steven and Sons Ltd., 1964). (At p. 5) 
140  See Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India. Chalking out comparison between rational 
utilitarians and Evangelists Stokes pointed out,  
 Although there was, of course, a profound gulf between their actual practising ideas, the 
assumptions of Evangelical theology and the Utilitarian philosophy were remarkably similar. For 
both, man was a creature of sensation, of pleasure and pain. His failure to attend his happiness 
was the result of ignorance and miscalculation. Because of this he tended to prefer present 
pleasure to a more remote lasting happiness. Knowledge would show men their true state and 
enable them calculate aright. But until men were fully educated, and until they had sufficiently 
disciplined themselves to forgo the immediate pleasure for the sake of lasting happiness (the 
Evangelicals would say until men were ‘born anew’), a ‘severe schoolmaster’ was necessary in 
the form of law. For the Evangelicals this meant the Divine or Mosaic Law, whose first use was 
to punish ignorance and ‘slay the sinner’. For the Utilitarians it meant that the human legislator 
must assist men to avoid harmful acts by artificially weighting such acts with the pains of 
punishment. (At p. 54-55) 
141  Sir Gooroodass Banerjee, The Hindu Law of Marriage and Stridhana (Delhi: Mittal Publications, 
1984). (At p.169) Also Rudolph and Rudolph, “Living with Difference in India: Legal Pluralism 
and Legal Universalism in Historical Context.” 
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chance of regeneration, and they themselves make a demand to the colonial 
government for improving natives’ condition. It was believed that an adequate 
combination of strict laws and appropriate system of education could go a long way 
in inculcating the desire in the native population to reach the stage of advancement 
which British were presumed to have reached. 
 
With respect to situation of women, secularisation of laws and substantive reforms 
in customary and religion based laws appeared to be of utmost necessity. However, 
given compulsions of colonial rule and colonial rulers’ reluctance in interfering 
personal/family matters, British rulers saw their role limited to providing state 
judicial forums and to rendering the laws uniform, written, certain and 
systematised.142 The ‘policy of non-interference’ was a result of the above 
reluctance, with little realisation that the process of rendering law certain and 
predictable would cause serious distortions in Indian society.  
 
2.4 Policy of Non-Interference: Means for Exercising Tolerance 
British, it is a well-known fact, came to India as traders and continued as rulers.143 It 
was decided already in the early years of the Empire not to interfere in personal and 
religious matters of indigenous population. Best attempts were made to refrain from 
dealing with personal (familial) or religious disputes of members of native 
population. Derrett pointed out,  
By 1769 the British had no intention of accepting more knowledge or interest 
in Hindu or Muslim customs or laws than was essential for performing the 
functions which had devolved on them. The natives were to govern 
themselves, provided that the government should retain all the advantages of 
any authority or jurisdiction which the Company had inherited. 144 
																																								 																				
142  Cohn, “Law and the Colonial State in India.” Highlighting concern for natives’ religion and 
culture in colonial administrators Cohn stated, “Jones wanted to restore to India its laws, which 
pre-dated Islamic invasions.” (At p. 147) 
143  For a detailed discussion on this point see Anil Chandra Banerjee, English Law in India (New 
Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1984). Also, J. Duncan M. Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in 
India (London: Faber & Faber, 1968). 
144  J. Duncan M. Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India (London: Faber & Faber, 1968). (At 
p. 284) 
 For a similar view also see Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India. Highlighting concern for 
religion and traditions amongst British, Stokes noted, 
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In later years when confronted with the necessity to settle disputes related to 
personal (family) matters of indigenous population,  policy of non-interference in 
personal and religious matters of natives was devised as a way towards respecting 
religious beliefs of the natives. All British wanted to do was to provide official 
forums that could efficiently administer indigenous religious laws for indigenous 
population.145 A clear expression of this policy was: the famous regulation of 1772 
by the then Governor of Bengal, Warren Hastings to the effect, “in all suits 
regarding inheritance, marriage, caste and other religious usages and its institutions, 
the laws of the Koran with respect to the Mahomedans, and those of Shasters with 
respect to the Gentoos, shall be invariably adhered to”.146  While making such a 
Declaration, British saw their role limited to providing state judicial forums and to 
rendering the laws uniform, written, certain and systematised.147 However, in the 
context of colonial rule, loaded with pre-conceived notions about non-western 
societies, it was difficult for Britishers to appreciate that the policy of non-
interference and the efforts for mere systematisation of laws- were actually tools for 
interference in Indian society.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 Even after 1772 when it had stood forth ‘in the character of Dewan’, the Company under 
Hasting’s guidance had been anxious to keep as far as possible to the traditional Indian methods 
and forms of government. ‘We have endeavoured’ wrote Hastings of his administrative reforms, 
‘to adapt our Regulations to the Manners and Understanding of people, and Exigencies of the 
Country, adhering, as closely as we are able, to their Ancient Usages Institutions. (At p. 35-36) 
145  Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India. Expressing skepticism towards British concern for 
efficient administration of justice Stokes stated, 
 Efficient administration of justice meant English law, particularly a modern law establishing 
private property rights in land, and a system of courts which ensure that the influence of the law 
should be felt in the remotest hamlet. It meant using law in a revolutionary way, consciously 
employing it as a weapon to transform Indian society by breaking up the customary, communal 
tenures. (At p. 42) 
146  Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. Drawing attention towards familiarity of British 
with the Personal law systems Derrett stated, 
 The European rulers were prepared to believe in personal laws based upon religion because they 
knew that such a system operated in the Ottoman Empire and they viewed the Mughals as a 
variety of ‘Moors’ or Muhammadan sovereigns with whom the Christian world had many and 
various dealings. It is just possible that some jurists of the period remembered the personal laws 
of the Middle Ages in Continental Europe, whereby citizens of various towns and provinces of 
the Empire were entitled to have their laws administered to them wherever they were. Yet in 
such suppositions European visitors to India were merely rationalizing a situation they saw for 
themselves but imperfectly understood. (At p. 53) 
 Also see Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context. (At pp. 239-242) 
147  Cohn, “Law and the Colonial State in India.” Highlighting concern for natives’ religion and 
culture in colonial administrators Cohn stated, “Jones wanted to restore to India its laws, which 
pre-dated Islamic invasions.” (At p. 147) 
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For the colonial administrators, it was difficult to understand that the notions of the 
law, religion and progress nurtured by them were culture-specific notions148 and that 
a policy incorporating above notions would, instead of being a means to respect and 
tolerate religions and cultures of India, be a tool for exercise of cultural imperialism 
and ethnocentrism. 149 In context of colonial rule not much attention could be paid to 
the fact that the Declaration of 1772 was actually a means to offer a foreign 
framework for making sense of non-western traditions. It could not be seen that 
declaration was a means to introduce a scale to evaluate different societies, 
something which privileged written rules, attributable to a definitive source in 
Heaven, as progressive and advanced over unwritten/oral customs and traditions 
practiced by people as primitive and backward.150 
 
This declaration induced the process, from whereon all the efforts for understanding 
Indian traditions, religions and laws resulted into to making it fit into a ‘universal 
model’ of progress. It initiated a definitive process, through which diverse patterns 
of growth over thousands of years relating to regulation of family matters were to be 
interpreted along a linear pattern of development- from customs to religious laws. 
																																								 																				
148  Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context.  Ludo Rocher, “Hindu Conceptions of Law,” 
Hastings Law Journal 29, no. 6 (1978): 1283–1305. Highlighting that the concept of law 
imported by British was a western concept Rocher writes 
 It was not until 1772, the year in which it was decided that, “in all suits regarding inheritance, 
marriage, caste and other religious usages  or institutions,”  the Hindus should be governed by 
their own laws, that an effort was made to study and translate the Sanskrit books in which the 
Hindu laws were codified. These books happen to be the dharmasastras, treatises on dharma. 
Hence, the equation established by the Western editors and translators of these books was 
dharmasastra equals lawbook, code or Institute. They also established the equation: dharma 
equals law. (At p. 1283) 
 On culture specific nature of law introduced by British also see Surya Prakash Sinha, “Non-
Universality of Law,” ARSP: Archiv Für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for 
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 81, no. 2 (1995): 185–214. 
 Also Bernard S. Jackson, “From Dharma to Law,” American Journal of Comparative Law 23 
(1975): 490–512. Highlighting misunderstandings perpetuated by the British rulers Jackson 
points out, 
 An extreme case of erroneous identification with a modern model was committed by the British 
judiciary in India. Confronted by immense variety of Indian local custom they seized upon the 
famous dharmasastras (such as the “Code” of Manu), which had developed a recognizably 
juridical style, and transformed them into statutes. (At p. 492) 
149  Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context. (At p. 241) 
150  For a detailed discussion on this aspect see Rouland, Legal Anthropology. (At pp. 19-36) 
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Indeed, this could be made possible through combination of factors originating in 
local circumstances and colonial design.  
 
2.5  Policy of Non-Interference: Cause for Misconceptions 
As stated above, the Declaration of 1772, albeit inadvertently, introduced far-
reaching changes in the Indian society concerning regulation of family matters. 
Menski aptly described the implications of the 1772 regulation for Indian society 
and British rule as he noted, 151  
This important Regulation had several effects. First of all, it indicates British 
recognition of Hindu law, assuming that these laws were found, more or less 
codified, in the sastras. Secondly, this Regulation effectively confirmed that 
the British would not introduce English law in all respects and subjects. By 
preserving the so called ‘listed subjects’ to which succession was added in 
1781, as the domain of personal laws, notice was given that Hindu law was 
to be applied to Hindus even before much was known about their law. 
Thirdly, the Regulation gave notice that the British intended to exercise more 
direct control over public law, with criminal law as a priority. 
 
The Declaration was an announcement to the effect that the British considered 
Hindus and Muslims were relatively progressive as compared to other communities 
as both these communities appeared to be governed by laws which could be found 
written/codified in some specific sacred books.152 The Declaration was also an 
evidence of the British understanding that Hindus and Muslims could be divided 
into two distinct, homogenous communities divided on the lines of religion.153 For 
																																								 																				
151  Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context. (At p. 241) 
152  ibid.  At p. 240 
153  Elizabeth Kolsky, “Maneuvering Personal Law System in India,” Law and History Review 28 
(2010): 973–79. Highlighting diversity in India Kolsky notes, 
 Hasting’s plan was based on the assumption that Hindus and Muslims were distinct communities 
with separate and uniform bodies of law. This assumption was inconsistent with the diverse 
identities and syncretic religious practices existing among people on the subcontinent.  (At p. 
976) 
 Also see Michael R. Anderson, “Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India,” in 
Institutions and Ideologies: SOAS South Asia Reader (Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 1993), 
165–85. Anderson mentions 
 The Hastings plan rested on the notion that indigenous norms could be plugged into British-
based legal institutions without significantly compromising the integrity of either. Coming to 
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example, as Derrett eloquently explained that for British it was difficult to 
comprehend at the onset of colonial rule that despite being two distinct religious 
communities, ‘broad characteristics of Hinduism belonged to the entire 
population’.154 It was also an announcement to the effect that the life spheres would 
be divided into two distinct spheres- the public sphere which will be governed by the 
British rulers, which will be purged of the influence of religion and cultures and the 
private sphere where religion and cultures can have a role to play and which would 
be free from interference by the state or the colonial rulers.155  
 
In the context of colonial rule it was difficult to foresee that above understandings 
were potent tools of interference in Hindu society; that rather neutral and benign 
objective of systematisation of law was something laden with bias and prejudices 
which could cause serious distortions.156 That this process of systematisation would 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
understand that the shari’a was authoritative for Islamic legal scholars, many British 
administrators glossed over its internal contradictions and finely distinguished levels of moral 
approbation, and set about applying it as a set of more or less homogenous legal rules. (At p. 
172) 
154  Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. Explaining peculiarity of traditions in India Derrett 
points out, 
 Some characteristics of India require to be painted in the broad, because the majority of Indian 
Muslims and Christians was derived as communities from the Hindu population itself to which 
their ancestors belonged before they were converted. Broad characteristics of Hinduism belong 
to entire population still. (At p. 56) 
155  Declaration was also an indication of the fact that British felt the necessity to consult ‘local 
experts’ only in few areas, which came to be termed as ‘listed subjects’. It was an indication of 
the British presumption that these were the only areas which were important to determine 
religion based or cultural identity and would be governed by the cultural norms. On this see ibid. 
Addressing the issue of ‘listed subjects’ Derrett mentions 
 ‘Inheritance, marriage, caste, and other religious usages or institutions’ were to be administered 
to Hindus according to the law of ‘Shaster’. Why these topics and not others? Two forces were 
evidently at work, the influence of local jurists on the Company’s representatives, and the 
predispositions or prejudices of the latter. As far as former are concerned, Hastings had 
obviously been advised that in all questions of caste-breaking, religious institutions, and those 
topics of the sastra which were founded upon ‘unseen motives’ the laws of the Hindus must be 
ascertained from the sacred sastric texts and the learnings enshrined therein. It would be essential 
to consult pundits to discover what the appropriate rule was. Hastings and his colleagues were, of 
course, predisposed to see the division of topics of law in terms of contemporary English 
division. All matters of marriage and divorce, and all questions of testaments and distribution of 
goods, all matters of religious worship and discipline, excommunication and so forth were within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bishops’ courts, and the law was ecclesiastical law. So the 
pandits’ distinction between ‘unseen’ and ‘seen’ will have coincided with the Englishman’s 
notions of scopes, respectively, of the ‘courts christian’ and ‘courts temporal’. (At p. 233) 
156  ibid. Derrett noted, 
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create unique challenges, was something difficult to comprehend and appreciate. 
Derrett succinctly described challenge for Indian legal system as he wrote,157  
In unconscious conflict between dharma (righteousness) and mere law India 
has struggled, struggles now dramatically, and will struggle, and not least by 
way of matrimonial causes. The difference between a dharma problem and 
law problem is simply this, that in former cases all considerations, including 
the effect of various solutions upon the surrounding social circumstances, are 
taken into account at the point of decision, while a law-problem is solved by 
reference to predetermined rules worked out without reference to any 
particular persons, places or times, sometimes laid down by people quite 
unconnected with the parties and even residing in different countries and in 
different periods, and invariably obtained out of books and other printed 
paper! To jurists in ancient times, and still in various parts of India, the latter 
method of solving disputes seems gross and very amateurish. To the 
cosmopolitan scholar, of course, the former method is simply corrupt. There 
can be no reconciliation between the two, unless India will happen to be the 
first country to work it out. 
 
It could not be seen that for Hindus the systematised body of law would only operate 
as one of the layers of law with customs and traditions going underground.158 In the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 As it was, the British administrators insisted upon clarity, certainty and finality in terms foreign 
to Hindu tradition, and if the pandit was true to his sastra he could not at the same time substitute 
the new attempts at legislation for his own old authorities. Perhaps the attempts were doomed to 
failure. (At p. 269) 
 Also see Anderson, “Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India.” 
157  J. Duncan M. Derrett, The Death of a Marriage Law: Epitaph for Rishis (Durham, North 
Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1978). (At pp. 49-50) 
158  H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). Pointing out limitations of the westernised state law for large number of 
rural population in India Glenn noted, 
 The local traditions say different things, and they are profound things relating to life and death 
and personal responsibility, which have been passed on for millennia. There is no widespread, 
positive phenomena of obedience to law which is simply enacted or judicially stated. Already, 
within a half-century of the Hindu Code’s creation, it is being pointed out that older notions of 
legality still persist- caste autonomy, accepted forms of deviance, evasion or ignorance of law. 
The traditional society also uses the formal law for its own ends. So we may see the Hindu Code, 
like Maimonides code, pulled back to the people, surrounded by commentary, subject to on-
going, revelatory development of tradition. If the law is king, hindu law has long taught that it is 
the people who decide which law. (At p. 276) 
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context of colonial rule it was difficult to notice that the process of systematisation 
of Hindu and Muslim laws could be done only by obscuring some vital elements of 
these worldviews. In the context of colonial rule it was necessary to ignore or 
perhaps difficult to appreciate that colonial rulers’ presumptions about Hindu and 
Muslim communities, about notion of law prevalent in these communities was a 
result of some gross misconceptions about these communities and understanding of 
law prevalent therein. In search of closest equivalent to the western notion of law 
amongst Hindus, it was necessary to ignore that equating dharma to law or to 
‘Hindu law’- to a set of norms received from a definitive source in Heaven would be 
against the spirit of Hindu traditions.159 In the context of colonial rule it was also 
difficult to appreciate that while there existed rich literature for Hindus which could 
be seen as religion based scriptures and which provided extensive guidance to 
individuals on all possible aspects of life, reducing these scriptures to law books will 
entail gross misunderstanding about the concept of law in the Hindu society.160 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 For a detailed description, see Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. Derrett provides a 
comprehensive description of how British were convinced that the efforts for systematisation of 
Hindu Law was an activity in the interests of the Hindus. Drawing attention towards colonial 
administrators’ efforts to systematize and codify Hindu law and the challenges it created for the 
Indian legal system Derrett noted, 
 In May 1773 eleven Pandits, including some persons of known eminence in their profession, 
commenced their labours at Calcutta, finishing a digest to Hasting’s specifications in February 
1775. The work was called Vivadarnava-setu, or ‘bridge across the ocean of litigation’, and it 
acquired soon afterwards the alternative title Vivadarnava-bhanjana, ‘breakwater to the ocean of 
litigation’, implying thereby that the certainty now for the first time offered to litigants in the 
Company’s territories would put some check upon the appalling flood of cases which inundated 
courts. (At p. 239)  
 He further noted how British efforts to offer certainty to natives through codification of law, 
‘failed to deflect pundits from their normal sources of information, and merely added another to 
their many reference works’. (At p. 240 ) 
159  Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. Derrett stated, 
 No translation of any smriti, even that of Manu, could enable the courts to administer to the 
Hindus the ‘law of Shaster’ or their ‘law and usages’. In the same way no single text could do 
duty for an able pandit’s learning if honestly applied. (At p. 250) 
 For similar views on importance of texts as sources of Hindu law also see Jackson, “From 
Dharma to Law.”; Donald R. Davis, “Law and ‘Law Books’ in the Hindu Tradition,” German 
Law Journal 9, no. 3 (2008): 309–26. Considering British rulers’ attempts to equate dharma with 
law, Davis notes, 
 A failure to recognize the nature of the sacred texts on religion and law in the Hindu tradition, 
particularly the nature of Dharmasastra both as text and tradition, led to numerous 
misconceptions and misappropriations of the classical Hindu law tradition during and after the 
British colonial period in India. (At p. 317) 
160  S.G. Vesey Fitzgerald, “Place of Hindu Law in Comparative Jurisprudence,” Law Quarterly 
Review 39 (1923): 357–71.; David A. Funk, “Traditional Orthodox Hindu Jurisprudence: 
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Concerns for efficient administration of justice and the accompanying belief that 
uniformization and systematization would result into efficient administration of the 
colonised territories made it necessary for colonial rulers to ignore true nature of 
dharma as a multi-vocal concept, as an inherently plural entity which defied all 
attempts at translation161 and which meant different things at the same time. It was 
necessary to ignore that  
Dharma is multi-vocal: besides element, data, quality and origination, it 
means law, norm of conduct, character of things, right, truth, ritual, morality, 
justice, righteousness, religion, destiny, and many other things. It would not 
lead us anywhere to try to find an English common denominator for all these 
names, but perhaps etymology can, show us the root metaphor underlying 
the many meanings of the world.162 
 
Requirement of clear and certain rules to govern the natives through a formal 
judicial system made it necessary that colonial rulers ignored the concept of cosmic 
order, which was central to Hindu traditions and which rendered dharma as an 
inherently plural concept. 
  
2.5.1 The Concepts of Cosmic Order and Dharma: Sources of Cultural and 
Legal Pluralism in India  
The concept of cosmic order entails the understanding that the universe exists in 
form of a pre-existent macrocosmic order, as a kind of ecologically sound symbiotic 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
Justifying Dharma and Danda,” Southern University Law Review 15 (1988): 169–213. For a 
detailed discussion on challenges in using shastras as law books see Derrett, Religion, Law and 
the State in India. (especially see chapter three, “Religious Commands and Legal Commands” 
pp. 75-96). Drawing attention towards distortions to Hindu or ever Muslims’ understanding of 
law Derrett stated, 
 The need for certainty took precedence over the comfort of the science of jurisprudence. The 
dharmasastra  as a living and responsible science in matters which might come before a court of 
law died when the courts assumed judicial knowledge of the system in 1864, but the death-
sickness commenced with Jones’s quaint act of 1786. (At p. 250) 
161  Rocher, “Hindu Conceptions of Law.” (At p. 1284), also Ved P. Nanda, “Hinduism and Human 
Rights,” in Hindu Law and Legal Theory, ed. Ved P. Nanda and Surya Prakash Sinha, 
International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory (England: Dartmouth, 1996), 237–47. 
162  Sinha, “Human Rights.” (At p. 87-88) Also see Nanda, “Hinduism and Human Rights.” 
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order in which every component part has a place and an important role to play.163 
While it is indubitable that order exists, the question as to who is in charge of this 
order has been left open. It is commonly accepted that the higher order does not 
depend on one divine figure but on an unknown force. 164  While there is no 
agreement as to who or what is in charge of this order, there is no doubt that the 
higher order exists and that both Gods and men must submit to it alike. The Hindu 
worldview encourages every individual to understand that participation in this 
ordered universe is not subject to individual choice, and that Gods, humans, animals 
and all other beings have their place in this order due to some invisible ordering 
force to which everyone, by necessity, must relate. This ancient conceptualisation of 
pre-existent order consists in imparting less importance to individual as an ordering 
force than to elements beyond human or even divine control. The concept of cosmic 
order puts forward an image of inescapable interrelatedness between micro-cosmic 
and macro-cosmic and visible and invisible spheres. Envisaging inescapable 
interrelatedness, human beings and ordered universe, life, within Hindu system, is 
seen as a complex experience, in which everybody and everything is visibly and 
invisibly interconnected in a giant systemic network of cosmic dimensions. It is 
predominantly perceived to be an internally regulated, self-controlled order with in-
built mechanisms to correct its disturbances that it is subjected to for various 
reasons. Expectations about conscious efforts for maintenance of self-controlled 
Order in the Hindu system are accompanied with the realisation that Order will 
always be subject to disorder. As Menski points out, 165  
The internalised dialectics of cosmic order as a never-ending process rather 
than an idyllic final state mean that the ideal of balance will at all times 
																																								 																				
163  For a detailed discussion on the concept of cosmic order see Werner Menski, Hindu Law: 
Beyond Tradition and Modernity (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003). Menski, Comparative 
Law in a Global Context.  
164  For a detailed discussion on Hinduism not being a “revealed religion” see Menski, Hindu Law. 
Menski states,   
 Hinduism does not require its adherents to accept the supremacy of a particular God and to 
submit to His Order. The higher Order does not depend on one divine figure but on an unknown 
force. Therefore, Hindu is not defined by allegiance to a particular God or gods, but to the 
conceptual system as a whole and, later to a way of life relating to such concepts. Having 
assumed that no one particular named superior God can solely be in charge of this Order, 
Hindus, it appear had agreed to disagree over the identity of ‘the Absolute’. (At p. 147) 
165  Menski. (At p. 160) 
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necessarily be accompanied by imbalance, thus requiring constant vigilance 
and re-balancing. 
Belief in the presence of self-healing mechanisms of internally regulated self-
controlled Order excludes the necessity of imposing norms of appropriate conduct 
by any external authority or institution for maintenance of this order.   
 
2.5.1.1. The Concept of Dharma 
Dharma, which comes from the Sanskrit root dhr, signifies an obligation, a duty for 
all, Gods, humans and others to try their best to partake in the higher order, 
contributing as much as possible in its sustainability.166 This is deemed important 
because of the understanding that the order or the balance in the Cosmos is 
maintained as long as every constituent element makes its proper contribution, that 
is, performs one’s own duty, the svadharma.167 This worldview also incorporates the 
understanding that the roles are specific to different people and situations, and they 
depend on factors like gender, age, stage or status in society. It also encourages 
every individual to understand that although maintenance of order requires 
conscious efforts on part of every individual, the universe is a self-controlled order, 
and that it consists of in-built visible and invisible mechanisms for its maintenance 
that involves Gods, humans, animals and all other beings. Therefore, the worldview 
encourages every individual to understand that deviations from svadharma bring 
consequences not only in this life but also in subsequent lives.168  
 
Drawing upon this image, dharma signifies an obligation binding upon every 
individual, which is to be his or her svadharma, to choose a way of life that 
embodies awareness of the overriding demands and expectations of an ordered 
(symbiotic) universe. The expectation is that each individual engages in any action 
or inaction with the awareness that he or she is integrally connected to family, clan, 
community, state, nation, and ultimately the universe and that each action as well 
																																								 																				
166  For a detailed discussion on the concept of dharma also see K. L. Bhatia, Concept of Dharma: 
Corpus Juris of Law and Morality: A Comparative Study of Legal Cosmology (New Delhi: Deep 
& Deep Publications, 2010). 
167  P. V. Kane, History of Dharmashastras, vol. I (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 
1968). (At p. 1) 
168  Sri Aurobindo, The Foundations of Indian Culture, 3rd ed. (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram 
Press, 1971). 
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inaction has potentially wide reaching visible (drista) and invisible (adrista) 
consequences for all the other elements in the web.169 Dharma, in other words, 
implies an obligation upon every individual to take appropriate action, to do the 
right thing at the right moment, for serving the inescapable interrelatedness, after 
understanding and accepting, through a process of critical reflection, her position 
and her role in the complex cosmic web.  
 
2.5.1.2. Dharma as an Inherently Plural Entity 
In Hindu worldview, while there is an expectation concerning appropriate actions 
from each element, a distinctive feature has been the fact that there is no fixed 
notion of what is appropriate. Appropriateness is an essentially relative criterion. 
Therefore conceptually dharma, is universalistic in extreme, which means that there 
does not exist an absolute, measurable notion of ‘good’, while adharma (opposite of 
dharma) cannot be interpreted as an equivalent of ‘bad’. Human life is perceived as 
a constant, complex and dialectic process of ascertaining what is appropriate or 
right. Therefore, notions of dharma and adharma depend on particular situations, 
signifying doing the right thing at the right moment.170 A general understanding that 
no two situations can be identical influences decisions about appropriateness. This 
belief underscores the basic requirement that each individual situation is to be dealt 
with separately against the whole contextual background. 
 
																																								 																				
169  J. Duncan M. Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 
1963). Emphasising the value of interconnectedness in Hindu traditions, Derrett stated 
 The ancient Hindus saw the ‘after-life’, or ‘-lives’, as of one piece with this life, the transient 
with substantial, and the individual did not exist apart from the needs, prejudices, and claims of 
his family, claim, occupational class, and ethnic group. Claims conflicted, duties cut across each 
other, and out of these conflicts juridical thought emerged. (At p. 3) 
170  ibid. Drawing attention towards plurality inherent in dharma Derrett noted, 
 The view that everything could be right, and yet that some ways were more right than others, led 
to the proliferation of compositions on the subject of righteousness; and the comparison, 
explanation, and digesting of such texts, which were at first oral, became a science. (At p. 3) 
 Also Ram Mohan Das, Women in Manu and His Seven Commentators (Bodh-Gaya: Kanchan 
Publications, 1962). Das notes, 
 To speak of Dharma itself becoming Adharma and vice versa according to the change of times 
and localities is really to speak a good deal more than just allowing the mere possibility of 
modification in Dharma. It is to ask men to be prepared for such complete and radical changes in 
Dharma as may be even contradictory to the generally accepted Dharma, in order to suit the 
exigencies of time and other conditions. (At p. 32) 
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Since the higher order does not depend on one divine figure but on an unknown 
force Hinduism has never required its adherents to accept the supremacy of a 
particular God or to submit to His order. Therefore dharma does not represent a 
creed or religion, requiring allegiance to a particular God or Gods. Dharma, instead, 
relates to the conceptual system as a whole and later to a way of life relating to such 
concepts, which regulates an individual’s or group’s activities as members of society 
as well as independent autonomous units with the aim of maintaining cosmic 
harmony.171 As long as this code of conduct is aimed at serving harmony in the 
micro-cosmic and macro-cosmic spheres, different groups or the individuals can 
claim allegiance to Hinduism. 
 
A fundamental aspect associated with this core conceptual structure is that these 
notions about the existence of Higher Order and every element’s place in it are not 
to be imposed on anybody. A core concept, called atmanastushti (one’s own 
satisfaction) warrants that one of the basic requirements for serving this order would 
be the satisfaction of every individual’s conscience. Consequently, dharma does not 
possess element of force or constraining power with an external authority as an 
integral element. Lingat explains this point well as he notes,  
Dharma has no constraining power by itself. It puts itself forward, it shows 
the way which one should follow, but it does not impose that way.172  
Therefore the basic purpose of the Hindu system, as Menski emphatically points out, 
remains to offer guidelines for every human being in order to regulate his or her 
activities as an individual and as a member of society in accordance with dharma, to 
discover himself or herself amidst never-ending chain of role conflicts and to find 
his or her own path in life.173 Nobody, no matter how well-versed about the 
intricacies of the workings of cosmic order and place of human being in this cosmic 
order, is supposed to take more steps than that are required to provide guidance 
about this order. Svadharma of those well-versed in such intricacies is to show the 
way or to provide guidance about every individual’s or his immediate social group’s 
																																								 																				
171  Menski, Hindu Law. (especially chapter three, at PP. 86-107) 
172  Robert Lingat, The Classical Law of India, trans. J. Duncan M. Derrett (USA: University of 
California Press, 1973). (At P. 258) 
173  Menski, Hindu Law. (especially chapter three, At pp. 86-107) 
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obligations in particular situation and context and leave on him or them the choice to 
proceed on the recommended path. 
 
The Hindu worldview envisaged social order as being one with natural order, a self-
controlled order which could be maintained and perpetuated by internal self-control 
or performance of svadharma on part of each individual. However, given the 
realisation ‘that the ideal of balance will at all times necessarily be accompanied by 
imbalance,’174 it is accepted that activities in conformity with svadharma will always 
be accompanied with deviations from it. Yet, deviating behaviour of individuals and 
acceptance of deviations did not effect the belief that every individual carries the 
potential to reflect, understand, and accept one’s position in the cosmic web and to 
perform her obligations accordingly. At the same time there is also an acceptance 
that this potential cannot be realised by an individual in one lifetime, but through 
constant guidance every individual will reach the stage, even if in subsequent lives, 
where he/she will be able to realise this potential. Various factors relating to varying 
combinations of basic inclinations (gunas) in every individual, human instincts and 
diverse worldly circumstances are believed to create obstacles in this realisation. 
These obstacles can be dealt with and their effect minimised through constant 
guidance about one’s dharma to serve the interconnectedness in the micro-cosmic 
and macro-cosmic spheres. As a means of guidance for each individual, Hindu 
system classifies every human being’s pursuits of life into four broad categories, the 
pursuit of moral order, (dharma); seeking material security/wealth, (artha); seeking 
fulfilment of desires for pleasures, (kama); and seeking freedom, (moksa). The pre-
dominant purpose of this classification is to take into consideration and thereby 
attempt to regulate the effect of human instincts on society. Through this division 
the system aimed at providing guidance so that every individual could pursue his 
worldy desires, the artha and kama considerations, in accordance with dharma, that 
is, with sense of duty towards cosmic harmony.  
 
These fundamental aspects of Hinduism- the importance of the satisfaction of 
individual conscience, emphasis on the potentiality of every individual to achieve 
																																								 																				
174  ibid. At p. 108 
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the ideal of internal self-control, and perception of cosmic order as a constant 
process of dialectics between balance and imbalance- render acceptance of diversity 
as its internal criterion. These aspects ensure that the body of Sanskritic literature- 
Vedas, Upnishads, dharamsutras, puranas, dharamshastras- which gives expression 
to and provides guidance about intricacies of the working of the cosmic Order and 
ideal expectations from different individuals and groups to serve this order is not the 
most important source for determining situation specific dharma.175 The sources that 
could be relied on for determination of dharma were: Atmanastushti, (satisfaction of 
individual conscience), that is, individual satisfaction about ‘doing the right thing in 
the right way at the right time’, collectively and individually experienced”; 
‘sadacara’( model behaviour), that is, customs of good people, where good people 
could be one’s peer group, respected people from one’s immediate environment, or 
learned men relying on scriptural authority; Smriti texts (post-Vedic Sanskritic 
literature) and the Vedas. 176 
 
Having emphasis on satisfaction of individual conscience as an important source of 
dharma practices, usages and customs of the different communities could vary from 
being in slight deviation to being in opposition to the Sanskritic norms as an internal 
criteria of the Hindu system. Consequently, conformity with the Sanskritic norms is 
not a determining factor for dharmic or adharmic character of different practices, 
usages or customs or any particular solution to a conflicting situation. Their dharmic 
character depends on their ‘appropriateness’ in the situational context.177 
																																								 																				
175  See Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. Pointing out the fact that dharmashastras were 
not the only source for decisions relating to dharma or ‘righteousness’ Derrett stated,  
 Custom existed for support, rather than the confinement, of inclinations. It was great part of 
dharma. ‘righteousness,’ and the rulers that upheld it were themselves upheld. (At p. 187) 
176  Menski, Hindu Law. (Chapter three, At pp. 112-130) 
177  On this point see Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. Addressing the issue of sources of 
law or of dharma Derrett noted, 
 In any litigation, the pleas must rely upon a source of law, but the practical needs of the context 
will exclude principles of written law which were stated in general terms and which must, 
according to general precept, be administered in conformity with nyaya or yukti, natural reason 
or equity. (At p. 155) 
 Highlighting complexity of the issue of relationship between sastras (written texts) and custom 
Derrett stated that for any one engaged in the task of determining dharma, it entailed dealing 
with arguments in circle. The issue, according to Derrett, was  
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Therefore while there were written texts laying down abstract rules and norms to 
govern behaviour of individuals, for a dharmic order the concern was not merely 
application of these abstract rules and norms to specific situations. In dealing with 
any particular situation the aim was to maximise social harmony or to abate group 
conflict or tension. It was reconciliation of parties through compromise and 
conciliation that characterised result of the litigation. Vyavahara roughly translated 
as litigation implied removal of doubts or ascertainment of dharma in a conflicting 
situation.178 As Derrett points out,  
The native system had always admired abstract justice from afar, but it applied only 
on levels where more pressing considerations were absent.179  
 
Native tribunals valued impartiality and had to distinguish between authentic and 
adulterated testimony.180 But the judgement concerning credibility of evidence arises 
from the intimate and direct knowledge the adjudicators have of dispute between 
them rather than through an elaborate system of rules of evidence, procedure and 
pleading. Priority for maximisation of social/group harmony leaves other principles 
like ensuring formal equality for every human being, protection of individualistic 
rights of every human being in a secondary position. Dharmic order also aspired to 
use each conflicting situation as an occasion to direct the society, as far as 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 The sastra refers in proper circumstances to customs for the solution of disputes, and yet must 
the customs not be inconsistent with the sastra? The meaning was that the custom should not of 
its very nature be hostile to the fundamental tenets of the Hindu socio-religious system as 
expounded in the sastra. (At p. 157-158) 
 Derrett further clarified the issue as he stated, 
 One who accepted the sastra, either as a hereditary possession, or as a novel import, accepted 
with it the facility to enforce customs, and also the duty to guide them and to apply them in a 
manner consistent with the basic principles of sastra. The authority for using the sastra as a 
residual system lay, therefore, in the Hinduism or Hinduizing tendencies of the ruler, and 
ultimately of the ruled. (At p. 163) 
 Derrett further mentioned, 
 In derogation from the sastra a valid custom was binding by sastric authority; but the source of 
the sastra’s authority was the public’s acceptance of the postulates of Hinduism, and the source 
of custom’s factual content and applicability was public desire not to move from the ways of 
ancestors. Yet in practice custom was not static, neither was the umbrella provided by the sastra 
inelastic. (At p. 164) 
178  Menski, Hindu Law. (At pp. 112-120) 
179  Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. (At p. 285) 
180  Menski, Hindu Law. (At pp. 112-120) 
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practicable, towards understanding and acceptance of the requirements of the cosmic 
Order. Dharma as an organisational principle served two-fold aims: first, to act as a 
guiding force for the society to direct it to the idealist positions as a means to serve 
the cosmic harmony; and second, to provide solutions to the conflict situations with 
an aim to ensure that every individual performs obligations and also receives his or 
her entitlements.  
 
2.5.1.3. Dharma: Neither Law nor Religion   
Perceptions of interconnected between micro cosmic and macro cosmic spheres also 
impart a specific and distinctive character to dharma as organisational principle of 
existence along with imparting a distinctive understanding to law in Hindu 
conceptual structure. Stressing on this distinctive understanding of law that underlies 
dharma, Menski mentions, 181  
In an integrated society, where spheres of law, morality and religion largely 
overlap, one may perceive dharma and its implications as religious, but it 
operates together with other forces and is neither simply law, nor just 
religion.  
 
Beliefs about interconnectedness preclude division of life spheres into autonomous 
distinct domains, the public sphere and the private sphere, thereby rendering 
meaningless for the dharmic system differentiation between legal rules and religious 
rules. The understanding about interconnectedness between different spheres 
necessitates that every legal norm is at the same time a religious norm for it 
inevitably will carry an effect on invisible sphere. Derrett emphasised the above 
point eloquently as he cited an important ancient jurist Medathiti,  
the function of judge which is never entirely immune from the taint of sin 
(for no judgement can be prefect), must be approached as if it were the 
performance of a religious obligation.182  
 
																																								 																				
181  ibid. At p. 98 
182  J. Duncan M. Derrett, “The Concept of Law According to Medathiti, a Pre-Islamic Indian Jurist,” 
in Essays in Classical and Modern Hindu Law, by J. Duncan M. Derrett (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1976), 174–96. (At p. 184) 
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For a legal system based on dharma, the main concern is not the distinction of life 
spheres into religious and secular. Instead as Derrett explained eloquently, 183   
The fruitful distinction is between the commands that were merely binding in 
conscience, and that which was, apart from the conscientious sanction, 
capable of being enforced by the king or his officer in the course of judicial 
proceedings. 
 
The overlapping of religious and legal does not preclude distinction between various 
kinds of injunctions that may be required for operation of dharma in society. Various 
distinctions like, enforceable injunctions, unenforceable injunctions, ‘injunctions 
unenforceable by nature’, injuctions which are capable of enforcement by a caste 
tribunal, could be discerned from the sastras. Similarly while concern for both, 
visible as well as invisible spheres, played an important role in arriving at decisions 
in accordance with dharma, extent of concern for either of them depended on the 
situational context, therefore, varying from one situation to the other. Derrett has 
shown, with the example of one of the great jurists of the dharmic order, 184  
To him the transcentendal and the practical are equally real. Those who do 
not accept the transcentendal must accept the practical, or they will suffer in 
this world. Though it is the task of dharamsastra to teach both, since the 
problems of avoiding re-birth were seen to be as real as those of avoiding 
imprisonment, the teacher is aware of the greater urgency of the latter to 
most people.  
 
Emphasis on situation dependent concern for visible and invisible sphere ensured 
that concern for invisible sphere did not overshadow practical and immediate 
concerns. It was concern for these practical issues that led various smritikaras185 to 
device ways to obviate the effects of written texts when they could not respond to 
the demands of the situation. Medathithi made a distinction between drastartha 
(related to seen world) and adrastartha (related to unseen world) texts, but 
contended that the smriti texts are to be considered as drastartha to facilitate 
																																								 																				
183  Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. (At p. 77) 
184  Derrett, “The Concept of Law According to Medathiti, a Pre-Islamic Indian Jurist.” (At p. 180) 
185  Literally meaning authors of treatises on various facets of dharma 
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deviation from them to suit the demands of the situation. It was every individual 
situation that guided which rules, religious, customary or textual were to be applied 
and which aspect, related to the visible world or to the invisible world, is to be given 
prominence. Derrett writes, 186  
Interpretation of law was never complete unless the surrounding 
circumstances of the alleged offender had been taken into account”. “There 
is entire chapter of sastra (scriptural text) devoted to ‘apat’, time of distress. 
This can also be called law of exceptional circumstances. The theory was 
that restrictions on powers and the seriousness of social misconduct and 
crimes were automatically modified in a time of distress, such as invasion by 
the enemy, drought, famine, plague and the like.  In such circumstances 
marriages otherwise improper could be entered into, improper adoptions 
could be performed, and most, striking of all, the normal precaution against 
crime and sin might be relaxed. Moreover, as see from Manu XI, 16-18, 
which enable a Brahman to steal from a person of lower caste enough to stay 
his hunger if he has not eaten for three days, even a personal distress, not 
really qualifying for the relaxations appropriate to apad, which should be 
general misfortune, may serve to vary the normal rigour of the law. 
 
																																								 																				
186  Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. (At p. 95) Also see Das, Women in Manu and His 
Seven Commentators. Explaining the concept of dharma according to a famous smritikar Manu, 
Das states, 
 The recognition of desa and kala as potent factors affecting dharma itself is a tacit acceptance by 
Manu of the fact that despite attempts at formulating rules for regulating man’s conduct of life 
and behaviour through Dharma, they are not to be taken as rigid and static principles, but have 
been allowed a certain amount of flexibility and modifiability in their operation to suit varying 
conditions. (At p. 32) 
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2.5.2 Family: A Resort in Spiritual Journey of Life  
 Asrama-vyasvastha187- the scheme that provides guidelines for organisation of life 
of an individual- also gives guidance about the importance of the institution of 
family for the social Order and cosmic harmony. According to this scheme each 
individual’s life should be divided into four ashramas or stages of growth: 
brahmacharya (student-hood), grhastha (married life), vanaprastha (quiet life of 
contemplation and withdrawal from activities) and sannyasa (renunciation). This is 
perceived as a division required to facilitate the spiritual journey of life and to 
enable every individual in realising four goals of life, artha (material pleasures), 
kama (sensual desires), dharma (performance of duty), and moksha (renunciation). 
Each stage of growth represents a stage of maturation. The society, including its 
legal system, has to guide the inner process of maturation by providing spiritual 
disciplines, appropriate to each stage of growth.  
 
The first stage - the stage of student-hood - is the period to prepare an individual for 
participation in social life, so that he or she fits into society, grow as an individual 
and contribute to social growth. It is through the second stage- the stage of married 
life- that an individual starts to participate actively in social life.  By taking a 
suitable partner in life an individual enters the married stage of life, in which couple 
participate together, deciding to contribute. This stage is considered most important 
of all the four stages of growth, as it is during this stage and through the institution 
of family that individuals can provide support for people in the other three stages. 
Therefore, maintenance and continuation of the family as an institution is an 
obligation of every member of the family as one’s contribution towards society. 
Ramajois points out verses from Manusmriti that emphasise the importance of 
Grihasthaashrama:188 
A householder who follows the path of Dharma and discharges his obligation 
as a householder is superior to all persons in other Ashramas because he is 
the supporter of all those in other Ashramas. ( VI- 89) 
																																								 																				
187  This can be roughly translated as an arrangement of different stages of life. 
188 M. Rama Jois, Ancient Indian Law: Ancient Values in Manusmriti, 1st ed. (Delhi: Universal Law 
Publishing Co., 2002). (At p. 46) 
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Just as the rivers, big or small, find place of rest in the ocean, even so men 
belonging to all Ashramas find protection in the householder. ( VI-90) 
They contribute to the family, to the neighbourhood, to the community, to 
the earth they live on and to the cosmos in both micro cosmic and macro-
cosmic dimensions.  
 
Every human marriage, which provides basis for the family, is perceived as an 
action of cosmic relevance.189  Menski points out, 190  
It has the impact of conceptually equating husband and wife as cosmic forces 
(…..). Their permanent timeless unity, their visible and invisible linkages, 
and the atmosphere of symbiotic mutual support all serve as blue prints for 
an everlasting human marriage.  
 
This cosmic union between two individuals is also an occasion for manifesting links 
between larger groups of people which can be extended families (kinship groups or 
clans), caste groups, villages to enhance mutual co-operation and contribution to 
cosmic harmony. Menski further notes, 191  
Vedic expectation is that a human marriage will be conducted in accordance 
with rta (macrocosmic ‘Order’), as a human activity for the purpose of 
strengthening cosmic harmony and the entire ‘system’, however perceived.  
 
Entering in to the stage of married life is a kind of religious or moral obligation for 
both man and woman. Since purpose of the family is to contribute in cosmic 
harmony (‘divine’ purpose), family is perceived as a religious institution, sanctified 
by religious ceremony and meant for a religious or spiritual life. In this view 
creation and maintenance of a partnership between two individuals for each other’s 
satisfaction is not the sole purpose of marriage.192 This partnership is also created for 
																																								 																				
189  Werner Menski, “Marital Expectations as Dramatized in Hindu Marriage Rituals,” in Roles and 
Rituals for Hindu Women, ed. Julia Leslie (London: Pinter, 1991), 47–67. 
190  ibid. At p. 52  
191  ibid. At p. 53 
192  ibid. Describing nature of Hindu marriage Menski noted,  
 Hindu marriage rituals are concerned with all different components of this cosmic whole and not 
merely the two individuals at centre. (At p. 53) 
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the performance of the other familial and societal obligations within the cosmic web. 
Importance for partnership arises from the fact that marriage (vivah) gives a man the 
eligibility to perform certain Vedic rituals stressing on the importance of ritual 
partner in individual’s life.  Rama jois points out, 193 
Devaruna (pious obligation to the Gods) was required to be discharged 
through religious sacrifices and other virtuous deeds such as making gifts to 
deserving people and various kinds of service to the needy and helpless and 
suffering people as a householder. It was ordained that all such acts must be 
performed by the husband and the wife jointly: To be mothers were women 
created and to be fathers men. Religious rites therefore are ordained in the 
Veda to be performed by the husband together with his wife.( IX-96).  
 
Through marriage a man and a woman creates a new nuclear family within the 
husband’s joint family or clan. Therefore, marriage, as a way of marking cosmic 
links, is a means through which a family or a group contributes in the perpetuation 
of another group. Thus, marriage implying passage of bride from and by her natal 
family to the marital family is itself a spiritual act where one family or group offers 
procreative power of a woman to another family for its continuation. This act of 
passage of woman from one family to the other lays down obligation on both sides 
that are involved in it. It is dharma of both marital and natal family to take all the 
steps necessary to facilitate incorporation of bride into marital family.194 Ritual 
process or ceremony is an important part of formation of marriage relationship, as 
rituals are perceived to prepare man and woman for entering into a different stage of 
life. Once the basic rituals for incorporation have taken place, care and well-being of 
the bride is an unavoidable responsibility of the marital family. Having entered into 
new family for the purpose of contributing in its perpetuation, maintenance and 
prosperity, bride’s dharma is to take all possible measures to realise this purpose. 
 
2.5.3 Marriage: A Pluralistic Institution and A Timeless, Eternal Yet a 
Dissoluble Union    
According to the Hindu worldview, marriage, ideally, is a monogamous union and 
solemnisation of this union as a samskara (sacrament), through appropriate ritual 
																																								 																				
193  Jois, Ancient Indian Law: Ancient Values in Manusmriti. (At p. 39) 
194  ibid. (At p. 40) 
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observance, is the ideal union between a man and a woman.195 Marriage as a 
samskara (sacrament) can be defined as a union or a solemn contract between a 
man, having qualifications for accepting a girl in marriage and a woman, having 
qualifications for being given in marriage, with their approval and also with the 
approval of the concerned families or groups, at an auspicious moment and through 
appropriate ritual ceremony before witnesses from social microcosmic sphere. The 
married life is expected to provide opportunities for fulfilment of worldly desires 
while being conscious of the demands of maintaining harmony in microcosmic 
spheres. The main purpose of marriage as a sacrament is procreation and also to 
provide stable foundational bricks to the general social structure.196  
 
Sanskritic texts provide guidance about the ideal or preferred ways for effecting a 
cosmic union between man and woman and also offer guidance about ideal 
qualifications of and expectations from partners in the marriage who can best serve 
this religious/spiritual institution. While sanskritic texts offer necessary guidance 
about appropriate rituals and all, given the importance of individual conscience and 
customs of different communities in Hindu system dharmic validity of marriage is 
not a function of conformity with the idealistic (or sanskritic) norms. Ways for 
formation of marriage relationships and qualifications and expectations from 
partners have varied from community to community. Deviations from texts were not 
the reasons for rendering a union between man and woman as invalid. Sanskritic 
texts too give adequate recognition to this plurality as they incorporate eight forms 
of marriage. The kind of marriage signified in what way the marriage was 
contracted: 
  
Brahma-vivaha (marriage based on voluntary giving away of the girl decked with 
ornaments by father to an honourable and learned groom), Prajapatya vivah 
(marriage based on giving away of the girl by the father to a suitable groom who 
																																								 																				
195  Bhagwat Saran Upadhyaya, Women in R̥gveda (Delhi: S. Chand, 1974).; Also see Paras Diwan, 
Law of Marriage and Divorce, 6th ed. (Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Co., 2011). (At p. 14) 
196  K.P. Jayaswal, Hindu Polity: A Constitutional History of India in Hindu Times (Bangalore: 
Bangalore Publishing Co., 1943). Jayaswal notes,  
 Marriage according to the Dharma School, is a duty, and, as already pointed out, a sacrament. 
Without son the Sraddha could not be offered to manes, and, to have sons, marriage was 
necessary. (At p. 225) 
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asks for the hand of the girl so that they should perform their duties together), 
Daiva-vivah (marriage based on giving away of the girl by father to an officiating 
priest at a sacrificial ceremony), Arsa-vivah  (marriage based on the approval of the 
father and giving away of the maiden after receiving from a suitable groom a 
consideration or a conditional security), Asura-vivah (marriage based on the 
purchase of the girl by the suitor to the father of the girl), Gandharva-vivah ( 
marriage based on the union between a man and woman in absence of consent of the 
respective families), Raksasa-vivah (marriage based on the capture of girl from her 
natal place by force), and Paisaca-vivah (marriage based on deception, or based on 
seduction of girl during her insensibility).197 
 
Though one can find differences among texts about hierarchical ordering of different 
forms but a general pattern in the texts is categorisation of first four (Brahma-
vivaha, Prajapatya vivah, Daiva- vivah, Arsa-vivah,) as approved ones and higher in 
scale as compared to the last four (Asura-vivah, Gandharva-vivah, Raksasa-vivah, 
and Paisaca-vivah) considered as blame-worthy ones. There also appears to be an 
agreement amongst diverse texts that Brahma and Prajapatya forms are most 
appropriate for ‘twice-born’ castes (dvijas or higher castes), that is, people 
belonging to those castes who have been initiated to the knowledge of Vedas, yet 
Arthasastra text of Kautilya reveal increasing incidence of Arsa forms amongst such 
caste groups. Similarly for Kshatriyas (ruling castes), though belonging to ‘twice-
born’ castes exception appears to be in place and Gandharva and raksasa vivah were 
also considered approved forms.  
 
Sanskritic authorities’ treatment of different kinds of marriage and their concern for 
attaching consequences to them very well reflects the fundamental concerns of 
dharmic system- to draw a balance between serving the particularistic and practical 
demands of the community and the individuals concerned and providing guidance 
																																								 																				
197  Diwan, Law of Marriage and Divorce. (At pp. 49-50). Ludwig Sternbach, Juridical Studies in 
Ancient Indian Law (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1965). According to Sternbach there were not 
eight but eleven forms of marriage that existed in ancient India. He opined,  
  When, however, these forms of marriage are closely examined the conclusion can be reached 
from the legal point of view there existed in ancient India not eight but eleven forms of 
marriage.” (At p. 347) 
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about svadharma of each individual and the community concerned in accordance 
with the demands of the cosmic Order. Therefore, even while blameworthy kinds of 
unions were not deprived of dharmic validity,198 the system realised its concern for 
providing guidance about svadharma by attaching different psychic, social and 
economic consequences to marriages dependent on the nature of the union that was 
at the base. As another author pointed out,199  
The quality of the off-spring depended on the quality of the marriage rite” 
i.e. from the praiseworthy marriages virtuous children were born, and from 
blameworthy marriages bad children. These virtuous children were radiant 
with knowledge of the Vedas and were honoured by Sistas.  
 
Under Hindu system various forms of marriage, which could be given recognition 
by the community concerned have enjoyed the dharmic validity. Based on dharmic 
system’s concern on satisfaction of individual conscience, decisions about dharmic 
validity depended on the values which were accepted by individual and his 
collective group. Decisions such as whether forms unapproved by texts such as 
‘marriage by capture’ or ‘marriage by purchase’ should be considered valid or not 
rested on the community concerned. Communities were also free to take decisions or 
to seek support of the ruler or any higher authority in order to discontinue certain 
practices related to union between a man and a woman. Similarly, while higher caste 
groups are expected to adopt any of the first four forms for marriage solemnisation, 
still any incident of union which could fall under last four forms did not 
automatically imply dharmic invalidity of marriage. Nature of consequences that 
could be attached to any particular incident of union between man and woman 
depended on the whole situational context surrounding any incident and also on 
those concerned with particular issue. 
																																								 																				
198  ibid. Sternbach points out, 
 In any case it appears… that the division of the forms of marriage into 8 or 11forms had no 
special meaning from the legal point of view and all the forms of marriage could be divided into 
righteous forms i.e. orthodox forms of marriage (Brahma, Daiva, Arsa, Prajapatya with the 
exception of only case Mn. 9.196-7 also Gandharva) and the blameworthy forms of marriage i.e. 
the non-orthodox forms of marriage ( Gandharva, Asura, Rakshasa, Paisacha). (At p. 347) 
 Also see John Duncan Martin Derrett, Hindu Law, Past and Present: Being an Account of the 
Controversy Which Preceded the Enactment of the Hindu Code, the Text of the Code as Enacted, 
and Some Comments Thereon (Calcutta: A. Mukherjee, 1957). 
199  Chandra Chakraberty, A Study in Hindu Social Polity (Delhi: Mittal, 1987). (At p. 260) 
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With final decision-making authority residing with different communities concerned 
for recognising any particular union, Hindu marriage consisted of immense variety 
of customary forms of marriage solemnisation and of locally and socially 
determined and observed customs or rituals which could be employed for bringing 
into effect union between man and woman.200  These rituals or ceremonies varied 
according to factors like family’s/group’s purpose of according recognition to the 
union, nature of the union. It also mattered whether the bride is presumed to be 
virgin or not, and whether a spouse is widowed or not. Menski writes, 201  
The traditional Hindu law on marriage solemnisation is entirely informal, 
and yet has a plethora of formal elements in the shape of ritual steps which 
lead towards a full-fledged, fully recognised and legally valid Hindu 
marriage. The whole thing is an extended, often a very complex process, and 
it can last days- but it may in certain circumstances be extremely short and 
may not involve any visible ritual at all. There may even be what I have 
called a ‘Zero-ritual’, especially when the bride was married before and is a 
widow. 
 
Marriage as a cosmic union creates a bond between two suitable partners that is to 
be considered sacred, manifesting micro-cosmic and macro-cosmic links. This bond 
is primarily perceived to be indissoluble and not only for this life but for eternity. 
Bride having been incorporated in the husband’s larger family establishes multiple 
links with different family members. Both husband and wife are expected to possess 
enough qualities and capabilities to make this union realise its purpose- serving the 
interconnectedness. Svadharma of all the other members of the extended family or 
kin group is to ensure that each nuclear family within the joint family can survive as 
independent unit while being connected to the larger family group. Personal 
satisfaction of two individuals or two partners in the marriage not being the sole 
purpose of this bond, partners in the marriage are expected to conduct their lives 
with consciousness about the higher concerns of harmony within immediate social 
																																								 																				
200  Werner Menski, “Legal Pluralism in Hindu Marriage,” in Hinduism in Great Britain: The 
Perpetuation of Religion in an Alien Cultural Milieu (London: Tavistock, 1987), 180–200. (At p. 
186) 
201  ibid. (At p. 183) 
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sphere. Absence of harmony between two partners of marriage could be a reason of 
dissolution when it gives rise to possibility of negative effects on larger familial or 
social environment. Therefore, divorce or dissolution of marriage bond, though a 
possibility in principle, is something not recommended or is strongly discouraged. 
Rama jois highlights the phrases from Manusmriti that emphasise on the duty of 
both husband and wife to maintain the permanence of the bond,202 
Mutual friendship and fidelity is the highest dharma to be observed by 
husband and wife, throughout their life. (IX-101), Let man and woman, 
united in a marriage, constantly exert themselves that they may not be 
disunited and may not violate their mutual fidelity. ( IX-102), A man who 
always remains united with his wife and children, is the ideal person. 
Husband is declared to be one with his wife. Neither by sale nor by 
repudiation is a wife released from her husband. ( IX-45-46) 
 
Based on the perceptions of marriage as a cosmic union, requirements of harmony 
are expected to prevail over factors causing disharmony. But, the inevitability of 
disorder ordains that eternal union yields to temporal requirements, where dharma 
calls for dissolution of even a cosmic union initially perceived to be for eternity. 
Yet, there is a concern for not letting artha ( material pleasures) and kama (sensual 
desires) considerations easily sub-ordinate dharma considerations and destroy 
dharmic institution of marriage. There is also concern for not letting remedy of 
dissolution of marriage become a tool for escaping responsibility on part of either 
partner. Remedy of dissolving this union is to be perceived as an extreme one, a tool 
to be deployed when a union meant for performance of svadharma creates serious 
hindrances in its performance.  
 
Sastric texts leads to an inference that in the approved forms of marriage where 
adequate care has been taken by families, in matters such as suitability of the 
partners, performance of adequate rituals, the need for dissolution of marriage 
should not arise. Therefore many sastric authorities appear to be prohibiting divorce 
in four approved forms of marriage or for the people belonging to the groups 
																																								 																				
202  Jois, Ancient Indian Law: Ancient Values in Manusmriti. (At p.40) 
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initiated in the knowledge of Vedas (‘twice-born’ caste groups).203 However, for 
marriages amongst other groups or communities much more leniency for dissolution 
of marriage was accepted.  Remedy of dissolution could be availed whenever any of 
the ‘well-ordained purposes’ of effecting union between man and woman- 
performance of religious/spiritual and social obligations- remains unachievable. 
Since the system offered a man the possibility of effecting union with more than one 
woman in case any of such purpose remains unfulfilled, remedy of dissolution, in 
effect, seemed to have been available only for women.204 Various texts present 
evidence about possibility for a woman to abandon a husband on grounds such as 
bad character, his departure to a foreign land followed by long absence, seditious 
activities, has become dangerous to her life, has become an out-caste or even an 
impotent.205 
 
However, while sanskritic texts contained idealistic norms about marriage as an 
eternal union, there were also detailed norms about how and for what reasons a 
union between man and woman may be dissolved. The decisions concerning when, 
through what methods a marriage union may be dissolved, in other words decisions 
about dharmic validity of the dissolution of marriage, has been dependent on the 
community recognition.  
 
Decisions concerning- purposes of a union between man and woman, situations 
where continuation of union will be a threat to harmony in micro-cosmic sphere, 
circumstances where a woman should be allowed to abandon her husband, economic 
responsibilities of husband or wife in case of dissolution based on dislike, other 
incidental consequences like remarriage, maintenance of divorced wife and children- 
have also been based on community recognition. It was the whole situational context 
which determined whether a marriage should be dissolved or not, whether it should 
result in mere separation between spouses or complete dissolution with the 
possibility for remarriage to the divorced woman. Therefore, while in sastric texts 
one does not come across specific procedures concerning divorce, Hindu family 
																																								 																				
203  Das, Women in Manu and His Seven Commentators. (At pp. 120-1) 
204  ibid. At pp. 198-9 
205  ibid. At p. 93 
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dharma consisted of many kinds of customary methods of dissolution of marriages 
or managing breakdown in the marriage union that were allowed and accepted in 
different communities.  
 
2.5.4. Economic Entitlements: Means to Serve Inter-connectedness 
As discussed above the most favoured form of the organisation of family in the 
Hindu worldview was patrilineal and patrilocal embodying the institution of joint 
family although it gradually encompassed within its fold matrilineal and bilateral 
systems. For the patrilineal systems this institution of joint family was perceived as 
the best way to serve the cosmic interlinkedness and as a means of ensuring 
maintenance for a large kin group.206 Joint family was also to a larger extent a 
characteristic form of property enjoyment, in which adhikaras (rights or interests) of 
a multiple character converge upon each dhana (property).207 Distribution of joint 
family property incorporated the distinctive feature of the Indian concept of 
property- the capacity of svatva (ownership) to exist in favour of several persons 
simultaneously, not only identical adhikaras (rights) being shared, as in the case of 
co-owners, but especially where the adhikaras were inconsistent. In other words as 
Derrett points out,  
The chain from the mula-swami (“root-owner”) to the final, perhaps 
temporary, possessor must be complete, and each link is of the same 
qualitative value as the parts of a tree, from root to twig.208  
Gender equality or sex equality for the purposes of devolution or division of 
property certainly was not a matter of concern for the dharmic system. Predominant 
basis for the economic entitlements from the family property in this system was the 
																																								 																				
206  Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. Linking institution of joint family to religion 
Derrett pointed out, 
 Because religion is a social question as well as, or more significantly than a personal question, an 
opposite tendency manifests itself. The Indian is pre-eminently a family man. The background of 
joint-family, which persists to a large extent even amongst some groups of Muslims and 
Christians, teaches the child to play a multitude of roles and to learn the parts he must play as 
son, nephew, grandchild, brother and so on. The roles are stereotyped and are played irrespective 
of personal inclinations. (At p. 60) 
207  J.Duncan M. Derrett, “The Development of the Concept of Property in India c. A.D. 800-1800,” 
in Essays in the Classical and Modern Hindu Law, ed. J. Duncan M. Derrett, vol. II (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1977). (At p. 57) 
208  ibid. (At p.95) 
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role that one was accorded to play in the cosmic web on the basis of gender or status 
in the society. Therefore basis for economic entitlements is the nature and extent of 
obligations an individual is expected to fulfil. It was widely believed that svatva 
(ownership) couldn’t be severed from its purposes and functions.209  
 
The contention was that property existed entirely to perform sastric purposes, 
including for example the maintenance of the householder’s family, and the 
performance of other duties which were “equal to” or were in fact sacrifices.210 
Derrett points out, 211  
The head of the family might exercise discretion and bind others for religious 
purposes. The king held his property in order to perform his multifarious 
duties. Neglect of duties endangered, according to this school (sastric) of 
thought, the adhikara (right) itself. 
 
One of the important bases of the property entitlements in this patrilineal system was 
the belief that only the male descendants were capable of offering spiritual benefit to 
the father.212 In this model of family organisation men had to bear primary 
responsibility to deal with financial matters, to be breadwinners, to take care of the 
maintenance of the kin or clan members, and to perform spiritual obligations for 
serving the invisible links with the ancestors. Therefore, though system of property 
ownership by women was an integral part of this ancient system, on the basis of 
greater spiritual obligations male members were preferential heirs for allocation of 
‘absolute’ shares in the joint-family property.  
 
																																								 																				
209  ibid. At p. 101 
210  ibid. At p. 49 
211   ibid. At p.50 
212  ibid. Derrett has pointed out an important underlying aspect of this principle. He points out,   
 Their ( females) unfitness for some sacrifices was certain. (…..) Because of their lack of fitness 
to partake in sacrificial ritual upon an equal basis with men, because they lacked the indriya or 
vital potency which was thought to be necessary to be dealing with Indra and other devas, it was 
asserted in a late Vedic text that they were adayadas, i.e. non-sharers. This was interpreted to 
mean that they could neither inherit nor take property at a partition of the family’s wealth. Later 
commentators reasonable pointed out that they lacked potency and therefore lack a share in 
Soma- juice, not property in general. ( At p. 30) 
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Interests in the joint family property were to be divided amongst those having an 
‘absolute’ share in the property (predominantly male heirs); those having limited 
shares (certain category of female heirs) and those disqualified to have a share 
(shareless ones, some female relatives, concubines and their issues) but having 
entitlements to maintenance from the family property.  
 
Specific economic entitlements of women were also meant for the purposes of 
serving this interlinkedness in the family/community/society. Thus, entitlements of 
wives were keeping in line with one of the marital expectations, that is, ensuring 
perpetuation and prosperity of the marital family. Therefore, women were entitled to 
be the managers of the family property and were also entitled to alienate property in 
case of necessity or for the spiritual benefit of the husband. They could also inherit 
property subject to the rule that inherited property should not pass out of the family 
of a woman’s marriage except for her maintenance or necessity, or the husband’s 
spiritual benefit.213 In addition welfare of the marital family being the primary 
criteria women’s entitlements were also subject to their remaining chaste, as their 
chastity was perceived as a proof of their sincerity towards marital family and their 
higher capability to subordinate personal desires to higher concerns of family 
welfare. Daughters, usually not entitled to an absolute share in father’s property, 
could be allocated rights of the son in order to manage father’s property and her son 
enjoyed the authority to offer spiritual benefits to the maternal ancestors and to 
perpetuate name of that family.  
 
Expectation in the Hindu system is that those endowed with ‘absolute’ shares will 
perform their svadharma for ensuring well-being of those who have not been 
allocated such shares in the property. At the same time awareness about the 
possibilities of deviations from svadharma is well reflected in the shastric texts with 
their special emphasis of the entitlements of various categories of dependents on the 
joint family property. Derrett highlights, 214  
Aged parents, wife and children were the dependants of the first degree in 
that their rights attached to any property of the son etc. might acquire; others 
																																								 																				
213  ibid. At p. 55 
214  ibid. At p. 67 
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however were to be maintained out of specific property appropriate to their 
relationship to its holder. These rights of maintenance were valuable though 
not transferable, and they served as an encumbrance hindering gratuitous 
transfers (….). We should it is submitted, not be justified in failing to see in 
their position a very substantial right to enjoyment of property “belonging” 
to someone else. To this day in certain circumstances such persons have 
rights to challenge alienations by the owner of the property form which they 
must be legally maintained. 
 
Accordingly basic characteristic of joint property was its inalienability. The property 
could not be easily disposed of by way of sale, gift or will even by those holding 
‘absolute’ share. These restrictions ensured that even those male members who were 
in the category of ‘absolute’ owners enjoyed nothing more than a right to 
maintenance from the joint family property.  
 
The institution of stridhana (literally woman’s property), an institution specific to 
Hindu system, further reflects its concern for combining allocation of entitlements 
with their functions and purposes. Sanskritic texts consists of extensive provisions 
focussing on the exclusive property rights of women, their entitlements as wives, 
widows, divorcees, unmarried daughters215, married daughters meant specifically for 
their own maintenance. The system concerns itself also with placing specific 
restrictions on husband and on the marital family against appropriation of stridhana 
along with laying down detailed provisions relating to succession of stridhana.216 
Different shastric authorities lay stress on the obligation of the husband or the 
marital family for providing maintenance to wives, even if separated or abandoned 
or superseded, even if guilty of adultery or any other kind misconduct, to concubines 
																																								 																				
215  Unmarried daughters had right to claim marriage expenses from the joint property in their natal 
house. They also had right to residence in the joint family house in case they remained 
unmarried. There are numerous evidences of diverse customary rights in different regions 
involving handing over a piece of land to the daughter at the time of her marriage. For a detailed 
discussion see Das, Women in Manu and His Seven Commentators, chapter IV. 
216  ibid. There are references in smritis to the effect that neither the husband, nor the son, nor the 
father, nor the brother have authority over stridhana to take it or to give it away. The above point 
is now recognized even by the contemporary feminist scholars. For example see Agnes, Law and 
Gender Inequality. Agnes points out, This injunction is almost in the nature of a warning to male 
members to lay their hands off the woman’s property. (At p. 16) 
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and their children, to women having married in unapproved forms of marriage. 
Husband had obligation to pay to first wife ‘supersession fee’- an equal share of the 
property, which the husband gifted to the new wife. Increase in extent and scope of 
stridhana with the increasing complexity of the society, as evident in the texts from 
the medieval period also reinforce concern for ensuring adequate maintenance of 
women.217  
 
Hindu family dharma, based on this general understanding of the concept of 
property and this general perception towards economic entitlements of different 
members of the family incorporated numerous specific variations in economic 
entitlements of family members. These entitlements varied for different 
communities in different regions even within the patrilineal systems, which were 
more widespread and also for matrilineal or bilateral nature of the family 
organisation, which have prevailed in southern India and in western India.  
 
While in matters concerning property one can lay claim to greater authority of 
sanskritic texts Hindu system’s concern for grounding decisions on appropriateness 
based on overall situational contexts is well in place. Decisions about what 
transactions made by a widow or wife while managing the property could be 
considered in marital family’s interest, what should be an unmarried daughters 
entitlements, in what manner male members could use inherited property, what 
should be the entitlements of the other dependents from the family property were all 
subject to demands of specific context and of the situation.  
 
Presence of contradictory norms in the Shastric texts for dealing with the 
distribution of property even within same geographical region present evidence 
about the emphasis on the importance of taking decisions to suit the demands of the 
situation. Rocher describes the above point clearly as he notes, 218  
It is noticed that on various occasions, one and the same text exhibits more 
than one solution for the same legal question. Thus, Manu’s chapter on 
																																								 																				
217  A.S. Altekar, The Position of Women in Hindu Civilization: From Prehistoric Times to the 
Present Day, 2nd ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1959). (At pp. 232-3) 
218  Rocher, “Hindu Conceptions of Law.” (At p. 1296) 
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inheritance begins with the rule: “After the death of the father and the 
mother, the brothers being assembled, may divide among themselves in 
equal shares the paternal (and the maternal) estate…”. The rule, however, 
immediately following, unmistakably states the principle of primogeniture: “ 
(Or) the eldest alone may take the whole paternal estate, the others shall live 
under him just as (they lived) under their father.” Another rule speaks of 
different shares for the sons: “The additional share (deducted) for the eldest 
shall be one-twentieth (of the estate) and the best of all chattels, for the 
middlemost half of that, but for the youngest one-fourth”.  
 
2.6  Context of Colonial Rule: Compulsions to Ignore Sources of Pluralism 
It was the above-described complex, fluid conceptual structure which admitted 
extreme socio-legal and religious diversity that colonial rulers were expected to 
understand and deal with.219 There were enough elements in Indian traditions and 
society to establish that India had similarities with the European society in the 
ancient and medieval times. Perceptions about the Universe as a pre-existing Order,  
pre-determined roles for individuals in this order, concerns for maintenance of order, 
expectations from each individual to submit to the demands of the Order and to 
contribute in maintenance of this order, idea of marriage as sacrament, importance to 
the institutions of marriage and family, dominant presence of a class of intellectuals 
related with religion (addressed as Brahmins, and who could be identified as 
‘priests’), a rich body of sacred literature- all these were the elements which could 
be used by the British to substantiate colonial rulers’ presumptions about pre-
modern societies. Moreover, India was certainly not a society which had 
‘individualism’ as its core value or which believed in superiority of human beings 
vis-a-vis other elements in the cosmos. Furthermore, society appeared more 
concerned about duties or contribution of every individual in maintaining harmony 
than about rights of individuals.  
 
																																								 																				
219  Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World. Describing Hindu law as fluid and dynamic entity Glenn 
states, 
 If other laws are said to take the shape of pyramids, right-side up or inverted, nobody talks about 
pyramids in Hindu law. It’s more like a dirigible or Montgolfier, you can tie it down, but its real 
mission in life to float. (At p. 253) 
Rethinking the Relationship between Law, Gender Justice and Traditions in India: From Hostility to Harmony	
94 
However, despite the above familiar elements there was much in the Hindu 
worldview that made Indian society very different from what British had imagined it 
to be. In the early years of the colonial rule it was rather difficult for colonial rulers 
to accept that Indian society actually didn’t fit in the category of ‘non-western 
societies’. In contrast to British perceptions, Hindus and Muslims did not appear to 
be two distinct homogenous entities, governed by rules written down in a divine 
book. It was difficult to appreciate that Hindus nurtured a very different 
understanding of religion, where religion, as Derrett pointed out, was more a social 
phenomenon than being a belief in the existence of one definitive figure.220 Nor there 
was available any central institution which could be seen as a final word on the 
dictates of religion. For the British, requirement was to respect religious beliefs of a 
society where understanding of religion depended on individual conscience. The 
British had to deal with a society where allegiance to religion did not call for passive 
submission to some norms which could be termed religious or divine. It was a 
																																								 																				
220  Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. Derrett in this work has extensively and eloquently 
explained  specific characteristics of Indian society and its relationship with religion. Explaining 
perceptions about religion in India Derrett noted at one place, 
 The first characteristic, which plays a large part in the Indian make-up, is the non-confinement of 
‘religion’ to personal belief, and its persistence irrespective of personal belief. One if free to have 
any and every belief or no beliefs at all, without forfeiting one’s religious denomination or 
affiliation. On the other hand, if one’s social status is disturbed it would follow that one’s 
religion is likewise in doubt. Religion is thus a social phenomena, and the character of the 
religious observance or right to perform a religious observance depends upon factual 
membership of a group. (At p. 57) 
 Derrett further noted, 
 Religious affiliation is not a question of an individual’s belief, for on that footing he is free to 
believe or not believe in anything he likes, but of a social belonging. (emphasis original) (At p. 
58). “A Hindu can have Christian or ‘reformed’ beliefs alongside his ancestral beliefs.” (At p. 
59)  
 Drawing attention towards flexibility inherent in Hinduism as a religion Derrett further 
emphasised 
 Groups can deny the value of Vedic worship, can renounce ‘superstition’, can agree amongst 
themselves to have different marriage ceremonies and improve the tone of their little society in 
other ways: they are still Hindus, for Hinduism rejoices in never excluding a member for 
personal heterodoxy the chief reason why it is contended that Hinduism has no creed. Whatever 
Hinduism is, its members are supposed to live it as a matter of observance and irrespective of 
personal opinion. It is not altogether surprising that that some Christians who have cross-
communal interests and social ambitions should be found to have assumed a position in which, 
as with many Muslims, it is possible to contend both that they are Hindus and that they are non-
Hindus- to the occasional embarrassment of the courts. (At p. 60) 
 For further explanations also see Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, eds., A Source 
Book in Indian Philosophy (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1957). 
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worldview which allowed constant contestations on Truth, which allowed idea and 
form of God to be questioned and challenged constantly.221 
 
Colonial rulers were required to carve out religious and secular domains for a 
society for which whole life field was sacred, where every life sphere was seen to be 
integrally interlinked, and where each action as well as inaction was believed to 
carry effects on cosmic harmony.222 Thus, for the British, challenge was much bigger 
than finding and translating one or few law books of Hindus. A greater challenge 
was finding answer to a more basic question- who is a Hindu? Accommodation, 
absorption and acceptance of diverse practices having been an internal criteria for 
Hinduism, ‘Who is Hindu’ as a ‘legal’ question, had never been a central issue in 
pre-colonial India. However, it became the central question in the colonial period as 
																																								 																				
221  See Naresh Dadhich, “The Indian Plural Mind,” Economic and Political Weekly 49, no. 10 
(2014): 39–46. Highlighting pluralism inherent in the concept of dharma Dadhich notes, 
 Since at its very conception it has to accommodate various different conceptions and 
formulations of belief, language and behaviour, it has to have sufficient flexibility and elasticity 
in its thought structure for accepting and appreciating this profound heterogeneity. Take, for 
example, the various sects/sampradayas of Hinduism, which themselves are so varied and 
diverse that each one could almost qualify as a separate faith. That is why its true perception 
calls for a plural mind. There is no one single perception of God and no prescribed unique way to 
reach him. Above all, there is also room for the non-believer, which is a great strength as it co-
opts its own opposite. It is, therefore, almost impossible to defy it. If one is born a Hindu, one is 
condemned to die as one because there is no well-defined code the defiance of which could lead 
to exclusion. It is loosely accommodative of almost anything. (At p. 40) 
 Also Robert D. Baird, “On Defining ‘Hinduism’ as a Religious and Legal Category,” in Religion 
and Law in Independent India, ed. Robert D. Baird (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1993), 
41–58.; Lingat, The Classical Law of India. Highlighting diversity as an internal aspect of 
Hinduism Lingat noted, 
 The Brahminical religion is a tolerant religion whose dogmas are very wide and capable of 
encompassing the most diverse metaphysics. It follows that no interpretation could derive 
authority from the number of those assent to it. Its authority derives solely from the logical and 
moral value of the teaching involved. (At p. 16) 
222  See Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. Drawing attention towards the difficulty in 
dividing life spheres into secular and religious Derrett noted, 
 In fact the unbroken tradition of Hindu legal scholarship has emphasized the concept that the 
Hindu law concerns itself with eternity and with morality judged against the greater background, 
and not with material, temporal considerations. ‘In the Indian view all conduct rests on a 
suprasensible basis. This leads to a fusion of religion and morals, which is reflected in the 
existence of only one word in Sanskrit, viz., dharma for both. In modern eyes, in an age in which 
secularism is upheld as the ideal and religion has long been ignored, such association may appear 
as an entanglement. The tradition Hindu view is different. Morality, to have effective force, must 
rest of supramundane sanctions. So said the greatest interpreter of the dharamsastra to his 
contemporaries, Hindu and non-Hindu, young and not-so-young. (At p. 101) 
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for the purpose of administration of Hindu ‘laws’ to Hindus, colonial authorities had 
to identify and label population of India according to religious affiliations. 
 
For the British, religion based laws or divine law meant set of rules which can be 
found written in specific texts. However, in the Indian context, especially for the 
Hindus finding such a book was inconceivable. Hinduism was a religion which 
consisted of a rich body of literature and textual sources which could not be easily 
attributed to any specific author or authors.223 Nor was it possible to find one book 
which could be considered as the most authoritative one laying down a binding code 
of conduct for all Hindus. Despite a rich body of literature, among Hindus 
ascertainment of dharma – the right solution to a dispute or the rights and 
obligations of individuals in a given situation- was not a function of deriving rules 
from some textual sources which could be considered divine. Incorporating the 
understanding that balance will always be accompanied with imbalance, in Hindu 
society such ascertainment was as much a prerogative of an individual or a small 
group of people as it was for a specific class of people who could be called priests or 
Brahmins.224 Any community and even individual had the freedom to devise their 
own ways to relate to the cosmic Order as long as these ways allowed the same 
freedom to other communities and individuals, and were based on the awareness 
about the integral relationship between visible and invisible spheres.  
 
The institutions of marriage and family were indeed seen as the most essential parts 
of life for every individual. These institutions were also projected and promoted by 
society as ways to serve the interconnectedness, to make one’s contribution in 
maintaining order. The rich and sophisticated body of literature provided an ideal 
																																								 																				
223  Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World. Glenn reinforces the above point as he states,  
 What makes Vedas different, as revelation (aside from their content), is that there is very little 
insistence on their author, or on their author’s messenger. Some speak simply of revelation, 
others of gods, others again, as time went by, of God. And no one is identified as messenger or 
prophet, or saviour. It is a clearer case of revelation coming to be recognized as revelation, but 
apparently over such a period of time that its manner of revelation just slipped away. (At p. 254) 
 Also Menski, Hindu Law. 
224  Jackson, “From Dharma to Law.” Highlighting importance of custom in pre-colonial India 
Jackson noted, 
 In India custom appears to have been both a source of dharma and an instrument in its 
implementation as law. (At p. 498) 
Rethinking the Relationship between Law, Gender Justice and Traditions in India: From Hostility to Harmony	
97 
form for establishing intimate, personal relationships between individuals. However, 
allegiance to the texts was not a requirement for a marriage or a family to be called 
as Hindu marriage or Hindu family. However, it was a system where maintaining 
order or balance in cosmos was not a function of passive, unreflective submission to 
sets of norms given by a divine authority. There was more emphasis on duties of 
every individual with the prominence to the concept of svadharma.  Family, caste, 
community and scriptures played extremely important role in an individual’s life 
providing guidance to every individual about rights and obligations. However, the 
final decisions relating to what is one’s svadharma could be left on each individual 
or his or her immediate social group. There was also a clear understanding that the 
textual norms were not to be enforced through coercion.225 It was not a system where 
all individuals conducted their lives with passive submission to the dictates of caste, 
community or family.  
 
Far from suppressing human agency, expectations from individual was to exercise 
human agency to discover one’s individuality, to understand one’s position and 
one’s duties in the cosmic web and to find ways to contribute in the maintenance of 
order, in microcosmic as well as macrocosmic spheres. It was a system which was 
individualistic in essence, as embodying the theory of karma, it encouraged and 
expected every individual to make decisions of right and wrong and to accept the 
responsibility for one’s decisions in the current life or even in subsequent lives.226  
 
For the colonial rulers the requirement was to find rules which would govern all 
Hindus of the country while the Hindu society believed that no two groups of people 
could be considered to be governed by the same set of rules. The British needed to 
discover divine laws for that society where law making in positivist fashion to 
govern the society was a foreign concept. The colonial administrators needed to 
provide judicial forums embodying adversarial system as the method of dispute 
resolution for a society where contests/disputes between people were rarely seen as a 
fight between two or more adversaries or a contest between a right or wrong.  It was 
																																								 																				
225  Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. Also see Robert Lingat, The Classical Law of India 
(USA: University of California Press, 1973). 
226  Menski, Hindu Law. (Chapter three) 
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a system where every dispute resolution was treated as a contest between two rights 
and where adjudication was not limited to application of abstract rules to a fact 
situation. It meant, instead, finding most appropriate solution in a situation. By 
middle of the nineteenth century, as the colonial rule advanced, there had become 
available enough evidence that a large section of Hindus were governed by 
customs.227 British rulers were also gradually realising that treating shastras as the 
law books may be problematic as one could prove practically anything from the 
shastras.228 
 
The context of colonial rule, however, was not the time to take cognizance of the 
above facts. Sensitivity towards traditions would have required questioning the 
claims of the British superiority.  It would have required challenging colonial 
administrators’ belief in superiority of Western religions and the western 
understanding of law. It also would have required accepting the fact that huge 
diversity and plurality in India was not a result of inability of natives. Above all, the 
																																								 																				
227  See Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. Referring to the ill-founded opposition 
between custom and law Derrett’s work as claimed by the author himself sets out incidentally to 
destroy that 
 Law in India was immutable, immemorial custom was transcendent law, and the customs and 
usages that bound the public were neither open to be influenced by the classical jurists (whose 
theories were thought to be largely academic) nor amenable to alteration at the option of a 
political superior. All that is false. There appears to have been no stage at which law was 
immutable, at which custom was not open to influence from jurists, or to modification or even 
abrogation at the hands of the ruler. (At p. 152) 
 Also see Kolsky, “Maneuvering Personal Law System in India.” Kolsky points out, 
 As Britian’s empire in India expanded, colonial authorities found that Hindus and Muslims in 
different regional locations followed customary practices that did not square up with the laws 
prescribed in the colonial digests. Recognizing the importance of local, tribal, caste and family 
usages, new textualization projects in the nineteenth century aimed to digest customary law. 
This, too, had a problematic effect. In Punjab, for example, the textualization of customary law 
reified the authority of written sources and denied the essentially fluid and changing nature of 
custom. (At p. 976) 
228  Werner Menski, “Lost in Translation: The Monist Management of Colonial Hindu Law,” in 
Redefining Dharma and Well-Being (INDAS International Conference 2013: In Search of Well-
being: Genealogies of Religion and Politics in India, Ryukoku University, Japan, 2013). 
Highlighting this realisation Menski notes, 
 British officers found rich, ‘thick’ empirical evidence that whether a person or family was Hindu, 
Sikh or Muslim, specifically in Punjab, their daily legal actions were to a large extent determined 
by the laws of the soil, and thus normative patterns, rather than textual dictate. In other words, 
main source of law, certainly among rural people in this part of the world, was ‘custom’, 
however defined. (At p. 17) 
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requirement would have been to challenge the understandings about non-western 
societies, about the notion of progress and progressive society.  
 
And, none of the above was a possibility in the context of colonial rule. Shedding 
belief in their own superiority for the sake of respecting traditions and religions in 
India was certainly not the possibility for the colonial rulers at the onset of the 
Empire.229 Moreover, requirements of the Empire did not offer colonial 
administrators luxury of time and resources to fully appreciate and address the 
complexities of a country with huge cultural and religious diversity. For British, a 
primary concern was a set (or sets) of clear, predictable, certain, and definitive rules, 
which could be linked to natives’ religions, to govern different aspects of family 
matters.230  Not inclined to interfere in personal matters of the native population, the 
British saw their task as limited to taming the extreme socio-legal diversity to a set 
of abstract rules which could be deployed impartially by ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ 
arbitrators.231 In the context of colonial rule it was difficult to foresee that this 
process of discovery of laws will initiate a process of generating misunderstanding 
about Indian society.  
 
																																								 																				
229  Dhavan, “Introduction,” 1989. Dhavan points out how colonial administrators like Nelson were 
aware that  
 Dharamshastras was not the actual law which governed local communities in their day-to-day 
folkways. The dharamshastras sought to create an enduring set of attitudes and beliefs rather 
than to actually supplant customary practices with the imperatives ordained by rishis. (At p. xv) 
230  ibid. Calling process of discovery of ‘native law’ by British as egregious error Dahvan states that 
the process of discovery of law by British was as ‘inexact as it was purposive’. (At p. xiv) Also 
see Cohn, “Law and the Colonial State in India.” Commenting on the project of systematisation 
of law undertaken during colonial era Cohn noted, 
 Hastings encouraged a group of younger servants of the East India Company to study the 
“classical” languages of India- Sanskrit, Persian and Arabic- as a part of scholarly and pragmatic 
project aimed at creating a body of knowledge that could be utilized in the effective control of 
Indian society. He was trying to help the British define what was “Indian” and to create a system 
of rule that would be congruent with what were thought to be indigenous institutions. (At p. 136) 
231  Anderson, “Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India.” Highlighting British 
attempts to tackle extreme socio-legal diversity Anderson noted, 
 The British confrontation with myriad forms of legal authority and variegated local practices 
highlighted one of the foremost problems of colonial control: how to obtain simple, reliable, and 
reasonably accurate understandings of indigenous social life without sacrificing great labour and 
capital. Law and legal institutions provided a solution. Equipped with indigenous advisers, 
colonial courts served as mechanisms of inquiry, while the classical religious-legal texts, 
whatever their genuine relevance, were taken as the key to understanding colonised cultures and 
societies. (At p. 172) 
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2.7  Undesirable Consequences of the Colonial Rule 
 In the context of colonial rule it was difficult to take cognizance of the fact that the 
rather objective and neutral process of discovery and systematization of laws for 
Hindus or Muslims would lead to significant distortions in Indian society or in the 
way Hindu law or Muslim Law or institutions of marriage and family were 
understood in India. In the context of colonial rule it was difficult to imagine for 
colonial rulers that their attempts to impart certainty and objectivity to Hindu law or 
Muslim law will give rise to something which would ultimately be labelled as a 
‘hybrid monstrosity’ incorporating worst biases of both civilisations, Indian as well 
as British.232 While colonial rule triggered emergence of distortions,233 creation or 
emergence of such distortions was not too difficult a task. First of all, in the context 
of colonial rule it was perhaps difficult to comprehend that the process of 
determining rules in the backdrop of colonial administrators’ presumptions about 
non-western traditions will result into distortions and emergence of an artificial 
version of Hindu traditions as well as of Hindu law which not only could prove 
claims of British superiority but could also prove colonial rulers’ understandings 
about non-western traditions in general and Hindu traditions in particular.234 It was 
difficult to acknowledge that the above process would entail a serious of undesirable 
consequences:  
																																								 																				
232  Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. Derrett argued, 
 The British method of deducing the law from the European text writer’s idea of what the pundits 
meant, coupled with whatever might be deduced from the translations of a few prominent 
Sanskrit legal texts, and put cheek-by-jowl with decided cases enabled the law to be deduced in a 
most artificial and remote manner, to the despair of scholars able to read the Sanskrit original 
authorities. (At p. 298) 
 Derrett points out at another place, 
 English procedural methods altered much substantive law, curtailing some rights and amplifying 
others. (At p. 308) 
233  For a detailed description of process of emergence of ‘Codes’ at the instance of colonial 
administrators in 18th and 19th century see Derrett. Also Dhavan, “Introduction,” 1989.; Menski, 
Hindu Law.; Cohn, “Law and the Colonial State in India.” Commenting on the distortions 
created by the colonial administrators in the process of understanding Hindu law Cohn noted, 
 Jones, and especially his successor, Colebrook established a European conception of the nature 
of Hindu law that was to influence the whole course of British and Indo-British thought and 
institutions dealing with administration of justice down to the present. (At p. 146) 
234  With respect to impact of colonial interventions on Muslim law see Anderson, “Islamic Law and 
the Colonial Encounter in British India.” Also see Elizabeth Kolsky, Colonial Justice in British 
India: White Violence and the Rule of Law, Reprint edition (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
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2.7.1.  ‘Religious’ labelling of diverse communities as ‘Hindus’: 
Accommodation, absorption and acceptance of diverse practices being internal 
criteria for Hindu family dharma, ‘Who is Hindu’ as a ‘legal’ question, had never 
been a central issue in pre-colonial India. However, it became the central question in 
the colonial period. For the purpose of administration of Hindu ‘laws’ to Hindus, 
colonial authorities had to identify and label population of India according to 
religious affiliations. This identification was at the cost of ignoring that there was 
greater similarity between customs and usages of people from a region irrespective 
of their religious faith and affiliations, rather than between followers of a religion 
living in far-flung regions.235 British administrators undertook ‘religious’ labelling of 
population as ‘Hindus’ on a criterion foreign to Hindu conceptual structure- concept 
of institutionalised religion with clear affiliations along the lines of Christian church 
fellowships.236  Result was construction of a narrow and rigid definition of Hindus, 
wherein the title Hindu came to be reserved for that group of people who were 
willing to agree that they were governed by norms written in dharamshastras. And 
since it implied application of uniform rules to all Hindus, only way for any group or 
community to claim exemption from application of newly emerging Hindu law and 
to be able to apply their own customary laws was to convince the court that they 
were out of fold of Hindu community. This delimitation of population on religious 
lines introduced new categories for Indian society such as, ‘Hindus’, non-‘Hindus’, 
communities on fringes of ‘Hindu’ population, less ‘Hinduised’ communities, more 
‘Hinduised’ communities, ‘communities (like chamars), who apparently know little 
of ‘Hindu’ religion and less of ‘Hindu’ philosophy’.   
 
2.7.2. Shift in Centre of Activity from Community/group to the State  
It was for the first time in the history of India, that centre of activity shifted from 
communities or groups to the state or to any centralised authority. It was the also the 
first time that state or its institutions became authoritative (and exclusive) custodians 
of scriptures and administrator of dharma. As Kolsky rightly points out 
																																								 																				
235  Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality. (At p. 23) 
236  ibid. At p. 24 
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Not only did the colonial state determine the content of Hindu and Islamic 
law but personal law was also applied in state courts rather than in separate 
communal courts. The state did not allow communities to decide what their 
own law said on any issue, nor did it let them apply “their own” personal law 
through religious or community bodies. The personal law system in colonial 
India was, in fact, entirely state centered.237  
 
2.7.3. Passive submission of groups/communities/people to the authority of 
Scriptures or written texts  
Requirement of coercive and passive submission to the authority of the written texts 
and diminished authority of the diverse customs and usages of different 
communities was also an innovation that entered family matters of Hindus for the 
first time. Since British rulers believed that all Hindu law could be found in 
scriptures, it was a preliminary requirement for the ‘native priests’ (court assistants) 
to show that their opinion had scriptural authority. Although Hindu customary 
practices were not totally ignored or abrogated, but their recognition by the state 
authorities became dependent on stringent conditions. Unless it could be proved that 
the custom was ancient, certain, obligatory, reasonable and not against public policy, 
it had a very little chance of survival.238   
																																								 																				
237  Kolsky, “Maneuvering Personal Law System in India.” (At p. 977) 
238  Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law. Commenting upon the place of custom in modern 
Hindu Law Derrett noted, 
 Despite solecism in Hindu Code, custom is (with very exceptions such as, marriage ceremonies) 
not part of Hindu law at all. It has not been so since about 1790. Custom is pleaded, if at all, in 
derogation from Hindu law, and thus must be visualised as its opponent, not component. (At pp. 
12-13) 
 Also see John Duncan Martin Derrett, A Critique of Modern Hindu Law (Bombay: N. M. 
Tripathi, 1970). Derrett, The Death of a Marriage Law: Epitaph for Rishis. Writing about 
derogation of customs with onset of British rule Derrett noted, 
 In 1729, if any Hindu caste or subcaste had wished to abolish a particular practice it would have 
met in solemn conclave at a place of pilgrimage at an annual festival and, after endless 
discussion, decided that the practice should no longer take place and all offenders would be 
subject to a huge fine, and in default of payment they would be ostracised. By 1829 such 
procedures ceased to be effective since offenders would commence actions for libel, and defy the 
caste, and in any case get decrees from the courts which annulled the caste’s decision, since the 
latter would not be represented in the book law by which the courts were bound. Therefore all 
social reform had to take place for all castes concurrently and by statute alone if it was to be 
effective. ....The concept of statute as India’s education was born fairly early in British rule. (At 
pp. 80-81)  
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2.7.4.  Submission of different communities to power of Brahmins  
Due to British authorities’ perception about priests as the authoritative and only 
authentic expounder of the religious ‘laws’, Brahmins whom they equated with 
priests gained new found authority and state backed power to interfere in family 
matters of different Hindu communities. Once again, this was the first time that 
Brahmins gained this power or authority, which the concept of cosmic order denied 
to them. Hitherto, in accordance of Hindu dharma different communities had 
internal mechanisms to minimise the intervention of anybody who could claim title 
of Brahmin, for all kinds of religious and personal matters. New Hindu family law 
deprived them of this freedom by according state backed power to those who 
presented themselves as Brahmins and to their opinions.   
 
2.7.5.  Subsumption of Diversity to Idealistic Norms  
Hindu system consisted of a huge mass of literature written over different periods of 
time and from different range of people. The ‘process of discovery’ while giving 
place of pre-eminence to some written texts as source of ‘law’ resulted in dismissal, 
disregard or simple ignorance of a large number of texts thereby making a serious 
attack on the dharmic diversity.239 Sanskritic scriptures reflecting Hindu system’s 
concern for dealing with balance and imbalance consisted of idealistic norms as 
guidelines for performance of svadharma. They also incorporated numerous and 
diverse deviations from these norms. One of the characteristic features of Sastric 
literature was presence of two streams, one representing idealistic norms and the 
other representing all kinds of deviations from it, and both were dharmic. In the 
process of discovering Hindu law, it was only the former stream that got recognition 
as ‘legal’ while the deviations or all the other diverse forms of organising family life 
was rendered ‘illegal’ or had fight a tough battle for legal recognition.240  
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 Also Sharafi Mitra, “The Marital Patchwork of Colonial South Asia: Forum Shopping from 
Britain to Baroda,” Law and History Review 28, no. 4 (2010): 979–1009. 
239  Menski, Hindu Law. (especially chapter four, At pp. 156-185) 
240  Derrett, Hindu Law, Past and Present. ( At pp. 84-85) 
Rethinking the Relationship between Law, Gender Justice and Traditions in India: From Hostility to Harmony	
104 
2.7.6. Replacement of Flexible and Situation Specific Judgements for 
‘Appropriateness’ with Fixed and Certain Rules  
The process of discovery and application of Hindu ‘law’ inflicted a severe blow on 
the spontaneous growth of and flexibility in Hindu family dharma. Through the 
process of administration of ‘laws of shasters for Gentoos’ in official forums case 
law emerged as a new source of law embodying in the principle of stare decisis 
replacing the most elementary Hindu principle of justice241- no two situations can be 
same, which made consideration of facts and circumstances of every case as a 
paramount requirement.242    
 
And, given the concern for proving Hindus as progressive, albeit in the terms 
suggested by British, not much attention could be paid to the fact that the core 
concept dharma, an entity, inherently dynamic yet unchanging, received a new 
impetus during colonial rule, an impetus aimed at remoulding it so that it can be 
understood by people nurturing different cosmo-vision.  Attempt was made to set 
Hindu traditions and Hindu law on a path opposed to its spirit through efforts 
dedicated to getting an insight into it. It was also difficult to foresee that the new 
version of Hindu law and Hindu traditions will be different from common people’s 
understanding of their religion culture or traditions and that the new versions will 
																																								 																				
241  Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. Derrett points out, 
 Precedent and the certainty that the law would not depend upon the personality of judges, but 
upon the skill of advocates and the court’s learning, were the pillars of the English system. ...... 
The native system had always admired abstract justice from afar, but it applied only on levels 
where more pressing considerations were absent. That all men should be equal before law was an 
attractive presupposition only where defendant was a government official. The British judicial 
system, with its disregard for social distinctions, its dependence upon pleadings and evidence, its 
failure to take into account questions, which, although distinct from issues, were actually part of 
the same complaint in the eyes of the parties, ands its harsh and rapid methods of execution-
taking no account of the native genius for delay and contempt for the decisive- caused 
consternation. A flood of plaints and petitions occurred, and actual and potential defendants, 
guilty and innocent alike, were known to migrate into territories administered by native rulers 
until the abnormal times should end. (At p. 286-287) 
242  Lingat, The Classical Law of India. Lingat endorses the fact of diversity in Hindu law as he 
notes, 
 In the Hindu system no interpretation could fix the meaning of any shastric precept. They were 
always available for new interpretations. Shastric precepts contained within itself a variety of 
solutions permitting interpretation to diversify its effects according to plans and periods. English 
judge called upon to define law, fixed interpretation once and for all. Commentaries and digests 
that were only diverse forms of interpretation became fixated to different territories. (At p. 259)  
Rethinking the Relationship between Law, Gender Justice and Traditions in India: From Hostility to Harmony	
105 
not be able to displace the socio-legal reality243 or the values of ‘interconnectedness’ 
or ‘cultural and legal pluralism upheld by the ‘natives’.244 It was difficult to foresee 
for the British that their interaction with Indian society was an attempt to achieve the 
unachievable.245  However, as Menski aptly points out, that in the context of colonial 
rule, British as well as natives too did not realise the intrinsic polycentric power of 
dharma and also, therefore, could not anticipate to what extent this would raise 
problems for emerging state structures.246 
 
2.8 Emergence of New Understandings of Hindu Law, Hindu Marriage and 
Hindu Family 
2.8.1 Restricted Definition of Hindu Marriage 
While plurality in solemnisation of marriages was an important characteristic of 
Hindu society, marriage as sacrament or samskara came to be reduced to certain 
specified rituals. Derrett described aptly the emerging rigidity in giving legal 
																																								 																				
243  Kolsky, “Maneuvering Personal Law System in India.” Also see Gauri Viswanathan, 
“Colonialism and the Construction of Hinduism,” in The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism, ed. 
Gavin Flood (UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 23–44. Also Dhavan, “Introduction,” 1989. In 
introduction to Marc Galanter’s work on law and society in India Dhavan noted, 
 Galanter took the view that many of the modern legal system’s assumptions about Indian society 
did not correspond with social reality. The law reconstituted Indian society so as to dilute certain 
aspects of social reality and give prominence to others. In an unpublished paper, Galanter 
showed how the doctrine of varna was virtually invented by British law in the nineteenth century 
to preserve traditional mores in an otherwise rapidly changing society. (At p. xxxix) 
244  Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. Citing various examples like law relating to 
adoption, inheritance etc Derrett stated, 
 A literate and obstinate adherence to sastric rules, misunderstanding their original purport, has at 
times produced situations inconsistent with the traditional Hindu background; the result is that 
the Anglo-Hindu system is occasionally more orthodox than sastra; or where the words have not 
been distorted the spirit has been abandoned. (At p. 310-311) 
 Also see Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law. Highlighting the difficulties in 
interpretation of Vedic texts Derrett stated, 
 Without the technique of Vedic textual interpretation, and knowledge of the cruxes of Vedic 
practical application, the words of the smritis, which were believed to reproduce the gist of 
Vedas, would be so much dead matter. The spirit counted no less than the letter, and the spirit 
was not acquired by reading alone. (emphasis added) (At p. 3) 
245  Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India. Drawing attention towards the zeal of reformers 
Derrett pointed out, 
 This is not to suggest that they imagined that they were foisting upon the remainder of the public 
something for which they alone had any use: they believed that sooner or later the remainder, the 
submerged six-sevenths of iceberg, would share their outlook and their needs. They were leaders 
and were giving to others as well as to themselves benefits which, in their view, had been 
withheld from them by the foreign government. (At p. 323) 
246  Menski, “Lost in Translation.” (At p. 16) 
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recognition to pluralistic forms of marriages in India as he pointed out, “new 
ceremonies could not be invented, even by societies established to abolish 
superstitious rituals”.247  Amongst various rituals of marriage solemnisation one 
ritual, saptapadi (which was roughly presented as taking of seven steps before fire) 
came to acquire place of the essential ritual. Derrett highlights, 248  
Not every part of the customary ceremony was essential to its effectiveness, 
but the saptapadi (where in use) could not be omitted without risk of the 
marriage being declared void.  
Recognition was attempted to the existence of diverse customary forms of marriage 
solemnisation, but to be recognised as a ‘legal’ marriage it was made necessary to 
prove that marriage was performed in ‘established customary form’. Other option 
available with different communities was to claim and convince the court about their 
non-‘Hindu’ status so that the marriages which were not performed in accordance 
with prescribed rituals ‘samskara’ could be considered ‘legally’ valid.  
 
Concerned with managing co-existence of diverse groups while allowing them 
possibilities to function as autonomous units, Hindu system consisted of extensive 
norms, which recommended qualifications of a bride and a bridegroom in 
accordance with regional preferences for exogamic or endogamic forms of 
marriages. However, through the process of discovery certain ‘selected’ norms, 
came to be established as the ‘legal’ norms for any ‘legally’ valid ‘Hindu’ marriage. 
For example, some general preferences for selecting a bride such as, bride should be 
virgin, must not have been married previously, should be younger than bridegroom, 
got transformed into ‘legal’ requirements for a ‘legally’ valid marriage. Similarly 
preferences about degrees of prohibited relationship249 got fixed as ‘legal’ 
restrictions, thereby rigidifying the restrictions for marriages between different caste 
groups/communities resulting in rendering marriages performed in violation of those 
restrictions as illegal and consequently making it possible to deprive women or 
																																								 																				
247  Derrett, Hindu Law, Past and Present. (At p. 92) 
248  ibid. 
249  ibid. Derrett offers a detailed description of how rules relating to degrees of prohibited 
relationship were reduced to schools like ‘Bengal’ school, Benares school ignoring large 
variations within same geographical region. ( At pp. 89-90) 
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children of such marriages rights of wife or legitimate children. Solution with 
different communities for rendering unions entered into violation of ‘legal’ 
restrictions was either to claim non-‘Hindu’ status or to prove their low caste status 
within ‘Hindu’ fold.    
 
2.8.2 Hindu Marriages Rendered a Permanent Indissoluble Union: Ignorance 
of Customary Divorces 
Perceiving marriage as a timeless cosmic union Hindu system strongly discouraged 
dissolution of marriage union. For Hindu ‘law’ given the trend of giving pre-
eminence to idealistic stream within shastric literature, ‘Hindu’ marriage came to be 
established as a permanent union without ‘legal’ possibility of dissolution. Through 
this new ‘law’ claiming and proving indissolubility of marriage within one’s group 
also became a means to acquire higher social/caste status, given the propagated 
shastric interpretation that divorce or breaking of marriage unions can be undertaken 
only by groups lower in caste/social status. Derrett refers that perception of marriage 
as ‘permanent without possibility of dissolution’ is not the correct representation of 
the final position of shastras. He points out, 250  
The tenor of original texts seems to have been that a man or his wife could 
not voluntarily repudiate each other. The texts must be read against a 
background of the loosest behaviour. But the present shastric position 
ignores this historical fact and reads the texts which clearly admit divorce on 
certain grounds such as impotence, becoming an outcaste etc. as applying to 
another age, and not ours. The texts which lay down the permanency of the 
relationship between husband and wife and their “oneness” are held to apply 
to such an extent that even death does not release a wife from her husband, 
so that remarriage in any form is sinful, adulterous, and the remarriage of a 
widow in a samskara form impossible.  
 
Given this definition of ‘Hindu’ marriage as permanent, indissoluble union, once 
again the strategy available with majority of the communities where customary 
																																								 																				
250  ibid. At pp. 112-3 
Rethinking the Relationship between Law, Gender Justice and Traditions in India: From Hostility to Harmony	
108 
divorces and remarriages have always been prevalent was to convince the court 
about their non-‘Hindu’ or lower caste status.  
 
2.8.3 Hindu Women Denied Right to Own Property  
In matters concerning economic entitlements women became victim of British 
adjudicators preference for ‘freeing the individuals and their property from 
customary constraints’, of their perception about lower status of women in Hindu 
civilisation and of their English background which did not allow property rights to 
women.251 Preference of the Hindu system for male heirs as ‘absolute’ owners got 
converted into ‘legal’ right amidst complete ignorance of the fact that according to 
Hindu dharma women could also inherit, own and manage property. Urgency to 
make certain and clear Hindu law available in written form for British adjudicators, 
especially to deal with property matters caused its reduction into two schools: 
Dayabhaga and Mitakshara.252 Economic entitlements of women were constructed 
along the perception that Hindu system allows ownership rights only to the male 
members and therefore women can be ‘legally’ entitled only to receiving 
maintenance from the joint family property. 
 
We discussed before that the institution of stridhana (women’s property) in the 
Hindu system safeguarded women’s economic entitlements and also allowed them 
exclusive rights on property, both moveable and immoveable. It was also discussed 
that smritis from medieval period lead to inferences about increasing scope and 
extent of stridhana in later years. One comes across in Mitakshara expanded scope 
of stridhana to include property acquired by woman through every source, including 
inheritance and partition. Through new ‘law’ exclusive rights of women in stridhana 
were imparted a ‘limited’ character. Judicial decisions giving rise to a body of Hindu 
																																								 																				
251  Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality. Agnes quotes comments of an English judge in case 
concerning property dispute as one of the evidences of this perception,  
 A custom for females to take no share in the inheritance is not unreasonable in the eyes of the 
English law for it accords in great part with the universal custom, as to real estates where there 
are any male issues and with some local custom mentioned by Blackstone through which in 
certain manors females are excluded in all cases. (At p. 51) 
252  Menski, Hindu Law. ( At pp. 172-3) 
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‘law’ excluded property received by a woman through inheritance from the category 
of stridhana. Agnes points out,253  
A new legal principle was gradually introduced through court decisions that 
whether the property is inherited by a woman through her male relatives 
(father, son, husband) or through her female relatives (mother, mother’s 
mother, daughter), it is not her stridhana and that it would devolve on the 
heirs of her husband or father. Women lost the right to will or gift away her 
stridhana and it acquired character of a limited estate. Any transaction by a 
widow in respect of property inherited by her had to be justified on two 
grounds, ‘legal’ necessity or religious or charitable purpose. 
 
Through case law English concept of ‘reversioners’ found an entry in Hindu 
dharma, according to which upon widow’s death property reverted back to the 
husband’s male relatives. Introduction of this concept bestowed upon the male 
relatives the right to challenge all property dealings by Hindu widows. Agnes draws 
attention to courts cases, which ruled that property inherited by a daughter from her 
father was not her stridhana. Courts extended this principle to property inherited by 
an unmarried daughter from her mother and also to property inherited from all 
female relatives, thus sealing all avenues for the continuation of property 
devolution.254 
 
Based on ‘selected’ norms from Sastric texts in ignorance of diverse customary 
rights Hindu family ‘law’ came to consist of rigid and gender biased norms 
regulating economic entitlements of family members. These restrictions which 
became representative of ‘Hindus’ family ‘laws’ rendered it necessary for women 
which came to deprived of their traditional rights to hold property and other 
economic entitlements, to convince the court about their non-‘Hindu’ status or to 
claim a lower caste status or to claim that their community was ruled by Muslim law 
or should be covered under Indian Succession Act, 1925, in order to claim protection 
which their customs allowed. If court was not convinced and ‘bestowed ‘Hindu’ 
																																								 																				
253	Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality. (At p. 47) 
254 Ibid. At p. 48 
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status upon the communities’ women could be deprived of their customary/ 
traditional rights.  
 
2.9 Relationship between Law, Gender Justice and Diversity: Impact of 
Colonial Distortions 
While not inclined to interfere in personal matters of Hindus, an important demand 
of the colonial Empire was to create a version of “traditional” which could be 
posited against modern and could also be shown as backward, primitive, oppressive 
and arbitrary.255  Confronted with Indian society, which did not really fit in the 
category of non-western traditions, the only options available with colonial 
administrators were to ignore, to create distortions or to choose those elements from 
the natives’ worldviews, which could prove the claims of British superiority and 
substantiate the following beliefs: (i) that unwritten customs and oral traditions were 
features of ‘primitive societies’, (ii) that progress required transition from a society 
governed by unwritten pluralistic customs or religion-based norms to the one 
governed by uniform and secular written laws. It also needed to be proved that 
despite being progressive as compared to other Asian and African societies, India 
had remained a backward and static society as compared to the European society due 
to influence of religion on all spheres of life, especially on legal sphere or not having 
been able to carve out distinction between a religion based private sphere and the 
secular public sphere. For British, the requirement of the colonial rule was to garner 
evidence to establish that influence of religion and tradition signified expectations of 
passive submission to the authority of priests and also to the set of immutable, 
eternal norms with no scope for exercise of human agency and freedom to 
individuals to choose one’s own way of life. With respect to the institutions of 
marriage and family, it needed to be shown that (i) these were religious institutions 
governed by the priests and the norms written in dharamshastras, (ii) society in 
India gave importance to these institutions due to influence of religion on law and 
																																								 																				
255  Dirks, “Foreword.” Describing the process of interaction between Indian society and colonial 
rulers Dirks noted, 
 Cultural forms in society newly classified as “traditional” were reconstructed and transformed by 
and through this knowledge, which created new categories and oppositions between colonizers 
and colonized, European and Asian, modern and traditional, West and East. (At p. ix) 
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(iii) sanctity of the these institutions was maintained by denying social, economic 
and sexual freedom to women. With respect to the institution of marriage it also 
needed to be proved that being a sacrament it was an indissoluble union especially 
for women, with no possibility, whatsoever for a woman to leave her matrimonial 
home, howsoever oppressive was the marital relationship. Need of the hour, for 
British, was to make natives realise, degenerate nature of their civilisation, so that 
demands for ‘fundamental transformation’ in Indian society and establishment of 
British political and legal institutions could arise from ‘inside the society’. And the 
above result could be achieved by the colonial rulers by the time they left India, 
ironically, despite the policy of religious tolerance. Because all that was required to 
be done to achieve the above result was to obscure or under-emphasize those 
elements of the Hindu worldview which rendered dharma as an inherently plural 
concept.  
 
By the time the British left India, a strong case for abolition of influence of 
traditions had been made as, following presumptions were fully in place: (i) that 
pluralistic forms of marriage solemnisation and practices of dissolution of marriage 
were anti-Hindu practices- signs of degeneration in Hindu religion and traditions; 
(ii) that customary laws and informal methods of dispute resolution were signs of 
backwardness and arbitrariness; (iii) that situation of women can be improved only 
by transferring complete control of family matters to the State and its legal system; 
(iv) that sanctity of institutions of marriage and family was maintained through 
denial of individualistic rights such as right to divorce, right to maintenance, right to 
property to women; (v) that reform of Hindu laws along secular lines to incorporate 
similar changes as have been made in the family laws in the West, will reduce 
importance of sanctity of marriage and the institution of family in Indian society. 
 
Emergence of the above-described version was not too difficult a task when a 
significant section of natives came to accept the challenge to prove that India, Hindu 
law and Hindu traditions were  progressive in terms of the framework suggested by 
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the British.256 Showing dharamshastras as law codes and equating dharma to a set 
of written rules received from heaven was possible once natives accepted that 
progressiveness called for elements like: monotheism and a society governed by 
written, codified, uniform laws.257 Everything else, lack of a definitive centralised 
authority, societies/human groups governed by oral traditions or unwritten customs, 
pluralistic forms of marriage formation and dissolution, were all to be seen as 
primitive or backward. There wasn’t available the luxury for discussing nuances of 
Indian worldviews, which did not lend themselves to the binaries of family v 
individual or religious v secular or dharma v custom.258 There wasn’t much time to 
show that the notion of ‘individualism’ actually related to a very specific 
anthropocentric worldview which was very different from the Hindu worldview, 
which did not impart any position of superiority to human beings vis-a-vis other 
elements in the Universe. Also, establishing Indian society, in need of reform 
through the instrument of law was not difficult once natives accepted that there was 
no possibility of individual growth and exercise of human agency to choose one’s 
own way of life in pre-colonial, traditions’ bound India, due to the fact that Indian 
society was governed by ‘divine laws’ which, gave more importance to family not to 
individuals, to duties and not to rights.  
 
Having accepted codification as a sign of progress, it was not possible to prevent 
emergence of one scripture as a ‘code of law’ which could be presumed to be 
governing Hindus in all matters, especially the family matters. By the time British 
left, there had come into existence a version of Hindu law and Hindu traditions, 
which denied range of social and economic rights to women, allegedly to deny them 
possibility to choose their own way of life and to keep them constrained to the 
institutions of marriage and family, irrespective of their wishes. It was a version of 
																																								 																				
256  For a detailed description on role of native population in making Indian religions and traditions 
fit the framework offered by the British see Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Post-
Colonial Theory, India and “The Mystic East” (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
257  Menski, Hindu Law. (especially chapter 2) 
258  Dhavan, “Introduction,” 1989. Drawing attention towards distortions of native law in the process 
of its discovery Dhavan highlights how by the end of 19th century 
 Legal scholarship turned to servicing the lawyering and litigational needs of Anglo-Indian law 
and paid lesser attention to the deeper pre-British tradition that governed decision making in civil 
society. (At p. xv) 
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Hindu traditions, wherein being a woman meant accepting a life of sexual slavery 
and of absolute moral and economic dependence on men.  
 
There were voices within natives, who challenged the idea of reducing Hindu 
marriage to sexual, moral and economic oppression of women or of labeling of 
Hindu traditions as backward and non-progressive. Demands for reform or 
secularization of Hindu laws could be generated easily once natives were willing to 
accept two things, first, that Hindus were a homogenous community governed by a 
body of uniform, coherent rules which were codified in a scripture named 
Manusmriti. Second, that these rules denied social and economic rights to women, 
such as right to divorce, right to separate residence and maintenance, right not to 
marry, right to remarry and right to own property. And the worst effected in this 
process were the institutions of marriage and family which were deprived of their 
plurality. And, as Menski points out, strangely enough, it was the above version of 
Hindu traditions and Hindu laws which was fully owned by the natives, something 
which natives wanted or needed  to defend from ‘westernisation’ and 
‘Europeanisation’. 
 
By the time of independence, British had succeeded in making at least a section of 
society believe about ‘degenerate nature of Hindu traditions’ and in raising the 
demand for change from the natives themselves. It had also been possible to identify 
certain practices which appeared anti-women, such as child marriages, sati, 
prohibition on widow remarriage, and label them as core practices of Hindus. 
However, it was difficult to see that legislations prohibiting above practices would 
not result into writing off of core values underlying Hindu traditions and Hindu 
laws.  It was difficult to see that legal reforms, new laws made by the State would 
not be able to disturb core values of interconnectedness between individuals and 
family, between individuals and larger cosmic order. It was also difficult to 
appreciate that legal reforms, which granted rights to divorce or to own property 
would not be able to undermine the sanctity of marriage and family in Indian 
society. It was also not possible to foresee that transferring complete control to state 
for regulation of family matters, especially for formation and dissolution of 
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marriages would remain a far-fetched dream. However, context of colonial rule had 
closed the possibilities of taking cognizance of above facts.  
 
At the time of independence there was no reason to doubt the belief that eradicating 
influence of traditions was essential, and that this influence could be removed by 
repealing and replacing dharamshastras and substituting them with secular laws 
made by the state. For those, who wanted to show sensitivity to traditions, there 
were only two options- to accept ‘abolition of  dharma’ under the guise that dharma  
or Hindu law, in contrast to other religion based laws, was a flexible, progressive 
entity, ready to accept changes or to project reform of Hindu law, the process of 
secularisation of Hindu law as a means for return to Golden past, to address 
aberrations that had become part of Hindu traditions. There wasn’t available any 
option to challenge or question potential of law to bring about fundamental 
transformation in Indian society, although there existed possibilities to nurture 
different understandings on what fundamental transformation would mean. As 
Derrett aptly describes, at the time of independence and some decades after that the 
“reformers seriously understood that the dharmsastra could be repealed, and that all 
that was necessary for legal and social change was legislative enactment.”259 It was 
also unquestionable that progress meant achieving transition from a stage where 
society is governed by religion based or customary laws to a stage of being governed 
by state promulgated secular laws. 
 
However irrespective of the emerging belief about relationship between law and 
Hindu traditions, the fact remained that the process of uniformisation of Hindu law 
was manifestly only a fragment of the entire field and of the social reality of Hindu 
law. The conceptual framework and ideologies underpinning multiple ways of life, 
and hence the entire customary social edifice of Hindu culture, remained largely 
immune to the powerful wonder-drug of legal modernisation which had been 
administered in measured doses since well before 1947 and was again used during 
the 1950s and thereafter. While the reformed Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was 
projected as a code to govern all Hindus, at the time of independence and soon after 
																																								 																				
259  Derrett, The Death of a Marriage Law: Epitaph for Rishis. (At p. 67) 
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that it was not possible to take note of the fact that this very Code embodied all the 
diversity, as far from curtailing, it promoted legal pluralism and legal diversity 
amongst Hindus giving legal recognition of all forms of marriage solemnisation and 
customary divorces.  
 
However, emergence of increasingly uniform official Hindu ‘law’ in ignorance of 
customary practices of different communities gave rise to ‘law’ as an elite 
phenomenon, focussed on the written word. Given holistic nature of dharma and its 
concern for the whole context- social, religious, moral- in decision making, division 
of life into independent and distinct domains was an innovation for Hindu society. 
There had also come into existence very peculiar challenges for the Indian legal 
system. Derrett succinctly described challenge for Indian legal system as he wrote,260  
In unconscious conflict between dharma (righteousness) and mere law India 
has struggled, struggles now dramatically, and will struggle, and not least by 
way of matrimonial causes. The difference between a dharma problem and 
law problem is simply this, that in former cases all considerations, including 
the effect of various solutions upon the surrounding social circusmstances, 
are taken into account at the point of decision, while a law-problem is solved 
by reference to predetermined rules worked out without reference to any 
particular persons, places or times, sometimes laid down by people quite 
unconnected with the parties and even residing in different countries and in 
different periods, and invariably obtained out of books and other printed 
paper! To jurists in ancient times, and still in various parts of India, the latter 
method of solving disputes seems gross and very amateurish. To the 
cosmopolitan scholar, of course, the former method is simply corrupt. There 
can be no reconciliation between the two, unless India will happen to be the 
first country to work it out. 
 
However, the time of seeking independence from British was not really the occasion 
for scholarly discourses to even take cognizance of those challenges. As the above 
presumptions were dominant to socio-legal discourses at the time of independence in 
India, it was difficult to appreciate that even the reformed, modernised Hindu laws- 
such as Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 actually gave recognition to legal pluralism in 
marriage solemnisation and marriage dissolution or that courts in India will continue 
																																								 																				
260  ibid. At pp. 49-50 
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to hold marriage as sacrament, even after reformed Hindu law which grants right to 
divorce to all Hindu women. It was to take nearly half a century very idea of 
transferring complete control to state in matters relating to formation and dissolution 
met strong challenge even from the women groups. 
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Chapter Three 
Relationship between Law, Traditions and Rights of 
Women in Post-Independence India: From Pre-1990s to 
Post-1990s Framework 
 
Women’s rights scholarship in India, mainly since late 1990s, has entered a new 
phase. While the period before the 1990s was of absolute faith and trust in the state 
and its legal system, in women’s rights scholarship the period after 1990s has been a 
phase of disenchantment with law. This is phase wherein ‘modernity’ and associated 
elements such as rule of law, enlightenment philosophy and rights discourse, all that 
have been considered panacea for progress and empowerment of women in India 
since colonial era has come under challenge. It has been a phase of increasingly 
inter-disciplinary nature of women’s rights scholarship, wherein, in contrast to the 
pre-1990s phase engagement with law is not a prerogative only of ‘legal scholars’. 
Scholars across various branches of social sciences are no longer willing to follow, 
what is now seen as a simplistic idea of keeping faith in potential of law to bring 
about social change. Scholars from different disciplines no longer see their role 
limited either to highlight those areas where law has not been yet able to bring about 
change or to suggest social and other non-legal means to support state and its legal 
system to ensure better implementation of laws. Even, the legal scholars, no longer 
perceive their task as being restricted to (i) identifying laws which deny women 
equal legal rights, (ii) seeking legislative reforms to address denial of rights for 
women, or (iii) seeking better enforcement of new laws and legislative amendments 
which grant equal legal rights to women. Instead, concern of scholars from different 
disciplines, including legal scholars, in recent times has been to question, challenge 
and then engage with law and colonialism in a much deeper way. While the previous 
phase was about unquestioningly accepting role of law as an instrument of social 
change, the current phase is about doubting, questioning and deconstructing the role 
of law as an instrument of social change. The current phase, as some legal 
scholars261 describe, is  
																																								 																				
261  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 25) 
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About interrogating the ideological character of law in constituting and 
sustaining unequal power relations beyond the liberal understanding of 
explicitly discriminatory laws. 
 
For socio-legal scholarship in India the post-1990s period has been a phase where 
scholars, drawing upon certain theoretical developments in the West, do not any 
longer accept the presumption that colonial rule initiated the process of women’s 
empowerment and progress in India. In the inter-disciplinary feminist literature of 
recent years India’s colonial past is, no longer, about the triumph of modern law and 
the trajectory of progress running through pre-colonial medieval India to modern 
India.262 Instead, for current scholarship, the colonial past is about causing 
distortions, generating misunderstandings about Indian society. Current scholarship 
questions everything- the evolutionary theory of progress, understanding of personal 
laws as a homogenous set of rules received from heaven, anti-women perceptions 
about customs, preference for the uniform civil code as a key to women’s 
empowerment- all that which was taken for granted till the 1990s. In sharp contrast 
to pre-1990s scholarship, the current streams are about accepting the fact that law 
everywhere exists in close connection with culture, politics or ideology and that the 
law,  not even in the presumably secularized western societies, is a value-neutral 
entity.263  
 
This chapter aims to highlight important changes that have come to characterise 
socio-legal scholarship concerned with rights of women in India. The chapter is 
divided into three sections. The first section draws attention towards the main 
features of the scholarship in the pre-1990s phase, wherein scholars perceived that 
colonial rule as a beneficial legacy for women. The second section highlights to 
what extent the scholarship in the post-1990s phase differs from that of the pre-
																																								 																				
262  Tanika Sarkar, “Rhetoric against Age of Consent-Resisting Colonial Reason and Death of a 
Child-Wife,” Economic and Political Weekly 28, no. 36 (1993): 1869–78. Sarkar mentions,  
 The historian cannot afford to view the colonial past as an unproblematic retrospect where all 
power was on one side and all protest on the other. ( At p. 1870)  
263  For changes in women’s rights scholarship see Samita Sen, “Towards a Feminist Politics?: The 
Indian Women’s Movement in Historical Perspective,” Policy Research Report on Gender and 
Development (World Bank, Development Research Group/ Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Network, 2000); Herklotz, “Dead Letters?” 
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1990s phase. The third section draws attention towards new concerns of the 
women’s rights scholarship in India.  The last section looks into the significance of 
the changes that have come to characterise socio-legal discourses in the recent years.  
 
3.1  The Pre-1990s Phase  
3.1.1 Colonial Rule: A Beneficial Legacy 
Women’s rights scholarship in India, as in many other ex-colonial countries, is a 
colonial legacy.264 In recent years scholarly opinion is divided about whether this 
legacy can be considered a beneficial one or not. However, till few decades ago 
scholars, activists, policy makers and law makers- almost everybody concerned with 
social change- was convinced that their task was to finish the process of 
transitioning towards modernity, which had been left incomplete during the colonial 
rule.265  Transitioning towards modernity pre-dominantly meant, seeking separation 
between law and religion or law and traditions. It meant replacing pluralistic, 
customary or religion based laws with a set of uniform, homogenised laws 
promulgated by the secular State to govern family matters of all individuals 
irrespective of religion.266 Promulgation of the Uniform Civil Code, that is, 
transferring complete control of family matters to the secular state, was considered 
necessary to ensure transition of India from being a traditions’ or religions bound 
conservative society, where family and community was considered more important 
than an individual to a modern progressive society, where an individual is 
																																								 																				
264  Sen, “Towards a Feminist Politics?: The Indian Women’s Movement in Historical Perspective.” 
265  Neera Desai, Women in Modern India (Delhi: Vora, 1977). Presenting women’s movement as a 
colonial legacy and transition towards modernity an unfinished process noted 
 Indian society experienced a qualitative jolt under the impact of the British rule. Along with the 
changes in the general life of the people, decisive transformation in the life of the Indian woman 
also resulted. In fact, in centuries’ old history of the life of Indian woman, the British impact 
inaugurated a strikingly new phase of existence. Even after independence the currents 
engendered during the British period continue to operate. Though the hurdle in the form of 
foreign rule has been removed, the Indian woman has not still achieved complete freedom. (At p. 
xi) 
266  Matrimonial matters in India, as is well known, are governed by four sets of, what are seen as, 
religion-based personal laws for Hindus (including Buddhists, Jainas and Sikhs), Muslims, 
Christians and Parsis.  In addition to the religion-based laws there also exists a special enactment, 
named the Special Marriage Act of 1954, which facilitates formation and dissolution of inter-
religious marital relationships. These laws prescribe some norms for formal as well as material 
validity of the marital relationships. There has always been a demand for compulsory registration 
of marriages, however, in India non-registration does not render a marriage invalid. Section 8, 
Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 
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considered more important than family and community. The domain of family law 
was the main focus of scholars because family, scholars argued, was an area, where 
values of equality and freedom were yet to take roots, having been left by the 
colonial rulers to be governed by the natives themselves through the pluralistic 
religion based laws or customs given compulsions of the colonial rule and colonial 
administrators’ reluctance to interfere in the personal or private sphere of the native 
population. 267 The State in independent India was thus expected to take those strong 
measures against religions and traditions which a colonial government could not 
take.268 There was a common belief that with the advent of colonial rule India had 
made substantial march towards modernity in the public sphere,269 since it was 
possible for the state to promulgate secular laws to govern the matters relating to 
public sphere. Scholars were convinced that women’s situation in India would 
improve and India would also be a progressive society only and only when the 
progress achieved in the public sphere could be repeated in the matters relating to 
family.270   
 
																																								 																				
267  Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India. Also, “Towards Equality.” With respect to 
the shortcomings in the modern Hindu family law the commonly accepted justification, as stated 
in the famous report on status of women in 1974 was that  
 The hold of tradition, however, was so strong that even while introducing sweeping changes, the 
legislators compromised and retained in some respects the inferior position of women. By 
yielding to pressure, it sacrificed the uniformity which had been one of the major aims in 
introducing this law’. (At p. 135)  
 With respect to future of gender justice in India a common analysis suggested that due to deeply 
entrenched patriarchy and consequent gender bias of the male dominated state machinery gender 
equality in Hindu society is a far-fetched dream in spite of the fact that the Constitution of India 
guarantees sex-equality to women. Most authors agreed that ‘since a very large section of our 
society still continues to be under the influence of traditional standards.’ See “Towards 
Equality.” (At p.7). For endorsement to above view also see Derrett, Religion, Law and the State 
in India. 
268  For a strong support to this demand see Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India. Also 
“Towards Equality.” 
269  The important pieces of general legislations which came into existence during colonial rule were: 
The Civil Procedure Code, 1908; the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; the Indian Penal Code, 
1860; the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; and the Indian Contract Act, 1860. 
270  Jeffery A. Redding, “Slicing the American Pie: Federalism and Personal Law,” New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 40, no. 8 (2008): 941. Redding noted, 
 As much discussion of personal law makes clear, many people perceive personal law to be the 
law that the wild, savage, and uncivilized adopt. Whether they be Germanic tribes, or just Asians 
and Africans, or (in the case of India) the “pre-constitutional” people who live under personal 
law are often perceived to be pre-modern, non-western, and illiberal. (At p. 956) 
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During all these years, scholars were undoubtedly aware that the task of 
transitioning towards modernity- by modernising or secularising the sphere of 
family was a mammoth task. However, the difficulties in the process of transition 
were not sufficient enough to raise doubts about the feasibility of the task of 
transition. The path on which family laws in India were to move was supposed to be 
a well-tested path, already treaded by the West. The West was a success story as it 
had already transitioned towards modernity- to an era of reason, science and concern 
for human dignity in all spheres of life, public as well as private. And, the 
instrument that had made this transition possible in the West was: the modern law- a 
set of uniform, predictable, neutral rules promulgated by the secular state. 271 There 
was no doubt that the success story of the West would be repeated in India through 
the same instrument of law. All that was needed to be done was to replace 
pluralistic, customary or religion based pluralistic laws with a set of uniform, 
homogenised laws promulgated by the secular State to govern family matters of all 
individuals. 
 
Moreover, the above task didn’t seem impossible given the fact that the process had 
been started by the British with respect to at least one community- the Hindus. The 
British influence, and the reforms in the Hindu family law,272 it was believed, had 
made it possible to initiate the process of secularization of the institutions of 
marriage and family for the Hindu community. A beginning had been made to 
displace the idea of marriage as a sacrament and to introduce effectively the idea of 
marriage as contract, by granting many individualistic legal rights to Hindu women, 
such as right to divorce, right to separate residence and maintenance and the right to 
own property. It had also been possible for the state to legislate against and also to 
																																								 																				
271  Adda B. Bozeman, The Future of Law in a Multicultural World (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1971). 
272  Some of commonly cited examples of legislative reforms achieved during colonial period were: 
the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act in 1929 followed by another in 1937 which heeded to 
the plight of widows without any means of their own, depending entirely on the family; the 
Hindu Women’s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act in 1946, which inter alia, 
permitted the wife to live separate and claim maintenance from her husband on some grounds; in 
matrimonial matters it a shift from the sacramental character of marriage could be effected; the 
Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946 and the Madras Hindu (Bigamy 
Prevention and Divorce) Act, 1949 were other enactments which provided improvements in the 
marital life of Hindu women; the Shariat Act 1937 which brought all Muslims under the Act and 
practically abrogated the customary practices which had grown over the years. 
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criminalise, what were seen as deeply religious and ancient practices, like sati, 
dowry, child marriages bigamy, and adultery. Women’s rights scholars were 
convinced that ‘the woman in independent India has come to acquire a better status 
in society than ever before in any period of India’s history’273 only as a result of 
process of secularisation, homogenisation and uniformisation of pluralistic, 
traditional Hindu laws. Reforms in Hindu family laws had offered opportunities to 
Hindu women to break free of the religious beliefs and traditions which had 
confined them to the narrow sphere of family. 274 Reforms in Hindu law, it was 
believed, had offered various opportunities for Hindu women to emerge as 
individuals, to be ‘masters of their own will’ and to claim an independent identity 
for themselves by fighting against the traditions, particularly Hindu traditions, 
wherein given its ‘strong patrilineal structure’ the roles of wife and mother were 
seen as the only proper roles for women.275 And, the steps which could be taken for 
Hindu women needed to be replicated for all women irrespective of religion.  
 
																																								 																				
273  Yaqin Anwarul and Badar Anwar, Protection of Women under Law (New Delhi: Deep & Deep 
Publications, 1982). (At p. 11) 
274  Some of the oft quoted changes which have been claimed as revolutionary till recently were:  (i) 
the principle of monogamous marriages: It was claimed that the ‘spread of Christianity with its 
concept of marriage as a union for life of one man with one woman marked the first step towards 
the legal recognition of the principle of monogamy’ and this principle came to applied for the 
first time for the Hindus with the enactment of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, “Towards 
Equality.”(At p. 104); (ii) Abolition of child marriages: Authors argued that furthering the 
measures undertaken during colonial period to raise the minimum age of marriage in order to 
curb the evil of child marriages, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 laid down as one of the 
conditions of marriage, the completion of 18 years and 15 years by the bridegroom and the bride 
respectively; (iii) Remedy of Divorce: It is repeatedly asserted that with the enactment of the 
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a novel remedy of divorce became a part of the law governing all 
Hindus; (iv) Equal rights of maintenance: The official report argued that the Hindu Adoptions 
and Maintenance Act, 1956 introduced another revolutionary measure in the Hindu family. 
Departing from the traditional concept which regarded woman only as a dependent and imposed 
the obligation for maintenance only on the husband, the co 
dified Hindu law makes both husband and wife liable for bearing the expenses if the other spouse has 
no independent income; (v) Right to own property: It is pointed out that the Hindu Succession 
Act, 1956 passed ‘after stiff resistance from the traditionalists’ ‘brought in some radical and 
fundamental changes, the most important of which was to introduce equal rights of succession 
between male and female heirs. (….) It also simplified the law by abolishing the different 
systems prevailing under the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga schools.’ For a detailed discussion see 
“Towards Equality.”  
275  “Towards Equality.” (At p. 40) 
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3.1.2 Awareness about Limitations of the State in dealing with Traditions in 
India  
While law remained central to women’s struggle till the 1990s, it was not the case 
that during all these years scholars’ faith in law and their advocacy for uniform civil 
code or for equal legal rights to women were based on ignorance about the 
limitations of the State and its legal system in dealing with customs and traditions. 
Much like colonial administrators and the present day scholars,276 earlier too there 
was full awareness that law alone may not be able to change things for women. 
There was awareness that eradicating influence of religion from the private sphere- 
from the personal lives of people- will be an arduous task.277 The gap between law in 
books and law in practice was a matter of constant concern for legal scholars as well 
as scholars from other disciplines.278 Limitations of law in eradicating social evils 
like dowry and child marriages were highlighted constantly. Many scholars argued 
that in spite of the title modern, the reformed modern Hindu family law did not 
conform to the modern values, and that it had failed to achieve both the professed 
goals – uniformity and sex-equality.279 Authors often wrote to show that prohibition 
against bigamy, right to divorce, right to own property, and even idea of marriage as 
a contract remained merely theoretical possibilities for women.280 Judicial 
application of the modern Hindu family law was also a subject of critical evaluation 
																																								 																				
276  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 51) 
277  Reflecting awareness about the limitations of law, the dominant view till the 1990s was that 
since a very large section of our society still continues to be under the influence of traditional 
standards dissemination of values incorporated in the Constitution will meet slow progress. 
“Towards Equality” (At p. 7).  
 Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty and J. Duncan M. Derrett, The Concept of Duty in South Asia (Delhi: 
Vikas Publishing House, 1978). Flaherty and Derrett also opined that the improvement in 
situation of women depends upon the speed with which the masses follow the rapid stride of the 
elite towards tomorrow’s world in which individualism will be so pervasive that only two duties 
will need to be considered, towards oneself  and towards one’s country. (At pp. x-xi) 
278  Roscoe Pound, “Law in Books and Law in Action.,” American Law Review, 44 (1910): 12–36. 
Mautner, “Three Approaches to Law and Culture.”For a critique of ‘gap theory’ see Dhavan, 
“Introduction,” 1989. Also see Griffiths, “What Is Legal Pluralism?” 
279  Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India. 
280  Derrett, The Death of a Marriage Law: Epitaph for Rishis. Discussing stronghold of traditional 
values in Indian society including women Derrett noted, 
 The legal system, though it has been forced to react to the new economic and educational 
position of the upper-middle-class Hindu woman, is bound to take account, especially at the 
judicial level, of the traditional expectations of the older generation, and the still traditional self-
image of the Hindu married woman herself. (At p. ix) 
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for a considerably large number of works281 and authors also focussed on revealing 
gender bias in the interpretation and implementation of the reformed gender-neutral 
provisions.282 
 
It was also accepted that law and legislative reforms alone, could not bring about a 
fundamental transformation in society and that desired changes in women’s situation 
could be achieved only through intensive support of other social methods, such as 
education.  There was available a realisation that formal equality by itself cannot 
bring about much change in the condition of women. Therefore scholars often 
reiterated that the struggle for equality included demands for both formal and 
substantial equality and for promulgation of laws which made special provisions for 
women keeping in view their differences from men.283  
 
By the 1970s, it had also started to become clear that society in India was not 
keeping pace with legal reforms and changes.284 Expressing this realization, Derrett, 
writing in the late 1970s, noted,  
the idea that the dharmsastras could be repealed, and that all that was 
necessary for legal and social change was legislative enactment, had started 
to appear ‘careless and naïve’.285   
While judicial separation or right of divorce was seen as a right in favour of women 
by the 1980s there had started to emerge scholarly analysis which showed that laws 
relating to bigamy, even divorce laws were not in interests of women.286 There were 
																																								 																				
281  Derrett, A Critique of Modern Hindu Law. Also, Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in 
India. 
282  Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India. 
283  “Towards Equality.” 
284  Derrett, The Death of a Marriage Law: Epitaph for Rishis. Highlighting unchanging nature of 
Hindu marriage even after reform in marriage laws and enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act 
1955 Derrett mentioned, 
 Marriage in India is worth what it was before, and the judges will see to it that that is what it 
remains. Modern styles, modern manners, modern aspirations will all have had their way: but a 
synthesis of the old and the new will leave the essence of the old in the ascendant. (At p. 44) 
285  ibid. (At p. 67) 
286  ibid. Drawing attention towards ineffectiveness of laws relating to judicial separation and divorce 
Derrett noted, 
 The new marriage-and-divorce law was made by a tiny elite to subserve people who believe 
marriage to be an affair of the spouses themselves, as modern world expects. How came they to 
facilitate a system whereby parents not only make a marriage by their more or less expert 
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disagreements amongst scholars on the relevance of the issues such as compulsory 
registration of marriage287 or ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ as a ground of 
divorce288 for women in India. However, till the 1990s, this realisation about 
limitations of law in neutralizing influence of culture was not a reason good enough 
for doubting the belief that as an entity autonomous from society, law can neutralize 
influence of religion and traditions from society in India too. There was awareness 
that the field of personal laws would be the most difficult one to change, still change 
seemed inevitable based on the belief that British had set a trend in the right 
direction, which made it possible to interpret most personal aspects of life in terms 
of the Constitution’.289 
 
3.1.3 Continuing Influence of Cultures on Law: Not a Reason to Rethink 
Antagonism between Law and Cultural Diversity  
Till 1990s there was no reason to question the idea of law as an instrument of social 
change having potential to reconstruct society in accordance with modern values290 
or to question law’s ‘autonomous character’. There was absolutely no reason to 
challenge the understanding that laws promulgated and implemented by a secular 
state possessed qualities like value neutrality, impartiality, objectivity, which were 
absent in the traditional understanding of law, will realise the aspiration of 
modernity for Indian society too.  
 
The law made by the State was believed to have the potential to effect transition to 
modernity, as scholars were convinced that it possessed all those characteristics 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
betrothing, but can also end it while the children are still fairly young? A new weapon has been 
placed in hands of unscrupulous parents of, especially, boys and it is not utterly incongruous with 
any modern marriage law. (At p. 141) 
287  For a discussion on relevance of compulsory registration of marriages in India see Agnes, Family 
Law Volume 1. (At pp. 93-102) 
288  Various divorce laws in India do not include ‘breakdown of marriage’ or no fault ground as a 
reason for dissolution of marriage but for the Muslim law which allow options to both men and 
women, though in different ways, to dissolve a marriage.  
289  Rama Mehta, Socio-Legal Status of Women in India (Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1987). (At p. 
163) 
290  See Derrett, The Death of a Marriage Law: Epitaph for Rishis. While taking cognizance of 
continuing influence of religion and culture on Indian society and law Derrett was also hopeful 
that “there will come a time when the elaborate, ultra-modern apparatus of law will fit the social 
facts.” (At p. x) 
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which traditional laws were perceived to be lacking.  Law in its traditional 
understanding was found to be deeply embedded in society, religions, ideologies, 
traditions; whereas modern law was believed to be an entity autonomous from 
society, promulgated by a secular state, distant not only from ideological 
subjectivities, but also unconstrained by categories like religion, caste, class, sex or 
ethnicity. Moreover, deeply embedded in society traditional law appeared biased and 
arbitrary, and tainted with local knowledge and particularistic practices, whereas 
modern law appeared neutral and objective- an embodiment of universalistic 
knowledge, humanistic values. Furthermore, while  traditional law appeared to be 
concerned only with maintaining extant social order- maintaining differences 
between individuals on the basis of caste, sex, religion, ethnicity etc., modern law 
was presumed to be a force with the potential to reconstruct the society on the basis 
of higher principles, such as equality, freedom and dignity for all. In addition to the 
above, while law in traditional India was pluralistic, having different standards for 
different individuals, modern legal system was seen to be promising uniformity and 
neutrality- the blindness towards differences between individuals and therefore, the 
equality before law to all human beings.  
 
Being convinced about potential of law as an instrument of progress, till the 1990s, 
the continuing influence of religions and traditions on law could simply be attributed 
to various reasons such as, high levels of illiteracy amongst women, under-
enforcement of the existing legal provisions, inaccessibility of the legal system to 
Indian women, deeply entrenched patriarchy, economically disadvantaged position 
of women in an ex-colony, and political compulsions of a communally sensitive 
multi-religious country.  
 
Maintaining belief in beneficial legacy of colonial rule, for feminists, the strong hold 
of tradition was not a reason either to negate the potential of state law or to give up 
the aspiration of neutralizing the influence of traditions from law and society. 
Therefore, till the 1990s, most works, which pointed out the gap between law in 
books and law in reality, highlighted, rather assiduously, the strong opposition from 
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the traditional conservative forces to the efforts for secularization of Hindu laws.291 
However, scholars advocating reforms were convinced that influence of traditional 
values was not strong enough to neutralise the impact of modern values and to kill 
the progressive spirit of legal reforms.  
 
All these years there was no reason to question the task of seeking separation 
between law and traditions or to attribute the existing gap between law and reality to 
any kind of misunderstandings about the concept of personal laws, about indigenous 
traditions in India. There was no reason to link persisting influence of culture or 
law’s failure in eradicating cultural diversity to misunderstandings about the 
concepts of law and religion, about the concept of personal laws. Scholars had no 
reason to question or challenge the understandings of the concepts of dharma or 
sharia as a ‘book law’ or to believe that the dominant scholarly understandings 
about these concepts were result of misconceptions about Indian worldviews. It was 
an unquestionable belief that progress meant moving forward on the same linear 
path, which the west had followed and where one end of the continuum was customs 
and the other was that of secular laws. There was a conviction that with adequate 
combination of legal and social measures- legal reforms which ensured formal and 
substantial equality and the social and educational reforms- traditional values of 
importance to the institution of marriage and family would come to be replaced with 
new, western values of treating marriage as a contract. Scholars were convinced that 
age-old concepts of subordination of women to family, to religions/traditions could 
be addressed through gradual reforms in family laws in India, on the lines of British 
matrimonial statutes.292  
 
Perceiving legal pluralism and diversity as a root cause not only for backwardness of 
Indian society293 in general but also for women’s problems, understanding in those 
years was that the legal fragmentation of Indian women not only thwarts the 
																																								 																				
291  Jana Matson Everett, Women and Social Change in India (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 
1981). 
292  Derrett, The Death of a Marriage Law: Epitaph for Rishis. 
293  Redding, “Slicing the American Pie.” Making a comparison with the United States, Redding 
gives a detailed description of the perceptions wherein legal pluralism has always been a sign of 
backwardness.  
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Constitution but strengthens the hold of religion on the mind of women and thereby 
distances them from the only concept of justice permitted to be recognised- that is 
the Constitution.’294 Based on the above understanding one of the main concerns of 
the scholars was to ensure that the state takes care of this legal fragmentation and 
ensure that a uniform civil code came into existence to govern family matters of all 
individuals.295  
 
Convinced of a close connection between law and progress, the concerns of 
women’s rights scholarship across all disciplines till the 1990s were relatively 
simple. For the legal scholars the main concern was to identify the laws which 
discriminated against women and suggest legal reforms- to achieve uniformity in 
laws and to grant equal legal rights to women in all spheres of life, but more 
particularly in the private sphere of family. On the other hand for scholars from 
other disciplines the common tasks were: first, to draw attention towards continuing 
gap between law and reality, usually referred as the gap between law in books and 
law in practice, and second to understand, analyse and explain the reasons for the 
above-mentioned gap and to suggest social and economic measures to support the 
law and the state in its task of neutralising influence of traditions and religion.    
 
There was no reason to presume that the problem of denial of rights to women could 
be structural, that law itself could be implicated in perpetuating this gap and 
reinforcing patriarchy. In contrast to the scholarship in the post-1990s phase, there 
was no reason to ‘question law’s commitment to social change’ or to ‘consider the 
role of law in subordination of women, beyond the discriminatory character of some 
laws.’ Till the 1990s, it was an unquestionable presumption that Indian society has 
been initiated on path of transition towards modernity, as a result of colonial rule 
and introduction of the new understanding of law in Indian legal system. There was 
also no reason for scholars, especially the ‘women and law’ scholars to think that 
there may be emerging a new generation of feminism in India which would question 
																																								 																				
294  Krishan Mahajan, “Indian Women: Victims of Indian Constitution,” in Women, March Towards 
Dignity: Social and Legal Perspectives, ed. Kusum (Delhi: Regency Publications, 1993). (At p. 
92) 
295  Vimal Balasubhramanyam, “Women, Personal Laws and the Struggle for Secularism,” Economic 
and Political Weekly 20, no. 30 (1985): 1260–61. 
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their own understanding of law.296  Moreover, there was no reason to think that there 
would be emerging such theoretical developments in the western academics which 
will take away the comfort of the binaries of tradition v modernity, east v west, 
religion v secular, dharma v law and would question the very notion of 
progressiveness and backwardness, which formed the basis for superiority claims of 
colonial rule. 
 
Till the 1990s it was unthinkable that- modernity, enlightenment philosophy, the 
idea of uniform civil code, the concern for transferring complete control of family 
matters to the State, rights discourse, criminalization of patriarchal practices like 
bigamy or adultery- all that was considered important for progress, for 
empowerment and upliftment of women will come under challenge. For women’s 
rights scholars engaged in fighting cultural and legal pluralism, it was unthinkable 
that soon their understanding of Indian traditions will come under challenge. It was 
beyond contemplation that the new, modern understanding of law as a neutral, 
objective and autonomous entity, as a uniform set of rules, would acquire the label 
‘traditional’, and concern of women’s rights scholars would be to challenge this 
‘traditional notion’ of law.297 It could not have been imagined that women’s rights 
scholarship would put the idea of uniform civil code on backtrack and would come 
to see cultural diversity and legal pluralism as a source of empowerment of women. 
It was inconceivable that there would be a need to develop an indigenous version of 
feminism which could be sensitive to cultural diversity in India.  
 
																																								 																				
296  Pratiksha Baxi, “Feminist Contributions to Sociology of Law: A Review,” Economic and 
Political Weekly, 43, no. 43 (2008): 79–85. (At p. 81) 
297 As an example of this change see Flavia Agnes, Family Law: Family Laws and Constitutional 
Claims, vol. I (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011 ). As a forerunner for introducing insights 
of critical theory in India Agnes noted, 
 While challenging the premise of neutrality of law, I ground my arguments within feminist legal 
theory, posited as ‘perspective scholarship’ which challenges the traditional notion that law is a 
neutral, objective, relational set of rules, unaffected in content and form by passions and 
perspectives of those who possess and wield the power inherent in law and legal scholarships. 
Perspective scholarship adds the explicit consideration of diverse perspectives to the realist, law-
in-society tradition and is based on the premise that certain groups historically have been 
unrepresented (or under-represented) in law and that their exclusion has led to biases and an 
incompleteness or deficit in contemporary legal analysis and institutions…………This 
scholarship adds nuance to the traditional rather monotonous canvas of law. (At p.  xxiv) 
(emphasis added) 
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However, the unthinkable took place. By the end of the 1990s the idea of law as an 
instrument of social change came to be challenged. Finding it difficult to ignore the 
theoretical developments in the West under the rubric of ‘critical theory’, women’s 
rights scholarship in India came to challenge everything that was considered panacea 
for progress. Most important of all, modern law, one of the most important 
dispensations of the colonial rule, came to be displaced from its position of privilege 
as the only normative discourse guiding or controlling society. Once seen as a 
neutral terrain, an embodiment of objectivity and rationality, an entity autonomous 
from society, law was finally perceived as an entity deeply embedded in society. It 
came to be seen as a terrain imbued with ideology and cultures and values rooted in 
society. 
 
3.2  Post-1990s Framework: New Understandings 
 
Women’s rights scholarship in India has undergone tremendous changes in recent 
changes. Women’s rights scholars do not want to be seen as perpetuating the 
colonial legacy. An important change that have come to characterize the socio-legal 
scholarship in the last few decades is changing perception of scholars two important 
things: first, towards the impact of colonial rule of law and society in India and 
second, understandings about nature and role of  modern law in women’s 
empowerment.  
 
3.2.1 Changed Perceptions about the Impact of Colonial Rule: Colonial Rule- 
Not a Beneficial Legacy for Women 
Women’s rights movement in India is a colonial legacy. While it was considered a 
beneficial legacy for any decades after the independence, scholars’ perceptions in 
recent years has changed. The recent decades have witnessed the emergence of 
considerable literature from different disciplines wherein a major concern of 
scholars is to highlight the negative effects of the colonial rule on Indian society. A 
major concern of scholars in recent years has been to demonstrate use of the law as 
an instrument for colonial expansion and imperialism. Colonial rule, scholars have 
been arguing, far from bringing about liberation and empowerment of individuals, 
has been about the increasing assertions of mythical western superiority for 
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denigration of non-western traditions and indigenous population.298  Colonial rule in 
the current streams of works is about creation of such traditional hierarchies where 
none existed, or about imparting inflexibility and rigidity to customs and traditions, 
to ways of living of people in India which was unknown before. Scholars in the 
current phase no longer accept the idea that the British rulers, given their policy of 
non-interference, did not interfere in the customs and religion based laws of the 
Indians.  
 
There is now available rich literature from different disciplines which demonstrates 
the complex ways in which colonial rule had influence on women’s issues.299 The 
concepts of tradition and modernity, east and west, which were once accepted as 
clearly distinct and mutually exclusive categories have now been problematised.300 
In contrast to the earlier understanding where traditions were seen to be pre-existing 
colonial rule, recent works highlight in great detail how both the concepts of 
tradition and modernity were coming into existence simultaneously during colonial 
rule.301 
 
The concept of woman- the definitive, well-known entity, the oppressed being, the 
object of liberation and emancipation by modernity has been destabilized.302 Instead 
																																								 																				
298  Some of the prominent works adopting this approach from disciplines other than law are: Lata 
Mani, “Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India,” Cultural Critique, no. 7 
(1987): 119–56; Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid, Recasting Women: Essays in Indian 
Colonial History (Rutgers University Press, 1990); Sudhir Chandra, Enslaved Daughters: 
Colonialism, Law & Women’s Rights (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998); Uma Chakravarti, 
Rewriting History: The Life and Times of Pandita Ramabai (Delhi: Kali for Women, 1998). 
299  Anshu Malhotra, “Empire, Nationalism and Women’s Rights,” Economic and Political Weekly 
50, no. 26 (2007): 2504–5. Also see Veena Talwar Oldenburg,  Dowry Murder: The Imperial 
Origins of a Cultural Crime (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). Presenting 
dowry as a crime which emerged in colonial era Oldenburg mentions, 
 We must look beyond the statute book to comprehend a central paradox of colonial policy in 
India that persists in post-colonial India: although the legislative record is indeed impressive, and 
includes the outlawing of several customs that underscored the bias against women, there was in 
colonial period a profound loss of women’s economic power and social worth. This was a direct 
consequence of the radical creation of property rights in land. (At p. 3) 
300  Mani, “Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India.” 
301  ibid. At pp. 119-120 
302  Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, Real and Imagined Women: Gender, Culture and Postcolonialism 
(London; New York: Routledge, 1993). Sanjukta Ghosh, “Feminism in India,” blog, Dissent 
Magazine, 2007, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/democratiya_article/feminism-in-india. 
Kapur, “The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric,” 2002. 
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of lauding the contributions of colonial rulers in emancipation of women, scholars 
have highlighted how colonial rule was more an occasion for suppression of 
women’s agency.303 Far from celebrating contributions of colonial rule in bridging 
the gap between tradition and modernity through legal reforms, contemporary 
scholars prefer to analyse the legislative measures of pre-independence as well as 
post-independence India to demonstrate the ways in which colonial rule was 
responsible for artificially creating the opposition between tradition and 
modernity.304   
 
Legislative reforms dealing with traditional practices, the process of secularization, 
homogenization and uniformization of Hindu law, which were highlighted till the 
1990s as significant contributions of the British in initiating the process of women’s 
empowerment in India, are no longer treated as examples of positive influences of 
the colonial rule. A common concern of scholars during past decades has been to 
draw attention towards ethnocentrism involved in colonial policies- to demonstrate 
how every occasion for legal reform was an occasion to denigrate Indian cultures, to 
establish superiority claims of British305 and justify perpetuation of British rule in 
India.306 Scholars now argue that each instance of legislative reform, though 
																																								 																				
303  Mani, “Contentious Traditions.” Offering an insightful analysis of debates around the issue of 
sati Mani mentioned,  
 Official discourse forecloses any possibility of women’s agency, thus providing justification for 
“civilizing” colonial intervention. (At p. 130) 
304  ibid, At pp. 119-120 
305  Joanna Liddle and Rama Joshi, “Gender and Imperialism in British India,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 20, no. 43 (1985). The authors state,  
 The colonial government may have wished to free Indian women from male dominance, but they 
did not intend to do so by allowing them equal voting rights. It would indeed have been difficult 
for British to agree to such a policy in India in 1919, since women in Britain were not granted the 
vote until 1928. (At p. 74) 
306  Also see Nussbaum, “In Defense of Cultural Values.” Nussbaum mentions 
 We should also remember that the equation of the entirety of a culture with old or change 
resistant elements is frequently a ploy of imperialism and chauvinism. The British in India 
harped continually on elements of Indian culture that they could easily portray as retrograde; 
they sought to identify these as “Indian culture”, and critical values (especially those favoring 
women’s progress) as British importations. At the same time, the British actively promoted 
antiscientific elements in Indian culture in order to prevent a development of science and 
technology in India that would threaten their continued hegemony. (At p. 391). 
 Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality. Talking about the politics of women’s rights during colonial 
era Agnes states,  
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ostensibly meant for women, was in reality a terrain of politics, a terrain of contests 
between the economic, political and ideological interests of British and indigenous 
reformers.  There is now available rich literature which aims to highlight limited 
understanding of local traditions and customs among colonial rulers which resulted 
into serious distortions in the way the concept of personal laws or the traditions 
came to be understood in India.  
 
For example, offering incisive analysis of discourses around the legislation to ban 
sati Lata Mani highlighted how the discourses relating to sati  were not primarily 
about women and their rights but  about what constitutes authentic cultural 
tradition.”307 Discussing the reform relating to widow remarriage Chakravarti shows 
that even as the widow remarriage law attempted to liberate the upper-caste widow 
from enforced widowhood, it denied her inheritance to the deceased husband’s 
estate, thus ensuring her economic dependency. Once codified this law became 
applicable to all castes, including those caste groups in which widows were entitled 
to continue holding the inheritance upon remarriage. As a consequence this law set 
back the status of women from caste groups that granted more rights compared to 
the position of widows from the upper castes. Chakravarti’s study of the emergence 
of brahmanical patriarchy in early Indian history shows how norms relating to 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 Since property and its regulation forms the basis of all civil laws, the legal systems located 
within feudal and capitalistic patriarchal moulds would necessarily be based upon anti-women 
stipulations to varying degress. But within this universe of sexist biases, it is interesting to 
observe that at particular historical junctures, certain biases of a political system are either over-
emphasized or undermined. (At p. 2) 
 Stating various positive dictates about property rights of women in Hindu law even in pre-
colonial period Agnes further states, 
 These positive dictates are shrouded by an over-emphasis on practices, which are not contained 
in the smriti texts, just as the universally accepted principles of Hindu law- widow immolation 
and infant marriages- are not. These projections which rendered Hindu society barbaric, provided 
moral justification for colonial rule and its reformist scheme. During the corresponding period, 
undermining the issue of meagre economic rights of women, within an indissoluble marital 
bondage under the tenets of feudal Christianity then becomes a political mission.  (At p. 3) 
 Liddle and Joshi, “Gender and Imperialism in British India.” Arguing that British were not 
interested in women’s position for its own sake and that they used women’s issues for 
perpetuating British imperialism, Liddle and Joshi demonstrate that  
 The British had an interest in maintaining both women’s subordination, and in liberalizing it, the 
former to show that India was not yet for self-rule, the latter to confirm Britain’s superiority in 
relations between sexes. (At p. 73) 
307  Mani, “Contentious Traditions.” (At p. 122) 
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sexual purity and ideology of ‘pativrata’308 were deployed to gradually establish 
patriliny, sexual division of labour, and caste and class relations in society through 
the family. These norms served not only to control reproduction, sexuality, and 
property ownership within household, but were also crucial to distinguishing the 
upper caste from other castes and to regulating relations of gender, labour and 
property ownership within and between caste groups. 309 
 
Process of codification, which till few decades ago was considered most beneficial 
legacy of the British rule is now seen as a process of negotiating and cementing the 
status quo in relation to gender, caste, class, and nationhood.310 Colonial 
administrators’ attempts to construct a homogenous version of Hindu law are also no 
longer seen as a part of beneficial legacy of the colonial rule. Instead, in recent years 
legal scholars have taken cognizance of the fact that the above attempts during 
colonial rule resulted in suppression of cultural and religion based differences and 
caused emergence of a rather homogenous version of not only Hindu law, Hindu 
traditions or religions but also of other religions, something which was alien to the 
religions or religion based laws in India.311 Scholars from different disciplines 
including legal scholars now show effectively that the colonial rule resulted in 
ascendance of ‘scriptural law’ or ‘textual law’, much at the cost of flexible local 
customs and traditions, which more often than not granted better rights to women.312 
																																								 																				
308  Pativrata is a term used to refer to a lady with complete dedication to her husband. 
309  Uma Chakravarti, “Conceptualising Brahmanical Patriarchy in Early India: Gender, Caste, Class 
and State,” Economic and Political Weekly 28, no. 14 (1993): 579–85. 
310  Chakravarti, Rewriting History.; Also see, Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality. 
311  Mani, “Contentious Traditions.” Mani writes, 
 In meant that officials could insist for instance, that brahmanic and Islamic scriptures were 
prescriptive texts containing rules of social behavior, even when the evidence for this assertion 
was problematic. Further, they could institutionalize their assumptions, as Warren Hastings did 
in 1772, by making these texts the basis of personal law. Official discourse thus had palpable 
material consequences, of which constitution of personal laws from religious texts is perhaps 
most significant from the point of view of women. (At p. 122) 
 Also see Paul B. Courtright and Namita Goswami, “Who Was Roop Kanwar? Sati, Law, 
Religion, and Postcolonial Feminism,” in Religion and Personal Law in Secular India: A Call to 
Judgement, ed. Gerald James Larson (Bloomington and Indiana Pollis: Indiana University Press, 
2001), 200–225.; Bina Agarwal, A Field of One’s Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia 
(Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
312  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. Providing a detailed account of construction of personal laws 
during colonial era Agnes writes,  
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In sharp contrast to earlier streams, the scholars no longer perceive legal reforms or 
process of codification as measures for empowerment of women or of giving them 
better rights than what they enjoyed in the pre-colonial period. Many feminist 
historians have shown how codification of laws relating to family has always been 
steered by dominant notions of public morality and the material interests of elite 
men in positions of power.313 Drawing on the insights of inter-disciplinary work 
legal scholars have also shown how processes of codification were processes of 
combining worst biases of both systems of law in personal laws, much to the 
disadvantage of women.314 There is available rich literature which demonstrates with 
rich evidence that the processes of codification of Hindu laws was merely a means 
to privilege and impose upper caste norms of Victorian or Brahmanical purity on the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 During this time, several Sanskrit scholars wrote treatises to meet the British demand. But the 
work of European authors came to be trusted and used in preference even to genuine shastric 
works. The translated codes, backed by the authority of British courts, began to make alterations 
in custom. In their attempt to make the shastric injunctions precise and definite to suit the 
structure of the Anglicised adversarial court system, the British forced it towards a straight 
jacketed mould, which led to a loss of complexities and localized contexts. This also provided 
the scope for the biases of the English scholars to creep into the translated texts. (At p.6) 
 Joanna Liddle and Rama Joshi, “Gender and Imperialism in British India,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 20, no. 43 (1985): 72-78, Liddle and Joshi mention, 
 Most Hindu law, apart from that of Brahmins, was unwritten and based on custom, which varied 
both over time and across cultural and regional boundaries. In contrast, Western law was written 
and based on the binding force of Parliament, applying uniformly to everyone and interpreted 
more rigidly as precedent developed. To bring Hindu law in line with the British concept, 
Warren Hastings, Governor of Bengal, decreed in 1772 that Brahmin written law should be the 
sole authority of all Hindus. (At p. 73) 
313  For example see Chakravarti, Rewriting History.; Chandra, Enslaved Daughters.; Mani, 
“Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India.” 
314  Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality. Drawing attention towards colonial biases which influenced 
socio-legal discourses in India Agnes writes,  
 At particular historical junctures certain biases of a particular system are either over-emphasized 
or undermined. The quote from Manu that a woman must be protected by her father in 
childhood, by her husband in youth and by her sons in her old age, and that she is not entitled to 
freedom is common knowledge. But it is less well-known that Manu laid down comprehensive 
principles concerning women’s separate property approximately two thousand years before the 
English legal system accepted this in principle, and issued the warning: Friends or relations of a 
woman, who, out of folly or avarice, live upon the property belonging to her, or the wicked ones 
who deprive her of enjoyment of her own belongings to go hell, or that Narada dictated that the 
husband must give one-third of his property to the first wife at his second marriage. These 
positive dictates are shrouded by an over-emphasis on practices, which are not contained in the 
smriti texts, just as the universally accepted principles of Hindu law- widow immolation and 
infant marriages- are not. These projections which rendered the Hindu society barbaric, provided 
moral justification for colonial rule and its reformist scheme. During the corresponding period, 
undermining the issue of meager economic rights of English women, within an indissoluble 
marital bondage under the tenets of feudal Christianity then becomes a political mission. (At p. 
3) 
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lower caste groups.315 It was a process, scholars argue, wherein those in power drew 
selectively upon the upper-caste brahmanical norms to homogenize Hindu law, in 
the process erasing the diversity of customs, many of which allowed women greater 
rights.316  
 
In contrast to the earlier phase where the scholars considered transferring control of 
family matters to the state as a sign of progress and advancement in India, one of the 
important concerns of family law scholars is to show how process of transferring 
control to the state became a means to impose rigid religious identities over different 
communities. Scholars have rightly highlighted that colonial rule created a context 
where the indigenous elite were under a pressure to claim an identity for themselves 
which was as progressive as that of the British, yet distinct.317 Shamir and Hacker 
note,  
A local elite was struggling to position itself at once on a par with British 
criteria of scientific competence and yet not as a mere proxy for British 
interests; at once able to articulate itself in terms of enlightenment concepts 
such as reason and modernity and yet celebrating its own distinct cultural 
authenticity.318  
 
Introduction of modern legal system- state-regulated and state-controlled 
adjudicative system which was once seen as one of the most beneficial legacy of 
British rule is now seen as a means to kill the complexity of indigenous systems and 
for bringing into existence an artificial notion of ‘personal laws’.319  
																																								 																				
315  Liddle and Joshi, “Gender and Imperialism in British India.” 
316  For some specific examples where women’s rights were curtailed see Chaudhuri, Feminism in 
India. Kapur, Erotic Justice. 
317  Ronen Shamir and Daphna Hacker, “Colonialism’s Civilizing Mission: The Case of the Indian 
Hemp Drug Commission,” Law & Social Inquiry 26, no. 2 (2001): 435–61. 
318  Shamir and Hacker. (At p.50) 
319  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. Agnes writes,  
 The transformation was at two levels: (i) through the introduction of a legal structure modeled on 
English courts which were adversarial in nature (that is, Anglo Saxon jurisprudence); and (ii) 
through principles of substantive law which were evolved and administered in these courts (that 
is, Anglo-Hindu and Anglo-Mohammedan laws). (At p. 5) 
 Agnes further wrote,  
 The new legal  structure, based on the model of the English courts, necessitated the enactment of 
statutes. But the realm of ‘personal’ laws was spared from the process of codification as per the 
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Sardamoni320 uses example of the transformation of matriliny in Kerala in the early 
twentieth century to show how the process of codification undermined women’s 
stable rights to matrilineal property. She points out that the new education system in 
that period generated transferable employment opportunities and ushered in changes 
in trade and landownership, thus creating the material basis for a change in property 
ownership. The new education also generated ideas and increased exposure to a 
homogenous brand of brahmanical Victorian morality that shaped the new nation, 
contrasted against which polyandry, the informal ‘sambandam’ relationships(where 
the male partner in the relationship had the visiting rights) of Nayar women, and 
custom of ‘visiting husbands’ began to be viewed as concubinage. She further 
mentions that all these changes set the stage for codification, a process in which 
women did not participate, but which replaced ‘sambandam’ relationships with 
monogamy and marriage. The process introduced women’s dependence on the 
husband, and also diminished the stable and autonomous rights that women had in 
matrilineal property. For many scholars politicisation of the issue of women’s rights 
during colonial rule and also in independent India is a matter of concern.321 Scholars 
have attempted to show that legal discourses during the whole colonial period 
remained a terrain of politics, a terrain of contests between the economic, political 
and ideological interests of British and indigenous reformers.  
 
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
assurance given in the Queen’s proclamation. Despite this, the Hindu and Muslim family laws 
went through great transformation during this period. The establishment of courts based on rules 
and procedures of English courts, with a clear hierarchy of courts, was meant to take the 
arbitration fora certain along the model of English courts. While at the initial stage, scriptural law 
was awarded judicial recognition, after 1864, the British attempted to curtail use of scriptural 
law. The British interpretations of the ancient texts became binding legal principles and made the 
law certain, rigid and uniform. (At p. 8) 
320  K. Saradamoni, Matriliny Transformed: Family, Law and Ideology in Twentieth Century 
Travancore, 1 edition (New Delhi: Walnut Creek, CA: SAGE Publications Pvt. Ltd, 1999). Also 
Leela Dube, “Matriliny and Women’s Status,” Economic and Political Weekly 36, no. 33 (2001): 
3144–47. 
321  Chaudhuri, Feminism in India. 
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3.2.2 Changed Perceptions about Law and Legal Uniformity 
3.2.2.1 Law and Legal Uniformity- Instruments of Oppression 
Law, as has been previously stated, was one of the most potent instruments of the 
colonial rule.  As described in the previous section, faith in law has been based on 
the understanding that modern law or the state law possessed all those characteristics 
like, value-neutrality, impersonal character, autonomy, objectivity, impartiality-  
which have been absent in the traditional law or non-western law. In recent years 
while law continues to play an important role in women’s struggle for social change, 
scholars’ perceptions about nature and role of law have undergone important 
changes. Recent scholarship is not about celebrating above characteristics of modern 
law.322 Keeping pace with developments in the feminist legal theory in the West,323 
scholars in India have argued that all those characteristics of modern law which were 
seen to impart superiority to it, are mythical.324 Modern law, women rights scholars 
in the post-1990s argue, has been an instrument used since colonial era to disguise 
the complex interplay of law, power and ideologies.325  
 
Drawing upon insights of feminist legal theory in the West, family law scholars in 
India too accept that while law is presumed to always do justice, “it is always the 
																																								 																				
322  One of the most prominent example of such scholarship is,  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1.  
 Also see, Parashar and Dhanda, Redefining Family Law in India. Parashar and Dhanda mention, 
 Interdisciplinary study of law must become the norm, and the aspirations of legal theorists to 
conceptualise law as radically independent, or autonomous, would have to be given up. As 
Cotterrell argues, there is need to study both the doctrine, and the social, economic and political 
contexts of the doctrine, in order to be able to explain how legal change happens. … While legal 
scholarship on the whole must broaden its horizons beyond the conventional concerns of the 
lawyers, there is an equally strong need for engaging scholars from other disciplines to analyse 
law and legal institutions. (At pp. xx) 
 Also see, Pratiksha Baxi, “Feminist Contributions to Sociology of Law: A Review,” Economic 
and Political Weekly 42, no. 43 (2008): 79–85.  
323  See Frug, “A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft).” Highlighting the 
idea of law as gendered Frug stated, 
 Legal rules- like other cultural mechanisms-encode the female body with meanings. Legal 
discourse then explains and rationalizes these meanings by appeal to the “natural” differences 
between the sexes, differences that the rules themselves help to produce. The formal norm of 
legal neutrality conceals the way in which legal rules participate in the construction of those 
meaning. (At p. 1049) 
324  Nandita Haksar, Demystification of Law for Women (New York: South Asia Books, 1986). 
325  Nadine Taub and Elizabeth M. Schneider, “Women’s Subordination and the Role of Law,” in 
The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, ed. David Kairys, third edition (New York: Basic 
Books, 1998); Frug, “A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft).” 
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notion of justice held by dominant groups that is reflected in the laws of the region, 
which invariably causes injustice to the weaker and marginalized sections of 
society.”326 Ideas like instrumental characterization of law as a tool for the potential 
transformation of society, which once dominated women and law scholarship are 
now found too simplistic.327  Law which was once viewed as having unlimited 
potential to reconstruct the society according to some rational norms is now seen as 
a “crude device, circumscribed by the dominant ideologies of society in which it is 
produced.”328 
 
For current scholarship women-friendly legislations do not present any kind of 
evidence of women’s empowerment or signs of success of women’s movement in 
India. Instead of recounting legislative victories of women’s movement, scholarly 
energies are now focused on reviewing judicial process and the processes of 
implementation of laws to show how even the gender-neutral laws can result in 
																																								 																				
326  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1.; Erin P. Moore, Gender, Law and Resistance in India (USA: 
University of Arizona Press, 1998). Blaming men and Indian male judges, especially from North 
India, for perpetuating patriarchy Moore writes 
 Male elders and male judges at all levels of north Indian society are given the power to define 
what is behaviourally right and wrong. In many cases women are silenced, deprived of equal 
rights before law, and returned to their male guardians. In this way law contributes to the making 
of cultural hegemony by legitimating and enforcing a particular vision of the social order. This is 
the law’s patriarchy. (At p. 4) 
327  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. Also, Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist 
Engagements with Law in India. That Kapur and Cossma’s work represents a new phase in 
feminist legal scholarship in India becomes clear from the fact that it begins with the question, 
“is law an oppressive site?” (At p. 11).  Considering ‘instrumentalist view of law as too narrow 
and restrictive Kapur and Cossman mention, 
 Many studies have been done reviewing the laws that impact on women’s status, and 
highlighting those laws that continue to discriminate against women. Our study moves beyond 
these reviews, and examines at a deeper level the contradictory ways in which the law is 
implicated in oppression of women. (At p. 12) 
 Also see Kalpana Kannabiran, “The Law, Gender and Women,” Economic and Political Weekly 
xliv, no. 44 (2009): 33–35. 
328  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. Explaining their 
endeavour in this work Kapur and Cossman Kapur and Cossman. mention, 
 We will attempt to move beyond the understanding of law as a simple instrument of either 
oppression or social engineering which has informed much of the earlier work on women and 
law in India. Building on the work of recent feminist studies, we argue that the role of law cannot 
be adequately captured by a dichotomous understanding of law as either an instrument of 
oppression or of liberation. We believe the terrain of law is much more complex, in both the 
oppression of women, and in its promise for challenging that oppression. ( At p. 12) 
 Also see Erin P. Moore, Gender, Law and Resistance in India (Tucson, USA: The University of 
Arizona Press, 1998). 
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denial of justice to women.329 Giving strong evidence of changes in scholars’ 
perceptions towards, law, Agnes emphatically highlights gendered nature of even 
gender neutral laws as she notes,330 
Though ‘adultery’ is a ground for divorce for both men and women, the 
social and legal implications for the husband and wife differ widely. 
Historically, Hindu husbands had sanctions of polygamy and institutions 
such as concubinage and prostitution served to cater to men’s polygamous 
and extra marital sexual desires. Hence as per popular perceptions of legality, 
adultery by men tends to be condoned, by community, law and even by 
wives themselves as their social status and economic rights depend upon 
their marriage. But in context of high premium awarded to women’s chastity, 
any lapse on the part of women seem to be viewed far more stringently, 
leading to denial of maintenance and may even hamper rights to custody of 
children. Even innocuous terms such as ‘cruelty’ or ‘desertion’ which may 
superficially appear to be devoid of gendered context, when used as a ground 
																																								 																				
329  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1.  Agnes notes,  
 Existing beliefs and assumptions shape the context of a legal provision. Even when changes are 
successfully made on a doctrinal level, they can and will fail if judges or others charged with 
application of new laws revert to interpretations that merely replicate old results……. Since 
legal, moral, and social codes are determined by hegemonic claims of patriarchy, an exploration 
into the notion of justice and fairness to women can be embarked upon only after piercing the 
viel of ‘neutrality’, ‘impartiality’, and formal equality within law. (At p. xxiii) 
 Sylvia Vatuk, “Where Will She Go? What Will She Do? Paternalism Towards Women in the 
Administration of Muslim Personal Law in Contemporary India,” in Religion and Personal Law 
in Secular India: A Call to Judgement, ed. Gerald James Larson (Bloomington and Indiana 
Pollis: Indiana University Press, 2001), 226–48. 
 Vatuk draws attention towards implementation of Muslim Personal Laws in India. Criticising 
protectionist attitude towards women she mentions, 
 Those responsible for administering the personal laws tend to believe, as do most Indian, 
especially of the upper and middle classes, that the proper place for an adult woman is within a 
marital relationship. ........ In order to “save” women by “saving” their marriages, lawyers, court-
appointed social workers, and judges alike make ample use of delays, attempts at mediation, and 
pressures to reach a compromise. (At p. 228) 
 Vatuk further writes at another place 
 In the context of family court negotiations, women are regularly encouraged to drop criminal 
charges they may have filed against their husbands, to withdraw or reduce property, 
maintenance, or custody demands, and even to resume living with men who may have subjected 
them to long-standing abuse in the past. A legal discourse of “rights” is thus transformed into a 
discourse of “welfare”, whose defining terms are set, not by the woman herself, but by her 
counsellor, her advocate, the judge, and, in the last analysis, by the realities imposed by the 
society within which she lives. (At p. 232) 
330  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1., (At p. xxvi) 
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for divorce acquire a specific gendered meaning. The problem gets 
exaggerated in proceedings for maintenance, where economic claims are 
pitted against women’s sexual morality. 
 
An important engagement of feminist literature over the past decades has been to 
highlight role of the law in subordination and oppression of women.331 Instead of 
law reforms and enforcement the focus has been on the ideological character of 
law,332 on it’s active role in constituting and sustaining unequal power relations, and 
in suppressing cultural and religious differences amongst women. The idea that law 
is deeply embedded in society is explored by scholars by looking at the different 
forms of legalities and illegalities that are constitutive of the state law.  
 
3.2.2.2 Law as a Culturally Embedded, Plural Entity 
Challenging the trend of equating progressiveness with the idea of law as a 
homogenous, uniform force in the post-1990s phase there is increasing recognition 
																																								 																				
331  Baxi, “Feminist Contributions to Sociology of Law,” 2008.  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive 
Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. Subversive Sites consists of one full chapter 
where one of the main concerns of scholars is to highlight how laws have been used to impose 
specific ideologies on women. See Chapter 4: Women, Hindu Right and Legal Discourse; the 
authors claim in the conclusion of this chapter,  
 the chapter has provided an example of the way in which legal discourse and equality rights are 
not necessarily progressive in nature. While the women’s movement, and other progressive 
marginalized groups have deployed this discourse in pursuit of struggles for social change, we 
have seen in this chapter an example of groups with less progressive agendas similarly 
appropriating and deploying this discourse, (At p. 275) 
 For another such example see Sharmila Lodhia, “Legal Frankensteins and Monstrous Women: 
Judicial Narratives of ‘Family in Crisis,’” Economic and Political Weekly 9, no. 2 (2009): 102–
29. Lodhia provides an analysis of jurisprudence around section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 
a provision which makes cruelty, particularly dowry related cruelty, against women a punishable 
offence. She gives examples to show how implementation of Section 498-A is defeated by 
patriarchal inclinations of judges. For a strong critique of law as an entity implicated with 
ideology also see Haksar, Demystification of Law for Women. 
332  Trying to underline a distinct break from the earlier phase Kapur and Cossman mention,  
 In subversive sites, we focus our analysis on the legal regulation of women in and through the 
family. We do not provide an overview of the various family laws in India, or of the various 
legal provisions that continue to discriminate against women. Rather, we examine the legal 
regulation of women in the family as a site of women’s oppression, of contradiction and of 
struggle.”) …….. Many studies have been done reviewing the laws that impact on women’s 
status, and highlighting those laws that continue to discriminate against women. Our study 
moves beyond these reviews, and examines at a deeper level the contradictory ways in which the 
law is implicated in oppression of women. (At p. 12-13) 
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of the law as a plural entity.333 Uniformity and homogeneity which were once 
considered as characteristics associated with the ‘modern concept of law’ are now 
described as ‘traditional monotonous canvas of law’.334 Describing significant 
changes in feminist understandings of law, Baxi writes335  
In recent years feminist understandings of law, be this through placing 
feminist theory within jurisprudence, through substantive areas of law or 
through specific campaigns authored by women’s movement in India, has 
challenged the idea of legal centralism.336 The challenge has been offered in 
different ways. First, the idea that state law itself is plural. Second, non-state 
law offers a challenging context to understand multiple forms and techniques 
of gender subjection. Third, not only does state law intersect with non-state 
law, but state law also mimes non-state law.  
 
As Baxi points out, one of the concerns of feminist scholars in the recent times has 
been to deploy, ‘the notion of plurality to challenge the idea of a coherent, 
																																								 																				
333  Baxi, “Feminist Contributions to Sociology of Law,” 2008. Discussing about relationship of state 
law with different forms of local, customary practices relating to marital relationships, where a 
woman enters a form of partnership agreements with to live-together with a man in an intimate 
relationship, Baxi highlights three different conceptions of law. She states,  
 first, customary law is modern, in that it constantly re-invents itself by absorbing forms of formal 
law to circumvent existing legal regimes. Second, the regulation of sexuality cannot be 
understood within a doctrinal framework of law- state law is embodied in different forms of legal 
pluralisms- and it moves to contain its threats at some points of time, which tolerates pluralism at 
others. Third, sexual partnerships that are registered in an economy of trust under the shadow of 
law- which means that while such contracts cannot be used to deploy the force of the state, in 
case the promise is betrayed-the partnership becomes an event (and therefore a record) through 
the form of law. ( At p. 83) 
334  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1., (At p. xxiv) 
335  Baxi, “Feminist Contributions to Sociology of Law.” 
336  One of the most influential scholars on legal pluralism is Griffiths, “What Is Legal Pluralism?” 
Quoting Griffiths Baxi describes legal centralism as,  
 Authority… centralized in the form of the state, represented through government, the most 
visible form of which is legislature….Law was conceived as gaining its authority from the state, 
and, as part of the process of government became authoritative. This authority, as its most basic 
level, was upheld through the power to impose or enforce sanctions. While associated with 
government, law was at the same time able to develop relative autonomy both from the state and 
from society through the existence of its own institutions, which dealt exclusively with legal 
matters… In this way law became established as a self-validating system, a system whose 
validity, authority and legitimacy rely no longer on external source such as morality or religion, 
but rather on internal sources which are self-referential for its regulation and perpetuation. (At p. 
84) 
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homogenous and singular technique of harnessing legal authority’.337 Agnes 
challenges the understanding of distinction between state laws and non-
state/community based laws as she mentions,338 
The domains of formal state law and community-based non state law are not 
mutually exclusive. Though apparently in conflict, statutory law, which is 
deemed to be uniform and certain, but also formal and alien, coexists 
alongside pluralistic community practices, which are fluid and ridden with 
internal contradictions, but also accessible. Most women live with these 
contradictions in a sort of middle ground and negotiate their rights within 
both, the formal and alien court structures and the informal and accessible 
community practices. 
 
Emphasising pluralistic nature of law Agnes further states, 339 
Life experiences do not neatly correspond to formal institutional locations 
and that the law gets constituted in a ‘bottom up’ manner as opposed to top 
down process of law making by legislators and judges. 
 
3.2.2.3 New Understanding of the Concept of Personal Laws 
Another important change which makes the current phase of scholarship markedly 
different from the previous phase is the changed understanding of the concept of 
personal laws, and of the relationship between religion and personal laws. Pioneer 
among family law scholars in India for advocating this new understanding, Agnes 
challenged the long-held belief that personal laws were based on divine revelation, 
as she notes,340 
Despite the claim of divine revelation, religious laws, in effect, are people’s 
laws which are moulded through community practices, which in turn are 
influenced by the prevailing socio-economic and political forces. 
 
																																								 																				
337  Baxi, “Feminist Contributions to Sociology of Law,” 2008. (At p. 82) 
338  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. (At p. xxx) 
339   ibid. At p. xxvii 
340  ibid. At p. xxix 
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Agnes further deconstructs the colonial era belief about no role of human agency in 
religion-based laws as she mentions, 341 
A popular misconception which shrouds the issue of ‘personal laws’ is that 
these laws are based on religious texts which lay a claim to ‘divine 
revelations’ and are hence, pre-ordained, infallible, sanctimonious, and static.  
 
In contrast to the earlier streams where scholars were convinced that gender justice 
requires replacement of the religion-based pluralistic laws or customary practices, 
usually referred as traditional laws, scholars in the new phase are willing to accept 
co-existence of state law and non-state law as a sign of richness of Indian society. 
Agnes notes further, 342 
With its rich and diverse cultural heritage, religious beliefs and, customary 
practices, Indian provides a vast, complex, and at times contradictory, field 
of personal laws where the traditional coexists with the modern. State-
enacted statutory law and court-evolved case law have reconciled with non-
state ‘people’s law’. 
 
Describing personal laws as rich mix of textual laws and community based practices 
she further views,343 
It would be accurate to state that the diverse laws regulating family 
relationships are rooted either in customary practices or in interpretations of 
the divine law by scholars which were later modified through colonial 
interventions.  
 
Highlighting importance of customs in pre-colonial Indian and challenging the 
tendency of reducing Hindu law to textual law or to a set of rules found written in 
scriptures Agnes further writes, 344 
																																								 																				
341  Also see Razia Patel, “Indian Muslim Women, Politics of Muslim Personal Law and Struggle for 
Life with Dignity and Justice,” Economic and Political Weekly 44, no. 44 (October 31, 2009), 
http://www.epw.in/journal/2009/44/review-womens-studies-review-issues-specials/indian-
muslim-women-politics-muslim.. Deconstructing the practice of reducing Muslim law to set of 
rules based on ‘divine revelation’ Patel mentions, “Muslim personal law in India is not a divine 
book. It is rather a man-made law”. (At p. 45) 
342  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. (At p. 1) 
343  ibid. (At p. 2) 
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To trace the antecedents of the non-state dispute resolution mechanisms 
within Hindu law, we need to examine the ancient Hindu dharmashastras (or 
the Brahminical smriti law), upon which the modern Hindu law of marriage 
and divorce is based. These scriptures do not contain legal principles in the 
strict sense that we understand the term today. The smritis preached dharma, 
denoting ethics, morality and good behaviour (sadachara). Custom was 
recognised as an important source of law. A custom which contravenes a 
smriti rule could be perfectly valid and could be given effect to, not only in 
informal dispute settlement processes but even in a formal court of law. The 
accepted legal maxim was that a clear proof of custom outweighs a written 
text...... Even the oft cited Manusmriti, which is projected as ‘divine code’ or 
as ‘Laws of Manu’ (akin to Law of Moses), is a compilation of ancient 
customs and usages.  
 
She further draws attention towards plurality inherent in Hindu traditions, as she 
states that, 345  
Since the smritis were based on local customs, there was great diversity 
within them. Practices which were contradictory to each other could be 
termed as ‘Hindu traditions’.  
 
3.2.2.4 New Understanding about Legal Developments in India: Family Laws 
Not Moving on the Linear Path of Progress 
Taking a distinct break from the earlier streams contemporary scholars are willing to 
recognize that neither developments of family law nor the processes of attaining 
gender justice have followed a linear path of progress, from a continuum where one 
end is of customary laws and the other is that of neutral, secular laws.346 Challenging 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
344  ibid. At pp. 2-3. For diversity in context of Muslim personal laws also see Patel, “Indian Muslim 
Women, Politics of Muslim Personal.”. Discussing diversity in Muslim personal law Patel states, 
 Muslims are often wrongly perceived as a homogeneous block of people with uniform religious 
laws governing them. However, it is very often ignored that Muslims worldwide have many 
different practices, and have a large number of variations in laws governing them within different 
Islamic countries and regions. (At p. 45) 
345  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. (At p. 3) 
346  For a similar challenge in the western context see Martha Minow, “Forming Underneath 
Everything That Grows: Towards a History of Family Law,” Wisconsin Women’s Law Journal, 
1985, 819. Questioning use of such linear trajectory of progress to highlight development of 
family laws in USA Minow states, 
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the pre-1990s notion that transition from community based non-state laws to state 
laws is a sign of ensuring gender justice to women Agnes notes, 347  
The process of attaining gender justice has not been linear and both 
community laws and state laws continue to function from an inherent 
patriarchal bias against women.  
 
Questioning the practice of projecting state enacted laws as pro-women she further 
states, 348 
There is also a tendency to project all customary laws as anti-women and 
state enactments or official laws as pro-women. Contrary to popular belief, 
the history of women’s rights is not linear, with scriptural and customary 
laws forming one end of the scale and statutory reforms slowly and steadily 
progressing towards the other.  
 
Questioning the idea of transferring control of family matters to the State, Agnes 
mentions, 349 
The claims of women from minority communities cannot be formulated 
merely within the narrow context of a progression from community control 
to state control and needs to be contextualised within the multiple hierarchies 
and complex negotiations between community, nation-state and the female 
subject, and the dynamics of contemporary majority-minority politics.  
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 According to the traditional model, history follows a simple trajectory starting with female 
subordination in the family collectivity and ending with egalitarian individualism. This trajectory 
implicitly relies on an ideology of separate spheres as its initial starting point and an ideology of 
political autonomy as its destination. (At p. 869) 
347  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. (At p. xxx), Also see Parashar and Dhanda, Redefining Family 
Law in India. 
348  For a similar view see  Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just 
Framework of Women’s Rights and the Family. Also see Rudolph and Rudolph, “Living with 
Difference in India: Legal Pluralism and Legal Universalism in Historical Context.” Taking 
cognizance of the fact that family laws have not been developing on a linear path of progress the 
authors state, 
 In India, the opposition between legal pluralism and legal uniformity is not likely to yield to a 
smooth progressive historical narrative in which society moves inexorably from first to second. 
Whether regarded as benign or malign, identity formation, in the form of religiously based 
personal law, seems to be alive and well. (At p. 56) 
349  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1.(At p. xxxi) 
Rethinking the Relationship between Law, Gender Justice and Traditions in India: From Hostility to Harmony	
147 
3.3  New Concerns 
3.3.1 Scholarly Attempts to Rethink the Relationship between Law, plurality 
and feminism 
Having incorporated the above changes women’s rights scholarship has undoubtedly 
undergone significant changes during the last three decades. Although some legal 
scholars are skeptical about the relevance of ideas like law as a site of oppression for 
India,350 it is clear that taking a break from the earlier phase where the law was 
central to women’s struggle, even for the legal scholarship the law has now been 
displaced from the position of privilege. Law is no longer central to women’s 
struggles since current scholarship embody the understanding that law is only one 
amongst many discourses, such as religious, moral and social discourses that 
influence and regulate society.   
 
Scholars now suggest that women’s movement to be organized with the 
understanding about the true nature of law.351 Drawing on the revelations regarding 
law’s connection with ideology, many legal scholars now direct feminists to break 
down the assumptions that ‘law is the solution’ and that it can provide ‘definitive 
answers to the problems that women confront in their lives’.352 Legal scholars now 
suggest to resort to law with ‘appropriate expectations, with - the knowledge that 
law cannot alter the substantive realities of women’s lives. With these trends, 
feminists are exposed to the requirement of broadening the scope of struggles and 
shifting focus from legal reforms. It is argued that feminists will have to stop 
measuring strategic engagements with law only in terms of a legal result- winning or 
losing a particular case or achieving desired legislative change.  Suggesting new 
																																								 																				
350  Archana Parashar, “Essentialism or Pluralism: The Future of Legal Feminism,” in Feminist 
Terrains in Legal Domains: Interdisciplinary Essays on Women and Law in India, ed. Ratna 
Kapur (Delhi: Kali for Women, 1996), 36–60. Also Dhanda and Parashar, Decolonisation of 
Legal Knowledge.; Parashar and Dhanda, Redefining Family Law in India.  
351 See Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. Also, Amita 
Dhanda and Archana Parashar, Engendering Law (Lucknow: Eastern Book Co, 1999). 
352  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 315) 
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ways to engage with the law with the awareness that the law can play a role in 
subordination of women, Kapur and Cossman state353 
Legal discourse has constructed women as gendered subjects- it has 
constructed women as wives and mothers, as passive and weak, as 
subordinate and in need of protection. It is a discourse which has contributed 
to the subordinate position of women through its very construction of 
women’s roles and identities. At the same time, law is a site where these 
roles and identities have been challenged. It is a site where social reformers 
and feminist activists have sought to displace previously dominant 
understanding of women’s appropriate roles and identities, and sought to 
reconstruct women’s roles and identities as more full and equal citizens. In 
place of an instrumentalist vision of law, we argue that law needs to be 
reconceptualized as a site of discursive struggle, where competing visions of 
the world, and of women’s place therein, have been and continue to be 
fought out. We believe that such a reconceptualization of law can better 
capture both the possibilities and limitations of law, and law’s contradictory 
nature in women’s struggle for social change.  
 
Kapur and Cossman  further suggest,354  
Law’s role should be reconceptualized as including one of process. It may be 
a process of engaging with law- of litigation, of law reform, of legal literacy- 
that will offer the most to feminist struggles, and that may be able to most 
empower women. It is the process of engaging with law that may be able to 
best promote women’s participation in decision-making. Instead of 
measuring strategic engagements with law only in terms of the legal result, 
winning or losing, law’s role can be seen as, and measured against the extent 
to which it is successful in creating democratic space for women’s 
participation in political, social, economic and cultural life. 
 
																																								 																				
353  Kapur and Cossman. (At p. 12) For reconceptualisation of relationship between law and 
feminism also see Eileen Fegan, “‘Ideology’ after ‘Discourse’: A Reconceptualization for 
Feminist Analyses of Law,” Journal of Law and Society 23, no. 2 (1996): 173–97. 
354  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 285) 
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There is also clarity that formal equality through the law is an ineffective tool for 
changing the status of women in society.355 Taking into account new insights about 
nature of law, current legal scholarship does not want law to be a neutral and 
autonomous force. Law is no more expected to be blind or indifferent towards a 
range of differences amongst women based on caste, class, religion, ethnicity etc. 
Aspiration of contemporary scholarship seems to be to re-conceptualize the 
relationship between law and feminism, so that the legal and judicial system can be 
sensitive towards a wide range of differences amongst women.356 Indicating 
significant change in approaches of the feminist legal scholars Parashar states,357 
The central issue for legal feminism is: how is the insight that women are 
more likely to view themselves and others in relational terms rather than as 
autonomous individuals to be translated into law? The most common answer 
is that our legal concepts should recognize and value these qualities. 
 
Feminist legal scholars advocate against pinning excessive hopes on legal reforms to 
bring social change and women’s empowerment. Instead, law is now to be seen as a 
political force and a double edged weapon which can be used simultaneously for and 
																																								 																				
355  Kapur and Cossman. (At p. 13-14) 
356  Jana Everett, “All the Women Were Hindu and All the Muslims Were Men,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 36, no. 23 (2001): 2071–79. Emphasizing the necessity of taking into account 
differences between women, Everett notes, 
 Crafting of a multi-cultural women’s movement, however difficult as it might be, is an 
imperative in order to counter effectively the manipulation by political elites. (At p. 2079) 
 Also Prabha Kotiswaran, “Book Review: Rumblings of a New Beginning: The Case of Feminist 
Legal Scholarship in India: Reviewed Book: Subversive Sites: Feminist Engagements with Law 
in India,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 20 (1997): 341. Kotiswaran states 
 Feminist analysis in Indian context must address women’s need to profess their religion, their 
ability to negotiate the structures that accompany such religious practice, and their capacity to 
appropriate opportunities for resisting ideology that discriminates against them.  
 Also Kapur, “The Fundamentalist Face of Secularism and Its Impact on Women’s Rights in 
India.” Making a strong case for the efforts to protect diversity and differences Kapur mentions 
 The vast multitudes of deities co-exist with the vast multitude of people. You bump into them on 
the streets, trip over them on the sidewalk, they sit with you in taxis and attend street parades 
where they are the constant cause of traffic jams. Nothing could be more obvious and more a part 
of every day life than this fact of diversity. Yet today this very diversity is at risk, at peril. In the 
hands of the Hindu Right diversity is being re-fashioned as a weakness, as a fracturing of society, 
as a threat to the whole rather than what constitutes the whole. This is where the battle lies, in 
retrieving and revitalizing this value in cultures where the religious right is shaming people for 
their defects and differences, and where the assertion of difference is not merely about belief, it 
is about the very right to exist. (At p. 333) 
357  Parashar, “Essentialism or Pluralism: The Future of Legal Feminism.” (At p. 51).  
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against the interests of women.358 It is to be considered a process,359 a site for 
struggle where differences can be expressed and ‘contesting views of the world can 
be fought out’.360  
 
While the earlier phase was about making efforts for grant of equal legal rights to 
women, scholars in the current phase problematize the notions of equality or 
sameness between men and women within marriage and implications of using a 
gender neutral term- ‘spouse’. Furthermore, while in the pre-1990s phase scholars 
perceived creation of a universal category ‘woman’ as an essential precondition for 
protection of rights of women, the concern in the current phase is to problematize 
the use of a generic term ‘women’, devoid of its specific socio-cultural context and 
location.361 While previously there could not have been any question about the 
																																								 																				
358  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 39) 
359  Baxi, “Feminist Contributions to Sociology of Law,” 2008. 
360  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 12) 
361  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. Agnes notes,  
 While using generic term ‘women’, it cannot be denied that there are many important differences 
amongst women. Since all women are not similarly situated, there is a need to contextualize the 
specificities of women belonging to marginalized communities. Since women’s oppression is not 
homogenous in content and since it is not determined by one root, underlying cause, there cannot 
be one ‘feminist method’, or ‘feminist epistemology’. (At p. xxvii) 
 Agnes notes further, 
 I find Chandra Mohanty’s critique of euro-centrism within western developmental discourses of 
modernity through the lens of racial, sexual, class based assumptions, useful. Mohanty points out 
that gender essentialism, i.e., over generalized claims about women, assumes that women have a 
coherent group identity within different cultures prior to their entry into social relations. Such 
generalizations are hegemonic in that they represent problems of privileged women who are 
often (though not exclusively) white, western, middle class. These generalizations, based on 
some abstract notion of strategic sisterhood, efface the problems, perspective and political 
concerns of women, marginalized because of class, race, religion, ethnicity, and/or sexual 
orientation. (At p. xxviii) 
 Also see, Rajan, Real and Imagined Women.. Setting up a goal for feminists, Rajan writes,  
 One of the ways in which such a political appropriation may take place is by installing in the 
space vacated at the center (of history, society, politics) a resisting subject- one who will be 
capable of the agency and enabling selfhood of the ‘active’ earlier subject, while at the same time 
acknowledging the politics of difference. (At p. 10) 
 Also Maithreyi Krishnaraj, “Between Public and Private Morality,” Economic and Political 
Weekly 43, no. 17 (2008): 40–43. Advocating importance of taking into account ‘differences’ 
between women Krishnaraj argues, 
 Particularities can only flourish in the context of shared, broad based universalist democratic and 
socialist economic equality. The difficulty is how to recognize particularities without making it 
perpetual, closed and unchanging. To grapple with these contradictions feminists propose a 
middle ground- of differentiated universalism. The feminist slogan of personal is political 
implies that any issue can become subject of public debate. (At p. 43) 
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relevance of the western concept of human rights for India, in the current phase 
scholars want to question the relevance and desirability of applying the ‘notion’ of 
human rights within specific local context of the non-west.362 Agnes makes a 
pertinent remark as she notes, 363 
Law-making cannot be a narrow and short-sighted venture at the instance of 
some pressure groups, acting upon certain international mandates of human 
rights. It carries very deep implications for a vast majority of people. 
 
Further challenging the relevance of international human rights discourse for Indian 
context Agnes states, 364 
I argue against the demand for universal application of human rights as 
articulated by international women’s groups from the West ( and endorsed by 
some women’s groups and feminist scholars in India) in favour of a more 
nuanced and culture specific theory of women’s rights.  
 
Emphasizing the necessity for developing a new version of feminism which can be 
sensitive to the specific local demands Agnes further mentions, 365 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 Yet another author, Prabha Kotiswaran suggests that feminists can 
 Draw from each other’s experiences in a manner that recognizes Third World differences without 
treated Third World women as a homogenous category or long-suffering victims of patriarchy. 
(At p. 6) 
 Kotiswaran, “Book Review: Rumblings of a New Beginning: The Case of Feminist Legal 
Scholarship in India: Reviewed Book: Subversive Sites: Feminist Engagements with Law in 
India.” 
362  Ratna Kapur, “The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the ‘Native’ Subject in 
International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 15, no. 1 
(2002): 1–38; Kapur argues that feminist politics and international human rights discourse have 
created women in the image of ‘victmized subject’. Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. (At p. xxv) 
363  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. (At p. xxviii) 
364  ibid. At p. xviii 
365  ibid.  (At p. xxviii)  Also Rajan, The Scandal of the State. Aiming to use rights discourse for the 
cause of women’s rights Rajan  states 
 The discovery and disappointment about the necessary-but-insufficient scope of rights has led to 
two different kinds of feminist developments: either a complete turning away from (further) 
rights rhetoric and struggles or an attempt to identify the precise limits of rights, rectify 
shortcomings, and seek to work towards substantial equality. The first is a radical repudiation, 
the latter a liberal reformist response. Few things, however, are sufficient in themselves, and the 
expectation that rights would be all-powerful, cancelling at one stroke the inequities of history, is 
also at one level a recognition of the enormous cost of not having political rights or citizenship in 
the world today. (At p. 18) 
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Contemporary feminist discourse needs to be far more nuanced... Rather than 
blindly advocating a ‘universally’ accepted position framed by a first world 
feminist discourse, women’s rights groups need to advance a position which 
is rooted within Third world realities. A feminist voice must lend credence to 
the claims of the weaker against the might of the status quo-ists institutional 
authorities. 
While the changed expectations from law is an important change, the most 
significant change of recent years undoubtedly is in the domain of family law, given 
the fact that demand for a uniform civil code as the solution for ensuring 
empowerment to women in family is now on the backtrack.  
 
3.3.2 Rethinking the Relevance of the Uniform Civil Code for the Cause of 
Women’s Rights 
Although uniform civil code debate continues to be a hotly debated subject in 
India,366 there has emerged a stream of legal feminists who no longer consider it to 
be a solution to the problem of gender inequality in the domain of family. 367 
Transferring complete control of family matters to the State, especially in matters 
relating to formation and dissolution of marital relationships, are no longer 
perceived as desirable measures for women’s empowerment by an increasing 
number of women’s rights scholars.368 Expressing doubt about the utility of the 
																																								 																				
366  Supra fn. 8  
367  Some of the important works which question the relevance of the UCC are: Agnes, Law and 
Gender Inequality. Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just 
Framework of Women’s Rights and the Family.;  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist 
Engagements with Law in India. Menon, “It Isn’t about Women.” 
368  Many recent works do not consider monogamy or homogenised forms of marriage as signs of 
progress.  Some prominent examples are: Agnes, Family Law II, 2011.; Mehra, Rights in 
Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s Rights and the 
Family.; Emphasis on imposition of monogamy, homogenised single forms of family, and formal 
relationships as the only form of valid marital relationships are now depicted by Madhu Mehra as  
 The ways in which law privileges men’s control and ownership of women and property, as also it 
does upper-caste forms of sexual control of woman through privileging monogamy, while 
stigmatizing non-monogamy, popularly perceived as a lower-caste practice. (At p. 16) 
 Also see, Choudhury, “Between Tradition and Progress: A Comparative Perspective on 
Polygamy in United States and India.” 
 Apart from questioning valorisation of monogamy, feminist scholars in recent years have also 
expressed doubt about the importance of individualistic property rights to women. See Menon, 
“Uniform Civil Code – the Women’s Movement Perspective,” October 1, 2014. Emphasising 
requirement of rethinking in the women’s movement Menon noted,  
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uniform civil code for rights of women, especially for women belonging to minority 
denominations, Agnes notes,369 
The demand for a UCC places gender as a neutral terrain, distanced from 
contemporary political processes. The demand projects minority women as 
lacking a voice and an agency either in their own communities or through the 
process of litigation, to claim their rights within existing structures. It 
projects legislative intervention in the form of an enactment of a uniform 
code as the only option to attain gender justice for minority women. 
 
Highlighting the importance of diversity in family forms another author notes,370 
The diversity is not an outcome of random choice or ignorance, and cannot 
simply be homogenised by the enactment of law.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 The question of women’s equal rights to property may need to be reformulated radically at this 
stage of the UCC debate. I suggest that the Personal Laws on succession and property represent a 
point of conflict between the imperatives of the State and those of the Family. The modern state 
requires legibility in order to mobilize resources towards capitalist industrialization, that is, it 
must be able to ‘see’ and organize different forms of property in existence, especially land. 
Towards this end, the institution of individual rights to property is crucial. All forms of property 
must become completely alienable and transparent to the state – this development is essential for 
capitalist transformation of the economy. 
 The family on the other hand, has its own imperatives of controlling name, descent and passing 
on of property, a project disrupted by individual property rights. In the light of this, we must 
view the state’s gradual granting of property rights to women under Hindu law – the most recent 
amendment in 2005 giving women rights to ancestral property as well – as more than a simple 
triumph of feminist demands. It also represents the establishment of a bourgeois regime of 
property for the Hindu community at least in principle, which makes land completely alienable 
by every separate individual owner. In the current climate of widespread resistance to land 
acquisition by the state, this is a considerable achievement for the state, as it always easier to 
pressurize or tempt individual owners rather than communities, to sell land. 
 It is in this context that we must understand feminist legal scholar and activist Nandita Haksar’s 
critique of some feminist initiatives to press for individual rights to property for tribal women 
over community rights. She urges the need for a struggle within tribal communities to evolve 
new customs that are more egalitarian, rather than forcefully introducing from above, individual 
rights to property.  Feminist land rights activists have also become cautious about focusing on 
joint titling of family plots while losing sight of the state’s encroachment on commons and public 
lands. Common property, they realize, is the biggest impediment to market relations, and they 
would rather work for collective ownership of the commons, rather than for ‘women’s rights to 
land’ – this would necessarily be a political, anti-state struggle, allied to other livelihood 
movements, and would not be a women’s struggle but a community movement. 
 Should the larger question of land rights and land acquisition by the state be set aside while 
discussing individual women’s rights to property? Clearly, the feminist debate over the UCC has 
reached a new stage of complexity, and conversations have begun afresh. 
369  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. (At pp. xxvi-vii) 
370  Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s 
Rights and the Family. (At p. 15) 
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It is true that one of the reasons for giving up the demand of uniform civil code is 
the apprehension amongst scholars that this issue was being mis-appropriated by the 
conservative and orthodox political forces.371  Apart from this, scholars’ change in 
stance is based on the realization that the promulgation of uniform, gender-neutral 
laws and imposition of monogamy has neither resulted in eradication of influence of 
religion and traditions from people’s lives nor has it necessarily resulted in 
empowerment of women.372 There is an increasing realization that attempts to use 
the instrument of law to eradicate customary practices like bigamy or different forms 
of establishing intimate relationships has not been favourable to women.373  
																																								 																				
371  Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality; Choudhury, “(Mis)Appropriated Liberty.”; Menon, 
“Uniform Civil Code – the Women’s Movement Perspective,” October 1, 2014. ; Rajeswari 
Sunder Rajan, The Scandal of the State: Women, Law, and Citizenship in Postcolonial India 
(Duke University Press, 2003);  Mullally, “Feminism and Multicultural Dilemmas in India,” 
2004.; Kapur, “The Fundamentalist Face of Secularism and Its Impact on Women’s Rights in 
India.” Expressing concern over what is labelled as Hindu Right Kapur states, 
 Religious fundamentalism is often presented as a characteristic or feature of ‘other’ countries, 
`other’ worlds, and most frequently of course, the Islamic world and the Muslim community. The 
Taliban is frequently invoked to justify this claim. But the Taliban did not come into power 
through popular consent and democratic process—it used brute force. Today, my concern has 
been with what I perceive to be the more insidious, indeed more alarming development in our 
respective worlds—the seepage of the ideology of the religious right in and through democratic 
institutions and liberal rights discourse. (At p. 332) 
372  Referring to a secular legislation the Special Marriage Act Agnes mentions,  
 The civil law of marriage provides an optional secular code for all Indians and is a step towards 
uniformity and secularization of laws of marriage and divorce. But it has failed to make a dent 
within community-based customary practices. (At p. 111) 
 Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. Agnes mentions at another place, 
 We also need to acknowledge that despite codification, a large segment of the Hindu (this applies 
to other communities as well) population lives and manages its affairs outside the pale of state 
laws and regulations. In fact, a Hindu need never interact with state authorities, neither for 
solemnization of marriage nor for its dissolution, as these can be carries out through customary 
practices with the non-state mediation fora. It is within this sphere that the rights of poor and 
marginalized women to whom the formal court structures seem too distant and alien, are 
constantly contested and negotiated. (At p. 2) 
373  See Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of 
Women’s Rights and the Family. Based on PLD’s field work in rural and semi-urban contexts in 
some states like Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Kerala Mehra  notes, 
 The case work undertaken as a part of crisis intervention consistently revealed the limitations of 
legal support available to women in relationships other than valid marriages. For instance, 
women in bigamous marriages, those who were long-term partners, common-law wives, and 
those in premarital relationships founded on the promise of marriage fell outside the ambit of 
legal support. The claims of such women to financial support, shelter and maintenance upon 
‘desertion’ have no place in law.  
 …… 
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Contemporary scholars are gradually willing to question the feasibility and 
desirability of transferring complete control of family matters to the State.374 There is 
also an increasing, albeit reluctant, realization that total state control, for example in 
the form of compulsory registration of marriages, is neither going to work 
effectively nor is it going to be favourable to women, necessarily.375 Notably, current 
scholarship rejects the idea of imposing a single form of family through uniform 
laws, as a means for protecting rights of women or for ensuring them equality with 
men in personal relationships.  
 
In contrast to the earlier phase, in recent years, one of the important expectations of 
women’s rights scholarship has been that the state and its legal system should allow 
men and women freedom to organise personal relationships either according to their 
religion and customs or according to their choice.376 Contemporary scholars and 
activists somehow expect law to protect the rights of those women who choose to be 
a party to a range of formal and informal ways of organising adult intimacy. Human 
rights framework which was expected to be indifferent or even intolerant towards 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 We believe that legal regulation could be instrumental in facilitating social justice within the 
family, but only if it could challenge norms that establish the systems of control over women, 
women’s labour, and women’s reproduction and sexuality- for all women in intimate 
relationships and for all families constituted by such relationships. (emphasis added) (At p.17) 
 Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. Questioning relevance of the anti-bigamy laws for rights of 
women Agnes states, 
 The question of muslim polygamy also needs to be examined in the context of Hindu polygamy 
and the implications of imposing monogamy through the enactment of Hindu Marriage Act, 
1955. Women in culturally accepted polygamous or marriage like relationships are denied their 
rights to maintenance due to these hegemonic claims. (At p. xxviii) 
374  Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s 
Rights and the Family. Not finding any direct connection between homogenised family laws and 
rights of women Madhu Mehra states,  
 Whether our role as advocates, activists, and fieldworkers is to expand gender justice and to seek 
legitimate entitlements for women at margins, or whether it is to promote legality, its norms, and 
a homogenised form prescribed by law. (At p. 13) 
375  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. Raising doubts about utility of compulsory registration of 
marriages Agnes states, 
 The demand for compulsory registration of marriage and for declaring all unregistered marriages 
as well as all child marriages as void needs to be examined in the context of increasing state 
control and raises a concern whether such control will be beneficial to women or, on the contrary 
serve to defeat their existing rights. (At p. xxviii) 
376  Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s 
Rights and the Family.; Agnes, Family Law II, 2011. 
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cultural and legal pluralism, is expected to be cognizant of diversity. Expressing her 
concern for diversity of family forms, Madhu Mehra writes,377 
A human rights framework requires us to recognize the diversity of family 
forms and to ensure that gender justice is achieved in all those contexts, 
rather than being limited to one ‘formally’ recognized context alone. 
 
Also, considering uniform civil code as a majoritarian Hindu agenda, a dominant 
concern of scholars is to devise a process of reform within personal laws to protect 
women from internal patriarchies.378 Doubting the value of UCC for the cause of 
women’s rights Agnes states,379 
While examining the demand for a uniform set of family laws applicable to 
all communities, a question that needs to be interrogated is whether the term 
‘women’ is a universal category, devoid of specific socio-cultural contexts 
and locations and whether personal laws can be examined ahistorically, 
stripped of their colonial and post-colonial groundings?  
 
Questioning the idea of complete state control on family matters as essential for 
gender justice Agnes further states,380 
The claims of women from minority community cannot be formulated 
merely within the narrow context of a progression from community control 
to state control and needs to be contextualized within the multiple hierarchies 
and complex negotiations between community, nation-state and the female 
subject, and the dynamics of contemporary majority-minority politics. 
 
Uniform Civil Code, the scholars in this new phase argue, is a project which situates 
minority women in antagonistic relationship against their own communities.381 
																																								 																				
377  Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s 
Rights and the Family. (At p. 14) 
378  Parashar and Dhanda, Redefining Family Law in India. Highlighting main concern of their work 
Parashar and Dhanda state,  
 We aim to move beyond the impasse of debates about religion versus state and majority versus 
minority. (At p. x) 
379  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. (At p. xxvi) 
380  ibid. At p. xxvii 
381  Menon, “Uniform Civil Code – the Women’s Movement Perspective,” October 1, 2014. 
Reflecting skepticism towards utility of Uniform Civil Code for minority women Menon notes,  
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3.4 Emerging Changes in Women’s Rights Scholarship in India: A Bane or 
Boon?  
3.4.1 Emerging Changes and Divergence in Feminist Legal Scholars’ Views  
Having incorporated all the above changes women’s rights scholarship, 
undoubtedly, has made significant advances over the earlier streams wherein 
scholars reposed complete faith in potential of the State and its legal system for 
effecting ‘fundamental transformation’ in Indian society. While changed approach 
towards law is now one of the central features for contemporary women’s rights 
scholarship it took sometime before legal scholars in India could openly declare 
their estrangement with law. 382 Convinced that transition from tradition to modernity 
is essential to bring about any improvement in the situation of women, scholars have 
been raising doubts about relevance of the new streams of legal studies for Indian 
society. While modernity and modern law were seen as mythical in the western 
academics, particularly by feminist scholarship,383 some scholars in India argued for 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 The women’s movement supports initiatives within communities to bring about reforms, so that 
the rights of women do not become a casualty to the fear of minority communities that reform of 
personal laws is only a pretext for eroding their identity in this sharply polarised polity.  It is not 
a paradox that some Islamic states have managed to reform laws in the interests of women. When 
a minority community is threatened with annihilation, the obvious response is to close ranks. It is 
when a community is confident that it can afford to be self-critical. What the women’s 
movement demands is the bringing about of gender justice within both religious and secular 
laws. 
382  For a forceful questioning of the relevance of new streams for Indian discourses see Parashar, 
“Essentialism or Pluralism: The Future of Legal Feminism.” Also, Parashar and Dhanda, 
Redefining Family Law in India.; Dhanda and Parashar, Decolonisation of Legal Knowledge.; 
Dhanda and Parashar, Engendering Law; Archana Parashar, “Religious Personal Laws as Non-
State Laws: Implications for Gender Justice,” Journal of Legal Pluralism 45, no. 1 (2013): 5–23. 
In her recent writing of 2013 Parashar finds the ‘legal pluralism discourse’ which aims to extend 
support to customary laws as highly problematic.  
383  Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (USA: Harvard 
University Press, 1987), Mackinnon is a pioneer scholar in the western context pioneers in 
questioning the idea of law as instrument of social change. For a detailed discussion on this issue 
see Scales, “The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence.” While feminist scholars, including 
feminist legal scholars, have embraced insights of the critical theory which challenge role of the 
State and modern law in empowerment of women, there have been concerns in the Western 
writings too about the effects of such challenges, especially that of post-modernism on legal 
feminism. See Fegan, “‘Ideology’ after ‘Discourse.’” Drawing attention towards challenges 
faced by feminism Fegan writes, 
 Of many challenges faced by feminist legal scholarship in recent years, the post-modernist 
challenge to the use of overarching theoretical frameworks to ‘explain’ women’s position under 
law has been characterised as one of the most ‘destabilizing’. Theories derived from the 
analytical concept ‘ideology’, and advocating ‘conscious-ness raising’ as the means of redressing 
women’s inequality under law have been the subject of most frequent criticism due (in part) to 
their reliance upon unsustainable essentialist notions of truth and femininity. Yet, increasingly 
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the necessity of maintaining that myth for a society like India which, according to 
these scholars, was in grip of traditions and religion.384 Perceiving the realm of 
traditional understanding of law as undesirable particularly from point of view of 
women’s rights, these scholars cautioned against questioning the role of the law and 
the state in pushing India on the path of progress.  
 
For example one of the leading family law scholars, Archana Parashar considered 
that situation in India was not yet ripe for any scepticism against the state and its 
legal order.385 She argued that the newly emerging Western trends in legal feminism 
were not only irrelevant but can also be potentially damaging for Indian context. 
According to Parashar, 386  
If all that legal feminism does is to identify law as an exercise of power, and 
therefore of not much use to the majority of women, then legal feminism 
cannot fulfil its potential as a social movement. In fact this would be an 
inexcusable use of the label of feminism by legal academics to secure private 
academic career paths. 
 
Taking note of the feminist works, which have ‘expressed great doubt about the 
desirability of gender equality as a feminist goal as well as the capacity of the law 
reform to achieve this goal’ Parashar cautioned ‘against applying these theories to 
the Indian situation’.387 In her view, feminist writers challenging the ‘efficacy of law 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
‘discourse’, the post-modern successor to ideology, has come under attack from feminists 
concerned with maintaining a reformist stance towards law. (At p. 173) 
384  Ram Puniyani, “A Doll’s House,” Economic and Political Weekly 39, no. 46–47 (2004): 4974–
75. Naming post-modernists who appear to be defending traditional community practices as 
sophists Puniyani makes a case in favour of modernity as he states, 
 Modernity, essentially, has to be an ensemble of concepts where equality amongst citizens, 
irrespective of caste, gender and religious identity, is a non-negotiable concept. (At p. 4975) 
385  Archana Parashar, “Essentialism or Pluralism: The Future of Legal Feminism,” Canadian 
Journal of Women and the Law 6 (1993): 328–48  
386  Parashar, “Essentialism or Pluralism: The Future of Legal Feminism.” (At p. 36) 
387  ibid. Challenging relevance of new trends in feminist legal theory in the West, Parashar argues 
 Carol Smart advises us to decentre law, and Catherine Mackinnon says law is male, with the 
implication that we should abandon it. How can such analyses explore the potential of law to 
change itself or society or to explore the ways in which law reform can be meaningful project for 
the benefit of all “other” women? Admittedly these are not the priorities of white affluent 
feminists and they should not be expected to waste their time on the problem of others. But then 
have they not lost the claim of legitimacy to talk about “women” and the law? Instead of talking 
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as an instrument of social change’ ‘come from very different societies’,388 the 
societies which had long ago taken the evolutionary leap to emerge as societies 
divested of the authorities of religion, tradition or custom. Parashar asserted that the 
western feminists’ concern shifted beyond law reform and legal rights only after 
they had virtually achieved legal equality with men after the laws incorporating 
formal equality had been successful in establishing equal moral worth of women in 
western societies.389 She emphasised that notwithstanding its limitations, it is the 
state and its legal order which has made it possible for western women ‘to focus on 
alternative strategies for ending the oppression of women’.390 Emphasising direct 
relation between religion/tradition and discrimination against women Parashar 
implied that in the West it is the freedom and empowerment gained by women 
through uniform, secular family (civil) codes and consequent allocation of same 
legal entitlements as men that permits western feminists to question role of the state 
in the sphere of family, to argue against homogeneity and uniformity in law and to 
demand freedom to organise personal relationships in diverse forms. 
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
about feminist jurisprudence these writers should be talking about first world feminist 
jurisprudence. (At p. 48) 
388  ibid. (At p. 50)  
389  ibid. Finding new trends in the feminist scholarship problematic Parashar accuses western 
feminists of insensitivity towards traditions. Labeling the western feminists as ‘white, middle 
class, fairly mainstream’, those living in ‘secularised polities’ of the First world, Parashar argues 
that western feminists are insensitivity towards the concerns of third world women. She further 
argues that the western feminists have failed to take into account ‘intersection of law and religion 
in oppression of third world women’. She suggests that western feminists should realise that 
being far behind the advanced western countries third world women have not yet come to acquire 
the same concerns about women’s oppression as the western feminists have. She argues 
 Catherine Mackinnon identifies sexual objectification as the most important aspect of women’s 
oppression. It follows that the appropriate objective of the legal feminism is to prevent sexual 
objectification. However, for an African woman or any other third world woman, sexual 
objectification is almost irrelevant. Much more important is whether she can protect herself 
against physical abuse, save herself from being burnt alive for bringing inadequate dowry, 
prevent herself from being turned out of her house with nowhere to go and no social security 
system to fall upon, or to avoid starvation for herself and for her children. (At p. 46) 
 Parashar further notes,  
 the legal feminists’ enthusiasm for semantic deconstruction cannot be of much solace to battered 
wives or single mothers living in poverty’. (….) The same can be said for Western legal 
feminism’s concern with sexual objectification and sexual harassment. These can hardly be 
concerns of women who have no opportunities for economic or psychological independence.  
Likewise sexual harassment has little relevance for women who cannot even hope for steady 
wage employment. (At p. 47) 
390   ibid. 
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Defending an important role of the state and its legal machinery in women’s 
emancipation she argued that increasing focus in feminist scholarship on the 
oppressive nature of modern law and on the ineffectiveness of formal equality 
undermines the much-required efforts for exploiting potential of law in improving 
women’s situation in India. Parashar argued that the feminists analysis that have 
emerged in the West concerning patriarchal nature of state and its law do not 
outweigh the imminent necessity of law’s involvement in seeking liberation of 
women from the constraints of religion, tradition, caste, custom or community. In 
her view, like western women, Indian women too need to struggle to ensure that 
family relations are regulated uniformly by the state in order to arrive at a position 
from where interference of the state can be challenged and sidelined.391 For Parashar 
taming traditional ‘chaos’ of extremely heterogeneous customary and religious 
forms of organising family (personal) relations through a set of uniform and general 
family law rules is a pre-requisite to empower women and to establish their equal 
moral worth in the society. Her assertion was that much of the disillusionment with 
the efficacy of law is a result of ‘inappropriate expectations’ about its potential to 
bring about women’s emancipation. She contended that feminist should remain 
aware that ‘by itself legal equality would not be sufficient to transform the present 
unequal relations between men and women and make all social relations absolutely 
uniform’.392 Stressing on the symbolic role that law can play in inducing social 
change Parashar argued that instead of unrealistically expecting that law can change 
the whole social system, it would have been more productive to realise that the State 
and its political and legal institutions can be instrumental in mobilising forces to 
lead Indian society towards fundamental transformation.393  
 
3.4.2 Increasing Scholarly disillusionment with the State and its Legal 
System: From Scepticism to Acceptance 
Whatever may be the skepticism of some legal scholars about relevance of the new 
ideas like law as a site of oppression for India, it is no longer possible to overlook 
the insights highlighting the ‘myth of modernity’ and deconstructing the idea of 
																																								 																				
391  Parashar, “Religious Personal Laws as Non-State Laws: Implications for Gender Justice.” 
392  Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India. (At p. 26) 
393  ibid.  At p. 28 
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modern law as a rational, autonomous and objective force.394 At a global level it is 
now a well-accepted fact that the colonial rule had detrimental influence on non-
western societies. The efforts for a changed relationship between law, traditions and 
rights is now a widely accepted phenomena in all parts of the world. Whether it is 
feminist scholars or the rights scholars in general, nobody questions the ideas that 
evolutionary theory of progress gave rise to ill-conceived binary oppositions such as 
tradition v modernity or east v west and that the law and the rights discourse have 
been means for curbing cultural and religion based differences and for perpetuation 
of colonial hegemony on non-western societies. Even the skeptics have agreed to the 
fact that law must be sensitive to differences based on religion, sex, caste, ethnicity 
or sexual orientation.395  
 
Moreover, in the last few decades, the above-mentioned scepticism has gradually 
given way to acceptance and accommodation of new understandings about the law 
and the state with emergence of pioneering works like that of Kapur and Cossman396 
who suggested ways to deal with deconstruction of law in Indian context.397 Such 
																																								 																				
394  While this faith in law persisted for a long time, the post-colonial scholarship points towards the 
tendencies for Occidental hegemony involved in this projection of law as omnipotent. See 
Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law. Fitzpatrick points out 
 Along with generality of its sanctioning force, law demands ‘that all sectors of society abandon 
their autonomy of legal interpretation (that is, the extent of their obligation) in favour of a single 
interpretative authority’. Thus we have replicated in law the ‘Christian axiom that custom, 
history, tradition, were to be conquered in their effectiveness by the word- and the law’. … What 
is more modern law could re-shape the conquered could release norm-contents from the 
dogmatism of mere tradition and…. determine them intentionally.  … The legal subject emerges 
out of this paradoxical privatism not only as the abstract bearer of legal rights and duties but also, 
…. as the possessor of a specific Occidental identity not unlike that possessed by the subject of 
the Christian god. (At p. 57) 
395  For example see Parashar, “Essentialism or Pluralism: The Future of Legal Feminism.” A most 
vehement critique of the new trend in feminist scholarship does not want to seen as someone 
who is not sensitive towards traditions. 
396  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India.  
397  A precursor to this accommodation by the Indian legal scholars can be seen in the works like 
Jackson, “Contradictions and Coherence in Feminist Responses to Law.” Pointing out the 
challenges faced by feminists and the legal reformers due to the postmodern challenge to 
universalism Jackson states, 
 As feminism in the 1990s begin to deconstruct women’s experiences and find that there is not a 
single category of women sharing identical experiences as a result of their gender, the use of law 
seems more problematic. If feminists proclaim that theirs is a fractured narrative, lacking 
coherence and rationality, it may be easier for the legal establishment to ignore its responsibility 
for social change. ............ Finding a perplexing degree of diversity among women is not a reason 
to call into question the point of feminism. Still less it is a reason to abdicate from a legal arena 
in which this fractured narrative can too easily be denounced as insufficiently abstract and 
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authors were neither sceptical of the new trends in legal feminism nor did they 
perceive revelations regarding the oppressive nature of law as a reason for 
‘relinquishing law’. Attempting to establish importance of law, these authors argued 
that legal discourse is useful for feminist struggles, since not only it enjoys the 
position of ‘particularly authoritative discourse in society’, but also for the fact, that, 
Relinquishing the terrain of law would be to surrender a powerful site in 
discursive struggles for ideological hegemony…relinquishing law would be 
to leave the terrain to communalist and other patriarchal forces.398 
 
Moreover, recent changes in socio-legal discourses can be considered important 
given the fact that it is for the first time that women’s rights scholars appear inclined 
not only to acknowledge but also to take responsibility of the fact that women’s 
movements have not been able to make difference in the lives of millions of 
common women in India.399 The cause of women’s rights in India has suffered due 
to scholarly ill-founded conviction that India is following the path of progress which 
is presumed to have been followed by the West.  
 
After nearly two hundred years of colonial rule and nearly sixty years after 
independence, the Indian legal system does contain many laws which, as scholars 
and activists believed, should have taken India or at least Hindus in the country 
towards modernity. In other words, the Indian society should have acquired the 
situation: where an individual, and not the family or community is seen as a basic 
unit in society; where marriage as perceived as a contract and not a sacrament; and 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
coherent. Instead, it is very nature of this legal establishment which should be questioned. The 
rules of the theory game are not neutral, and feminism has an important role to play in exposing 
their partiality. Moreover, feminism which is more subtle as a result of including contradictory 
and inconsistent accounts of women’s lives has, I believe, an even greater transformative 
potential. (At p. 399-400) 
 For similar views also see Kapur, Erotic Justice. 
398  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (Ay p. 285) 
Also Ratna Kapur, “Postcolonial Erotic Disruptions: Legal Narratives of Culture, Sex, and 
Nation in India,” Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 10 (2001): 333–84. 
399  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. The authors 
state,  
 Despite the legal victories over the years, the social, political and economic status of women has 
shown remarkably little improvement. There is extensive evidence of the startling amount of 
sexual and physical violence against women- rape, dowry and domestic violence persist in the 
face of legislation designed to eliminate these practices. (At p. 20) 
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where all aspects of individual and community life are governed only by a uniform 
set of laws made by the state. However, it is a fact that despite a modernized legal 
system and modernization of Hindu family laws, traditional social order and 
traditional values- such as viewing marriage as sacrament and the family as basic 
and sacred unit is society- have refused to yield. Notwithstanding numerous 
legislative victories which seem to be pushing India towards modernity and effecting 
a transition from ‘dharma to law’, the transition towards modernity has remained 
incomplete. Despite incessant efforts of scholars and activists it has not been 
possible to move to a stage where it can be shown that India has a legal system 
based on a strict separation between the law and religion. Although the socio-legal 
scholarship in India supports the belief that the Constitution of India envisages a 
society having an individual as a basic unit, family and community continue to be 
the central organising units of society in India.400 Moreover, society as well as the 
judiciary of the country continues to reinforce the traditional idea of marriage as a 
sacrament401 in spite of the scholarly perception that the legislative reforms which 
granted the right to divorce to women were meant to replace notion of marriage as a 
sacrament with the idea of marriage as contract. 402   
 
Given the above state of affairs it is a highly significant change that scholars and 
activists, especially legal scholars, are now willing to deal with law with an 
acknowledgement and appreciation of the fact of close connection between law and 
culture or law and society.403 It is an important development that scholars are 
																																								 																				
400  The Family Courts Act, 1984, The Act aims to promote conciliation in disputes relating to family 
matters.  
401  Amardeep Singh v Harveen Kaur, No. C.A. No. 11158 of 2017 (Supreme Court September 12, 
2017).  
402  Werner Menski, “The Uniform Civil Code Debate in Indian Law: New Developments and 
Changing Agenda,” German Law Journal 9 (2008): 211–50. Taking note of developments in 
Indian family law Menski convincingly argues 
 India today increasingly turns its back on supposedly European or “Western” models, and has 
been developing its own country-specific and situation sensitive methods of handling complex 
socio-legal issues. (At p. 211) 
403  For a detailed discussion to establish the fact that connection between law and culture/law and 
religion/law and traditions is a ‘universal phenomenon’ and not merely a non-western 
phenomenon see Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal 
Tradition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983); Masaji Chiba, Legal Pluralism: 
Toward a General Theory through Japanese Legal Culture (Japan: Tokai University Press, 
1989); Adda B. Bozeman, The Future of Law in a Multicultural World (New Jersey: Princeton 
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inclined to take cognizance of the fact that it has not been possible to reorganize the 
Indian society around tenets of rights, legalism and individualism, the tenets which 
are central to human rights discourse and are presumed to be central to society in the 
West.404 It is an important development that scholars are willing to reject the ‘gap 
theory’ which has been the dominant way to explain the situation of gap between 
law in action and law in books.405 Scholars have also begun to question their practice 
of equating progressiveness with uniformity in law. For the first time there is a 
realisation amongst the ‘legal actors’, especially those concerned with rights of 
women, that the cause of women’s rights in India requires new and indigenous 
versions of women’s movement- versions where law is required to be neither neutral 
towards differences, nor it is to be an instrument for eradication of cultural and 
religion based differences.406  Instead the law is now expected to be sensitive to 
differences based on caste, class, religion, culture or ethnicity.407   
 
Recent changes in the socio-legal discourses are also important for bringing to the 
forefront certain important elements about non-western traditions which remained 
obscured for many decades. For example, it is really important for the cause of 
women’s rights in India that scholars are willing to challenge the colonial era 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
University Press, 1971). On the concept of legal culture see Mark Van Hoecke and Mark 
Warrington, “Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for 
Comparative Law,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 47, no. 3 (1998): 495–
536; Roger Cotterrell, “The Concept of Legal Culture,” in Comparing Legal Cultures, ed. David 
Nelken (Dartmouth, 1997), 13–31; Martin Krygier, “Law as Tradition,” Law and Philosophy 5, 
no. 2 (1986): 237–62. Also see Griffiths, “What Is Legal Pluralism?” 
404  A prominent example of this approach is: Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. 
405  Rajeev Dhavan, “Introduction,” in Law and Society in Modern India, by Marc Galanter (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), xiii–c. (At p. xxiii). While for feminist scholars rejection of gap 
theory may be result of increasing influence of critical theory, some analysts of Indian legal 
system like Dhavan have also criticised this theory. Rejecting the ‘gap theory for continuing 
disparity between law in action and law in books Dhavan opines, 
 ‘Gap’ theory is a political ploy to persuade the disadvantaged that the programmes which were 
designed for their benefit had, somehow, accidentally, rather than deliberately, misfired. ‘Gaps’ 
are created by powerful forces in society. (At p. xxiii) 
 Also supra fn. 272. 
406  Chiba, Legal Pluralism. Arguing against the deployment of binary of tradition v modernity to 
make sense of non-western traditions Chiba writes, 
 The prevailing characterisation of the non-Western law and society as ‘traditional’ in contrast to 
the Western as ‘modern’ is too simple a labelling to afford correct understanding of the non-
Western situation. (At p. 6) 
407  Chaudhuri, Feminism in India. Also see, Ghosh, “Feminism in India.” 
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practice of reducing family laws of different communities to a set of texts presumed 
to be based on divine revelation.408 Questioning the colonial era practice of equating 
dharma with law is a significant step taken by the prominent family law scholars 
like Agnes.409 It is also a welcome change that scholars are willing to take notice of 
the distortions created by colonial rule by equating scriptures to legal norms.410 
Drawing upon streams like post-structuralism, the new streams makes it possible to 
raise doubts on the colonial descriptions of non-western cultures and to put forward 
the contentions that colonial rulers constructed these cultures in negation as a means 
to perpetuate European domination. Among new streams of work, most significant 
are those which draw attention towards diversity of family and marriage forms in 
pre-colonial India and explain how colonial rule was a cause of curtailing legal 
diversity.411 Diversity of family forms is a historical fact in India, which has survived 
the onslaught of colonial rule. Protecting rights of women in wide range of formal 
and informal relationships particularly those which came be declared as void and 
illegal in wake of modernisation has been a matter of concern for Indian legal 
system, particularly for Indian judges, since a long time.412 For protecting rights of 
women in pluralistic relationships it is an imminent requirement that legal scholars 
take cognizance of plurality of Hindu law or Muslim law or other religion based 
laws and customs to protect women in pluralistic relations.413  For the cause of 
women’s rights in family it is also important that scholars make efforts to devise 
some kind of legal framework to deal with the rights of women in different kinds of 
formal and informal relationships. 
 
																																								 																				
408  Two prominent works by Flavia Agnes which challenge some of the established notions which 
dominated family law scholarship are: Agnes, Family Law II, 2011; Agnes, Family Law Volume 
1. 
409  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. (At p. 10-12) 
410  Dhavan, “Introduction,". 
411  Most prominent examples of such works are: Agnes, Family Law Volume 1.; Agnes, Family Law 
II, 2011.; Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India.; 
Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s 
Rights and the Family. 
412  Agnes, Family Law II, 2011. Also, Narendra Subramanian, “Legal Change and Gender 
Inequality: Changes in Muslim Family Law in India,” Law & Social Inquiry 33 (2008): 631; 
Werner Menski, Modern Indian Family Law, 1st ed. (Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 2001). (At 
p. 9-20) 
413  Menski, “Legal Pluralism in Hindu Marriage.” 
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It is an extremely important change that the feminist scholarship has started to 
acknowledge the fact that cultural and legal pluralism in India has survived the 
onslaught of colonial rule. It is also important to challenge the myth of Hindu Code 
as modernized and secularized Hindu family laws.414 It is high time the legal 
scholars take cognizance and appreciate implications of the fact that even the 
reformed, modernized Hindu law has not been moving on the linear trajectory where 
one end was of customary, religion based pluralistic laws and the other end will be 
of uniform, homogenized secular laws.415 It is also important that women’s rights 
scholars take note of the values which underlie even the modern Hindu law, and 
which have refused to be written away through the processes of codification and 
modernization.416  
 
It is indeed a welcome change that feminist scholars are concerned about highly 
polarised and politicised debates around the issue of women´s rights. Indian legal 
system especially judiciary in India has been striving to find ways to protect rights 
of women while being sensitive to cultural diversity.417  Politicisation of the issues of 
women’s rights and uniform civil code has indeed been responsible for ignorance 
amongst scholars, activists as well as judiciary towards important developments in 
India family law.418 It is therefore important that women’s rights scholars express 
concern over highly communalised media campaigns and react loudly about the 
harmful effects of such campaigns on rights of women.419  There are important 
																																								 																				
414  Madhu Kishwar, “Codified Hindu Law: Myth and Reality,” Economic and Political Weekly 29, 
no. 33 (1994): 2145–61. For a strong support of this view see Menski, Hindu Law. Also, Menski, 
Modern Indian Family Law, 2001. 
415  Menski, “Legal Pluralism in Hindu Marriage.” 
416  Kishwar, “Codified Hindu Law: Myth and Reality.” Werner Menski, Hindu Law: Beyond 
Tradition and Modernity (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003); Werner Menski, Modern 
Indian Family Law (India: Routledge, 2013). 
417  Subramanian, “Legal Change and Gender Inequality.”; Madhu Kishwar, “Pro-Women or Anti-
Muslim? The Shah Bano Controversy,” Manushi 32 (1986): 4–13. Kishwar invokes example of 
‘shah bano controversy’ to show how this one particular judgement became a reason imparting 
communal and political over tones to the issue of rights of Muslim women to maintenance.  
418  Werner Menski, “Solemnisation of Hindu Marriages: The Law and Reality,” Kerala Law Times, 
Journal Section, 1985, 1–10.; Gupta, “Women, Family Laws and Informal Relationships.” 
419  For extensive discussions on politicisation of the issues relating to rights of women see, Agnes, 
Law and Gender Inequality., Flavia Agnes, From ShahBano to Kausar Bano, Contextualising 
the Muslim Woman within a Communalised Polity, Ania Loomba and Ritty Lukose (eds.), South 
Asian Feminisms,  , 33-53,  Duke University Press, 2012. Lamenting over the politicised debates 
relating to the project of the Uniform Civil Code Agnes states,  
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insights which help us understand the relationship between law and plurality in a 
different light.420 It is also possible to understand the complex and contradictory 
ways in which colonial rule influenced Indian society. The literature of post-1990s 
phase provides very important insights about the ways the issue of women´s rights 
took shape in India during 19th and 20th century. The new phase in women’s rights 
scholarship is significant for scholars’ willingness to challenge the presumptions 
about anti-women nature of customary practices, more particularly the practices 
relating to marriage formation and dissolution.  
 
This scholarship is an important step forward for the cause of women’s rights as 
scholars now acknowledge that the prevalent understandings about indigenous 
traditions in India are result of over-emphasis on one aspect of the traditions in a 
context of civilisational encounter.421 Such revelations are important as they not only 
emphasize the need for questioning scholars’ understandings about indigenous 
traditions, but also open the way for deeper engagement with indigenous traditions.  
 
Socio-legal scholarship in its new phase carries a promise to acknowledge and 
rectify the mistakes of scholarship of the pre-1990s phase, in order to better serve 
the cause of protection of rights of women. Scholars in this new stream aim to offer 
re-conceptualization of relationship between law, feminism and traditions in India in 
order to ensure that law can be sensitive of diversities in society and can also protect 
rights of women.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 such a project, which would inadvertently situate minority women in an antagonistic relationship 
against their own communities, and hence may not receive the support of women of these 
communities, who have been subjected to extreme violence and humiliation, as Muslims, during 
communal violence. (p. xxvii) 
 Also see Patel, “Indian Muslim Women, Politics of Muslim Personal”; Vatuk, “Where Will She 
Go? What Will She Do?”. Highlighting prejudices against matters relating to Muslim law Vatuk, 
on the basis of her field work states, 
 My evidence suggests that even though possibility of being unilaterally divorced doubtless 
weighs heavily upon the wife in any troubled marital relationship and accentuates the need for 
her to be submissive and placating at any cost if she wishes to remain married, most talaqs  are 
probably not pronounced “on a whim”, as the popular stereotype would lead one to believe. (at p. 
241) 
 Also Rajeev Dhavan, “The Road to Xanadu: India’s Quest for Secularism,” in Religion and 
Personal Law in Secular India: A Call to Judgement, ed. Gerald James Larson (Bloomington and 
Indiana Pollis: Indiana University Press, 2001), 301–27. 
420  For a detailed discussion on this point see, Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context. 
421  For a detailed discussion see  Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality.  
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But has that actually happened? Have all the new insights about the concepts of law 
and religion, about the nature of colonial rule and its interactions with the non-
western traditions actually remoulded the nature of dominant socio-legal 
discourses/legal scholarship in India?  Is the series of binary oppositions such as 
family v individual, religious v secular, contract v sacrament which have been used 
since colonial era to make sense of non-western cultures, a thing of past? Do we 
now have scholarship which offers ways to understand relationship between law, 
traditions and women’s rights discourses in a different light- where law is not to be 
used as an instrument for eradication of influence of traditions? Is there now 
available some indigenous versions of legal feminism, which suggests a new “path 
of progress” where eradication of influence of traditions or transition from dharma 
to law are not the essential requirements for women’s empowerment in India?  Most 
important of all, considering that influence of traditions in India is closely linked to 
the institutions of marriage and family, is there now available some scholarship 
which does not any longer consider importance to the institutions of marriage and 
family as the main element for all injustices against women.  
 
The next chapter seeks answers to the above-mentioned questions. It undertakes a 
closer analysis of the emerging changes in the socio-legal scholarship. It also looks 
into a recent legal development, the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 which emerged as 
a result of increasing concern for plurality in women’s rights scholarship.  
 
It argues that though representing an advance over those earlier streams, none of 
these works go far enough in making use of new understandings about the colonial 
rule and nature of law for rethinking relationship between law and cultural diversity. 
It further shows none of these works, despite the fact that they draw upon insights of 
critical theory, show signs of deeper engagement with indigenous traditions.  
 
Undertaking closer analysis of a few recent works which reflect a shift in perception 
towards law and the state the next chapter demonstrates that despite changing 
perceptions about nature and role of law and colonial rule, socio-legal scholarship, 
particularly, women’s rights scholarship has remained engaged in reinforcing 
opposition between law and indigenous traditions. It shows that contemporary 
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scholarship does not show any signs to give up the simplistic framework inherited 
from colonial era (i) where every instance of denial of rights to women was to be 
attributed to the institutions of family and marriage and to continuing influence of 
religions and indigenous traditions on all spheres of life, including legal sphere and 
(ii) where solution for every such instance of denial of rights was presumed to be 
eradication of influence of traditions through replacement of tradition based laws 
with laws promulgated by the secular state which could be seen to be based on 
individual will and which grant rights to women. The next chapter draws attention 
towards the fact that the critique of ‘evolutionary theory’ and acknowledgement by 
scholars that the notions of tradition and modernity have been colonial era constructs 
has not induced any significant change in feminist scholarship. The works that have 
emerged during last three decades shows no signs to give up the presumptions that: 
(1) Concern for women’s dignity requires a development along the lines of 
western societies 
(2) Sexual, moral and economic oppression of women is inherent in non-western 
cultures since these cultures, not having been able to achieve separation 
between law and religion, give more importance to the institutions of 
marriage and family 
(3) Women can be ensured various rights within and outside the sphere of family 
only when indigenous cultures are pushed ahead on the ‘scale of progress’ to 
undergo fundamental transformation so as to give more importance to 
individual will and individual rights than to ‘duties’ and to the traditional 
concepts of the sanctity of marriage and family. 
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Chapter Four 
Changing Perceptions towards the Relationship between 
Law, Traditions and Rights of Women: Important but 
Insufficient Efforts in the New Direction 
 
Lasting impact of colonial rule on all its ex-colonies is an undisputed fact. Colonial 
rule, with its most important dispensation- the modern law- has been instrumental in 
initiating a process of irreversible change in its ex-colonies, and India has been no 
exception. As discussed in the previous chapters, till few years ago, the task of the 
scholars and activists was relatively simple: to follow a well-tested path, which had 
already been tread by the British. However, in the recent years the situation has 
changed. The task is much more difficult. Scholars are now required to devise an 
indigenous version of scholarship which can be sensitive to cultural and religion 
based diversity in India.  
 
It is a welcome change that socio-legal scholarship in India seems to be rising up to 
the above challenge. It is important that there has emerged rich literature reflecting 
scholars’ willingness of going beyond the simplistic framework, which dominated 
women’s movement till the 1990s. It is an important change that the feminist 
scholarship acknowledges that cultural and legal pluralism in India has survived the 
onslaught of colonial rule, and is willing to deconstruct the long-held myth that the 
uniformity in laws is a sign of progress. Scholars’ changing perceptions towards 
legal uniformity and the role of the state in regulating personal, intimate 
relationships has resulted in an important legislative development in the form of the 
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (The 2005 Act). Seen as a 
landmark development in the history of women’s rights this Act aims to grant rights 
to women even in those intimate relationships which cannot be considered valid 
under any of the marriage laws in the country. But have these changes resulted in 
emergence of new tools for dealing with prevailing diversity in India while 
protecting rights of women? Has it been possible to address the colonial legacy of 
antagonism between cultural and legal pluralism and rights of women? More 
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specifically, do we have better appreciation of the reasons as to why marriage 
continues to be a sacrament in India or for continuing importance to the institutions 
of marriage and family in Indian society?  
 
Seeking answers to the above questions, this chapter undertakes closer analysis of 
recent scholarly and legislative developments in India. Divided into two sections it 
aims to explore implications of recent shift for the cause of women’s rights in India. 
The first section undertakes a close analysis of pioneering inter-disciplinary works 
which represent a new phase in socio-legal scholarship in India. It looks into two 
important changes- first, the changing perception towards the idea of colonial rule as 
a beneficial legacy and second, increasing concern for differences between women. 
The second section looks into functioning of the 2005 Act. This chapter argues that 
though representing an advance over the earlier streams, the recent developments do 
not go far enough in the task of rethinking relationship between law and cultural 
diversity. There aren’t signs either of deeper engagement with indigenous traditions. 
Antagonism towards indigenous traditions continues to characterize the post-1990s 
scholarship as much as the pre-1990s phase. The stand in favor of plurality or 
differences among women in recent works is not about appreciating and 
understanding cultural and legal pluralism as it has been prevalent in India. It also 
does not mean including those voices which do not perceive antagonism between 
rights of women and traditions or religion-based institutions of marriage and family 
as sources of one’s empowerment and way of life. Instead, what we have is the 
scholarship which reinforces the understandings: that continuing influence of 
religions and traditions is the main obstacle to women’s empowerment and that 
women’s empowerment can be a reality only by bringing to culmination the process 
of eradication of influence of religions and traditions from all spheres of life. 
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4.1 Unchanging Nature of socio-legal discourses in India: Persisting 
Hostility towards Cultural and Legal Pluralism 
4.1.1 The Concept of Ancient Tradition: Merely a Colonial Construct to 
Perpetuate Denial of Rights to Women  
First important change that has come to characterize socio-legal scholarship in India 
during past few decades is the ant-colonial stance adopted by scholars. As discussed 
in the previous chapter the anti-colonial stance consists of the willingness of 
scholars to question the idea that colonial rule, like in other colonies, initiated the 
process of progress and modernization in India. Many new works from different 
disciplines in last few years have been concerned about highlighting the fact that the 
colonial rule was responsible for denigration of indigenous traditions. With the anti-
colonial stance, the current streams of socio-legal scholarship undoubtedly appear 
very different from the pre-1990s literature where scholars and activists were 
convinced about the beneficial legacy of colonial rule.  
 
Anti-colonial stance amongst scholars is important as it makes it possible to 
challenge the well-established binaries like religion v law, tradition v modernity, 
public v private etc. The scholarship with anti-colonial stance has also been able 
very effectively to bring to forefront that colonial rule used the issue of women’s 
rights to show India as a primitive and barbaric culture. Most of the interdisciplinary 
works are of great value with their insightful analysis of discourses around the social 
reform legislations which, till recently, were believed to be ushers of modernity in 
India. Literature of last few decades is full of insights which establish that our 
struggles for social change in India have been based on the ‘authoritative accounts’ 
of British administrators whose ignorance about India was a proof of their 
objectivity.422 These works are valuable as they deconstruct the colonial policies to 
reveal patriarchal biases of British officers or to highlight oppressive nature of the 
state law or to illustrate abuse of tradition even by the natives in self-interest. For 
example, Lata Mani’s critical analysis of discourses relating on Sati makes an 
important contribution as she highlights how discourses around Sati were more an 
occasion for the emergence of artificial, distorted understandings of traditions and 
																																								 																				
422 Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India. (At pp. xi-xvi) 
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personal laws by the officials, missionaries, and the indigenous elite.423 Sangari and 
Vaid’s work is also an important contribution as it challenges the public-private 
dichotomy which dominated women’s rights discourses till the 1990s.424 Division of 
life spheres into public and private spheres has been a great misconception, which 
has wrongly influenced scholarly understanding of non-western traditions. Inter-
disciplinary works, which have challenged the idea of colonial rule as a beneficial 
legacy, have also inspired legal scholars to draw upon the insights of critical theory 
and challenge the simplistic framework of social change. For example, legal scholars 
like Agnes425  and Kapur and Cossman426 made important contributions in the late 
1990s as they incorporated insights of critical theory to understand role of law in 
social change, amidst strong skepticism of some legal scholars who questioned the 
relevance of these insights for the Indian context.427  Much to the contrary, Kapur 
and Cossman find these recent Western developments in legal feminism of special 
significance for India, as, in their view, these insights provide essential guidelines to 
forge ‘a fundamental shift in the way that we conceptualize law’,428 and thereby, to 
																																								 																				
423  Mani, “Contentious Traditions.” Offering critical analysis of debates relating to Sati Mani states, 
 Official knowledge [about Sati] was generated through questioning pundits resident at courts. 
The interactions between pundits and judges, and pundits and magistrates, are valuable for 
plotting the logic of official discourse. Analysing them clarifies how the very formulation of 
official question shapes the responses of pundits and how the answers of pundits are interpreted 
in specific ways by officials. (p. 121) 
424  Sangari and Vaid, Recasting Women. For feminist criticism of public-private dichotomy in 
general see Frances E. Olsen, “The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal 
Reform,” Harvard Law Review 96, no. 7 (1983): 1497–1578; Katherine O’Donovan, Sexual 
Divisions in Law (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985); Jenny Morgan, “Feminist Theory as 
Legal Theory,” Melbourne University Law Review 16 (1988): 743–59. 
425  Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality. 
426  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. 
427  Archana Parashar, “Essentialism or Pluralism: The Future of Legal Feminism,” Canadian 
Journal of Women and the Law 6 (1993): 328–48.; Dhanda and Parashar, Engendering Law. 
Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. Appearing to be 
aware of such resistance and objection to relevance of theoretical developments in west for India, 
Kapur and Cossman offered a mild defence as they stated,   
 Subversive Sites is the product of a collective endeavor. In collaboration, we draw on the insights 
offered by feminist legal scholars and activists in different parts of the world. Feminists outside 
of India have developed diverse approaches to feminism and law, which in our view, offer some 
potential for advancing the analysis of feminist legal struggles in India. We do not believe that 
some this scholarship can be unproblematically applied to the Indian context. But we do believe 
that some of the insights that have emerged from this expansive and increasingly sophisticated 
literature may be of assistance in revisioning feminist engagement with law in India. (At p. 14) 
428  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 285) 
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build a positive and constructive role for the law.429 Rather than rejecting critical 
theory as irrelevant authors like Agnes, Kapur and Cossman posited that these 
insights can be useful to strengthen feminist engagements with law by revealing the 
complex and contradictory nature of law.430   
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the changing perceptions about relationship 
between law, colonialism and rights of women is undoubtedly an important change. 
However, an unfortunate situation is that a closer look into the inter-disciplinary 
literature, as we shall see in the following discussion, reveals a different story- of 
continuing antagonism between rights of women and indigenous traditions. There is 
no change in scholars’ perceptions about the possibility and necessity of eradicating 
influence of traditions. Instead, two main concerns of scholars of the new stream 
seem to be: first, to undertake more intensive efforts to establish the necessity of 
eradicating influence of traditions from all spheres of life and second, to devise 
sophisticated strategies to achieve the above.  
 
In most of the literature of the post-1990s phase which draws on the insights of 
critical theory, the scholars’ main grievance against the colonial administrators is not 
that they caused denigration of Indian traditions or the traditions based institutions 
of marriage and family. For many of these works, British administrator’s claims 
about ‘degradation of Hindu civilization’, about ‘the abject position of Hindu 
women’ are too obvious to be questioned. Charges of ignorance, arrogance and 
ethnocentrism on imperial administrators and even the realization that ‘tradition’ and 
‘modernity’ are colonial constructs,431 have not inspired efforts to look underneath 
these constructs and seek a better insight into traditions. Scholars share colonial 
administrators’ firm conviction that elements such as ‘inferiority of women’,432 
																																								 																				
429   ibid. 
430  ibid. Explaining their endeavour in the work the authors mention, 
 We will attempt to move beyond the understanding of law as a simple instrument of either 
oppression or social engineering which has informed much of the earlier work on women and 
law in India. Building on the work of recent feminist studies, we argue that the role of law cannot 
be adequately captured by a dichotomous understanding of law as either an instrument of 
oppression or of liberation. We believe the terrain of law is much more complex, in both the 
oppression of women, and in its promise for challenging that oppression. (At p. 11-12) 
431  Sangari and Vaid, Recasting Women. 
432  Chandra, Enslaved Daughters. (At p. 6) 
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‘female subordination’,433 enslavement of women, strict sexual, moral and economic 
control of women by men, are integral part of Hindu traditions and have been 
inherent in all the traditional forms of life in Indian society.   
 
The scholars are also not much concerned that during colonial rule indigenous 
traditions came to be constructed and labeled as backward, oppressive and non-
progressive forces, which needed to be eradicated through the instrument of law. 
Instead, the pre-dominant concern for many works seems to be to highlight the 
apathy of otherwise committed British rulers towards the deplorable condition of 
women in the Indian/Hindu society.  The scholars do not cast much doubt on the 
humanitarian and democratic commitments of British, nor do they intend to question 
in anyway superiority of the British civilization.434 There is not much doubt about 
the necessity of civilising mission in India.435 The anti-colonial position in the 
scholarship appears to be more about admonishing British rulers, both explicitly and 
implicitly, for not bringing this mission to culmination, for their half-hearted and 
insufficient efforts to bring about a thorough reformation in India and for depriving 
their subjects, especially women from the miracles of enlightenment.436 
 
The common theme underlying most of the works which take an anti-colonial stance 
is: to highlight the inability of the British in displacing Hindu traditions while being 
aware of its degenerate nature.  For example, Lata Mani appears to lament that the 
																																								 																				
433  ibid. 
434  ibid. 
435  Prominent examples for this position are: Sangari and Vaid, Recasting Women.; Chakravarti, 
Rewriting History.; Chandra, Enslaved Daughters. 
436  Joanna Liddle and Rama Joshi, “Gender and Imperialism in British India,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 20, no. 43 (1985): 7; Liddle and Joshi write,  
 The British claimed they were a liberalizing force in the colonies, yet their espoused policy was 
of non-interference in Indian culture and religion. Clearly these two approaches were in conflict. 
(At p. 73) 
 Also Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. 
Highlighting lack of concern for women’s emancipation in colonial period Kapur and Cossman 
argue 
 The strategies of the social reformers were informed by a form of protectionism. Women were 
not assumed to be equal to men; indeed, the discourse of equality was strikingly absent from the 
debates, as were the voices of women themselves. Social reformers sought to eliminate customs 
and practices that they considered to be evils perpetrated on women. They sought protective 
forms of legislation, prohibiting these practices. The discourse within which these legal reforms 
were sought was heavily embedded with familialism (At p 52). 
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British, being more concerned with maintaining colonial rule, instead of simply 
dismissing Hindu traditions, attempted to find justification for abolition of sati 
within it. She points out that the discourse on sati, notwithstanding big rhetoric, was 
not an instance of ‘modernizing’ discourse as “it was not a secular discourse of 
reason positing a morality critical of ‘outmoded’ practices and a new conception of 
‘individual rights’’’.437 Chandra, focusing on the reforms relating to the age of 
consent for marriage implicitly supports the need of coercive action, and seems to 
regret that British, ‘rather, held back, democrats that they were, because of 
conservative Indian opposition’.438 Chakravarti, while analysing the debates that 
accompanied the Bill for raising the age of consent for marriage, also attributes the 
indigenous reformers’ resistance to the Bill only to one thing- their concern to 
protect Hindu tradition. In her view protecting Hindu tradition meant ensuring that 
female sexuality remain a subject of caste and community control, and traditional 
marital obligations of the wife to her husband are upheld so that husband could 
enjoy unrestricted access to wife’s body.439  Chakravarti draws attention towards 
British complicity in women’s oppression by not taking more direct and coercive 
measures for displacing the hold of oppressive patriarchal forces on the private 
sphere of religion and personal relations.440 Also, Sangari and Vaid, while they point 
out integral relation between public sphere land revenue policies and rights of 
women in private sphere of family, regret that the British, giving primacy to 
commercial interests of the Empire, strengthened instead of destroying traditional, 
highly patriarchal forms of ownership, which granted individual rights to ownership 
to men.441 At the same time some other scholars, not finding the individual rights to 
property objectionable per se, regret that British perpetuated the traditional practice 
of exclusion of women from the ownership rights, and that British, given their own 
patriarchal biases, restricted only to men the opportunities ‘to release the individual 
energy’ from the traditional constraints.442 
																																								 																				
437  Mani, “Contentious Traditions.” (At p. 116) 
438  Chandra, Enslaved Daughters. (At p. 6-7) 
439  Chakravarti, Rewriting History. 
440  ibid. 
441  Sangari and Vaid, Recasting Women. 
442  Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality. 
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While scholars take note of the fact that during colonial rule various elements related 
to Hindu traditions received very narrow interpretation, the main concern is not to 
challenge such interpretations and to make efforts for nuanced understanding of 
traditions in India. The concern is also not to draw attention towards the core 
elements of Hindu worldview like the idea of universe as a self-controlled order, the 
concept of svadharma. Instead the scholarship in post-1990s phase rejects very 
existence of the concept of ancient Indian traditions in pre-colonial India.443 The 
scholars blame not only the British rulers but also Europeans in general for further 
entrenching patriarchy by having contributed in giving birth to an idea like ancient 
Indian tradition. The scholars, quite ironically, go to the extent of suggesting that the 
concept of tradition or the idea of traditions as ancient phenomena, as something 
existing since time immemorial as integral part of worldview of the people is a mere 
colonial construct, brought into existence only during colonial rule. And, the 
influence of traditions on common people, scholars suggest is, merely a result of 
ideological domination by indigenous elite with the aim of perpetuating patriarchy 
and domination on women and other weaker groups.  
 
The new streams are not about making efforts for more nuanced understandings of 
the important concepts such as ‘marriage as sacrament’, ‘sanctity of marriage’ and 
‘stability of family’. Instead for the scholars in the new stream, the above notions 
never existed in pre-colonial India, and were brought into existence for the first time 
only during colonial rule. Moreover, the belief has also been that the British rule 
offered the occasion for introduction of these notions into in the lower caste groups, 
																																								 																				
443  Chakravarti, Rewriting History. Considering influence of traditions as merely an ideological 
construct Chakravarti notes, 
 What was gradually and carefully constituted, brick by brick, in the interaction between 
colonialism and nationalism is now so deeply embedded in the consciousness of middle classes 
that ideas about the past have assumed the status of revealed truths. Any suggestion that we 
might fruitfully analyse the manner and the different stages by which this body of knowledge 
was built up, or how and when we came by our immediate intellectual and cultural heritage 
(which is often only a hundred and fifty years old) would therefore be considered quite 
unnecessary or even futile. But for women in particular this heritage, this perception of the past, 
of the ‘lost glory’, is almost a burden. It has led to a narrow and limiting circle in which the 
image of Indian womanhood has become both a shackle and a rhetorical device that nevertheless 
functions as a historical truth (emphasis added) (At p. 28). 
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or even in minorities, where, supposedly, marriage was a mere contract,444 where 
people lived under loose or perhaps no norms of moral and sexual conduct, where 
formation and dissolution could be organised through economic exchanges.445 
 
Most new stream works blame colonial rulers for giving an artificial sense of 
cultural and political unity to the otherwise isolated, disconnected and often warring 
caste and clan groups, and, above all, by having brought into existence a concept of 
tradition, where according to  scholars, none existed.446 Sangari and Vaid implicate 
British for having facilitated revival of certain constructs, such as ‘ancient Hindu 
tradition’, ‘cultural continuity’, ‘spirituality’, ‘institution of family’, which in their 
views found existence only during colonial rule with an aim to oppress women or 
lower caste groups.447 Convinced that traditional models of family are sources of 
oppression for women, Sangari and Vaid regret that not only Indian women social 
reformers but even the western reformers did not find it necessary to challenge 
traditional institutions of marriage and family in India. Sangari and Vaid regret that 
during colonial rule while Indian women reformers remained limited to re-
constituting ‘themselves with varying degrees of conformity’ to ‘the offered 
models’448 of family and tradition, a western reformer such as Annie Beasent who 
had been an ‘active socialist, feminist, free thinker, union organiser, strike leader’449 
																																								 																				
444  However, in contrast to the popular view that marriages in Muslim are contracts see Choudhury, 
“(Mis)Appropriated Liberty.” Choudhury writes,  
 It has been said by some scholars that Muslim marriages are essentially contractual in nature. 
There is offer, acceptance, and consideration. Yet, it would be a mistake to reduce marriage to 
such a mere contractual formality similar to a contract for services or goods. Marriage is 
considered a sacred institution that all able Muslims are enjoined to enter. It is of central 
significance in the ordering of group life and, consequently, gender relations. Moreover, Muslim 
marriage laws reflect a traditional understanding of how partners in a marriage relate to each 
other and outline a set of duties and rights for each partner. These duties and rights begin at the 
very onset of marriage through the requirement of mahr, or consideration that must be given or 
promised before a marriage can be solemnized. (70,71) 
445  Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality. Agnes states, 
 ‘since women of the lower castes were free relatively free from these notions of purity and 
pollution, they were governed by a relatively lax code of sexual morality and women held a 
slightly higher status’.   Marriages among the various lower castes were less sacramental and 
more contractual. (emphasis added) (At p. 20) 
446  Chakravarti, Rewriting History. 
447  Sangari and Vaid, Recasting Women. 
448  ibid. At p. 14 
449  Chakravarti, Rewriting History. (At p. xii) 
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before coming to India, left behind all these dimensions of her work as she ‘threw 
herself in the task of the spiritual and national regeneration’.450 Chakravarti finds 
deeply problematic Annie Beasent’s arguments that ‘education was not to make 
women think of themselves as rivals and competitors to men in all forms of outside 
or public employment as was becoming prevalent in the west’ and that ‘west has 
created artificial problem between the sexes’. According to Chakravarti, Beasent’s 
arguments are evidence of the fact that Beasent gave up the cause of women under 
influence of the colonial constructs and therefore did not find subordination of 
women through perpetuation of ‘distinction between the public and private domain 
and sexual division of labour’ problematic in any sense.451 
 
While ensuring agency to women is one of the major concerns of the most feminist 
works in recent years, common people, according to the recent streams, have had no 
agency in creating, sustaining or perpetuating traditions, and if there is any, it is 
result either of ‘ideological determination’452 or false consciousness.453  The recent 
streams undoubtedly differ from the works in the previous streams as scholars no 
longer believe that in India influence of traditions can be eradicated by substituting 
traditions or religion based laws with the secular laws (or laws promulgated by the 
State). But there is no doubt that the influence of religion needs to be eradicated and 
that this can be done through appropriate strategies- the most important seems to be 
to check ideological domination of common people. Even in recent works there are 
dominant tendencies to label any kind of resistance to feminist demands or to a pro-
women legislative reform change as anti-women or non-progressive.454 Also, any 
efforts which put reliance on the indigenous framework or on religion and traditions 
are suspect, as attempts to revive oppressive and patriarchal traditions.  
 
																																								 																				
450  ibid.  At p. viii 
451  ibid. At p. xii-xiii 
452  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 59) 
453  ibid. At p. 259 
454   One such prominent examples from legal works is Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites 
Feminist Engagements with Law in India. It is example of the kind of scholarship where 
reference to any of the traditional imageries such matri- shakti or women as Goddess are suspect 
as they have the potential to re-inscribe women in roles of wives and mothers. (At p. 247) 
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4.1.2 Institution of Family: A Site for Oppression of Women 
The traditional institution of family and its relationship with rights of women has 
always been a matter of central focus for scholars since pre-independence era. Till 
few years ago, scholars accepted unquestioningly the colonial idea of family as a 
religious institution in India governed by immutable norms found written in the 
scriptures. However, post-1990s has been the time for emergence of pioneering 
works of authors like Kapur and Cosmann and Agnes, who took a distinct break 
from the above approach as they highlighted family as an ideological and cultural 
construct. Aiming to challenge the idea which privileged only one form of family as 
natural, immutable and universalized Kapur and Cossman made an important 
contribution in their work Subversive Sites as they drew attention towards a rich 
diversity of family forms in which women lived and continue to live in India. This 
work also reflects much better understanding of social reality in India as the authors 
regret that a familial ideology455- a single notion of ideal family and the roles of 
women therein have come to dominate the thinking about family forms in India and 
have been used as standards to judge the women in all other family forms. In 
addition to various forms of family the authors have also highlighted varied patterns 
																																								 																				
455  ibid. Explaining the term ‘familial ideology’ the authors state 
 By familial ideology, we are referring to a set of norms, values, and assumptions about the way 
in which family life is and should be organized; a set of ideas that have been so naturalized and 
universalized that they have come to dominate common sense thinking about the family………. 
Familial ideology constructs the family as the basic and sacred unit in society, and women’s 
roles as wives and mothers as natural and immutable. This vision of the family, and women’s 
roles therein, appears throughout the law as self-evident, and beyond question.  …. It is a vision 
of the family that has operated to undermine women’s full and equal participation in society, and 
which continues to justify this inequality. It is a vision of the family that continues to limit law’s 
ability to deliver on its promise of equality for women. (At p. 14) 
 Kapur and Cossman attribute continuing subordination of women in India to what they identify 
as the dominant familial ideology. Scholars state,  
 Despite the diversity of family forms and experiences in India, it is possible to identify a 
dominant familial ideology, based on the ideal of the joint family, and certain prescribed roles for 
men and women therein. (At p. 15) 
 One of the main endeavours of authors in this work has been to highlight influence of familial 
ideology in the areas of constitutional law, family law, criminal law, labour law, and the new 
economic policies. Although in chapter related to constitutional law, it is stated, 
 we are not suggesting that familial ideology will always operate to preclude effective 
constitutional challenges on the basis of sex discrimination. Our claim is much more modest- that 
in examining the legal legacy of challenges on the basis of sex discrimination, familial ideology 
has informed and constrained many decisions. (At p. 175) 
 For use of the term ‘familial ideology’ in Sri Lankan context see Coomaraswamy, “To Bellow 
Like a Cow.” 
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of division of labour among men and women across different economic classes or 
even within the same economic class.456 Kapur and Cossman also highlight that the 
familial ideology and sexual division of labour, where men are seen as bread-earners 
and women are assigned domestic roles, are not the concepts that can be 
unproblematically applied to describe the way in which all Indian women live in and 
are subordinated in families. These authors rightly note, 457 
Many women live in nuclear, supplemental nuclear or single parent families, 
not in joint families. And many women work as wage labour outside of the 
family, and as unpaid but productive labour inside of the family, wherein 
they make important- often essential-contributions to the financial provision 
of the family. And the nature of women’s work both inside and outside of the 
family is mediated by relationships of class, caste and other materially 
specific contexts.  
 
Kapur and Cossman along with Agnes made an important contribution as they 
offered a nuanced and advanced analysis as compared to the works in earlier streams 
as they take note of the normative ideals about the institutions of marriage and 
family in pre-colonial India and also notice the phenomena of ‘divergences between 
the empirical realities and the normative ideals’.458 These authors definitely take a 
step forward from the earlier streams as they highlighted how during colonial rule 
something which was merely a normative ideal in the society came to be enforced 
through the instrument of law, to the great disadvantage of the people in different 
forms of family. However, despite above steps, there is a lot that has remained 
unchanged.  
 
The nuanced analysis in these works is not about challenging the colonial era 
conclusion that family is a site of oppression for women. There is no place for 
deliberations on the concepts of cosmic order and the dharma which offered 
																																								 																				
456  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. Especially 
Chapter 2, Women, Legal Regulation and Familial Ideology (At pp. 87-172) 
457  ibid. At p. 94 
458  ibid. 
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conceptual foundations for co-existence of diverse forms of family in India.459 
Despite the realization that colonial rule resulted in emergence of artificial 
constructs like ‘Hindu law’ and Hindu traditions’, the narrow and restricted 
understandings of the terms Hindu family and Hindu marriage are intact. There are 
also no efforts to challenge or question the colonial era presumptions: that Hindu 
family is a religious institution governed by set of written norms and that being a 
religious institution it ensures sexual, moral and economic suppression of women by 
denying various economic and social rights to them.  Instead of making efforts to 
show that diverse forms of family were as much part of Hindu traditions and 
continue to have recognition in the modern Hindu law, Subversive Sites, remains a 
work which reduces Hindu family to its normative ideal, and is more concerned 
about establishing its anti-women nature. For Kapur and Cossman too, the concern 
is not to revisit the concept like ‘sanctity of family’ or to further explore the reasons 
for the importance given to the institution of family in Hindu worldview. There are 
no efforts to appreciate the idea of family as a spiritual resort or as a means to serve 
the interconnectedness.460 Instead, for the post-1990s phase the root of the problem 
lies in the very idea of ‘sanctity of family’ and what are suspect are any efforts 
which claim ‘sanctity of family’ as an ancient phenomena in India.  
 
The unfortunate part is that while highlighting plurality of family forms available in 
Indian society and accepting that joint family is a ‘normative ideal’, the authors’ 
main concern is not merely to point out the misconceptions perpetuated in the Indian 
legal system about the concept of dharma and about Hindu Law. The concern is also 
not limited to the fact that since colonial era law has been privileging one form of 
family at the cost of delegitimizing the other forms of family and entitlements and 
obligations of individuals therein. Subversive Sites does not make any effort to 
understand whether co-existence of these pluralistic forms of family and the 
normative ideal of joint family or the family as a basic and sacred unit in society is 
an ancient phenomena. 
 
																																								 																				
459  For a detailed discussion on diversity in institutions of marriage and family see supra chapter 2 
460  Supra chapter 2 
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As works like Subversive Sites take note of the fact that large number of legislative 
changes has not resulted into substantial improvement in social, political and 
economic condition of women in India, a major concern of scholars is to suggest 
reasons for the continuing gap between formal equality and persisting substantive 
inequality. Authors point out, and rightly so, that under-enforcement of law and 
inaccessibility of the legal system to the majority of Indian women, are some of the 
important reasons for the gap between formal equality rights and substantive 
inequality. However according to authors the more important reason for the above 
gap is the fact that: “the realization of formal equality rights in the legal regulation 
of women inside and outside of the family has not displaced the familial 
ideology.”461  
 
While identifying ‘familial ideology’ as the main reason for subordination of women 
by law, authors have been careful in mentioning that their attack on familial 
ideology must not be misunderstood as disregard for ‘familial relations’ of the 
institution of family. Kapur and Cossman are conscious of the fact that family is an 
important institution not only in India but also in almost all the societies in the 
world. Being aware that “the family is asserted throughout national and international 
human rights documents as ‘the basic and fundamental unit of society’”462, Kapur 
and Cossman have been conscious that feminist research and criticism on the family 
may be understood as attack on the family, as they believe is often done. They have 
been careful in pointing out that 
The critical analysis and deconstruction of the role of the family and familial 
ideology in the sub-ordination of women does not necessarily imply that the 
family must be rejected or destroyed. Rather feminist criticism has attempted 
to highlight the extent to which the family has operated as a site of 
contradiction for women. Feminist research has attempted to illustrate, for 
example, that the family is essential to women’s socio-economic survival at 
the same time it is the site of women’s socio-economic oppression. The 
																																								 																				
461  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 14) 
462  Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The article states, ‘The 
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
society and the State.’ 
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family may be an important source of emotional support for women at the 
same time as it may be a site of emotional destruction and violent 
relationships.463  
 
Presuming that their efforts to show family as a site of oppression may be labeled as 
pro-family or anti-family, Kapur and Cossman also make a conscious effort to 
caution against any such labeling, as they state that such a dichotomous labeling 
may not adequately describe the subtle and complex role of the family and of the 
legal regulation in the oppression of women. They also make it clear that their aim is 
to argue “that women’s roles and responsibilities within the family must be 
recognized and affirmed, without being naturalized or universalized”.464   
 
In order to show that their criticism of family is not an attack on family Kapur and 
Cossman have made an important distinction between familial ideology and 
‘importance of familial relations’. Explaining that distinction the authors state 
Subversive Sites simultaneously argues that familial ideology must be 
resisted and deconstructed, while the importance of familial relationships and 
the roles that women play in their families neither be denied nor devalued. 
Feminists engaged with law must find ways to affirm these roles and 
relationships, without rigidly reinforcing them as women’s natural destiny. 
We argue for a feminist legal revisioning which recognizes and challenges 
the hegemonic potential of law and familial ideology. We seek subversive 
spaces that law might offer in reconstructing women’s roles and identities in 
																																								 																				
463  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 98-99). 
Trying to establish that their challenge to familial ideology should not be seen as challenge to the 
institution of family per se Kapur and Cossman further argue 
 while some feminist perspectives and research on family have concluded that the family should 
be rejected, others have argued for a more complicated understanding of the role of the family in 
women’s lives. Those aspects of the family that are oppressive must be rejected and restructured, 
while those aspects of the family that are most important must be supported. For example, we 
might develop policies that attempt to eradicate women’s powerlessness and enforced 
dependency within the family, while at the same time supporting women’s role in the provision 
of child rearing and child care, health care, food production and nutrition in the family. Similarly, 
it is possible to argue that the legal regulation of women needs to be defamilialized in some 
respects without necessarily arguing that the family must be rejected. (At p. 99) 
464  ibid. 
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ways more conducive to their full and equal participation in social, political, 
economic, and cultural life.465 
 
From the point of view of women’s rights the above-mentioned distinction between 
‘familial ideology’ and importance of familial relationships is definitely important. It 
emphasizes a valid point that the concern for saving institution of family should not 
result into denial of some basic human rights to women, such as the right to seek 
divorce or the right to economic entitlements, or even the right to care and custody 
of their children. Authors are rightly concerned about judges’ endorsement of 
various assumptions about women and women’s role, which are claimed to be based 
on traditions, and which have the effect of constituting women as weak, as entities in 
need of protection.466 They are also right in challenging such assumptions about role 
of women which restrict women to the role of wives and mothers preventing them 
from developing other facets of their existence outside the sphere of family to have 
equal participation in social, political, economic and cultural life. But what remains 
missing in Subversive Sites and also in other works concerned about rights of 
women in family is any deliberation on the issue whether there exits an inherent 
conflict in the above concerns and the idea of sanctity of family or family as basic 
and sacred unit in society. Also, what is missing is any analysis of the case laws 
whether it can be possible to grant rights to women while upholding the idea of 
sanctity of family and marriage. The larger concern for scholars is to establish that 
not only none of the above concerns could ever be addressed in traditional social 
structures, but also to prove that these concerns for well-being and rights of women 
will remain unaddressed in India as long as judges and the legal system keeps 
reinforcing the idea of sanctity of family.  
 
Moreover, Subversive Sites also has an effect of feeding into the process of 
politicization of the issue of women’s rights467. If one looks closely into this work, it 
																																								 																				
465  ibid. At p. 14 
466  For critical analysis of protectionist attitude towards women see Vatuk, “Where Will She Go? 
What Will She Do?”  
467  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. Authors state,  
 feminist research and criticism on the family has often been misunderstood as attacking the 
family. Indeed, this understanding of the feminist approach to the family has frequently been 
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appears pitted against traditions in India, especially against Hindu traditions, as the 
main aim of the work is to establish subordination of women in India society due to 
the ideal of joint family.468 At some place the authors do take note of the fact that the 
family can be source of socio-economic as well as emotional support for women. 
However, according to subversive sites no such value can perhaps be accorded to the 
institution of joint family.  While invoking the issue of centrality of the institution of 
family in India, it appears that the authors’ concern is not about those cases where 
sanctity of family may have been invoked to deny rights to women. Their concern is 
also not about scrupulous individuals abusing legal system and cloak of culture to 
deny rights to women under the garb of the argument that in Indian traditions role of 
women as mothers and wives is natural and immutable. Instead concern of the 
authors, much like colonial administrators, appears to be to establish that the 
traditional ideas of family as a basic unit in society or traditional roles of women as 
wives and mothers are anti-women, in other words are in opposition to the rights of 
women, and that rights of women can be protected only by eradication or 
displacement of these traditional ideas by law.469  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
deployed to delegitimize and reject feminism, and (…) to foster support for right wing and 
reactionary social movements that want to ‘save’ the traditional family from these attacks. (At p. 
98) 
468  For similar arguments also see Menon, “It Isn’t about Women.” Presenting Uniform Civil Code 
as only a tool of Hindu majority to oppress the minorities, especially the Muslims Menon writes,  
 Muslim Personal Law is already modern in this sense, since it has since the 1930s enshrined 
individual rights to property, unlike Hindu law, in which the family’s natural condition is 
assumed to be “joint”. In the decades of the 1930s and 1940s, contrary to later discourses about 
Muslim law being backward, it was Hindu laws that were considered “backward” and needing to 
be brought into the modern world of individual property rights. 
469  For similar apprehensions in Sri Lankan context see Coomaraswamy, “To Bellow Like a Cow.” 
Expressing concerns about use of traditions based symbols for empowerment of women 
Coomaraswamy writes,  
 Women’s empowerment in these traditional societies has manifested itself not through rights 
ideology but through family ideology. There have been in South Asia recently a spate of writings 
about “Mother, Mother-Community, and Mother-Politics”. (At p. 46) 
 Acknowledging that South Asia has the greatest concentration of women heads of state, she 
further mentions, 
 There is ideological acceptance of women in the public realm, but this is because these women 
have appropriated the discourse of motherhood. ….. Of Course, the glorification of woman as 
mother means the denigration of unmarried women, widows, childless women, and divorced 
women. And yet this ideology is so powerful that the present Tamil Nadu Chief Minister 
Jayalalitha has appropriated motherhood as a symbol even though she is neither married nor a 
mother. She is called the “Avenging Mother” from the context of being a protector of the poor 
and underprivileged.  
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There are no efforts anywhere in the work to understand whether concepts like 
‘traditional institution of family’ and ‘traditional roles of women’ actually preclude 
granting various social and economic rights to women. Traditions’ based institutions 
are to be fought against. Any discourses which give importance to the roles of 
women as wives and mothers need to be resisted. There is an apprehension that 
supporting them in any sense would mean restricting women only to the role of 
wives and mothers denying them their rights and their identity as women.470 Or else, 
emphasis on traditional roles of women, may be a well thought strategy of 
‘fundamentalist’ or ‘traditionalists’ to put double burden on women, to call for 
women to perform more work.471  
 
A dominant concern of Subversive Sites is the fact that the normative ideal of joint 
family continues to dominate the thinking of people in India and that this ideal has 
not been displaced till now.472 In other words, for the authors the main concern is 
																																								 																				
470  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. The authors 
state  
 While familial ideology once operated to preclude any recognition of employment or violence as 
political issues, in the hands of the Hindu Right, this familial ideology is being deployed to 
ensure that attention to these issues does not challenge the centrality of the patriarchal family. It 
is the very ideological stronghold of the family that allows and shapes the way in which women 
within the Hindu Right to take up women’s rights issues. Issues like violence and employment 
are articulated within the legal discourse of rights, without fundamentally challenging or 
displacing this familial ideology. The way in which the Hindu Right has begun to appropriate 
women’s issues is thus illustrative not only of the elasticity of familial ideology, but also of its 
resilience. The legal discourse of equality does not challenge or displace this familial ideology. 
Rather, familial ideology continues to provide the discursive framework within which the 
equality rights are given meaning. In the context of the Hindu Right, and its particular approach 
to equality as harmony in difference, familial ideology continues to shape the understanding of 
gender difference. Women continue to be constructed as naturally different- as dutiful wives and 
self sacrificing mothers- and according to the harmony in diversity model of equality, these 
differences must be respected and celebrated. Familial ideology and the harmony in diversity 
model of equality are mutually reinforcing in the gendered discourses of Hindutva. Women’s 
issues can thereby be recognized and addressed in ways that not only do not challenge the 
family, but which ultimately reinforce its ideological hegemony. (At p. 273) 
471  ibid. Kapur and Cossman note,  
 Women may work outside of the home- but their identity remains first and foremost as wives and 
mothers. And as wives and mothers, women are the guardians and purveyors of Indian tradition 
and culture. The Hindu Right is attempting to reconstitute an identity for women that firmly re-
inscribes women’s roles within the family, while embracing the demands of contemporary 
consumer capitalism and global economic restructuring. (At P. 269-270) 
 The Hindu Right’s discourse on women and equality can be seen as an effort to contain the 
challenge that this renegotiation presents to the traditional patriarchal family. (At P. 271) 
472  ibid. (At p. 94) 
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that the ‘joint family continues to dominate the way in which people think about 
family’. The authors note, 473 
Notwithstanding the important demographic variations in the ways in which 
people live in families, the joint family continues to be the dominant 
conception of family, and the dominant way in which people define their 
family, regardless of its lack of correlation of their own domestic 
arrangements. The subjective attitude towards family bonds and 
responsibilities continues to be informed by the dominant discourse of the 
joint family.  
 
Kapur and Cossman also quote other authors to show the adherence to the idea of a 
joint family in India. They quote from an author: 
Indeed, even where the traditional joint family system breaks into nuclear 
units, it has given rise to a modified or new type of joint family system. It 
merely breaks structurally, whereas functionally and sentimentally, 
individual units continue to form part of joint family.474  
 
They also have taken note of the fact that the preference for a joint family may be 
deep rooted as it has a relation to a worldview, to the way people see the world. 
They quote from an author who stated that, “the Hindu joint family is a familial 
group and at the same time, a category of thought, a way of seeing the world and of 
organizing it so to give it meaning.”475 
 
While Subversive Sites makes all the efforts to establish that joint family- the ties 
associated with it, continue to be the way people think about family in India, 
strangely enough476, there are no efforts in this work to understand the factors or the 
																																								 																				
473  ibid. 
474   ibid. At pp. 94-95.   Quoted from Promilla Kapur, ‘Women in Modern India’, in Man Singh Das 
and Panos B. Bordis, eds. The Family in Asia (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House 1978) 108 at 
139 
475  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 96, 
emphasis added by the authors) quoted from Roland Lardinois, Family and Household as 
Practical Groups: Preliminary Reflections’, in K. Saradamoni, ed. Finding the Household: 
Conceptual and Methodological Issues (New Delhi: Sage 1992) at p. 43 
476  In the process of supporting their argument that amidst diversity of family forms it is possible to 
identify one familial ideology that dominates the legal system in India, Kapur and Cossman 
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reasons which can be responsible for such a preference.  Neither do the authors see 
any kind of value in such a preference for joint family in India. Hinting that this 
preference for joint family may be result of mere ‘ideological domination’ by men 
Kapur and Cossman state  
The familial ideology continues to have resonance because it is partially 
constitutive of individuals’ identities within their families. It is in and 
through this familial ideology that women’s and men’s gendered identities 
within the family are constructed. It is through this ideology that women, 
despite their differences, are constituted as mothers and wives. Familial 
ideology operates to obscure women’s differences of class, caste, ethnicity, 
and to constitute women as homogenous.477 
 
Kapur and Cossman differ from colonial rulers as they are not inclined to link the 
preference for joint family among Indians to Hindu religion, nor do they want to 
give it any ancient roots. According to the authors the ideal of joint family is 
something which can be traced only to the 18th or 19th century, when it was brought 
into prominence by colonial administrators like Henry Maine. Despite the fact that 
the authors quote from a source which linked joint family to the worldview of 
people, yet the suggestion in the work is that it dominates the thinking of people 
across all religions because the legal system in India since colonial era is imposing 
this ideology on all groups, irrespective of caste, class, religion or ethnicity.478 
Moreover, the authors are very much on board with the colonial administrators as 
they emphasize oppressive nature of the institution of joint family. Perceiving joint 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
suffer from a strange dilemma. On the one hand they do not want to point out any element, 
which though having origins in Hindu religions/traditions, can be considered as common to 
whole of India, irrespective of religion or ethnicity. On the other hand for the sake of their 
arguement they need to prove that there is ideological domination of Hindu majority and the 
domination is to such an extent that all people irrespective of religion or community follow 
Hindu elements. 
477  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 95) 
478  ibid. Authors note,  
 Representations of family, which we refer to as dominant familial ideology, are partially 
constitutive of the family structure itself. Familial ideology continues to have resonance because 
it is partially constitutive of individuals’ identities within their families. It is in and through this 
familial ideology that women’s and men’s gendered identities within the family are constructed. 
(At p. 96) 
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family as nothing more than an instrument in the hands of men to sustain unequal 
and gendered power relations, the authors state,  
It is in and through this dominant familial ideology that the complex and 
unequal relationships between the intermarrying families is constituted and 
reproduced- that women are transferred away by way of gift from their birth 
families to their marital families. And within this, process, women are not 
only constituted as economic dependents to be transferred from one family to 
another, but this dependency is presented as ‘natural’ consequence of the 
‘natural’ roles. It is through this familial ideology that unequal gender 
relations are constituted and sustained, naturalized and obscured.479  
 
Therefore, far from offering any means to go beyond the opposition between 
tradition and modernity, ‘Subversive Sites’ reads like a piece of work where every 
reference to traditions in support of rights of women is suspect or an attempt to 
locate rights of women in traditions is suspect.480  Very much like the scholarship in 
pre-1990s era, this work also does not see any possibility of confluence between 
tradition and modernity. 481 While scholars claim that they want women’s 
contribution in family to be recognized, but any kind of assertions that such 
contributions have always been recognized and even celebrated in the indigenous 
traditions is to be seen as an attempt of traditionalists to relegate women only to the 
roles of wives and mothers. Traditions, the authors highlight throughout the book, 
are about family. Importance to family, according to Kapur and Cossman, implies 
oppressing women under the cloak of celebrating given, pre-defined roles of women 
as wives and mothers.  
																																								 																				
479  ibid. (At p. 96-97) 
480  ibid. Trying to highlight that the sole concern of traditional forces is to keep women confined in 
the bounds of domestic sphere Kapur and Cossman state,  
 “The concern with the indecent representation of women can be seen as a contemporary form of 
resistance to the incursion of western culture- where women and women’s bodies remain the 
repositories of tradition; where these bodies must be protected from western corruption. The 
opposition to sexualized representations of women is part of this resistance to the westernization 
of women. And the need for the protection of women is only heightened with the increasingly 
visible role of women within public sphere. It is part of the ‘modern but not western’ identity that 
is being constituted for women.” (At P. 272) 
481  One of the main concerns of the authors in this work is Hindu right’s efforts to locate rights of 
women within traditions, to find a confluence between emphasis on role of women as wives and 
mothers and their rights in public sphere. 
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4.1.3 Law- A Process to Eradicate Cultural Diversity  
The current streams take a distinct break from the earlier streams as they no longer 
accept the idea of law as neutral, objective and rational entity which is separate from 
society. As pioneers in this direction, the authors like Kapur and Cossman have 
suggested useful notions such as ‘law “as a process”, “as a discourse”, “as a site of 
discursive struggle” or “as a site where alternative visions of the world have to be 
fought”’, to explain nature of the law in contrast to its earlier perceptions, where it 
was seen as an instrument of social change.482 These emerging understandings in the 
recent works are indeed very valuable as they recognize two important facts: first, 
that the law exists in close connection with society and its cultures, and second, that 
a society consists of people/groups of people with alternate visions of world whose 
voices would be heard in a polity and its legal system.483   
 
The above-mentioned shift, especially the changing perception about nature of the 
law in the post-1990s phase, is a significant change. It is a shift with immense 
possibilities to go a long way in the direction of addressing the antagonistic 
relationship between law and cultural diversity. However, unfortunately in India the 
realizations about close connection between law and its cultural moorings has not 
resulted in emergence of any constructive solution to address the antagonistic 
																																								 																				
482  One of the pioneering feminist works in the West espousing the idea of ‘law as a site of struggle’ 
is Carol Smart, “The Woman of Legal Discourse,” Social and Legal Studies 1 (1992): 29–44. 
She states, the entry of feminists into law has turned law into a site of struggle rather than being 
taken only as a tool of struggle. (At p. 30) Also see Frug, “A Postmodern Feminist Legal 
Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft).” For suggestions to use law as process in Indian context see 
Rudolph and Rudolph, “Living with Difference in India: Legal Pluralism and Legal Universalism 
in Historical Context.” Extending idea of law as process to uniform civil code, the authors state, 
 We have suggested that a uniform civil code can be conceptualized as a process rather than a 
specific outcome, a process in which legal uniformity and legal pluralism jockey for dominance, 
not for the whole field. (At p. 56) 
 Another important pioneering work in India which has suggested the idea of law as process is 
Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 292) 
483  For an insightful discussion on importance of different perspectives for a legal system see 
Minow, “Justice Engendered.” Emphasising the importance of different perspectives prevalent in 
society even in the world of law Minow writes, 
 Justice depends on the possibility of conflicts among the values and perspectives that justice 
pursues. Courts, and especially the Supreme Court, provide a place for the contest over realities 
that govern us- if we open ourselves to the chance that a reality other than our own may matter. 
Justice can be engendered when we overcome our pretended indifference to difference and 
instead people our world with individuals who surprise one another about difference. (At p. 74) 
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relationship between law and cultural diversity. Convinced that non-western cultures 
are sources of oppression of women, the role of law, even in this new phase, 
continues to be the same: to neutralize the influence of religions and cultures from 
society and to introduce the value of ‘individualism’ in Indian society.  
 
It is true in the contemporary works law has also been displaced from the position of 
only normative discourse in society as feminist scholars. In prominent legal feminist 
works the law is one amongst many normative discourses which influence and 
govern relationships and behavior in society.484 Moreover, the current scholarship 
differs from the earlier streams as scholars do not any longer accept the simplistic 
understanding that mere secularization of laws would be sufficient to eradicate 
influence of traditions. Current legal scholars criticize the earlier scholars for 
reposing too much faith in potential of law or focusing excessive energies on legal 
reforms, believing law as an objective gender neutral force which can bring about 
social change. Current streams of works are no longer inclined to accept simplistic 
explanations for persisting gap between the ‘law in books’ and ‘law in practice’ or 
between the ‘state law’ and ‘people’s law’. For long scholars in India, perceiving 
law as an objective, autonomous force, were willing to attribute limitations of law in 
displacing traditional values to the stranglehold of religion or traditions based values 
on society.485 The current scholarship surely makes an advance over earlier streams 
by rejecting above mentioned simplistic explanation for continuing influence of 
traditional values on society. Instead, scholars in recent years have given very 
cogent descriptions about how apparently secular norms get meaning in the process 
of implementation and how these norms, though having an appearance of neutrality, 
are influenced by the ideology or the values that are prevalent in the society.486 There 
is also an important shift in direction of making legal scholarship inter-
disciplinary487 as well as practice oriented as they exhort feminist legal scholars and 
																																								 																				
484  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. Parashar and 
Dhanda, Redefining Family Law in India. (At p.xi) 
485  Supra chapter 3. 
486  Supra chapter 3. 
487  Parashar and Dhanda, Redefining Family Law in India. (At p. xii) 
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activists to shift their focus from law reform, to two other tasks- litigation strategies 
and legal literacy. 
 
While above differences make the current streams of works appear very different 
from the pre-1990s scholarship, but none of the above has meant emergence of any 
constructive solution to establish a harmonious relationship between law and 
cultural diversity. The only constructive solution that emerges is the suggestion that 
scholars and activists should not rely excessively on the instrument of law for social 
change.488 However, it is anything but a new revelation that law alone cannot be the 
precursor of social change. Discussions about limits of law, about the necessity to 
focus on other social and educational means was as central to the colonial discourses 
or to the scholars in the pre-1990s phase,489 as it is to the contemporary 
scholarship.490 Colonial rulers indeed imparted an important role to law as they were 
convinced that ‘severe schoolmaster in form of law’491 was necessary in India. 
Furthermore, there was also existing a school of thought amongst colonial rulers 
which believed that a ‘Golden age of British India’ could be delivered through direct 
frontal attack by state-made laws. However, this school of thought co-existed with 
those who believed in ‘subtle conquests of mind’ through social means such as 
education, which could remove natives’ false consciousness, could make them 
realize ‘degenerate nature of their civilisation’. Colonial rulers were well aware that 
demand for change should arise from the natives themselves and they made efforts 
to ensure that focus can also be maintained on social, economic and political 
discourses so that demand for change can arise from natives themselves. In India, 
colonial rulers refrained from secularization of the sphere of family only on the basis 
of the understanding that law should not be used as an instrument of change at least 
in the personal matters. No reforms in the personal matters were introduced till the 
demand for the same was raised by the natives themselves even if that meant only a 
small section of ‘enlightened elite’ amongst natives. 
																																								 																				
488  ibid. 
489  Supra chapter 3. 
490			Supra chatper 2.	
491 Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India. (At p. 59) 
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Furthermore, the acknowledgement that law is one amongst many normative 
discourses in society has not led to any concern for due recognition to all discourses, 
legal, social, religious, cultural as authoritative discourses in society. While law can 
be considered as the ‘most authoritative discourse’ being backed by the coercive 
power of the State, for socio-legal discourses in India, law apart from being 
authoritative, is also to be seen as ‘a superior discourse’- being the only one having 
the potential to displace traditional values and introduce new values of ‘secularism’, 
‘individualism’ and rights of women. The insightful critique of modern law, of 
human rights enterprise, does not in any way mean re-valorisation of the indigenous 
understanding of law, or traditional, pluralistic methods of dispute resolution.  
 
Kapur and Cossman assert that the state legal machinery, even if deprived of its 
universal, principled and value-neutral stand, maintains a distinctive place and 
importance in contemporary social order. It maintains its ‘particularly potent ability’ 
to shape the understanding about who we are, how we ought to live and how to 
understand the world that we live in. They further suggest that amidst the awareness 
that law is an important site of politics and that legislations and judicial decisions are 
product of political struggles between ‘fully contestable and temporally bound 
normative visions of the world’ it has to be accepted that law is not ‘simply 
reducible to politics’. According to these authors it has to be believed that state law 
even while being embedded in ideology and politics is relatively autonomous from 
other branches of the state, that its claims of ‘objectivity and universality are not 
entirely fictitious’ as  
It cannot be denied that law has its own discursive claim to truth, and its own 
institutional structures in which this discourse is embedded. It is this 
distinctive nature of law and the distinctive way in which law operates as a 
terrain of political and discursive struggle that must be focus of feminist 
studies.492  
 
Law reforms, the authors like Kapur and Cossman rightly argue, are important for 
their symbolic value, for the opportunities they offer to women to come together and 
																																								 																				
492  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 42)  
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articulate their claims.493 However, there is no doubt that women have to come 
together to fight against traditions. The State and its legal order are seen to be 
important as they seem to have offered many possibilities to women to challenge 
traditional social and legal order, and the traditional ways in which women are 
constituted in and through family. The fact that legislative changes have not been 
successful in bringing about significant change in women’s lives, it is argued, should 
not overshadow the symbolic contribution that these legal reforms have made by 
articulation of new social values and norms. Kapur and Cossman suggest that the 
past experience of abuse of humanitarian rhetoric by dominant patriarchal groups 
should not eclipse the fact that it is this rhetoric which carries potential for liberation 
of women and other weaker sections since  
In order to sustain its legitimacy, the rule of law must appear to be equally 
applicable to all of its subjects. The principles of equality before the law and 
of equal protection of the law must be accessible to all legal subjects, 
including those subjects who are members of socially disadvantaged groups. 
These values of legal liberalism create law’s counter hegemonic potential. 
Women, colonised people, lower castes and other historically 
disenfranchised peoples have been able with some degree of success to 
appeal to legal discourse, to legitimise and realise their struggles for 
inclusion.494 
 
With the suggestion to extend feminists engagements from legal reform to litigation 
and legal literacy, scholars and activists, including activist lawyers, undoubtedly are 
now expected to a more expansive role. However, but for this change in the 
magnitude, the nature of the task of these legal actors is the same: efforts for 
eradication of the influence of traditions from society. The above task, however, is 
to be realized through efforts which are not restricted to legal reforms. Emphasizing 
on the more expansive role of law Kapur and Cossman state, 495  
																																								 																				
493  ibid. (At pp. 314-322);  Also see Choudhury, “(Mis)Appropriated Liberty.” 
494  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 41). Also 
see, Arvonne S. Fraser, “Becoming Human: The Origins and Development of Women’s Human 
Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 21, no. 4 (1999): 853–906. 
495  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 330) 
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Law, as an ideologically dominant discourse, plays an important role in 
constituting and legitimating unequal power relations. Legal subjects are 
individual citizens, with individual rights and responsibilities, subject to the 
rule of law. To what extent does legal literacy become part of the 
Enlightenment project of law, that is, of constituting the subject as a legal 
subject, endowed with individual rights and responsibilities? Legal discourse 
constitutes women as right bearers. It is a discourse deeply imbued with 
liberalism, which constitutes subjects as individuals. This is its radical 
potential, since women have never had rights, and never been individuals. 
(emphasis added) 
 
Being convinced that importance given to the institution of family in India is result 
of ‘ideological determination’ by Hindu majority and that this has been possible 
through legal discourses, Kapur and Cossman expect feminist scholars and activists 
to use the legal discourse at all three levels- legal reforms, litigation and legal 
literacy to undo this ‘ideological determination’ exercised by Hindu majority. It is 
suggested that feminists should engage with law at each of these levels in order ‘to 
transform the meaning of equality, gender and gender difference’. In view of these 
authors, legal academics and activist lawyers in India should use each occasion of 
engagement with law- mobilising people for law reform, or organising legal 
campaign, or bringing a litigation, or conducting legal literacy programmes- to fight 
against ‘ideological determination’, for ‘consciousness raising’496, and for raising 
public awareness of discrimination and oppression in name of tradition. An essential 
component of consciousness-raising programmes has to be to teach participants 
about legal machinery, to help them gain access to justice while keeping them aware 
of hegemonizing nature of the legal discourse. Kapur and Cossman note,  
																																								 																				
496  For detailed discussion on ‘consciousness raising” as a feminist method see Katharine T. Bartlett, 
“Feminist Legal Methods,” Harvard Law Review 103 (1989): 829–88, Defining consciousness 
raising Bartlett states, 
 Consciousness- raising is an interactive and collaborative process of articulating one’s 
experiences and making meaning of them with others who also articulate their experiences. (at p. 
864) 
 Also see Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence. 
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Women must be taught about law, without becoming subjects of law. 
Women must be taught to think critically about legal discourse, and not 
simply to see the world through the lens of this discourse.  
  
It is argued that academics and activists in India have to use occasions of 
engagement with law for creating awareness amongst women, especially amongst 
women from lower castes and minority women that notions of Indian womanhood, 
of distinct and unique Hindu identity are nothing but mere colonial constructs, 
forged by the dominant sections (upper caste groups) of the majority Hindu 
community in order to perpetuate sexual and moral control of women and minority 
groups. Feminists have to assume the responsibility to reveal to the common women 
how recent and modern is the supposedly ancient cultural and intellectual heritage of 
India, brought into existence only for the purposes of ideological hegemony.  
Academics and activists have to undertake the task of making women realise that the 
vision of Hindu family, of the role of women therein which ‘appears throughout the 
law as self-evident, and beyond question’497 are in reality personal viewpoints of 
Hindu upper caste patriarchal groups who, having been able to seize power, have 
been enjoying the authority to define ‘legal and political concepts that give meaning 
to our world’.  
 
It is suggested that women’s organisation(s) should be prepared to play active role in 
supporting women litigants by designing strategies for bringing litigation, in framing 
the legal issue, in developing legal argument with the awareness that every 
individual case may assume national importance and may have a role to play in the 
political agenda of women’s struggles for social change. It is further suggested that 
women’s organisation should perceive each litigation as an opportunity for fighting 
against familial ideology and therefore, while framing legal arguments should 
choose the grounds strategically in order to avoid reinforcing familial ideology in 
process of getting desired relief for the litigant concerned.498  
 
																																								 																				
497  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 13) 
498  ibid.  (especially chapter 5.) 
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Opportunities of engagement with law are to be used to arrange for the conditions so 
that women can raise voice against traditions, the voice which does not find a vent, 
many scholars argue, as women find themselves forced to constitute themselves in 
accordance with traditional norms and expectations mainly as a question of 
survival.499 Kapur and Cossman also find role of the activists lawyers crucial as they 
take note of the fact that a majority of women in India are prone to support familial 
ideology if not instructed by activist lawyers. It is legal academics and activist 
lawyers who have to support women with the technicalities of the legal system. 
Scholars are aware of difficulties faced by women due to highly technical nature of 
the law, legal procedures, courts and also do appreciate the importance of informal 
methods of dispute resolution. But, for feminist struggles in India the informal 
forums for dispute resolution do not seem to be preferred options500 as they present 
danger of reinforcement of familial ideology. Such forums seem to offer to lesser 
possibilities to challenge familial ideology driven by need to arrive at a compromise, 
settlement. Despite being highly technical litigation has to be seen as preferred 
option as possibilities to involve in adversarial procedure and associated legal 
technicalities, allows more chances for choice of ‘appropriate’ grounds, for 
‘adequate’ formulation of litigation strategies, and for involvement of activist 
lawyers.501  
 
Also, while law is to be used as a site of discursive struggle where alternate vision of 
the worlds have to be fought out, for women’s rights scholars, the outcome of the 
battle is pre-determined- victory of those who endorse feminist vision of the world. 
The battle is not one for giving a chance to everybody to express their visions of the 
world and find a possibility for harmonious co-existence. Instead, this is an 
adversarial battle where the feminist vision of the truth has to emerge victorious and 
																																								 																				
499  ibid. (At pp. 298-302) 
500  Vatuk, “Where Will She Go? What Will She Do?” 
501  However, in contrast to this, for critique of adversarial process of litigation as something ‘male’ 
which does not allow much space for women’s particular life experiences seeWest, “The 
Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives.”; Menkel-Meadow, “Portia in a Different Voice.” 
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the others have to be deconstructed, destroyed and eradicated. 502 For example, the 
prominent works like Subversive Sites do not take into account the fact that there can 
be or there are multiple feminisms or multiple ways of articulating women’s 
concerns or that different women’s groups may speak up in different voices. 
Working on the presumption that in countries like India feminists have a uniform, 
homogenized vision of the world, ‘Subversive Sites’, far from offering possibility 
for co-existence of different visions of the world, is more like a call for destruction 
of all those visions which do not endorse or conform to above vision. Although the 
authors nowhere in the work have articulated clearly their ‘feminist vision’, but it 
seems to be a vision which, much like colonial rulers and the women and law 
scholars till 1990s, excludes any possibility of women’s empowerment in societies 
where family is considered basic and sacred unit in society, where marriage can be 
considered a sacrament and where there is emphasis laid on roles of women as wives 
and mothers.   
 
While scholars in this phase focus significant energy on demonstrating oppressive 
potential of law, it turns out that in context of India, law is a site of oppression for 
not having contributed in pushing Indian society ahead on the scale of progress. In 
other words, for feminist scholarship in India law is a site of oppression for having 
supported the concept of family as a basic unit in society. Also, as scholars take up 
the task of understanding why women’s struggles have not been able to change 
realities of women’s lives in India, the conclusion, as the above discussion has 
shown, is continuing influence of religion on all spheres of life and the fact that 
family continues to be basic and sacred unit in society.  
 
According to Kapur and Cossman distinctive nature of law ensures that not every 
normative vision of the world gets a chance in ‘discursive struggles for ideological 
hegemony’. Law’s discursive claim to truth, it is suggested, exercises necessary 
																																								 																				
502  For a critique of this feminist lawyers and activists in International discourses too see Engle, 
“Female Subjects of Public International Law.” Criticising the prevalent feminist approaches 
Engle writes, 
 Either the advocates maternalistically try to change her mind or they seem to ignore or not 
believe her desires, often dissipating her by attributing to her false consciousness. Either way, 
advocates’ imagined constructs of her guide her strategies for gaining recognition of women’s 
rights. (At p. 1525) 
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limits on the feminist requirement to challenge all the meanings dominant in law, 
thereby ensuring that this challenge ‘does not mean that anything is possible’, or that 
one can ‘re-define the meaning of gender at will’.503 
 
These scholars also find justification for perpetuation of ethnocentrism invoking the 
cause of women, on the basis of assumption that sexual, moral and economic 
oppression of women is inherent in Hindu tradition and Hindu law. For them, much 
like universalists in human rights discourse, seeking eradication of tradition is a 
noble cause, a matter of taking firm stand against intolerance, against oppression of 
women even at the cost of inviting the allegation of ethnocentrism.   
 
4.2 Concern for plurality: Merely an ‘ornamental Concern’ 
Apart from the above, another important change that has come to characterize 
women’s rights scholarship in past few decades is: scholars’ disenchantment with 
legal uniformity or what can be called as increasing sensitivity towards differences 
among women. This concern has been manifested in the post-1990s scholarship 
through two important issues- increasing skepticism towards the uniform civil code 
and growing demand for recognizing diversity of forms in the solemnization of 
marriages (or adult intimacy).   
 
Apart from taking note of diversity in family forms, another important change which 
characterizes women’s right scholarship is: shift in perception about the role of the 
state in regulating family relationships, particularly formation and dissolution of 
marriage. It is indeed a welcome change that scholars in India, in contrast to the 
scholarship till a few decades ago, have shown inclination to take cognizance of an 
important fact: that in India marriages or personal relationships, even Hindu 
marriages which are presumed to be governed by a uniform law governing all 
Hindus- the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, have continued to be purely 
social/community relationships with minimum role of the state.504  Family law 
scholars like Agnes and Mehra have made a very important contribution as they took 
																																								 																				
503  Kapur and Cossman, Subversive Sites Feminist Engagements with Law in India. (At p. 43) 
504  For a detailed discussion on this point see Werner Menski, Modern Indian Family Law, 1st ed. 
(Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 2001) (At pp. 9-35); Menski, Hindu Law.  
Rethinking the Relationship between Law, Gender Justice and Traditions in India: From Hostility to Harmony	
201 
note of the provisions like sections 7 and 29 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and 
drew attention towards vivid presence of legal pluralism in solemnization of Hindu 
marriages.505 
 
Women in India have been at the suffering end due to the widely prevalent myth that 
family laws of Hindus have been moving the linear path of progress, which is 
presumed to have been followed by family laws in the West.506 Women in India have 
been deprived of their rights and entitlements due to the wrongful belief that the 
Hindu Marriage Act prescribes some specific religion based forms of marriage 
solemnization. Women have also had to suffer denial of rights due to the myth that 
divorce was not available to Hindu women in pre-colonial India.  
 
Apart from taking cognizance of legal pluralism prevalent in solemnization of 
marriages in India, it is also a positive change that many scholars have taken 
cognizance of the fact that not only law has not been able to eradicate the practices 
like bigamy or adultery but the criminalization of practices like bigamy and adultery 
have also been resulting in denial of rights of women.507 Scholars’ concern for rights 
of women in diverse kinds of personal, intimate relationships including in bigamous 
and adulterous relationships is a welcome change given the fact that judiciary in 
India has been dealing with such issues right from colonial era. Strong belief shared 
by scholars and policy makers that prevalence of bigamy was a sign of 
backwardness of Indian society has not only resulted in denial of rights of women, it 
has also rendered rights of women subject to individual opinions of the judges.508 
Agnes also made a very pertinent point when she expressed concern about the fact 
that polygamy has been used as a tool for attributing backwardness to Muslim 
community despite the fact that bigamous/polygamous marriages are as much a 
reality amongst Hindus as it may be amongst Muslims.509  
 
																																								 																				
505  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. (At pp. 21-23); Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards 
an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s Rights and the Family. (At p. 21) 
506  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. (Especially chapter I, pp. 10-40) 
507  Dhagamwar, “Panch Parmeshwar.” 
508  Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. (At pp. 27-30) 
509  ibid. (At pp. 27-29) 
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All the above insights and concerns amongst scholars regarding role of the state in 
formation and dissolution of marriages and customary practices are indeed 
meaningful and pertinent. There is indeed an urgent need to develop a 
comprehensive legal framework for determining rights and obligations of 
individuals in personal relationships, irrespective of the form which they choose to 
adopt in determining these relationships. Courts in India have always been faced 
with petitions of women in informal relationships claiming rights. There exists 
important jurisprudence from the Supreme Court as well as the High Courts, 
wherein judges have taken steps to protect the rights of such women who were in 
informal relationships, even in technically illegal and legally void relationships.510 
There is indeed an urgent need to develop a comprehensive legal framework for 
determining rights and obligations of individuals in personal relationships, 
irrespective of the form which they choose to adopt in determining these 
relationships. It has been extremely important to save the uniform civil code debate 
from the binary of backward v progressive, where pluralism, especially legal 
pluralism, is seen as a sign of backwardness and the uniform civil code is projected 
as the only reason of hope and sign and symbol of progressiveness- only key to all 
problems relating to denial of rights of women in the domain of family.   
 
While cause of women’s rights in India require all the above steps, the unfortunate 
situation is that the scholars’ increasing concerns about rights of women in 
pluralistic relationships or challenge to the uniform civil code has not resulted into 
any efforts to challenge those colonial era presumptions which have responsible for 
denigration of cultural and legal pluralism in India and for holding Uniform Civil 
Code as a sign of progress. There are no signs to challenge the presumptions which 
have been responsible for ill-founded uniform civil code debate.511 Moreover, 
Scholars’ concern for rights of women in diverse kinds of relationships has not 
translated into efforts from scholars to develop comprehensive legal framework to 
deal with the rights of women in range of informal relationships including 
																																								 																				
510  Agnes, Family Law II, 2011. Also see Ruma Pal, A. M. Bhattacharjee’s Matrimonial Laws and 
the Constitution, 2nd ed. (Kolkatta: Eastern Law House Pvt. Ltd., 2017); (especially chapter 2, 
Hindu Law of Marriage At pp. 18-52) 
511  Supra chapter 2. 
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bigamous/adulterous relationships. All we have is a series of cases from different 
High Courts, from judges of the same High Courts, and also from the Supreme 
Court, which offer conflicting and divergent opinions on the issue of rights of 
women in such informal relationships.512  More recently, in 2005 there has been 
enacted exists a new piece of legislation, the Domestic Violence Act (DVA 
hereinafter), which can be seen as a concrete result of scholars’ concern for rights of 
women in informal relationships. This Act grants some rights to women who choose 
to be or find themselves in intimate relationships irrespective of the form used to 
establish such relationships. However, it is regrettable, as the next section shows, 
that even this new legislative addition and the judicial opinions thereon have 
introduced a new dimension to the confusions and lack of clarity that engulfs the 
said area. And, the responsibility, it cannot be denied, lies to a large extent on nature 
of socio-legal discourses with emerging concern for plurality without challenging 
the colonial era presumptions about Hindu marriage.  
 
4.3 Institutions of Marriage and Monogamy in India- Merely Instruments 
to Impose Oppressive Ideal of Hindu Marriage! 
While expressing concern for rights of women in bigamous/polygamous 
relationships, one of the main concerns of many of the recent works is not to explore 
the means for regulating the bigamous/polygamous marriages while protecting rights 
of women. The concern is also not to understand how pre-colonial India or 
traditional societies could find the balance between the ideal of monogamy and 
accommodating the reality of bigamous marriages. Far from being a scholarship 
which offers guidance on how to regulate polygamy most of these works seem more 
concerned about, (i) defending or supporting the practice of bigamy/polygamous 
marriages as a sign of sexual autonomy, or (ii) revealing the fact of prevalence of 
bigamy amongst Hindus513 or (iii) even establishing monogamy as a highly 
																																								 																				
512  For a detailed discussion on this point see: Agnes, Family Law Volume 1. Also Mehra, Rights in 
Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s Rights and the 
Family. 
513  Nivedita Menon, “Uniform Civil Code – the Women’s Movement Perspective,” October 1, 2014, 
Menon cites a sociological survey to show prevalence polygamy amongst Hindus 
 Sociologist Nirmal Sharma points out that while a Hindu man will desert his lawfully wedded 
wife to live with another, the multiple wives of Muslim men are entitled to equal legal and social 
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patriarchal device which has been used by orthodox societies to exercise sexual 
domination on women.514 For contemporary scholars emphasis on monogamy is 
nothing more than a negative effect of modernization, propagated either by those 
trying to impose Brahmanical values on Indian society or by the ethno-centric 
English educated elite.515  Monogamy, some scholars have been of the view, has just 
been an instrument to determine and impose the idea of good and bad intimacies on 
individuals.516 Finding even women’s movement’ support to the ideal of monogamy 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
rights. “Closet bigamy in Hindus is worse than open polygamy among Muslims,”. (emphasis 
original) 
 Also see Menon, “It Isn’t about Women.”; Flavia Agnes, “From Shah Bano to Kausar Bano: 
Contextualising the ‘Muslim Woman’ within a Communalized Polity,” in South Asian 
Feminisms, ed. Ania Loomba and Ritty Lukose (USA: Duke University Press, 2012), 33–53. 
Drawing attention towards prevalence of polygamy and other anti-women practices amongst 
Hindus Agnes writes, 
 The rhetoric conveniently overlooks the fact that abandonment and destitution of wives is as 
rampant among Hindus; that the matrimonial faults of adultery and bigamy are evenly distributed 
across communities and that Hindus, Christians and Parsees, with equal zeal, guard the 
patriarchal prerogatives within their respective personal laws. Further, that around 80% of all 
women burnt in their matrimonial homes are urban middle class Hindus! (At p. 33) 
514  Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s 
Rights and the Family. Expressing concern for rights of women Mehra states,  
 The reluctance to even debate monogamy has only served to privilege the rights of one woman 
over another, similarly placed woman. The popular discourse on monogamy typically assumes 
that monogamy is safe for women and is a less contentious matter for the rights enforcement 
system to handle because it is legal and normative and is an ideal family form (despite the 
countless cases that show that monogamy is as unsafe and as contentious for claiming rights.) (p. 
77) 
515  ibid. Presenting monogamy as a negative effect of modernization Madhu Mehra writes, 
 Today multiple marital relations are perceived by younger generation as moral transgression 
practised by those who were poor and illiterate and by those who lacked modernity, as they 
prefer monogamous marriage and lifelong unions. (At p. 50) 
 She further mentions, 
 Attitudes towards bigamy and polygyny have changed since the late 1970s, not only as a result of 
the law and as a result of conflating education with brahmanical values, and of conflating non-
monogamous conjugal traditions with signs of being uncivilized. (At p. 51) 
516  ibid. Making a case for rights of women in bigamous/polygamous relationships the authors of the 
Resource Book state 
 Our anxieties as social workers and rights advocates on this subject are whether recognition of 
rights will loosen the restrain on men’s sexual desires, disrupt families, and increase patriarchal 
exploitation of women. This fear overlooks the fact that monogamy is equally patriarchal. It also 
overlooks the fact that non-monogamy in its customary, contemporary, and emerging forms is 
widely prevalent despite law. (At p. 40) 
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ill-founded517 and expecting that law will not ‘privilege monogamous relationships’ 
the authors in a Resource Book on rights of women in intimate relationships state, 518 
The debates on monogamy tend to be limited to male monogamy, which is 
perceived as fundamental to securing the dignity and rights of the legitimate 
wife. Consequently, enforcement of rights for woman is conditional upon her 
being a wife, or a ‘legitimate’ rights holder, as distinct from an illegitimate 
claimant. The support for monogamy, however, goes beyond its instrumental 
value in the determination of rights, in terms of intrinsically defining 
‘proper’ intimacy. Indeed, monogamy has captured our collective 
imagination as feminists so greatly that exclusivity has come to define even 
non-normative intimacies, so that rights are imagined and articulated only 
vis-à-vis one another. 
 
While there are hardly any scholarly inputs for rights of women in bigamous 
relationships, the concern for rights of women in informal relationships or the 
relationships which came to be declared as illegal in the process of ‘modernisation’ 
and ‘codification’ of family laws of Hindu community, is also not about 
understanding the phenomenon of legal pluralism in Hindu marriages. Realization 
amongst scholars about plurality of marriage forms available to Hindu women has 
not resulted into scholarly efforts to understand how traditional India protected 
rights of Hindu women who chose to be or happened to be in different kinds of 
																																								 																				
517  ibid. Finding support offered by liberal feminists to monogamy problematic Madhu Mehra 
writes,  
 [This approach to monogamy] shapes the liberal feminist approach to rights in marriage, where 
only ‘good’ women are viewed as holding entitlements, and assumes often that, in fact, good 
women have it in them to make ‘good’ men too. (At p.36 ) 
 Also see Agnes, “From Shah Bano to Kausar Bano.” Considering support to monogamy as an 
modernist, elite practice Agnes writes,  
 At another level, for the liberal, modern, English educated, middle classes, the demand for UCC 
is laden with a moral undertone of abolishing polygamy and other `barbaric' customs of the 
minorities and extending to them the egalitarian code of the `enlightened majority'. This position 
relies upon the western model of nation state and liberal democracy and scorns simultaneous 
sexual relationships in the nature of polygamous marriages in the name of modernity but at the 
same time, endorses sequential plurality of sexual relationships (through frequent divorces), and 
also the more recent trends of informal cohabitations, which have gained legitimacy in the west.  
(At p. 9) 
518  Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s 
Rights and the Family. (At p. 36) 
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personal relationships, despite being a society where marriage has been considered a 
sacrament. Instead, one of the major concerns of scholars seems to be to deconstruct 
the idea of marriage as sacrament or prove it as a highly oppressive, anti-women 
ideal.  
 
While scholars now accept and acknowledge the fact that colonial rule had an 
impact of killing flexibility inherent in customs by imposing a strict and rigid 
definition of proving custom, there is not much concern about the issues such as, 
what these customs relating to marriage were; how they did relate to the traditional 
institution of marriage and how could they co-exist with the ideal of marriage as 
sacrament. There is hardly any discussion in the mainstream literature that wrongful 
imposition of artificial and hitherto unknown labels of ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ or 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’ on range of intimate relationships, resulting into denial of 
rights of women is a gross misunderstanding about the traditional institutions of 
marriage and pluralism inherent in it. Realization that there existed diversity of 
marriage forms in pre-colonial India and that colonial rule became a means for 
emergence of a narrow definition of marriage by privileging only one, presumably 
scripture based brahmanical form of marriage solemnization over the others, has 
also not resulted into efforts to understand the reasons which made co-existence of 
various forms of marriage solemnization possible. In recent years there have 
emerged scholarly insights which see customs as progressive and in favour of 
women’s rights, but a closer look into the literature suggests that customs are to be 
seen as progressive for not giving importance to the institution of family or to the 
idea of sanctity of marriage or for having possibilities for easy divorce or dissolution 
of marriages.  
 
Instead of challenging the colonial era practice of reducing Hindu marriage to a 
specific ritualistic form of marriage, most of the scholarship in the new phase, 
ironically enough, appears more concerned about proving Hindu marriage as a 
uniform, homogenous institution rather than a pluralistic institution embodying 
diverse forms. Convinced about the fact that religions or traditions deny rights to 
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women in what are seen as ‘non-normative relationships’, the main question for the 
authors of the Resource Book is519 
Should public policy be based on morality derived from religion or on 
morality derived from abstract ideals of good and bad conduct? Or should, it 
instead be derived from a political understanding of power and inequality in 
every context?  
 
Current scholars do differ significantly from the scholarship in the earlier streams as 
reform of family laws to grant equal rights to women in the matrimonial 
relationships is not their main priority. Instead, one of the important concerns of the 
scholars in the new phase is to ‘challenge or de-center marriage’, to question the 
idea of privileging marriage as a site of sexuality. However, apart from above 
difference, scholars in current phase are on board with the scholars in the earlier 
streams,  as the larger concern, instead, continues to be to prove the Hindu ideal of 
marriage as sacrament as a highly patriarchal and oppressive concept which has 
been responsible for denial of rights to women in matrimonial relationships.520 
Instead of efforts to challenge the opposition between the idea of sanctity of 
marriage and rights of women, what we have is a scholarship which seems to be 
driven largely to deconstruct the idea of marriage as sacrament as an ancient ideal at 
all. 521 Attempting to trace the roots of the above ideal only to the colonial era, the 
																																								 																				
519  ibid. (At p. 43) 
520  Menon, “It Isn’t about Women.” 
521  Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s 
Rights and the Family. Providing a review of how different women’s organisations have been 
addressing the issue of rights of women in different kinds of intimate relationships authors of the 
‘Resource Book’ seem to lament the fact that, 
 The debates that question the primacy of marriage, or those that attempt to subvert the normative 
family by including non-normative and transgressive family forms, remain few and far between. 
For the most part, our work in relation to advocacy and community programming has not 
attempted to challenge or de-center marriage. ( At p. 33) 
 For the authors of the Resource Book, the main goal therefore is, 
 The goal remains- in terms of advancing equality and non-discrimination within the family, as 
much as in the terms of making rights in the family available to all families, regardless of marital 
status or sexuality. The advancement of these goals necessitates challenging the ideological 
beliefs that justify a marriage-centric rights framework while demonizing non-marital 
relationships. Such a challenge requires acting on many levels simultaneously- by giving 
visibility to all those who live on margins, by critiquing the norms on which privilege and stigma 
are based, and by demoting the normative by making marriage available for non-normative. 
While this may not radically transform the privileging of dominant family forms, the processes 
Rethinking the Relationship between Law, Gender Justice and Traditions in India: From Hostility to Harmony	
208 
scholars in the new phase, do not give signs to challenge the colonial era practice of 
perceiving traditional institution of marriage as an ‘anti-women institution’. Instead 
of challenging the binaries of sacrament v contract or traditional v modern 
institution of marriage, what we have is scholarship with a new binary of upper caste 
Hindus v lower caste Hindus, wherein ideas of marriage as sacrament or sanctity of 
institution of marriage and family are nothing more than mere upper caste 
constructs. Despite being concerned about politicization of rights of women, main 
thrust of most of the recent literature is to establish how dominant Hindu majority or 
the upper caste Hindus have been imposing the regressive ideal of marriage as 
sacrament on the lower castes or even on those sections of population from minority 
religions where marriage has never been a sacrament.522  
 
While scholars take cognizance of the fact that modernization of Hindu law has not 
been able to displace the idea of marriage as sacrament, the larger concern is not to 
understand the reasons for the above situation. Instead, most scholars seem to repent 
the fact that the Hindu ideal of marriage as a sacrament continues to be a dominant 
idea even in post-independence India not only for majority of the population, but 
also for the legal system and the judges523. Scholars seem more concerned about 
challenging the very idea of privileging marriage as a site of sexuality,524 seeing it as 
a sign of patriarchy525 rather than finding means about how it can be possible to 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
of engaging in debate, bringing visibility to non-normative family forms, expanding rights, 
imparting rights education, and adopting new approaches to case work can make the practices of 
transgressing the norm more acceptable. ( At p. 78) 
522  Kapur, “The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric,” 2002. 
523  Flavia Agnes, “Controversy over Age of Consent,” Economic and Political Weekly 48, no. 29 
(2013), http://www.epw.in/journal/2013/29/commentary/controversy-over-age-consent.html. 
524  Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s 
Rights and the Family. Considering emphasis on heterosexual marriages as sign of patriarchy the 
Resource Book states,  
 Heteronormativity also intersects with and sustains other context-specific, cross cutting systems 
of power, besides patriarchy, such as caste, class, and religion. From a political standpoint, 
therefore, it is not enough to address heteronormativity by merely supporting all sexual 
preferences, for this alone does not fully challenge he web of power it creates. Indeed, it is just as 
important to question all interlinked systems of power, and to simultaneously support intimate 
relationships and sexualities that transgress or subvert institution of marriage, procreative sex, 
and partiliny. ( At p. 33) 
525  ibid. Madhu Mehra writes 
 Although marriage has long been critiqued in women’s studies for institutionalizing patriarchal 
control over women’s sexuality and their reproductive labour, such critical perspectives are not 
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protect rights of women without deconstructing the traditional ideal of marriage as 
sacrament. There are hardly any efforts to develop legal framework for rights of 
women in diverse forms of intimate relationships which came to be seen as illegal 
relationships as a result of ill-conceived colonial era mis-conceptions about 
understanding of Hindu marriages. Attributing continuing perceptions of marriage as 
a sacrament either to ‘false consciousness’ or to ‘ideological domination’ of women 
by the ‘Hindu Right’, recent scholarship in India far from challenging the binary 
opposition of sacrament v contract scholars seem to repent the fact that the Indian 
legal system and the judiciary has not been able to treat marriage or intimate 
relationships as mere contractual relationships. Expectations from the state and its 
legal system, and especially from the judiciary are to ensure two things, first that the 
marriage is not privileged as a site for protection of rights of women and second that 
all kinds of intimate relationships, including marriage, come to be seen as mere 
contracts governed by the will of the individuals concerned. For example, according 
to the authors of the Resource Book, cause of rights of women in diverse kind of 
intimate relationships, requires 
Activism must aim to shift the fulcrum on which rights are articulated and 
imagined from marriage to the household, from legality and the nature of 
kinship ties to the years spent together.526 (emphasis added) 
 
For protecting rights of women in diverse kind of relationships, according to the 
authors of the Resource Book, the requirement is the following, 
The new frameworks need to go beyond the liberal model of state feminism, 
where new rights are added to the existing family structure, or indeed where 
a few diverse family forms and a few women on the margins are ‘added and 
stirred’ into the existing framework. It needs to question and break the norms 
that privilege marriage, for today marriage is not simply one amongst other 
options. It is the only option where rights are recognized. For a rights 
framework to be transformatory, it needs to go beyond being inclusive- to 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
adequately manifested in programmes, campaigns and debates in the women’s movement in 
India. For instance, marriage is made compulsory for women by mutually reinforcing values that 
bestow social status upon women only upon marriage, coupled with disincentives for single 
women. (At p. 31) 
526  ibid. At p. 78 
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displacing norms that privilege marriage, chastity, monogamy, and 
heteronormativity, norms that privilege a few women- and go beyond 
attempts to make rights conditional upon compliance with these norms.527  
 
While being concerned about granting rights to women in what are addressed as 
‘non-normative marriages’, two things have completely been ignored, first, that co-
existence of what can be called ‘normative’ and ‘non-normative’ marriages is an 
ancient phenomenon and second, that denial of rights to women in diverse kinds of 
relationships in only a colonial legacy in India, resulting from distortions and 
misunderstandings about the concept of dharma and about institution of marriage 
and family in pre-colonial India. It has also been ignored that what are called 
common law marriages is not only an ancient phenomenon, and that this kind of 
marriages have always had recognition in the Indian legal system.528 The  ‘Resource 
Book’ is concerned about protection of rights of women in diverse kinds of intimate 
relationships, especially in those which have not been able to meet the test of legally 
valid marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act 1956,  or what are commonly referred 
as live-in relationships, addressing the latter as non-normative marriages.529  
According to the authors of the Resource Book, the three broad categories in which 
the law places non-normative relationships are customary, common law, and 
illegal.530 However, for the authors of this work, the concern to take distance from 
traditions seems to be so strong that they completely obscured the fact the Hindu 
law, that is, the Hindu Marriage Act and other laws, pre-reform as well as post-
reform, has been granting rights to women under all the above three categories of 
non-normative relationships. It completely obscures the fact that under the existing 
Indian marriage laws, women could enjoy status and rights of wife even in those 
relationships which would otherwise be called mere co-habitation arrangements for 
want of formal solemnization of marriage.531 While authors of the Resource Book 
are right in pointing out that the rigid and difficult definition of proving custom has 
been detrimental to the cause of women’s rights, what has been ignored by scholars 
																																								 																				
527  ibid. At p. 85 
528  Menski, Modern Indian Family Law, 2001. (At pp. 9-20);  
529  Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s 
Rights and the Family. 
530  ibid. At p. 41 
531  Infra, section 4.4. 
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in this work that despite this difficulty the Courts in India have been recognizing 
relationships as marriage even where no custom has been followed.532  
Most of the works advocating concern for rights of women in diverse intimate 
relationships have obscured the fact that in India formal solemnization of marriage is 
not the criteria for distinguishing between marriages and relationships in nature of 
marriage. The courts have often invoked the provision of presumption of marriage to 
validate a long co-habitation between a man and a woman as a legal marriage and to 
grant status and rights of wife to the woman concerned.  
 
What has further been ignored is that one of the peculiar features of Indian marriage 
laws, especially of Hindu marriage laws, is recognition to diverse forms of 
customary marriage solemnization533 and wide discretion enjoyed by the courts in 
determining the issues relating to formal validity of marriages.534 And, that scholarly 
reluctance to take cognizance of above elements has serious consequences for the 
cause of women’s rights in India is becoming evident from the functioning of the 
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005- the statute which has been 
a manifestation of scholars’ increasing concern for plurality. 
 
If one takes a close look at the way this Act has been in put into practice, it appears 
that in addition to increasing confusions, it has caused a strange and undesirable 
effect, i.e. revival of the myth of the Hindu Marriage Act as a uniform code of 
personal law, which prescribes some uniform conditions such as, saptapadi or 
oblations to the fire, for performing/solemnizing Hindu marriages. Promulgation of 
the Domestic Violence Act has resulted in a situation where not only scholarly 
discourses but also judicial discourses are perpetuating a set of following wrongful 
presumptions: (i) that the Hindu Marriage Act prescribes specific formalities and 
																																								 																				
532  Menski, Modern Indian Family Law, 2001. (At pp. 9-20); Menski, “Solemnisation of Hindu 
Marriages.” 
533  Menski, Modern Indian Family Law, 2001. (At p. 12) 
534  Matrimonial matters in India, as is well known, are governed by four sets of, what are seen as, 
religion-based personal laws for Hindus (including Buddhists, Jainas and Sikhs), Muslims, 
Christians and Parsis.  In addition to the religion-based laws there also exists a special enactment, 
named the Special Marriage Act of 1954, which facilitates formation and dissolution of inter-
religious marital relationships. These laws prescribe some norms for formal as well as material 
validity of the marital relationships. There has always been a demand for compulsory registration 
of marriages, however, in India non-registration does not render a marriage invalid. Section 8, 
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 
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ceremonies for marriage solemnization, (ii) that ‘common law marriages’ or a man 
and woman deciding to live together in relationships in nature of marriage  with very 
little or minimal formalities is a phenomenon which is new to India and which is a 
result of modernization and changing social context,535 (iii) that the Indian legal 
system has come to grant rights to women in various kinds of informal relationships 
for the first time through promulgation of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.  In a 
strange turn of events judges and also scholars and activists seem to have forgotten 
(i) that the section 7 of the HMA does not limit a valid Hindu marriage to conditions 
like performance of saptapadi or oblations to fire and (ii) that there exists a rich 
body of case laws granting rights to women in a range of informal relationships.536 
 
4.4 The Protection of Women from the Domestic Violence Act 2005: A New 
Source for denial of rights to women 
In 2005, the Protection of Women from the Domestic Violence Act (the Act)found a 
place in the Indian statute book as a progressive piece of legislation. Although a law 
primarily meant to address the issue of domestic violence by women in range of 
personal, intimate relationships,537 this Act has attracted maximum attention for 
another reason- for protecting some social and economic rights of women even in 
those women cannot be termed as a legally valid marriage.538  A much celebrated 
legislation amongst women’s rights scholars and activists, this Act has been 
acclaimed as the ‘watershed in our legal discourse’.539 The 2005 Act, which uses the 
																																								 																				
535  Continuing emphasis by the judiciary, policy makers or even by a section of women’s rights 
movement on compulsory registration of marriage as a means for protecting rights of women is 
strong evidence of the fact the prevalence of informal relationships or relationships in nature of 
marriage has always been prevalent in India. 
536 See also, Flavia Agnes, Marriage, Divorce, and Matrimonial Litigation (OUP, Delhi, 2011). 
537  The Act uses the term, ‘domestic relationship’, section 2(f), the Protection of Women from the 
Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The term domestic relationship is defined as: 
       Domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point 
of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, 
or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living 
together as a joint family. 
538  Indira Jaising and Monica Sakhrani, eds., Law of Domestic Violence, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: 
Universal Law Publishing Co., 2007). Other laws available in India for protection against 
violence- 498-A, 304- B, the Indian Penal Code, 1860.  
539  Jaising and Sakhrani. (At p. 8) “Domestic Violence and Law: Report of Colloquium on Justice 
for Women-Empowerment through Law” (Delhi: Lawyer’s Collective, 2010) ; Tahira 
Karanjawala and Shivani Chugh, “The Legal Battle against Domestic Violence in India: 
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term ‘domestic relationship’ to cover various kinds of interpersonal relationships 
wherein women need protection, divides intimate relationships into two categories:  
“marriage” and “relationships in the nature of marriage”.  A manifestation of 
women’s rights scholars increasing concern for plurality this Act has also come to be 
seen as a sign of Indian legal system’s recognition of changing social context and 
values in India. It is projected by women’s rights scholars as a sign of increasing 
inclination of Indian legal system not to privilege marriage as the only site of 
sexuality. 540 Given the fact that this Act uses the term ‘relationship in nature of 
marriage’ instead of marriage, it is projected as a law which legitimizes ‘live-in 
relationships’ in India.541  It is much more expansive in its scope as compared to 
personal laws542 and undoubtedly broader in its vision when it comes to granting 
rights to women. The Act also appears path breaking since it carries the possibility 
to grant monetary and social reliefs to women in those relationships, which 
according to personal laws would otherwise be considered bigamous or 
adulterous.543  
 
While the Act can be seen as an important milestone in the history of women’s 
movement in India, one of the important stumbling points for effective 
implementation of this Act has been lack of clarity about the term ‘relationship in 
nature of marriage’.544  Entrusted with the task of giving meaning to the term 
‘relationship in the nature of marriage’, the judiciary in India has been engaged in 
reflecting on various kinds of non-marital intimate relationships like ‘pre-marital 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
Evolution and Analysis,” International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 23 (2009): 289–
308. 
540  Mehra, Rights in Intimate Relationships- Towards an Inclusive and Just Framework of Women’s 
Rights and the Family. (At p. 116)   
541  The Act enables the wife or female living in relationship in the nature of marriage to file a 
complaint of domestic violence under the proposed enactment.   
542  P.K. Das, Universal’s Handbook on Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2nd ed. 
(Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Co., n.d.). 
543  Agnes, Family Law II, 2011. Talking about the Act Agnes mentions,  
 The DVA transformed the yesteryear concubine into present day cohabitees and their right to 
protection from domestic violence and rights of maintenance and residence have been awarded 
statutory recognition. (At p. 154) 
544  Shyam Krishan Kaushik, “A Relationship in Nature of Marriage- Hope and Disappointment,” 
Journal of Indian Law Institute 53, no. 3 (2011): 474–90. 
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sex’,545 ‘one night stands’,546 ‘relationships for casual sex’,547 ‘living together at 
times’,548 long term and short term co-habitation arrangements. The first 
authoritative pronouncement by the Apex Court on the meaning of the term ‘live-in 
relationships’ or relationship in the nature of marriage in the context of the 2005 Act 
appeared in 2011 in the case of D. Velusamy.549 This was followed by another 
judgement in 2013 in the Indra Sarma550 case. 
 
In the Velusamy case, although the petitioner did not invoke the provisions of the 
2005 Act, the Apex Court went on to give a specific definition to the term 
‘relationship in the nature of marriage, considering that the issue of bigamous or 
adulterous relationship need also to be examined for the purposes of the 2005 Act. 
The judges in this case took note of the fact that there can be many kinds of intimate 
relationships which can be named as live-in relationships. However, striking a 
distinction between live-in relationships and relationship in the nature of marriage, 
the judges categorically stated that “not all live in relationships will amount to a 
relationship in the nature of marriage to get the benefit of the Act of 2005”.551 
Enumerating various kinds of live-in relationships, the judges made it clear that one 
night stand, relationship for sexual services, keeps and concubines cannot be 
considered relationships in the nature of marriage. Defining the term relationship in 
the nature of marriage, the judgment stated, 
In our opinion a “relationship in nature of marriage” is akin to a common law 
marriage. The common law marriages require that although not being 
formally married:  (a) The couple must hold themselves out to society as 
being akin to spouses, (b) They must be of legal age to marry, (c) They must 
be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being 
unmarried, (d) They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves 
																																								 																				
545  Aysha v Ozir Hassan, (2013)5MLJ31 
546  D. Velusamy v D. Patchaiammal, 10 Supreme Court Cases 469 (Supreme Court 2010). 
547  D. Velusamy v D. Patchaiammal, 10 Supreme Court Cases.; Indubai Jaydeo Pawar v 
Draupada@Draupadi Jaydeo Pawar, SCC Online 2413 (Bombay High Court 2017). 
548  Joby v Elsy, 3 Kerala Law Times 450 (Kerala High Court 2013). 
549  D. Velusamy v D. Patchaiammal, 10 Supreme Court Cases. 
550  Indra Sarma v V.K.V. Sarma, 15 Supreme Court Cases 755 (Supreme Court 2013). 
551  D. Velusamy v D. Patchaiammal, 10 Supreme Court Cases. (At para 32) 
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out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time.552 
(emphasis original) 
It was further stated,  
A 'relationship in the nature of marriage' under the 2005 Act must also fulfill 
the above requirements, and in addition the parties must have lived together 
in a 'shared household' as defined in Section 2(s) of the Act. Merely spending 
weekends together or a one night stand would not make it a “domestic 
relationship”.553 
 
Although the Velusamy judgment has invited much criticism, mainly for use of 
objectionable language,554 it remains till date the authoritative pronouncement for the 
term relationship in the nature of marriage, not having been overruled by a larger 
bench.  Taking further the line of reasoning developed by the Apex Court in the 
Velusamy case, the Apex Court once again explained elaborately the differences 
between marriage, relationship in the nature of marriage and live-in relationships in 
2013 in the Indra Sarma case. In this case too the judges made it clear that the 2005 
Act does not give legal recognition to all kinds of live-in relationship. The Court 
specifically mentioned,  
Through the DV Act, the Parliament has recognized a “relationship in the 
nature of marriage” and not a live-in relationship simpliciter”.555  
 
Marriage, the Court mentioned, “involves legal requirements of formality, publicity, 
exclusivity, and all the legal consequences flow out of that relationship”.556 On the 
other hand, “relationship in the nature of marriage”, according to the Court, means a 
relationship which has some inherent or essential characteristics of a marriage 
though not a marriage legally recognized, and, hence, a comparison of both will 
have to be resorted, to determine whether the relationship in a given case constitutes 
the characteristics of a regular marriage.557 (emphasis added) 
																																								 																				
552  D. Velusamy v D. Patchaiammal, 10 Supreme Court Cases. (Para 31) 
553  D. Velusamy v D. Patchaiammal, 10 Supreme Court Cases. 
554  Agnes, Family Law II, 2011. (At pp. 160-161) 
555  Indra Sarma v V.K.V. Sarma, 15 Supreme Court Cases. (Para 53) 
556  Indra Sarma v V.K.V. Sarma, 15 Supreme Court Cases.(Para 23) 
557  Indra Sarma v V.K.V. Sarma, 15 Supreme Court Cases. (Para 35) 
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Distinguishing live-in relationship from a relationship in the nature of marriage, the 
court defined the former as,  
purely an arrangement between the parties unlike, a legal marriage. Once a 
party to a live-in-relationship determines that he/she does not wish to live in 
such a relationship that relationship comes to an end. Further, in a 
relationship in the nature of marriage, the party asserting the existence of the 
relationship, at any stage or at any point of time, must positively prove the 
existence of the identifying characteristics of that relationship, since the 
legislature has used the expression “in nature of”.558  
 
The judges also laid some guidelines for understanding the difference between 
marriage and relationship in the nature of marriage. According to the Apex Court, 
the factors that are to be taken into account for a relationship to qualify as a 
relationship in the nature of marriage under section 2(f) of the Act are:559 (1) 
reasonably long duration of period of relationship, (2) shared household (3) pooling 
of resources and financial arrangements in joint names to support each other (4) 
domestic arrangements or entrusting responsibility, especially on woman, to run the 
home (5) sexual Relationship, which is not just for pleasure, but for emotional and 
intimate relationship and also for procreation of children (6) children- having 
children and sharing the responsibility for bringing up and supporting them, (7) 
socialisation in public and holding out to the public as husband and wife (8) 
intention and conduct of the parties- common intention of parties to have a marriage-
like relationship.  
 
Taking a clear stand with respect to polygamous or bigamous arrangement the 
judges in the Indra Sarma’s case stated:  
A concubine cannot maintain a relationship in the nature of marriage because 
such a relationship will not have exclusivity and will not be monogamous in 
character.560  
																																								 																				
558  Indra Sarma v V.K.V. Sarma, 15 Supreme Court Cases. (Para 36) 
559  Indra Sarma v V.K.V. Sarma, 15 Supreme Court Cases. (Para 55) 
560  Indra Sarma v V.K.V. Sarma, 15 Supreme Court Cases. (Para 56) 
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It was further mentioned: 
Polygamy, that is a relationship or practice of having more than one wife or 
husband at the same time, or a relationship by way of a bigamous marriage 
that is marrying someone while already married to another and/or 
maintaining an adulterous relationship that is having voluntary sexual 
intercourse between a married person who is not one's husband or wife, 
cannot be said to be a relationship in the nature of marriage.561 
 
In Sarma’s case the judges did express sympathy towards those women who 
knowingly enter into bigamous relationships, however it expressed helplessness as 
they mentioned: 
Long standing relationship as a concubine, though not a relationship in the 
nature of a marriage, of course, may at times, deserve protection because that 
woman might not be financially independent, but we are afraid that DV Act 
does not take care of such relationships which may perhaps call for an 
amendment of the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act, which is 
restrictive and exhaustive.562 
 
Raising a demand for action from the Parliament, the judges further added, 
Parliament has to ponder over these issues, bring in proper legislation or 
make a proper amendment of the Act, so that women and children, born out 
of such kinds of relationships be protected, though these types of relationship 
might not be a relationship in nature of marriage.563 
 
While taking a clear stand against the bigamous/polygamous relationships, the Apex 
Court in the Indra Sarma’s case, made, however, a small concession in favour of 
bigamous arrangements, which was not made in the Velusamy case. In the Velusamy 
case, the Apex Court was of the view that the unmarried status of man and woman is 
																																								 																				
561  Indra Sarma v V.K.V. Sarma, 15 Supreme Court Cases. 
562  Indra Sarma v V.K.V. Sarma, 15 Supreme Court Cases. (Para 57) 
563  Indra Sarma v V.K.V. Sarma, 15 Supreme Court Cases. (Para 62) 
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one of the essential conditions for a relationship in the nature of marriage.564 
However, in the Indra Sarma case the court took a slightly different view as it 
mentioned that a relationship between an unmarried woman and a married adult 
male can be considered a relationship in the nature of marriage within the definition 
of section 2 (f) of the Act, if the woman unknowingly enters into a relationship with 
a married adult male. In other words, lack of knowledge on the part of the woman 
about marital status of the man with whom she has been living for a long time in 
capacity of wife may entitle her to claim reliefs under the 2005 Act.565  
 
Apart from the above-mentioned small difference both judgments appear to present 
a consistent view on the term relationship in the nature of marriage. Although the 
more recent case of Indra Sarma does not make an explicit reference to the 
judgment in Velusamy, a combined reading of both cases leads to the conclusion that 
according to the Apex Court a relationship in the nature of marriage under section 
2(f) of the Act would mean a relationship between a man and woman, (i) who have 
eligibility to marry or to fulfill conditions for material validity of marriage, (ii) who 
have lived together for a sufficient period of time, (iii) who hold themselves out in 
the eyes of society as husband and wife, but (iv) whose relationship cannot be called 
a legally valid marriage. In other words, a relationship which has all the attributes of 
marriage, including eligibility of parties to marry, but which cannot be considered a 
marriage presumably for lack of marriage solemnization or fulfillment of some 
formalities prescribed under any of the personal laws.  In other words, a relationship 
in the nature of marriage, the Apex Court seems to suggest, would mean a 
relationship between man and woman which fulfills all conditions of material 
validity but not of formal validity. 
 
																																								 																				
564  D. Velusamy v D. Patchaiammal, 10 Supreme Court Cases. (At para 31) 
565  For a similar view also see Badshah v Urmila Badshah Godse, 1 Supreme Court Cases 188 
(Supreme Court 2013). While deciding on the maintenance application of a woman under section 
125 Criminal Procedure Code, the Supreme Court held that a woman can be considered as a wife 
for the purposes of this section, as long as it can be proved that the petitioner lady was  unaware 
of the marital status of the man. Earlier the Supreme Court had held in a case in 2005 that a 
bigamous marriage is not immoral. Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga v Rameshwari 
Rameshchandra Daga, 2 Supreme Court Cases 33 (Supreme Court 2005). (At p. 40) 
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While the Supreme Court can be lauded for its efforts to impart clarity to a vital term 
in the 2005 Act, which had not received due attention for many years after the 
enactment of the statue, both the above judgments have received their share of 
criticism from scholars and activists, mainly for a narrow definition to the term 
‘relationship in nature of marriage’. The scholarly criticism is well-founded, not 
only for the above reasons but also because these judgements reinforce a narrow 
definition of the term Hindu marriage, having used formal solemnization of 
marriage as the main criteria for distinguishing between marriage and relationships 
in the nature of marriage.  
 
The above judgments completely ignore the fact that one of the peculiar features of 
Indian marriage laws, especially of Hindu marriage laws, is recognition to diverse 
forms of customary marriage solemnization566 and wide discretion enjoyed by the 
courts in determining the issues relating to formal validity of marriages. The 
marriage laws in India are also supported by a provision of the law of evidence,567 
which allows courts to draw presumptions of a valid marriage, albeit rebuttable, 
where no independent evidence of solemnisation of marriage is available, but where 
there is proof of prolonged and continuous cohabitation between a man and a 
woman in the capacity of husband and wife in the eyes of society. 
 
The courts’ discretion in determining solemnisation of marriage is related to the fact 
that the Hindu Marriage Act, though having section 7, which is presumed to 
prescribe conditions for formal validity of marriages, does not prescribe any 
particular from for a legally valid marriage. It grants validity to marriages performed 
																																								 																				
566  Section 7, The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Section 7 of the Act provides for, 
Ceremonies for a Hindu marriage. — 
(1) A Hindu marriage may be solemnized in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies 
of either party thereto. 
(2) Where such rites and ceremonies include the saptpadi  (that is, the taking of seven steps by 
the bridegroom and the bride jointly before the sacred fire), the marriage becomes complete 
and binding when the seventh step is taken. 
567  Section 114, The Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Section makes it possible to presume certain 
facts as it states:  
 The court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard 
being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private 
business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. 
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in accordance with a wide range of customary ceremonies and rites, which may or 
may not be based on religious texts.568 The customs of marriage which are given 
recognition in the Hindu Marriage Act vary from elaborate ceremonies to simple 
rituals and the mere requirement of living together as husband and wife.569 Such has 
been the diversity of forms of marriage solemnisation, especially amongst Hindus, 
that the issue relating to essential ceremonies of a Hindu marriage, continues to be 
unsettled even till date.570 Since the pre-independence period, the courts in India are 
constantly being called upon to decide whether a particular customary ceremony 
claimed by one of the parties to a marriage can be considered legally valid for 
solemnisation of marriage. While dealing with validity of marriage, another task for 
the Courts in India has been to decide questions relating to the status and the rights 
and obligations of those individuals571 who have been living together in capacity of 
																																								 																				
568 Diwan, Law of Marriage and Divorce. (At pp. 132-145) 
569  ibid. At pp. 139-141. In Punjab, under customary law in the kerava and chadar andazi marriages 
there are no ceremonies, intention to live together as husband and wife followed by actually so 
living is enough to constitute a valid marriage and confer the status of husband and wife on the 
parties. The Indian legislature has passed many Acts to validate different ceremonies of 
marriage, for example, The Arya Marriage Validation Act, 1937; The Anand Marriage Act, 
1909.  The Madras legislature amended the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 by inserting a new section 
7A which validates marriages with a very specific customary ceremony. According to Section 7-
A a valid Hindu marriage can come into existence: 
(a) by each party to the marriage declaring in any language understood by the parties that 
each takes the other to be his wife or, as the case may be, her husband; or 
(b) by each party to the marriage garlanding the other or putting a ring upon any finger of 
the other; or 
(c) by the tying of the thali. 
While legislature and judiciary has been giving legal recognition to a wide range of ceremonies 
to constitute a valid Hindu marriage, some scholars of Hindu law, such as Paras Diwan, have 
been critical of this trend. Diwan strongly advocates the idea that the Hindu marriage Act, 1955 
two alternative ceremonies for a valid Hindu marriage, shastric ceremonies and rites and 
customary ceremonies and rites. ibid. At pp. 132-133. While Diwan accepts that customary 
ceremonies may be ‘religious, secular, elaborate, brief or nominal’, he is critical of judicial trend 
of giving recognition to new ceremonies, which cannot be proved to be existing since a long 
time. He, like many other authors of Hindu law, is keen on proving that Hindu marriage requires 
some very specific ceremonies. Validity of section 7-A was challenged in the Supreme Court of 
India in the case of S. Nagalingam v Sivagami, 7 Supreme Court Cases 487 (Supreme Court 
2001). 
570  For a detailed discussion on different judicial approaches on ceremonies required for a valid 
Hindu marriage see Agnes, Family Law II, 2011; Menski, “Solemnisation of Hindu Marriages.”; 
Menski, Modern Indian Family Law, 2001. Diwan, Law of Marriage and Divorce. Highlighting 
uncertainty Diwan mentions, 
 The judicial pronouncements do not clearly lay down which of the ceremonies are essential for 
the valid performance of a Hindu marriage. (At p. 137) 
571  The courts have often been faced with questions on validity of marriage in the context of 
legitimacy of children. 
Rethinking the Relationship between Law, Gender Justice and Traditions in India: From Hostility to Harmony	
221 
husband and wife for a significant period of time without being able to give proof of 
having fulfilled formalities necessary to constitute a valid marriage. This arises 
today most prominently in the context of claims for maintenance after the 
breakdown of the relationship. For the courts in India, from the times of the Privy 
Council onwards,572 a deciding factor which has weighed heavily while dealing with 
issues relating to formal validity of marriage, is the existence of the de facto 
marriage- the existence of the relationship in the nature of marriage.573 The approach 
of the courts has always been to presume in favour of marriage, even if no 
independent evidence to prove fulfillment of formalities essential for a legally valid 
marriage is coming through. Confronted with an issue of relationship between man 
and woman who have been cohabiting as husband and wife for many years, but 
whose marriage could not be proved, the Privy Council, considering the law as well 
settled574 as early as in 1929, held that “the law presumes in favour of marriage and 
against concubinage, when a man and a woman have cohabited continuously for a 
number of years.”575 
There exists a series of cases576 where the higher judiciary has consistently 
reinforced this well settled legal position of “presumption in favour of marriage, 
																																								 																				
572  Mohabbat Ali Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim Khan AIR1929PC135 
573  Derrett, A Critique of Modern Hindu Law. So much has been the focus of the judges on attributes 
of marriage that one of the leading experts on Hindu Law, Professor J. Duncan M. Derrett once 
commented that in determining validity or invalidity of marriages, intention should be the 
criteria. He stated,  
 Did they intend to become man and wife? If they did so, the choice of ceremony is irrelevant…If 
on the other hand she aimed to be no more than a permanent concubine, the ceremonies, no 
matter how elaborate, should not have the effect of turning her into a patni against her intention! 
(At p.300) 
574  ibid, p. 17. The court mentioned,  
 The law applicable to such a case is quite settled. As Dr. Lushington, delivering the Judgment of 
the Board, observed in Khajah Hidayutoollah v. Rai Jan Khanum 3 M.I.A. 295 : 6 W.R.P.C. 52 : 
1 Sar. P.C.J. 282 : 18 E.R. 510. Where a child has been born to a father, of a mother where there 
has been not a mere casual concubinage, but a more permanent connection, and where there is no 
insurmountable obstacle to such a marriage, then, according to the Muhammadan Law, the 
presumption is in favour of such marriage having taken place. 
575  Similar proposition was laid down in by the Privy Council in Andrahennedige Dinohamy v. 
Wiketunge Liyanapatabendage Balshamy,  AIR 1927 PC 185 where it was stated, that where a 
man and a woman are proved to have lived together as husband and wife, the law presumes that 
they are living together in consequence of a valid marriage 
576  Some examples are: Gokalchand v. Parvin Kumar, AIR 1952 SC 231; S.P.S. Balasubramanyam 
v. Suruttayan, (1994) 1 SCC 460; Ranganath Parmeshwar Panditrao Mali v. Eknath Gajanan 
Kulkarni,  (1996) 7 SCC 681; Sobha Hymavathi Devi v. Setti Gangadhara Swamy, (2005) 2 SCC 
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where partners have lived together for a long spell as husband and wife”.577 The 
courts in India have consistently been giving such relationships the status of valid 
marriages, for the simple reason that these relationships were akin to marriage 
relationships, possessing all the attributes or characteristics of a valid marriage but 
for the availability of evidence to prove fulfillment of formalities considered as 
essential for a legally valid marriage.  
 
It is true that there is no single judgment so far which lays down the guidelines for 
drawing presumption in favor of marriage or for relationship in the nature of 
marriage, However, a combined reading of the case law relating to presumption of 
marriage leaves no doubt that the relationships fit for drawing presumption of a valid 
marriage are those, where there is no proof of fulfillment of legal formalities of 
marriage but which have all the attributes or inherent characteristics of marriage, as 
suggested by the Apex Court in Indra Sarma’s judgment. However, the paradox is 
that while in 1869 the proof of a relationship in the nature of marriage, made it 
possible for a woman to claim the status of marriage relationship, in 2014 with the 
judgments of the Supreme Court in Velusamy and Indra Sarma’s cases, the claim 
would only be to a kind of ‘live-in relationship’ or a relationship which has a status 
lower than that of marriage, where women and children involved would be enjoying 
lesser rights than what could be enjoyed earlier. And, undoubtedly, by no stretch of 
imagination can this be considered a progressive move of taking into account a new 
social phenomenon. Instead, it is about giving a new name to an old phenomenon, 
with lesser rights for women and children involved.  
It is true that to claim the benefit of the presumption of marriage the woman 
concerned has to claim some sort of solemnisation of marriage. The judges cannot 
invoke the presumption of marriage in the absence of any such claim being made by 
the woman concerned. It can also be argued that because of this authoritative 
definition to the term relationship in the nature of marriage by the Supreme Court in 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
244); Tulsa v Durghatiya, (2008)4SCC 520. Not only the courts have been presuming in favour 
of marriage, in Tulsa’s case the Court also held,  
 There would be presumption in favour of wedlock if the partners lived together for long spell as 
husband and wife; but it would be rebuttable and heavy burden lies on the person who seeks to 
deprive the relationship of legal origin to prove that no marriage took place. (At p. 525) 
577  Badri Prasad v Deputy Director of Consolidation, (1978)3SCC527 
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Indra Sarma’s case a woman need not make any claim relating to marriage 
solemnisation. Neither she has to wait for the judges to exercise discretion and make 
a presumption in favour of marriage under section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. 
The reliefs under the 2005 Act can now be claimed by a woman who has been living 
in a relationship in the nature of marriage as a matter of right.578 However, the 2005 
Act, while ensuring reliefs ensure that the woman concerned cannot claim status of 
wife. 
 
But does this mean that the provision relating to presumption of marriage is now to 
be rendered irrelevant? If not, then on the basis of interpretation to the term 
relationship in the nature of marriage by the Supreme Court, do we have to infer that 
women now have a choice between claiming marriage by invoking the presumption 
or relationship in the nature of marriage under the 2005 Act? And, can any woman, 
who would, in any case, be under an obligation to give evidence of prolonged, 
continuous cohabitation with a man in capacity of wife, be advised to settle for 
lesser status and transitory reliefs under the 2005 Act, when it is possible to claim 
the status of wife and all entitlements associated with it? Perhaps, the answer has to 
be in the negative. But then, has the Supreme Court in the recent judgments 
discussed here offered anything new? Perhaps, the answer again has to be in the 
negative.  
 
The Supreme Court in the Indra Sarma’s case could be seen as offering something 
new in the spirit of the 2005 Act, had it meant giving an opportunity to the 
individuals to strike certain arrangements, oral or written, for living together in 
intimate relationships with or without intention to marry. But, no part of two 
judgments lends itself to such an interpretation or can be read as laying down law for 
giving recognition to any such kind of co-habitation arrangement. Instead, it appears 
that relief under the 2005 Act can be claimed only by those women who have been 
in prolonged and continuous cohabitation as husband and wife. In the Indian 
context, where ‘common law marriages’ are an old phenomenon,579  where law gives 
																																								 																				
578  For similar concerns in western jurisdictions see  “Marriage as Contract and Marriage as 
Partnership: The Future of an Antenuptial Agreement.” 
579  Menski, Modern Indian Family Law, 2001. 
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recognition to diverse forms of marriage solemnization,580 and where registration of 
marriages is not an essential condition for validity of marriages, the distinction 
between marital and non-marital relationships on the basis of fulfillment of some 
legal formalities may lead to precarious consequences.   
 
Far from accounting for any new phenomenon or granting better rights to women, 
insistence on fulfillment of specific formalities as a criterion for determining legal 
validity of marriage, may have undesirable effects. This may result in a situation 
where many relationships would be deprived of the status of marriage and the 
woman involved therein would be denied the rights and entitlements associated with 
it. It may also have another undesirable effect of judges’ attempting to impose some 
specific forms of marriage solemnization as legally valid forms, thereby curtailing 
the freedom of individuals to choose the custom-based or other forms, which were 
allowed to them even in the traditional system and which have been given protection 
even under the modernistic and reformed Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.  
 
One can probably attribute responsibility for above state of affairs to the judiciary, 
more particularly to the Apex Court of India, given the fact that it is the judgments 
of the Apex Court which have brought about the above precarious situation with 
potentially for denial of rights to women. One can also blame judiciary for such a 
narrow definition to the term relationship in nature of marriage or for imposing 
conditions like ‘living like spouses’ or ‘cohabitation for a significant period’ for 
making woman entitled to claim protection. The 2005 Act, with its concern to 
extend protection against violence to women in non-marital relationships, is 
undoubtedly a welcome initiative. However, in the Indian context, in order to ensure 
that this concern translates into meaningful measures for the rights of women, there 
is a need for further debate on the meaning of the term ‘relationship in the nature of 
marriage’. And such a debate is required not only for some new social phenomenon, 
but also for the old phenomenon of bigamous or adulterous relationships, the old 
practices which have refused to be tamed even by the instruments of criminal law. 
There is surely an imminent requirement to deliberate on the issue of rights of 
																																								 																				
580  Supra fn 567, 568 
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women who, knowingly or unknowingly, become part of relationships which would 
be bigamous or adulterous in nature. 
 
Presuming that following the west, more and more couples in urban areas are willing 
to live-together without fulfilling any kind of marriage formalities, the new 
phenomenon which may need consideration could be relating to the arrangements 
between men and women to be in cohabitation arrangements of whatever duration, 
with or without intention to fulfill the rights and obligations associated with 
marriage, or of presenting themselves as husband and wife in eyes of society. The 
issue of giving legal recognition to the relationships of the above nature requires, as 
is obvious, greater deliberation on vital matters such as the nature of reliefs available 
under the 2005 Act. Once we agree on giving legal recognition to the co-habitation 
arrangements or to the contracts to live together, more discussions would also be 
required on issues such as: what should be the nature of rights granted to women in 
such relationships, which are not in the nature of marriage or which are mere 
arrangements or contracts to live-together without having all or any of the attributes 
of marriage identified in the recent Apex Court judgment? Can there be or should 
there be any difference between the rights or entitlements of women whose 
relationship can be termed as marriage or those whose relationship cannot be termed 
as marriage not even having attributes of marriage? What kind of economic rights 
can be granted to women in such relationships against the male partner as well as 
against the relatives, both male and female, of that partner? Would and should there 
be differences in entitlements during the relationship and after it ends?  
 
While there is an urgent need for scholarly energies to answer above questions, can 
this be possible without scholars’ and activists’ willingness to take cognizance of 
legal pluralism as an ancient phenomenon in India? Is scholarship in India inclined 
to seek answers to any of the above or similar questions given its reluctance to 
challenge those understandings about traditional institutions of marriage and family 
which came into existence during colonial era and which have been used since then 
to justify that India needs to follow the same path of progress which is presumed to 
have been followed by the West?  
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4.5 Emerging Concern for Plurality: A Reason for Crisis in Women’s 
Rights Scholarship  
Women’s rights scholarship in India during last few decades has undoubtedly 
become more complex and nuanced as compared to the works in earlier streams.581 
Scholars are no longer willing to accept the simplistic solutions for women’s 
empowerment such as substituting religion based laws with modern, secular laws. 
Scholars are also not inclined to accept rather simplistic ideas of law as objective 
entity autonomous from society and are now willing to accept close connection 
between law and ideology or law and society. However, as a closer analysis of 
scholarly writings and the recent legislative developments undertaken above 
exemplify this shift or complexity in scholarship, though claimed as paradigmatic 
shift by some feminist scholars, does not mean challenging, in any fundamental 
way, the framework for social change which came into existence during the colonial 
rule. In recent scholarship too, the causes of oppression of women and the means to 
deal with the diagnosed causes is the same as was suggested by the colonial rulers. 
 
In other words, in recent scholarship too, scholars attempt to take a pro-plurality or 
anti-colonial stance, does not mean in any way challenging the dominant 
presumptions: that indigenous traditions in India, which lay great importance on the 
institutions of marriage and family are sources of oppression of women and that 
empowerment of women in the traditional societies like India, can be possible only 
by eradicating influence of traditions from all spheres of life through instrument of 
the State and the Law. The new phase in feminist scholarship, despite great rhetoric, 
is not about challenging the binary opposition of backward traditions v progressive 
modernity. The new phase is not about challenging the series of binary oppositions, 
family v individual, sacrament v contract, rights v duty, custom v law, which have 
been used since colonial era label traditions as backward, non-progressive and static. 
Much like colonial rulers and the earlier streams of women´s rights scholarships, the 
scholars in recent streams find no reason to question the presumption that any 
improvement in situation of women in India is possible only by seeking a rupture 
																																								 																				
581 Sanjukta Ghosh, “Feminism in India,” Dissent Magazine, (2007), 
 https://www.dissentmagazine.org/democratiya_article/feminism-in-india; Chaudhuri, Feminism 
in India. 
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from the ‘past’582- only by making a transition from tradition to modernity. Despite 
much critique of liberal legalism and liberal feminism, there is not much doubt for 
feminist scholarship in India that law has to ensure that women can also emerge as 
‘independent, autonomous individuals’ who much like men, are in a position of 
imposing their desires on the world. 583 
 
The recent shift in the women´s rights discourses is not about going beyond the 
partial and distorted understandings of ancient, indigenous traditions and making 
efforts for nuanced understanding of indigenous traditions in India to rethink 
relationship between law and traditions in India. The complexity in recent works is 
also not result of the efforts to explore ways for the State and the legal system to 
protect rights of women while being sensitive to cultural diversity in India. Instead, 
as a result of scholars’ reluctance to go beyond colonial era presumptions, there is a 
situation, as the example of the 2005 Act demonstrates, where far from enjoying 
better rights in changed social and economic circumstances, women are deprived 
even of those rights which were available even in a very traditional, male-
dominated, social system. Far from having new ways to deal with plurality what we 
have is: a crisis like situation and which most pronounced in the field of family law. 
There is a situation of crisis because on one hand women’s rights scholarship must 
work towards establishing the need for seeking transition towards modernity. On 
other hand it must maintain the appearance of sensitivity towards cultural and 
religious diversity, while being fully aware that India, like in many Asian and 
African cultures, consists mainly of those cultural groups where family remains 
basic unit in society, where division of life spheres into secular or religious or 
																																								 																				
582  For insightful discussion on “Break from past” as a specific feature of modernity and forms of 
knowledge emerging from sixteenth century onwards see Santos, Toward a New Common Sense. 
Offering an insightful critique Santos states, 
 The new scientific rationality, being a global model, is also a totalitarian model, in as much as it 
denies rationality to all forms of knowledge that do not abide by its own epistemological 
principles and its own methodological rules. Such is the main feature of the new paradigm, the 
feature that best symbolizes its break with the preceding scientific paradigms. It is clearly 
defined in Copernicus’ heliocentric theory of the movement of planets, in Kepler’s laws on the 
planet’s orbits, in Galileo’s laws on the gravity of bodies, in Newton’s great cosmic synthesis, 
and lastly, in the philosophical consciousness that Bacon and Descartes confer upon the findings 
of the previous scientists. The idea of being witness to a fundamental break with the past and to a 
new and exclusive form of true knowledge is evident in the protagonists’ attitudes. (At p. 12)  
583  West, “The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives.” 
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relegation of religion to a private sphere or separation between law and culture or 
law and religion are alien ideas emerging from foreign worldviews.  Given 
reluctance of scholars to question its antagonism towards indigenous traditions and 
in absence of alternative ways available to conceptualise notions of law, rights and 
women’s empowerment, the only option available for scholars is to develop a 
disguise- a disguise for perpetuating antagonism towards traditions and for paying 
lip service to the cause of cultural diversity. Consequence is a situation of crisis 
because on the one hand, due to important changes in legal feminism in the west, it 
is no longer possible to adhere to same simplistic framework that was used by 
scholars in pre-1990s phase. On the other hand there has not emerged on horizon 
any other alternative framework which makes protection of rights of women 
possible without seeking eradication of cultures through instrument of law.584 
 
4.6 Post-1990s Framework: An Instance of Increasing Politicisation of 
Rights to Women 
Women’s movement in India having its roots in legal reforms of 18th century is 
nearly two centuries old now. Having nurtured a close relationship with law this 
movement has many legislative victories to its credit- the legislations which touch 
almost every sphere of women’s lives- be that the sphere of personal relationships or 
the formal sphere of work and public interactions.  
 
However, unfortunately, despite this intense legislative activity relating to women’s 
issues, women’s rights discourses in India, particularly scholarly discourses, right 
from its inception, have been more about politics and less about issue of women’s 
rights per se.585 These discourses have been more about taking sides between the 
																																								 																				
584  Parashar and Dhanda, Redefining Family Law in India. While accepting the fact that cause of 
women’s rights in India require some culture specific solutions Dhanda and Parashar state, 
 Family law theory produced in the Euro-American universities is the context in which Indian 
legal scholars must develop their ideas. (At p. 8) 
585  One of the most recent example and evidence of polticisation of women’s rights in India is the 
way the on-going debate on the issue of a customary form of divorce among muslims, popularly 
known as ‘triple talaq’ is being conducted. Triple Talaq, is one of the customary forms of 
divorce practiced among Muslims. It is a form which gives unilateral right to men to dissolve 
marriage, by pronouncing talaq (literal meaning divorce) three times. Seen as an easy way out of 
the marital and family responsibilities for men, triple talaq has been under attack from all 
sections of society as a highly derogatory, anti-women practice, which gives unwarranted power 
to men to throw women out of marriage. This customary form of divorce and the practice of 
Rethinking the Relationship between Law, Gender Justice and Traditions in India: From Hostility to Harmony	
229 
polarised binaries of backward east v progressive west and less about the real 
concern for protecting rights of women in diverse cultural and religious communities 
in India. Women’s rights scholarship in India has not been concerned about 
protecting rights of women in diverse traditions which have nurtured worldviews 
different from that which came to be introduced in India as a result of colonial rule 
under the broad rubrics of ‘modernity’.   
 
Indeed during last few years there has emerged extensive scholarship where scholars 
have taken account of the fact that issue of women’s rights in India has been more a 
matter of political contestation between dominant and powerful political groups. In 
fact during past few decades there has emerged a separate stream of studies, named 
post-colonial studies, where one of the major concerns for scholars is to highlight 
how the issues relating to women’s rights came to be exploited by colonial rulers as 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
polygamy amongst Muslims have always been on reform agenda of those concerned with social 
change and women’s empowerment in India. While both practices have kept surfacing in Indian 
socio-legal discourses time and again, often to reinforce demand for Uniform Civil Code and 
abolition of personal laws, abolition of triple talaq has emerged as a central issue since the Apex 
Court of India took suo moto cognizance of the issue- whether to deny legal recognition to 
practice of triple talaq or not? See Prakash and Ors. v. Phulvati and Ors., 2 Supreme Court Cases 
36 (Supreme Court 2016). 
 Given the fact that over the years triple talaq has come to be associated with Muslim identity in 
India, abolition of this practice has taken a hugely political and communal overtones. It is true 
that the issue of triple talaq has been politicized unwarrantedly by political parties in India. It can 
also be accepted that ‘women suffer not so much from divorce as more from economic 
disempowerment’. Malavika Rajkotia, “The Case Against Abolitionists,” The Indian Express, 
June 2, 2017, http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/triple-talaq-muslim-women-the-
case-against-abolitionists-4684993/. However, despite above, what is problematic is 
politicization of this issue even by renowned academicians family law scholars like that of Flavia 
Agnes. See Flavia Agnes, “Let’s Talk about Women’s Rights,” http://www.asianage.com/, May 
23, 2017, http://www.asianage.com/opinion/oped/230517/lets-talk-about-womens-rights.html. In 
this piece, Agnes, undoubtedly, expresses a very valid concern as she mentions that the issue of 
triple talaq should not be used to wage war against customs and customary practices in general 
or to perpetuate the colonial legacy of labeling customs as backward and oppressive. However, 
her concern for customs does not in any way challenge the binaries of sacrament v contract or 
status v contract. Agnes strangely enough defends practice of triple talaq as according to her this 
practice is a sign or progressiveness of Islam which endorsed the idea of ‘marriage as contract’ in 
contrast to other religions, which supported the idea of marriage as sacrament, and therefore, are 
to be seen as backward.  According to Agnes, triple talaq, “a practice which gives unilateral right 
to divorce or concept of dissoluble contractual marriage is contribution of Islamic law to the 
world.” Also, Agnes feels shocked that there is a section of feminists, who despite being secular 
feminists consider marriage as a status and not merely a contractual obligation. For another 
recent example of continuing politicization of the issue of women’s rights see “In the Name of 
Women.” While criticising the ruling BJP, the political party in power at the center, for 
highlighting the issue of ‘triple talaq’ prevalent amongst muslims, the editorial mentions, 
 As for gender equality, the status of women within Hindu society is hardly something to be 
proud of even as these men bemoan the conditions of Muslim women. 
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well as by indigenous elite to further their own commercial and political interests. 
Much of what was considered panacea for progress and a gift of the progressive 
Western civilisation to backward eastern traditions has come under challenge. There 
exists now rich interdisciplinary literature where one of the main engagements of 
scholars has been to deconstruct superiority claims of enlightenment philosophy, 
rule of law and rights discourse which were used by colonial rulers to establish 
degenerate nature of Indian society and to justify and perpetuate imperialism. Also 
under attack are binaries of tradition v modernity or east v west which were central 
to social change discourses during colonial rule.  
 
Yet, what is problematic is that the above realisation amongst contemporary 
scholars, particularly amongst women’s rights scholars, about politicisation of 
women’s rights issues has not prevented it’s politicisation further. On the contrary, 
with certain kind of political developments in India from 1990s onwards586, the 
situation has worsened. What we have is much crass politicisation of issue of 
women’s rights. There has emerged on the horizon a new binary of Hindu majority v 
Muslim minority, where all that was considered panacea for progress is now to be 
considered a tool in the hands of dominant Hindu majority to harass the Muslim 
minority.587 There is no change in the ‘context of civilisational encounter’ which, as 
many scholars argue, offered fertile ground for politicisation of women’s issues 
during colonial rule. Contemporary discourses make it mandatory to reject traditions 
																																								 																				
586  For a comprehensive account of changed political scenario and its influence on women’s rights 
see Gopika Solanki, Adjudication in Religious Family Laws: Cultural Accommodation, Legal 
Pluralism, and Gender Equality in India (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
587  Menon, “It Isn’t about Women.” Menon writes, 
 A Uniform Civil Code is meant to discipline Muslims, teach them (if they didn’t know it already) 
that they are second-class citizens, and that they live at the mercy of “the national race” (the 
Hindus), as M.S. Golwalkar decreed. 
 Also see Choudhury, “(Mis)Appropriated Liberty.” Choudhury writes,  
 Until the state is no longer a major site of oppression for all Muslims, until Muslim women's 
particular experience at the intersection of gender and religion is taken seriously by dominant 
women's groups, and until the discourse of women's rights in general is reclaimed from the 
Hindu Right, the efforts of Muslim women to enact reforms within their own communities and to 
foster dialogue with secular feminist groups are the most effective ways to change their lived 
experience. (p. 110,111) 
 Also see Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, The Scandal of the State: Women, Law, and Citizenship in 
Postcolonial India (Duke University Press, 2003); Kapur, “The Fundamentalist Face of 
Secularism and Its Impact on Women’s Rights in India.” 
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or take a stand against traditions in order to support the cause of women’s rights. 
There hasn’t emerged any framework to reconceptualise antagonistic relationship 
between law, women’s rights and traditions- wherein it can be possible to use legal 
means to endorse both the causes: the cause of women’s rights and the cause of 
protection of cultural diversity.  As a result what we have is a feminist scholarship 
which produces a situation where support to tradition means rejection of idea of 
women’s empowerment. This leads feminist scholarship into a situation of self-
contradiction. It results into a situation where feminist scholarship is neither able to 
serve the cause of gender justice nor of cultural diversity. As a human rights scholar 
cautioned years ago, in absence of efforts to understand non-western worldviews the 
only option for rights scholars is to declare as anti-feminist Asian and African 
societies.588 
 
And the consequence of this much polarised binary debate is that there hasn’t 
emerged any rational framework for offering legal protection to large numbers of 
women for whom dream of modernity is not realisable and who have been deprived 
of the protection of traditions. Not having made efforts to overcome its antagonism 
towards traditions women’s movement has done the disservice of denying even the 
protection available under the tradition where no new legal remedy is forthcoming. 
The consequence is that for a large number of women on one hand the rights 
available under the tradition are denied and on the other hand new rights through 
legal means are either not available or where they are available they can be claimed 
																																								 																				
588  Sinha, “Human Rights.” Cautioning against such an approach Sinha stated, 
 It is necessary to move forward, and that movement forward cannot be accomplished on the basis 
of the present single-catalog approach. Insisting upon this catalog, with its subsumptions of 
individualism, rights, and legalism, as the only possible means of human emancipation, leads us 
to two possible alternatives. One, we must ignore social order which are not based on 
individualism, rights and legalism. Two, we must force this conception of social order upon 
societies which are conceived differently. The first alternative has two consequences. On the one 
hand, it keeps most of the humanity outside its scope so that it really is incapable of relating to 
the peoples of the non-western social orders discussed above. On the other hand, and conversely, 
by its inability to relate to these societies it enlarges the scope of injustice inflicted by their 
governments upon their peoples. The second alternative of enforcing the individualist-rightist-
legalist conception of social order on the societies which have not cast in this mold is, in the first 
place, impossible.................. What is required is a redefinition of the problem of human rights 
which would focus not so much upon a particular way of human emancipation but at the very 
issue of that emancipation, recognizing the fact that there are more than one way of achieving 
such emancipation. It is, therefore, necessary to separate the concept of human rights from any 
particular catalog thereof. What is universal is the former, not the latter. (At p. 89-90) 
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only through a heavy cost- the cost of taking stand against one’s own traditions and 
that too in the situations where it may not be necessary at all.  
 
Can there be a way out of this situation? Can it be possible to talk about rights of 
women without taking sides between tradition and modernity or without expecting 
law to eradicate influence of traditions and religion? Can it possible to use legal 
means for dealing with menace of certain practices prevalent in some communities 
without taking sides between tradition and modernity? 
The next chapter aims to explore answers to above questions. It aims to address the 
issue of antagonism between women’s movement and indigenous traditions- the root 
cause which has been responsible for politicisation of issue of women’s rights since 
colonial era.  
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion  
Rethinking Relation between Law, Gender Justice and 
Traditions: Some Essential Steps 
 
The relationship between culture and rights has been one of the most contentious 
issues for socio-legal scholarship in all parts of the world since advent of colonial 
era. One of the primary concerns of scholars and activists has been to find ways to 
ensure protection of rights of individuals in non-western societies while being 
sensitive to cultural diversity. During last few decades there have also emerged 
important insights from different disciplines, which underscore the fact that cause of 
women’s rights anywhere in the world requires rethinking opposition between 
culture and rights.589 While this shift in scholarly approach towards cultural diversity 
at the international level should have been a positive sign, the unfortunate situation 
is that in the Indian context, influence of critical theory and recent changes in 
women’s rights scholarship, far from being beneficial, is becoming a reason for 
denial of rights to women. Scholars’ efforts to incorporate insights of critical theory 
in Indian debates, has led women’s rights scholarship to a situation of crisis. In 
matters relating to family there is a situation of crisis because on the one hand 
women’s empowerment can no longer be linked to transferring complete control of 
regulation of marriages and family to the State. On the other hand there hasn’t 
emerged any alternative to transferring complete control to the State in regulation of 
family matters. This chapter aims to explore ways to address the above-mentioned 
situation of crisis. It aims to understand the reasons why scholars’ changing 
expectations from law to be sensitive towards differences between women, far from 
being beneficial, is turning out to be a cause of denial of rights of women. It makes 
an attempt to understand if it can be possible to go beyond the opposition between 
tradition and modernity or culture and rights. 
 
																																								 																				
589  Supra chapter 1, section 1.3 
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This chapter aims to explore the possibilities to address the hostility towards 
traditions in India, which has been and which continues to dominate socio-legal 
discourses. Aiming to explore ways to transcend opposition between culture and 
rights it argues that roots of the crisis lie in scholars’ reluctance to go beyond the 
colonial presumptions about non-western societies and also about relationship 
between law, cultural diversity and progress.590 It further argues that reasons for 
crisis can also be traced to the fact that socio-legal discourses in India continue to 
ignore the long-standing anthropological insights which highlighted (i) that 
enlightenment philosophy, rule of law and rights discourses are culture specific 
developments rooted in specific developments in the West591 and (ii) that attempts to 
impose these developments on the non-western societies not only amounts to 
cultural imperialism or ethnocentrism592 but is also counter-productive for the cause 
																																								 																				
590  Griffiths, “What Is Legal Pluralism?” Questioning the opposition between western law as 
progressive and non-western law as primitive Griffiths wrote, 
 The theory of law in ‘primitive’ society has also suffered indirectly, by way of ‘false 
comparisons’ with the idealized picture of law in ‘modern’ society. (At p. 4)  
 For discussions on used of biased presumptions non-western countries in the United States see 
Michelle A. McKinley, “Cultural Culprits,” Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice 24, no. 2 
(2009): 91. Mckinley states, 
 The invocation of "culture" as a "cracking factor" or as a justification for criminal behavior in 
U.S. courtrooms reinforces an already widely held assumption about the incommensurability of 
gender equality and non-western cultures--i.e., that non-western cultures are inherently more 
sexist, brutal, illiberal, and intolerant--and that these attitudes and practices are better left behind 
in the "old country" than in the land of the free. Thus, as an initial step, the ideas of culture 
should be challenged. Culture is wielded in the courtroom as a monolithic, explicable construct 
that motivates people to "crack"--or act in certain ways. Unlike religion, or the even more 
ephemeral "values" which have achieved an a priori level of questioning as a means of 
explaining behavior, culture is fixed. (At p. 96-97) 
591  For a detailed discussion on culture specific roots of enlightenment philosophy as it emerged in 
18th-19th century Europe see American Anthropological Association The Executive Board, 
“Statement on Human Rights,” American Anthropologist 49, no. 4 (1947): 539–43; Jack 
Donnelly, The Concept of Human Rights (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985). Richard 
Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979), Charles Taylor, Sources of Self: The Making of the Modern Identity 
(USA: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
592  John Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age 
(London; New York: Routledge, 1995);  Santos, Toward a New Common Sense. Offering a 
critique to the concept of autonomy Santos writes 
 As a matter of fact, under the welfare state, the horizontal political obligation was transformed 
into a double vertical obligation between the taxpayers and the state and between welfare clients 
and the state. In this way, the exercise of autonomy presupposed by the principle of community 
was transformed into an exercise of dependence on the state. (At p. 78) 
 Also see Zygmunt Bauman, In Search of Politics, 1 edition (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University 
Press, 1999). 
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of women’s rights.593 Root of the problem lies in ignorance towards the repeated 
reminders given by the anthropologists about western nature of human rights 
discourse and its limitations for non-western societies. It is result of continuing 
reluctance in making efforts to look for the different ways available in different 
cultures for protection of human dignity. 
 
5.1  Need for Looking Beyond the Category- ‘Non-Western Traditions’ 
Rooted in increasing dominance of enlightenment philosophy594 the main reason for 
denigration of non-western traditions lies in the way we understand the distinction 
between tradition and modernity. Denigration of cultures is based on the 
understandings that it is only and only modernity which could save human beings 
and humanity from the tyranny of religion and customs, from arbitrariness and 
oppression prevalent in non-western traditions. Enlightenment philosophy, 
modernity, rule of law, human rights, on the other hand, have been about promise of 
‘emancipation through reason and law’.595 Traditions, non-western traditions in 
particular, scholarly discourses continue to propagate, have been about suppression 
of human will, subjection to what is ‘given’, given by the God or by those as 
powerful as God! 
 
Modernity is believed to have been able to save human beings because it’s unique 
characteristics: concern for human dignity; possibilities for realisation of full human 
potential, for exercise of human agency and freedom to choose one’s own way of 
life. An unquestionable scholarly assumption seems to be that it is only and only 
enlightenment era and the associated elements of the human rights and rule of law 
																																								 																				
593  Sinha, “Human Rights.” One of the most important proponents of this view in recent years is 
Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context. Also see Ved P. Nanda and Surya Prakash 
Sinha, eds., Hindu Law and Legal Theory, International Library of Essays in Law and Legal 
Theory (England: Dartmouth, 1996). 
594  For detailed and critical discussions on enlightenment philosophy and its increasing influence in 
the West see Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Oxford; Portland, Or: Hart Publishing, 
2000); also Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake; Santos, Toward a New Common Sense. 
595  Douzinas, The End of Human Rights. (At p. 2) Douzinas states 
 Western self-understanding has been dominated by the idea of historical progress through reason. 
Emancipation means for the moderns the progressive abandonment of myth and prejudice in all 
areas of life and their replacement by reason. In terms of political organization, liberation means 
the subjection of power to the reason of law. (At p. 5) 
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discourses which have allowed human beings to be fully human.596 It is modernity 
which has allowed each human being to be an end in himself or herself instead of 
being only a means for maintaining some Higher Order or peace and harmony in 
society, as human beings have always been presumed to be in the non-west and also 
in the pre-modern West.597 It is only with advent of enlightenment era and 
modernity, it has been believed, it became possible to bring to forefront the idea of 
distinctiveness of human beings vis-à-vis other elements in the Universe- in being 
endowed with faculty of reason and choice, in having potential of knowing his or her 
nature, in possessing the will and capability to act on one’s own choice based on 
reason, and acting accordingly.598 Modernity has been seen as an entity in opposition 
to traditions based on the belief that only modernity brought forth the understanding 
that every human being, endowed with the elements of human distinctness, is an 
independent, autonomous, self-sufficient being, ‘in a certain sense absolute and 
irreducible to another’, an end in himself or herself.599 Modernity was seen to be 
creating conditions for realisation of full human potential because with modernity 
emerged concepts like secularism, and a new conception of law and rights. It was 
secularism which made it possible for human beings to be governed by laws which 
were free from influence of religion and traditions. It has been modern law or the 
‘rule of law’ doctrine which could offer possibilities to conceive a society governed 
																																								 																				
596  Donnelly, The Concept of Human Rights. Explaining expectations from the a society which 
respects human rights Donnelly writes, 
 The underlying moral vision of human nature, if expressed and implemented in form of human 
rights, will actually create the envisioned person, so long as it lies within the psycho-biological 
and social limits of human possibility. Thus human rights represent a special sort of self-
fulfilling prophecy and provide a plan for the construction of a political regime in which a truly 
human being can lead a life of dignity, developing and expressing the moral possibilities of 
human nature. (At p. 2)  
 Also see Douzinas, The End of Human Rights. 
597  Madhavi Sunder, “Piercing the Veil,” The Yale Law Journal 112, no. 6 (2003): 1399–1472. 
Sunder argues 
 religion qua religion is less the problem than is our traditional legal construction of this category. 
Premised on a centuries-old, Enlightenment compromise that justified reason in the public sphere 
by allowing deference to religious despotism in the private, human rights law continues to define 
religion in the twenty-first century as a sovereign, extralegal jurisdiction in which inequality is 
not only accepted, but expected. Law views religion as natural, irrational, incontestable, and 
imposed--in contrast to the public sphere, the only viable space for freedom and reason. Simply 
put, religion is the “other” of international law. 
598  Pannikar, “Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?” 
599  Douzinas, The End of Human Rights. 
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by rational, objective and neutral principles and rules which could ensure freedom 
from arbitrariness and also from the demands of passive submission to customary or 
religious laws. It is rule of law and human rights doctrine which has made it possible 
for an individual to be a human being irrespective of sex, status, role, or position in 
society, which made it possible for an individual to be an autonomous being, 
governed by one’s own free will, free from all kinds of constraints, religious, moral 
or customary. Only with human rights doctrine it could become possible to move 
towards a society, where every human being could emerge as a ‘moral sovereign 
agent’.600  
 
While anthropologists have been highlighting ethnocentrism and cultural 
imperialism inherent in enlightenment philosophy since colonial era, with increasing 
influence of critical theory in recent decades many of the above claims of 
enlightenment philosophy and modernity are under serious challenge.601 As this 
study has shown, the above challenge has also resulted in emergence of a new phase 
in socio-legal scholarship in India.602 However, there is a lot that has remained 
unchanged when it comes to the understandings about non-western traditions. As 
our focus on women’s rights scholarship in India has also shown there are not too 
																																								 																				
600  ibid. Offering a critique of liberal philosophy and its assumptions of a human being as a ‘pre-
moral’ entity, as autonomous and self-disciplining subject, Douzinas note, 
 We are left with a notion of the human subject as a sovereign agent of choice, a creature whose 
ends are chosen rather than given, who comes by his aims and purposes by acts of will, as 
opposed, say, to acts of cognition. (At p. 4-5) 
601  ibid. Douzinas note, 
 Unfortunately political philosophy has abandoned its classical vocation of exploring the theory 
and history of the good society and has gradually deteriorated into behavioural political science 
and the doctrinaire jurisprudence of rights. (At p. 6) 
 Also see Rouland, Legal Anthropology. Rouland expresses similar view as he describes the 
difference between the modern law (or western law) and traditional understanding of law as 
follows: 
 Modern law does not regard truth as a value of fundamental importance, since the main thrust of 
law is to protect citizens against actions which threaten their rights. Also, as we all know, 
traditional societies tend to determine what is just by referring to a model of behavior rather than 
to a prevailing norm. In addition, modern societies, closely associate the principle of justice with 
coercive sanction, to which our symbols of sword and scales so eloquently testify. The traditional 
jurist is concerned more with discovering and instilling truth and justice than with using 
sanctions, and such sanctions as are in fact exercised assume the form of non-jurisdictional 
procedures. (At p. 115)  
 For a detailed discussion Supra chapter 1 
602  Supra chapter three 
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many efforts in scholarly writings concerned about social change in India to 
challenge the ideas: that modernity is about human beings, about importance to 
human agency and possibilities to exercise faculty of choice for determining one’s 
own way of life; whereas traditions and religions, are believed to be about concern 
for family, community, social order or the Higher Order and not for individual well-
being, individual growth or autonomy.603 There are also not many challenges to the 
presumptions that there is no role of human agency or no possibilities for exercise of 
faculty of choice in traditions or religions in India, specifically in Hindu traditions.604  
It is true that in Indian discourses there has been strong presence of a stream of 
scholars who have offered support to traditions.605 Such works have challenged the 
label of backward or non-progressive for societies which give more importance to 
the institutions of family and marriage or which reject the idea of ‘legal rights’ as the 
only basis for organization of relations between individuals. Challenge has also been 
made to the practice of equating progressiveness with those societies which consider 
individual and not the family as basic unit in society or where marriage is treated as 
a contract and not a sacrament. However, support to traditions has neither meant 
challenging the binary of religious v secular nor has it been about challenging the 
understanding of dharma as a set of norms received from Heaven. Even those who 
stand in favour of traditions have accepted unquestioningly that religions and 
traditions are concerned more about the sustenance of whole humanity and a Higher 
Order and not so much about well-being and autonomy of the individuals. And the 
West, the belief has been, is about giving more importance to individual autonomy, 
to individual growth and well-being and to individual (human) desires and not to the 
well being of the humanity or maintenance of harmony and peace in society. Far 
																																								 																				
603  Supra chapter 4. 
604  For endorsing the colonial era divide between tradition and modernity see Harold G. Coward, 
“India’ Constitution and Traditional Presuppositions Regarding Human Nature,” in Religion and 
Law in Independent India, ed. Robert D. Baird (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1993), 23–39. 
Coward sees a fundamental clash between Hindu religion and Indian Constitution. In the former, 
Coward argues, inequality is a fundamental tenet whereas the latter, as a British legacy is seen to 
be promoting equality. Coward dwells in to basic tenets of Hindu religion to establish that it 
endorses inequality, however, there is not much discussion on the concept of equality embodied 
in the Constitution.  
605  Jois, Ancient Indian Law: Ancient Values in Manusmriti. Also, Altekar, The Position of Women 
in Hindu Civilization. For a strong critique of this approach see Menski, Hindu Law. ; also 
Werner Menski, “Hindu Law as a ‘Religious System,’” in Religion, Law and Tradition, ed. 
Andrew Huxley (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 108–26; Nandy, The Intimate Enemy. 
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from challenging the above way of understanding distinction between the East and 
the West, in many such writings supporting traditions lack of concern for individual 
has been a reason to claim higher moral ground for non-western traditions, 
especially Hindu traditions.  
 
In such works concern for non-western traditions has not meant refuting the 
wrongful colonial era assumption that importance to institutions of marriage and 
family means denial of what are perceived as individualistic rights to women, such 
as right to divorce, right to separate residence and maintenance, right to own 
property etc. Even for those scholars who challenge the ‘western idea of 
progressiveness’ there aren’t many efforts to challenge the presumption that right of 
divorce or right to property for women is an idea alien to the cultures, like Hindu 
cultures, which nurture the idea of marriage as sacrament or where marriage and 
family are considered as sacred institutions.606 Moreover, most these works are more 
than willing to  
 
Most scholars endorse the presumption that there is no role of human agency or no 
place for exercise of faculty of choice in Hindu traditions since the greater concern 
here is sustenance of whole humanity and a Higher Order, contrary to the West 
where individual (human) desires are given more importance instead of overall well 
being of the humanity.607 Scholars simply want to defend the idea that there is no 
possibility of divorce particularly for women since marriage here is a sacrament, an 
indissoluble union, meant for the well-being of society, instead of being a contract, 
dissoluble merely at the will of individuals. Without making any challenge to the 
idea that Hindu tradition curtails rights of women or restricts their role to that of 
wives and mothers or that sexual and moral subordination of women is integral to 
Hindu tradition, a trend in Indian socio-legal discourses has been to endorse the 
presumption that various individualistic rights are alien to Hindu traditions. Most 
scholarly works far from challenging the above idea merely offer explanations such 
																																								 																				
606  Monmayee Basu, Hindu Women and Marriage Law: From Sacrament to Contract (Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
607  Jois, Ancient Indian Law: Ancient Values in Manusmriti. (At p. 131) 
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as great concern for stability of family or sanctity of marriage as reasons for 
curtailing rights of women.  
 
It is true that in recent years, as this study has highlighted, women’s rights scholars 
in India have come to challenge the divine basis of personal laws.608 Scholars have 
also taken cognizance of the fact that personal laws, such as Hindu laws and Muslim 
laws are inherently plural entities. Some scholars have come to challenge the 
practice of reducing personal laws to a set of norms received from Heaven. There is 
also a strong challenge to the practice of privileging scriptures or religion based texts 
as sources of law. However, the above shift in understanding of personal laws has 
not been accompanied by any significant challenge to the colonial era idea that 
importance to dharma or religion or concern for maintenance of Higher Order 
means unconditional, passive submission to certain set of ‘given norms’ with no 
possibility for exercise of human agency by common people, especially women.609 
Furthermore, emphasis on duty in indigenous traditions continue to mean 
expectations to fulfill certain God determined obligations or duty to follow the 
orders of others, to govern one’s life according to wishes of others with no 
possibility to claim anything out of one’s own will or choice. The dominant 
presumptions in socio-legal scholarship in India remain to be: that the traditional 
societies are about imposing or seeking passive submission of individuals to pre-
determined roles and identities with no role for human agency. On the other hand, 
the West, modernity and modern societies are about liberation of individuals, about 
freedom to determine one’s own identity and choose one’s own way of life.610 
 
There is also no questioning of the presumption that granting various rights to 
women in the sphere of family- that is right to divorce, right to property, right to 
separate residence and maintenance, right to marry according to one’s own choice- 
means: (i) neutralizing influence of religion from all spheres of life; (i) changing 
nature of marriage from sacrament to contract; and (ii) having individual and not the 
																																								 																				
608  Supra chapter 3. 
609  Coward, “India’ Constitution and Traditional Presuppositions Regarding Human Nature.” 
610  A prominent example of such scholarship is: Gerald James Larson, ed., Religion and Personal 
Law in Secular India: A Call to Judgment (Bloomington and Indiana Pollis: Indiana University 
Press, 2001). 
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family as a sacred unit in society. It has not resulted into valorising traditional 
understanding of law which rejects pretensions of being based on individual will and 
on strict separation between law and religion. 
 
And, scholars and activists reluctance to go beyond the above understanding about 
traditions has given rise to a situation where endorsement of culture means denial of 
rights to women.  
 
5.2 Revisiting the Current Ways of Understanding the distinctions between 
Tradition and Modernity 
In wide range of scholarship concerned with social change, with scholars attempting 
to take different stands for or against traditions or trying to transcend this opposition, 
it has not been brought to forefront that distinctions between tradition and modernity 
is not merely about differences between two such worldviews where one accepts 
rights and other rejects it. The distinction is also not about accepting or rejecting the 
idea of individual autonomy and growth or the values equality and fairness. For 
many non-western traditions, such as Hindu traditions in India, at a deeper 
conceptual level, differences with modernity or the West is more about relating to 
different perceptions about relationship between individual and the universe.611   
 
For example, for Hindu traditions, as Menski points out in great detail, one of the 
most vital elements is the concept of cosmic order which embodies specific 
understanding about the relationship between an individual and the Universe.612  
 
For Hindu traditions, like for many non-western traditions,613 difference with 
modernity is not about whether to accept ‘distinctiveness of human beings’ vis-a-vis 
other elements in the Universe. The point of difference is also not only about 
whether a society or culture or legal system should ensure human beings freedom to 
																																								 																				
611  Menski, Hindu Law. (At pp.86-93) 
612  ibid. 
613  Chiba, Legal Pluralism. Chiba discusses in detail Japanese way of thinking, and uses the terms 
such as ‘pre-modern like’ or “amoeba-like way of thinking” for it. Challenging the opposition 
between tradition v modernity for making sense of the Japanese way of thinking Chiba argues, 
“Its character and factors cannot be labeled nor classified by such a simple dichotomy as 
‘traditional vs modern’.” (At p. 22) 
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choose one’s own identity or not. The issue is also not about whether or not to 
perceive every human being as an end in himself or herself.  For example for 
traditions embodying the concept of cosmic order differences with modernity would 
hang on some other major differences such as: whether to accept or reject the vision 
of a cosmic order where every human being is to be seen as a part of a pre-existing 
cosmic web, to which he or she is connected in myriad ways through family, caste, 
community, religion etc..614 The difference is also about whether to accept or reject 
the idea of what has come to be addressed as “humanist conception of humankind as 
a privileged site of truth”615- the idea of superiority of human beings over other 
elements in the Universe.616 The differences are also about whether to perceive 
universe as divided into distinct spheres of religious and secular or to endorse the 
ideas of universe consisting of visible and invisible spheres and that of ‘inevitable 
interconnectedness’ between these spheres.617 The concern is about establishing the 
																																								 																				
614  Menski, Hindu Law. (At p. 90) 
615  Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake; (At p. 155) 
616  For dominance of what has come to be known as “anthropocentric worldview” with the 
emergence of modernity see Santos, Toward a New Common Sense. Santos states, 
 In modern science the separation between nature and human beings is total. Nature is mere 
extension and movement; it is passive, eternal and reversible; it is a mechanism whose elements 
can be disassembled and then put together again in the form of laws; it possesses no quality or 
dignity which impedes us from unveiling its mysteries; such unveiling, furthermore, is not 
contemplative, but quite active, since it aims at knowing nature in order to dominate and control 
it. In Bacon’s words, science will make of humanity “the master and owner of nature”. (At p. 13) 
 Also see Nandy, The Intimate Enemy. Referring to wars in 21st century Nandy states 
 The drive for mastery over men is not merely a by-product of a faulty political economy but also 
of a worldview which believes in the absolute superiority of human over the nonhuman and the 
subhuman, the masculine over the feminine, the adult over the child, the historical over the 
ahistorical, and the modern or progressive over the traditional or savage…… The ancient forces 
of human greed and violence, one recognizes, have merely found a new legitimacy in 
anthropocentric doctrines of secular salvation, in the ideologies of progress, normality and hyper-
masculinity, and in theories of cumulative growth of science and technology. (At p. x) 
 Douzinas, The End of Human Rights. Drawing attention towards “anthropocentric view” 
Douzinas point out, 
 No limits can be seen to restrain humanity’s ability to assert its power over nature and 
continuously rewrite the boundaries of the world. (At p. 188) 
 Douzinas further mentions at another place, 
 Our whole anthropocentric universe has been built on the assumption that the subject is morally 
responsible for his freedom and legally liable for his actions. The law must disregard motives 
and circumstances, which introduce external determinations, in order to support the foundation 
stone of our epoch, the claim that free will is the dominant principle and the subject the master of 
his fate and the world. (At p. 240) 
617  Menski, Hindu Law, 2003. (At pp. 86-92) 
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understanding that every action as well as inaction of human beings has 
consequences not only for immediate visible spheres of family or community but 
also for invisible spheres.  For non-western cultures an important point of distinction 
with modernity, furthermore, is not about whether a human being is endowed with 
faculties of reason and choice or not. The difference, instead, is whether the distinct 
faculties of human beings- the faculties of reason and choice- are to be perceived by 
individuals as means to impart higher moral responsibility towards their 
surroundings or to exercise moral sovereignty and dominance. The issue is whether 
the distinctiveness of human beings in possessing faculties of reason and choice are 
to render every human being as a ‘being of desires’- the master of the Universe, the 
one who is in position to mould the surroundings as per his or her will or desire, in 
his or her own interest, without any requirement of reflecting on impact of his or her 
actions on the surroundings.  Or else, endowed with the above faculties every human 
being is to be perceived as an entity who understands his or her position in the web 
as only one element in the symbiotic order, the one who is endowed with a higher 
responsibility for serving the ‘interconnectedness’- to maintain the symbiotic 
balance in natural and social order.618 For non-western traditions like Hindu 
traditions, the main concern is to ensure that each human being understands his or 
her high moral responsibility in using faculty of choice and reason.619 Human 
dignity, many non-western traditions believe, lies not merely in a ‘being of desires’ 
as a self-interested being, but more so in realizing, that human beings possessed with 
faculty of reason and choice owe greater responsibility towards the cosmic web, or 
in serving the ‘interconnectedness’ that one is born in.  
 
Rejecting the idea of privileging ‘humanist conception of humankind’,620 for 
traditions in India, like for many non-western traditions, discord with modernity is 
more about resistance towards any such worldview and the normative order which 
seem to be encouraging every individual to perceive himself or herself as an 
																																								 																				
618  ibid. 
619  ibid. 
620  Douzinas, The End of Human Rights. Douzinas note, 
 Man enters the historical scene by philosophically severing his ties with family, community, 
kinship and nature and by turning his creativity and wrath against tradition and prejudice, all that 
created, nourished and protected him in the past. (At p. 187) 
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‘unencumbered being’,621 as such an independent autonomous individual, who is 
unbound by any context, relation or external authority.622 Resistance is towards the 
idea of any normative order which promotes human beings to perceive themselves 
as beings at the center of universe- a human being as sovereign being, a being of 
desires, which is superior to other animate and inanimate beings in the cosmic order. 
One of the important points of difference is about expectations in non-western 
societies from different normative orders, social, moral, religious, or even legal 
order to make individuals understand one’s position in the cosmic web and to find 
ways to ensure that every individual understands the importance of making 
contribution for sustenance of the web. The point of difference with a modern, 
western culture would be about that social order where role of the State and legal 
system is reduced merely to some tools meant for ensuring freedom for 
individuals,623 to allow individuals to impose their desires on other individuals624, 
subject to only one constraint, allowing same freedom to others. For non-western 
societies, the main concern is not about whether a society should leave individuals 
free to choose one’s own way of life or not. The main concern instead is what should 
be role of the state, the legal system, or society in facilitating growth of every 
individual.625 The concern in other words is what should be role of the state or 
																																								 																				
621  Douzinas., “The Universal man of the declarations is an unencumbered man, human, all too 
human.” (At p. 187) 
622  ibid. Highlighting the main differences even between modern and pre-modern Douzinas write, 
 While classical and medieval natural law expressed the right order of the cosmos and of human 
communities within it, an order that gave the citizen his place, time and dignity, modernity 
emancipates the human person, turns him from citizen to individual and establishes him at the 
center of social and political organization and activity. The citizen comes of age when he is 
released from traditional bonds and commitments to act as an individual, who follows his desires 
and applies his will to the natural and social world. (At p. 20) 
623  ibid. Douzinas states, 
 Unfortunately political philosophy has abandoned its classical vocation of exploring the theory 
and history of good society and has gradually deteriorated into behavioural political science and 
the doctrinaire jurisprudence of rights. (At p. 7) 
624  ibid. Douzinas write 
 When nature is no longer the standard of right, all individual desires can be turned into rights. 
From a subjective perspective, rights in postmodernity have become predications or extensions 
of self, an elaborate collection of masks the subject places on the face under the imperative to be 
authentic, “to be herself”, to follow her chosen version of identity. Rights are the legal 
recognition of individual will. (At p. 11) 
625  Derrett, A Critique of Modern Hindu Law. Writing in the decades soon after independence 
Derrett rightly described role of the State in India as he stated  
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society in guiding individual in developing one’s own identity. Should an individual 
be left on his or her own to find one’s way, to determine one’s destiny? The doubt is 
with respect to the idea- “One who is master of one’s own destiny is also responsible 
for it”!!!!626 
 
From the view point of non-western traditions, what may be problematic is the idea 
of society where only state based normative order is privileged as progressive, as 
being in favour of individuals and other social, religious or culture based normative 
orders are labeled as backward or against individuals.  
 
For a worldview which nurtures vision of interconnectedness between every 
individual and his or her surroundings, what is alien is the idea of a human being 
seeking rights to break free of this interconnectedness.627 Those traditions which 
perceive every individual as integrally connected to family or community the foreign 
element is: the idea of opposition between family or community and individual. For 
a worldview which perceives institutions of marriage and family, society, 
community etc as means for every individual’s worldly and spiritual growth, the 
foreignness lies in the assertions that family or community being constraints in one’s 
growth. What is new to such a worldview is the vision of individual existing 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
 The Hindu believes that the individual has a right to follow his chosen path to salvation, and that 
salvation is natural right of the individual. His brief appearance in this phenomenal world should 
be regulated by the State in such a way as to enable him to reach that goal, consistently with the 
right of his contemporaries to do the same by their own chosen paths. The belief is a fact, not a 
fancy. To ignore this belief is to fail to implement a moral value operative amongst Hindus. (At 
p. 37) 
 For an apt description of differences between western and non-western law also see Rouland, 
Legal Anthropology. (At p. 115) (f.n. 11) 
626  Douzinas, The End of Human Rights.  
 Modern will knows no theoretical but only empirical limits. It is the absolute power of choice, an 
indivisible sovereignty of the self. This power finds its prefect expression in decision. In making 
a decision, the self becomes an agent, an autonomous responsible subject, whose mark is found 
in his external manifestations, those actions that can be imputed on him. (At p. 190) 
 Referring to Kant Douzinas mention, 
 [Kant] wanted to show how freedom and reason are inseparable in their common concern to 
enlighten man and release him from his self-incurred tutelage, his “inability to make use of his 
understanding without direction from another”. (At p. 191) 
627  For prevalence of similar views even in the western context see Minow, “Forming Underneath 
Everything That Grows: Towards a History of Family Law.” 
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separate from or apart from family and/or community and seeking protection or 
rights against the very institution of family or marriage.628 
 
Resistance towards rights discourses is more about resisting those discourses which 
reject the very idea of human being as a part of ‘pre-existing cosmic web’ as anti-
human, as the main constraint in growth and development of individuals. It about 
rejecting the idea of rooting rights for an individual merely on the will or desire of 
the individual, and the possibility to enforce these rights through instrument of law 
as the only means for establishing relationships between individuals.629 According to 
Hindu worldviews decisions about rights and obligations are not solely dependent 
on the will of the individuals. Requirements of given reality or perceived Order also 
provide basis for such decisions. Constraints are justified when perceived to be 
necessary for maintenance of harmony in the society or the group. A person may be 
obliged to perform an action with respect to B not only for the reason that B has a 
right to it, but also because of action’s righteousness with respect to the demands of 
a given reality. Therefore importance of A’s action lies in the action’s intrinsic 
relevance as well as in the fact that its performance results in satisfaction of B’s 
entitlement.630  
																																								 																				
628  For challenge to such a vision of opposition between family and individual even in western 
context see Minow. Challenging the idea that family laws in the West have moving ahead on a 
linear path towards progressive individualism Minow writes 
 The conception of the self as a member of a family, with duties, entitlements, and commitments 
associated with this position, provides a continuous reference point for the historian of the 
family, and a counterpoint to conceptions of the historical subject as an independent person, 
standing along before the state. For individuals, in history, this conception of themselves as 
family members could be a means for innovation as particular people tried to translate new 
experiences in terms of established family roles. (At p. 867) 
629   David Lyons, “Introduction,” in Rights, ed. David Lyons (California USA: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, 1979), 1–13. Highlighting importance as well as limitations of Rights 
Lyons noted, 
 Rights go beyond mere favors and privileges. One cannot claim a right to others’ kindness, to 
their unselfish sacrifice, or to their compassionate benevolence. There are two sides to this 
important truism. Rights do not secure all that is valuable in human relations (that is, the world 
would be a much sadder place without human sympathy). But rights concern what we can 
rightfully claim. (At p. 12) 
630  Donnelly, The Concept of Human Rights. Donnelly exemplifies clearly opposition with the 
notion of rights considered appropriate for human rights discourse as he stated,   
 When A has a right to x with respect to B, B is obliged by ‘right’, and his obligation is primarily 
to a person (to A). Here the intrinsic nature of x is a secondary consideration; B’s obligation 
arises primarily from the fact that A has a right to x, and therefore is owed x (emphasis original). 
(At p. 4) 
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For non-western traditions, one of the main points of contention with rights 
discourse is: the idea of separating rights from the right or the righteousness.631 The 
objectionable part is the idea of reducing rights as a means to impose one’s desires 
on the surroundings- on the family, community and culture or to liberate oneself 
from the constraints of religions, community, family.  
 
For many non-western traditions which perceive contribution of every individual 
essential for maintenance of cosmic web, resistance to rights discourse involves 
resisting that idea of a society where possession of ‘legally enforceable right’ by a 
fellow individual is the only reason for the other individual or individuals to fulfil 
his or her duty. For Hindu worldviews, which nurture vision of cosmic order or 
social order as a form of symbiotic co-existence between individuals and other 
elements, more often than not, duty or duties pre-exists a right or rights.632 
Considering performance of one’s own duty (svadharma) as essential for 
maintaining balance in cosmic order, rights often are the claims resting with 
individuals which needs assertion and enforcement as and when there are 
disturbances or imbalances in symbiotic nature of co-existence. Rights, in other 
words, are more a means for correcting the imbalance in the symbiotic order rather 
than merely being means for fulfilment of one’s desires, interests or preferences. 
Rights could be the means to make a claim when the religions, cultures, 
communities, or families become unreasonable obstructions in one’s search of 
identity.  
 
																																								 																				
631  For a discussion on the issue see Douzinas, The End of Human Rights. Douzinas state 
 The replacement of the idea of a right according to nature by natural and human rights which, as 
attributes of the subject, are individual and subjective and can hardly establish a strong 
community. A society based on rights does not recognize duties; it acknowledges only 
responsibilities arising from the reciprocal nature of rights in the form of limits on rights for the 
protection of rights of others. (At p. 10) 
 Douzinas further state at another place in his work, 
 A rights based legal system, places the subject at the centre and reflects and enforces his powers, 
faculties or desires. Right is a public capacity given to the individual to allow him to attain his 
private objects of desire. These subjective capacities have no inherent limitation and it is only 
when they come across the same rights of others that boundaries are erected. (At p. 241) 
632  Supra chapter 2 
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For many non-western cultures challenge to human rights discourse may be more 
about rejecting or questioning that worldview which encourages every individual to 
perceive marriage, family, community, society, religion as nothing more than 
arbitrary and oppressive external constraints on will of the individual, as mere 
obstructions in exercise of autonomy by every individual, or as mere obstacles in 
growth and development of individuals. For a worldview which perceives every 
individual interconnected with its surroundings in myriad ways to visible and 
invisible spheres, which perceives institutions of marriage and family, society, 
community etc as means for every individual’s worldly and spiritual growth, or as 
ways to serve the ‘interconnectedness’ what is highly objectionable are the 
assertions of family or community or other relations being sources of sexual, moral 
or economic oppression of women or family or community being constraints in 
one’s growth. What is foreign for such a presumably ‘traditional’ worldview is the 
vision of individual existing separate from or apart from family and/or community 
and seeking protection against the very institution of family or marriage.633 
Moreover, for a world view which promotes atmanastushti634- satisfaction of 
individual conscience as one of the important sources of dharma and encourages 
every individual to discover his or her own way to contribute to the 
interconnectedness, what is foreign is the assertion that there is no scope for exercise 
of human agency in Hindu traditions. For a worldview which considers contribution 
of each and every element essential for sustenance of cosmic order, as much as for 
the social order, what are foreign are not the ideas of autonomy or individuality of 
human beings. Instead, the primary concern for most cultures is to ensure that every 
human being finds ways to develop one’s individuality not by seeking separation 
																																								 																				
633  For applicability of such ideals also in western context too see Minow, “Forming Underneath 
Everything That Grows: Towards a History of Family Law.” Minow mentions,  
 The content of women's struggles—the search for a new ethos of social responsibility—suggests 
a counterweight to the story of increasingly autonomous individualism suggested by the 
traditional history of family law. Women acting through their claim to domestic virtue sought to 
inject family values—both with caretaking and moral reform elements—into law. Perhaps their 
efforts constructed a vantage point for criticizing autonomous individualism. If the formal family 
law that emerged bore too great a concern for family members as separate individuals, and was 
too little concerned with issues of social connection between family members and others, 
women's organizations addressed human needs and interdependence, and sought to connect the 
vulnerable with the strong. (At p. 882) 
634  Supra chapter two 
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from the community or family. The aspiration is to ensure that every individual finds 
opportunity to develop individuality while being part of ‘interconnectedness’. In 
name of modernization, what is problematic is an highly individualized, 
impoverished society where every individual is seen to have only two duties- duty 
towards one’s own self and duty towards state- duty towards one’s own self635- to 
protect one’s own interests and duty towards state because the state promises safety, 
security, privacy to protect those interests.  
 
Also, what may appear as resistance to the State and formal legal system, is not so 
much resistance to a new concept of law or to a concept of law which embodies idea 
of equality, liberty and human dignity. From the stand point of non-western 
societies, what may be problematic would be idea of society which has state based 
adversarial legal system as the only system for resolution of disputes between 
people.636 What is further problematic is idea of a society where state and its legal 
system consider community’s concern for maintaining Order as backward and 
oppressive. What is problematic is idea of society governed, regulated or controlled 
by only one set of norms arising from the State and where all other normative 
systems, social, cultural or religious are to be seen as anti-individual, anti-women 
and oppressive.637   
 
																																								 																				
635  Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India.  
636  For a detailed discussion on this issue see Kalindi Kokal, “Renditions of Balance: (Unspoken) 
Dialogues with State Law in Dispute Processing in Rural India” (Martin Luther Universitat, 
2017) ; Also Solanki, Adjudication in Religious Family Laws.; Nidhi Gupta, “Shariat Courts- 
Institutions with Laudable Objectives and Illegal Decisions,” Supreme Court Cases (Journal 
Section) 7 (2014): 28–34. 
637  Estin, “Unofficial Family Law.” Arguing in favour of ‘multulayered normative orders’ Estin 
states, 
 There are important reasons to facilitate multicultural accommodation in family law. All 
individuals are embedded in families and communities, which are important to their stability, 
happiness, and to the successful nurture of the next generation. A multilayered approach to 
family regulation builds on the notion that many families have a complex identity and 
experience, shaped and defined by many different cultural, legal, and political ties. It supports a 
richer notion of citizenship in which individuals are understood not only in terms of their 
relationship to the state, but also as members of families and religious communities. (At p. 452) 
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5.3 Sensitivity towards Indigenous Traditions: Implications for Rights 
Discourses in India 
Sensitivity towards non-western traditions is an important requirement for rights and 
legal discourses in all parts of the world. However, this requirement, as the above 
discussion has highlighted, is not about accepting or rejecting the ideas of women’s 
empowerment and ‘social change’. Sensitivity towards non-western traditions, may, 
in contrast, mean questioning meanings of the above terms. For non-western 
traditions resistance to women’s rights discourses is not about rejecting the idea of 
women’s dignity or relevance of humanistic values for women. Nor does it may 
always mean giving up efforts for legal reforms which address various cultural and 
religion based practices, which may be turning out to be oppressive for women. This 
resistance is not merely a resistance to the idea of ensuring range of legal rights to 
women for their economic empowerment or to protect women from abuse and 
violence in and outside family or to ensure women livelihood outside the sphere of 
family. Instead, resistance to human rights or women’s rights discourses mean 
questioning or rejecting those discourses for legal reforms to grant rights to women, 
which carry the pretension of arising from a legal system which embodies strict 
separation between religion or culture and law. Moreover, it may be resistance to 
those discourses, where every instance of legal reform, which grants rights to 
women, is used as an opportunity to establish ‘anti-women nature’ of religions or 
indigenous traditions, of the institutions of marriage and family and to show 
prevalence of customary laws or influence of religion and traditions on law as signs 
of backwardness.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, resistance to rights discourse involves 
questioning that limited idea which restricts women’s empowerment to a society 
where individual is seen to have only two duties, towards oneself and towards State. 
It is also about rejecting feminists’ vision of an empowered woman as one who 
protects individual autonomy by seeking rights against the family, community or 
society in favour of a vision which perceives empowered woman as one who is 
interconnected in a myriad ways with self and with family, community, religion, 
region, state and nation and who seeks rights to serve this interconnectedness, albeit 
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in one’s own way. The debate between indigenous traditions and women’s 
movement has also been about resisting those feminists ideas which consider 
traditional institutions of marriage and family as sites of oppression in favour of 
those ideas which consider these traditional institutions as means of individual 
growth. 
 
Women’s rights discourse which can be considered sensitive to Hindu traditions 
would be those discourses which uphold idea of a society where individual, far from 
being a central element, is seen as just one element in universe, connected in myriad 
ways to every other element. It is to be a movement which would support a legal and 
political system which respects the understanding that there is an inevitable 
interconnectedness between individuals and entities like family, religion, 
community, culture, and which encourages every individual to have duty towards 
one’s own self; towards the above-mentioned entities and also towards the State. 
Discourses sensitive to Indian traditions can be those which takes cognizance of the 
concept of cosmic order and the idea of inevitable inter-connectedness between each 
individual and the Universe638, and which is sensitive towards the idea of importance 
of every individual’s contribution in maintaining social order as well as the cosmic 
order. 
 
In Indian context, women’s movement which is sensitive to cultural diversity would 
mean a movement which is sensitive to a cosmo vision:  
• which encourages every individual to understand that he or she is part of a 
complex pre-existing cosmic web and is integrally related in myriad ways to 
family, community, religion, region, state, nation and ultimately the cosmic 
order and that there is a symbiotic co-existence between every individual and 
the above-mentioned diverse entities; 
• which expects every individual to deploy faculty of reason and process of 
critical reflection to understand his or her position in the cosmic web and 
responsibilities associated with that position;  
																																								 																				
638  Supra chapter 2. 
Rethinking the Relationship between Law, Gender Justice and Traditions in India: From Hostility to Harmony	
252 
• which considers social order as one with natural order and expects every 
individual to understand that performance of one’s own duty, svadharma, is 
the way to maintain order in the micro-cosmic spheres of family, community, 
and ultimately in the larger macro-cosmic sphere; 
• which encourages every individual to understand that although maintenance 
of order requires conscious efforts on part of every individual, the universe is 
a self-controlled order, and that it consists of in-built visible and invisible 
mechanisms for its maintenance that involves gods, men, animals and all 
other beings. Therefore, the worldview encourages every individual to 
understand that deviations from svadharma bring consequences not only in 
this life but also in subsequent lives.  
 
Sensitivity towards above features would in turn mean concern for the situation 
where the state and its legal system play a supervisory role to support the idea of 
society as a ‘self-controlled order’. This in turn, would mean a system which makes 
efforts to enable every individual to serve the interconnectedness, to perform one’s 
‘svadharma’, to participate in one’s own growth and in growth of fellow beings and 
also to contribute in growth of entities such as family, religion, culture or 
community. Conception of law and rights would be sensitive to and take into 
account the diverse and complex ways in which individual and religion, community 
or culture are interconnected to each other and contribute in growth of each other. 
 
In other words women’s movement in its re-conceptualised form will make a clear 
departure from the existing practices of engaging with religion, cultures or traditions 
only to understand the diverse ways in which religions or traditions oppress women. 
Instead, scholars will engage with indigenous traditions in order to appreciate 
diverse ways in which these traditions contribute in growth of women, in upholding 
dignity of women or in facilitating the task of discovering one’s own identity. 
Further, women’s movement with harmony towards traditions will be sensitive 
towards the idea that any individual has a duty not only towards self, but also 
towards family, community, culture and religion and that one of the important basis 
of upholding these duties is satisfaction of individual conscience. In its new version- 
a version which is sensitive towards non-western traditions, it would be required that 
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scholars and activists understand rights as means available with individuals to make 
claim as and when there are disturbances in symbiotic nature of interconnectedness 
or where religion, community or cultures become hindrances in growth of 
individual. Law and rights need to be seen as means to ensure first, that religion, 
community or culture contribute in growth of individual and second, that every 
individual also contributes appropriately in promotion and protection of religion, 
community or culture. And, what is appropriate may differ from situation to 
situation.  
 
Sensitivity towards Hindu traditions will require bringing to forefront the idea that 
dharma does not have element of coercion inherent it. What is needed are the efforts 
to bring to forefront elements, such as, ideas of self-controlled order, and of 
atmanastushti as a source of dharma, which militate against the assertion that 
dharma signifies passive submission to a set of given norms.  What also needs to be 
brought to forefront is the fact that while maintaining Order is one of the primary 
concerns, passive submission to a set of given norms to seek maintenance would be 
against the spirit of Hindu traditions.639  
 
It is true that Hindu traditions give more emphasis to the role of women as wives 
and mothers. There also exists extensive Hindu literature which provides detailed 
guidelines about obligations and duties of women as wives and mothers.  However, 
deeper engagement with traditions, with the concept of cosmic order and elements 
associated with it, also highlights the fact that valorization of above roles cannot 
mean relegating women to above roles against their wishes. A worldview which 
seeks satisfaction of individual conscience as a basis for serving interconnectedness 
cannot justify sexual, moral or economic oppression of women. While marriage of 
daughter is a religious duty of father or natal family of a woman, however there are 
enough elements in Hindu traditions which militate against the assertion that the said 
religious duty equals to “marrying away daughter at any cost”. 
  
Sensitivity towards traditions requires taking cognizance of the broad understanding 
of the conception of marriage which has been prevalent in pre-colonial India. There 
																																								 																				
639  Supra chapter 2. 
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is also need to consider that emphasis on the institutions of marriage and family, 
preference to monogamy as an ideal, do not exclude giving rights to those women 
who choose not to be part of one specific form of relationship considered ideal. 
Sensitivity towards traditions does not have to mean using instrument of law to 
impose certain pre-determined identities on individuals, especially on women. It 
certainly does not mean constraining any woman to the pre-determined role of a 
wife and or a mother much against his or her wishes and desires.   
 
Indeed, there is a need to have extensive debate on to what extent state should 
regulate the domain of marriage and family. There is a range of questions relating to 
institution of marriage and family, which are being debated also in the western 
countries where marriage is presumed to have been completely secularized. Rights 
and duties of individuals in intimate relationships are an issue of debate universally. 
While it is largely accepted that marriage is a contract, nature of marriage contract is 
still a matter of discussion.640 West, where women are presumed to have acquired 
equality, is also debating the issues such as to what extent marriage or intimate 
relationships between individuals are to be governed by the State.641  
																																								 																				
640  “Marriage as Contract and Marriage as Partnership: The Future of an Antenuptial Agreement.” 
This review draws attention towards a development called ‘convenant marriages’ in some 
jurisdictions. This development is an interesting shift away from ‘no-fault divorces’, and brings 
home the point that continuing use of binary of sacrament v contract for discussing marriage 
reforms is not really beneficial for the cause of women’s rights. Also see Dubler, “Wifely 
Behaviour: A Legal History of Acting Married.” Dubler drew attention towards continuing 
importance of institution of marriage in United States despite the fact that the laws in the 
different states do grant rights to women in various kinds of non-marital relationships. For 
importance to institution of family in UK see Andrew Bainham, “Family Law in a Pluralistic 
Society,” Journal of Law and Society 22, no. 2 (1995): 234–47. Also see David L. Chambers, 
“The ‘Legalisation’ of Family: Towards a Policy of Supportive Neutrality,” Journal of Law 
Reform 18, no. 4 (1980): 805–28. Also see Jens-Uwe Franck, “So Hedge Therefore, Who Join 
Forever: Understanding the Interrelation of No-Fault Divorce and Premarital Contracts,” 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 23 (2009): 235–76.  Jen-Uwe deconstructs 
the idea of marriage as contract as he mentions,  
 One should bear in mind that future spouses enjoy only a very limited contractual freedom to 
agree on conduct during the marriage; in particular, no jurisdiction permits couples to negotiate 
away from the obligation of spousal support during marriage. The duty of marital solidarity 
during marriage remains sacrosanct to the parties. Contractual freedom is essentially limited to 
agreements on the financial consequences of divorce. However, as will be further explored in 
turn, such agreements may serve as corrective to some of the problematic effects of the 
availability of no-fault divorce. Therefore, their enforceability should not be interpreted as a 
further weakening of the sanctity of marriage. (emphasis added) (At p. 253)  
641  For scholars expressing concern over increasing trend of ‘private contractualisation of marriage’ 
see Jr Witte John, From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion, and Law in the Western 
Tradition, 1. Ed edition (Louisville, Ky: Westminster/John Knox Press, U.S., 1997). Expressing 
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Sensitivity towards traditions would not mean relegating individuals to a situation 
where individuals are denied freedom of choice- freedom to choose one’s own 
identity. It also does not mean accepting denial of rights to women to exercise 
choice in name of religion or customary practices.642 As Puniyani rightly suggests it 
is indeed time to wake up and ensure that women do not suffer injustice or 
oppression in name of religion or customs.643 In contrast, sensitivity towards 
tradition would mean taking due cognizance of the fact that seeking passive 
submission to certain pre-determined roles can be done by ignoring one of the main 
concepts of Hindu worldview, the concept of atmanastushti (satisfaction of 
individual conscience)- a concept of central to Hindu world view. While 
‘interconnectedness’ and requirement of serving the interconnectedness are given 
great importance in Hindu worldview, and institution of marriage and family are 
important means to serve the interconnectedness, the concept of karma, rules out 
possibility of coercive imposition. It would also not mean relegating women to pre-
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
concern about weaker position of women and children in marriage relationships even in the 
United States Witte noted, 
 In the heady romance of budding nuptials, parties are often blind to the full consequences of their 
bargain. In the emotional anguish of separation and divorce, parties can be driven more by the 
desire for short-term relief from the other spouse than by the concern for their long term welfare 
or that of their children. The economically stronger and more calculating spouse triumphs in 
these contexts. And in majority of these cases today, that party is still man, despite the loud 
egalitarian rhetoric to the contrary. (At p. 214) 
 Witte expresses serious concern over changing nature of intimate relationships as he writes, 
 The early Enlightenment ideals of marriage as a permanent contractual union designed for the 
sake of mutual love, procreation, and protection is slowly giving way to a new reality of 
marriage as a “terminal sexual contract” designed for gratification of the individual parties. (At 
p. 207) 
 Also see Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law - State, Law, & Family in the 
United States & Western Europe, 2nd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). 
Also, Estin, “Unofficial Family Law.” Taking note of feminists demands for protecting rights of 
women in pluralistic forms of intimate relationships Estin states,  
 Beyond the argument for a pluralized marriage law, other writers have argued for abolishing or 
"privatizing" marriage law. These proposals sometimes suggest that civil marriage should be 
replaced with civil union or another substitute regime, and sometimes suggest that a status 
approach should be entirely rejected in favor of general principles of contract, property, and tort 
law. Advocates of privatization sometimes argue that these alternatives would give greater scope 
to the unofficial law of religious communities. As with a pluralization of marriage law, however, 
the state would remain involved in family regulation in either of these scenarios. Most 
discussions never reach the more specific, pragmatic questions of how a system of pluralized or 
privatized marriage could be implemented. (At p. 453) 
642  Puniyani, “A Doll’s House.” 
643  ibid. (At p. 3975) 
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determined roles of wives and mothers. In contrast, sensitivity towards traditions 
may mean efforts to ensure that valorizing role of women as wives and mothers does 
not result into de-valorisation of single women or the women who have not been 
willing to adopt that role or stay in that role.  
Sensitivity towards tradition would mean giving up the practice of constructing a 
negative view of culture or religion, which relegate cultures and religions in the 
realm of arbitrariness or irrationality. Sensitivity towards traditions as well as 
concern for plurality would mean giving space to those views which do not perceive 
institutions of marriage and family as sites of oppression of women.644 Sensitivity 
lies in taking cognizance of the fact that institutions of marriage and family are 
important for different people including women in different ways.645 These 
institutions vary from being religious, spiritual institutions for some to merely being 
merely socio-economic institutions for many others. For some, based on religious or 
spiritual perspective, marriage or family life is an essential stage in life or an 
important means for enjoying worldly pleasures in combination with fulfillment of 
religious or spiritual obligations. It may be a means to fulfill one’s religious as well 
as worldly obligations towards people one is connected with by birth, whereas for 
many others it may be an institution to provide stability in society or else, merely an 
institution for economic support of many, far and beyond those who are related to 
each other by consanguinity and marriage.  
 
Concern for cultural diversity would require space for those worldviews where 
community, religion or institutions of marriage and family are means to ensure an 
individual’s spiritual and worldly growth. Sensitivity towards traditions would 
further mean creating space for those views where claiming rights is not a way of 
making claims against family, community or religion. Concern for plurality requires 
																																								 																				
644  Siobhan Mullally, “Feminism and Multicultural Dilemmas in India: Revisiting the Shah Bano 
Case,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24, no. 4 (2004): 671–92. Mullally presents a strong case 
for giving freedom to women to interpret religion 
645  For support to such view even in Western context see Minow, “Forming Underneath Everything 
That Grows: Towards a History of Family Law.” She stated, 
 Just as study of the history of family law should encompass family members' economic 
interdependence, and intercorrelated roles, the future of family law too will involve the 
continuing interplay between autonomy and dependency, collectivity and individualism. (At p. 
894) 
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efforts for those views who do not necessarily perceive a conflict between religion 
and rights or culture and rights. Sensitivity would mean creating space for those who 
do not see their religion or culture as a source of oppression, who do not see religion 
or culture as requiring passive submission to given norms. 
And, none of the above would mean giving up scholars’ and activists’ struggle for 
granting legal rights to women in and outside the domain of family. Sensitivity 
towards traditions also would not mean giving up the concern that every woman is 
treated as an end in herself and not just a means for well-being of family or 
community. There is also no requirement of giving up struggles for legal reforms 
with an aim to ensure that women have rights in the domain of family. 
 
It would also not mean giving up struggle for creating a better world or a better 
society for women- a world or society where every individual can have freedom to 
choose his or her own way of life; a better world where the state and its legal system 
makes it possible for all to exercise a range of options- from being a member of 
family, community, religion to being an individual who does not claim allegiance to 
any of the above institutions; a world where women are not forced to be part of the 
institution of marriage merely for economic and social compulsions.646 
 
If we look at the domain of marriage, sensitivity towards tradition or emphasis on 
sanctity of marriage and family does not have to mean- denying legal rights to 
women who: prefer to remain single; prefers partner of one’s own choice 
irrespective of like or dislike of family and community; prefers to come out of the 
bond of marriage. It also does not mean belittling legal reforms which can 
underscore the importance of equality to women in and outside the domain of 
																																								 																				
646  Kim, “Towards a Feminist Theory of Human Rights.” Kim pertinently points out, 
 Neither feminism nor gender oppression is endemic to the West. Rather, feminism is a 
multicultural response to the oppression of women. There is nothing inherently “Western” about 
it. Feminism does not impose Western values upon societies in non-Western countries; rather it 
opens up options that enable women (in both Western and non-Western countries) to become 
“cultural participants” rather than cultural victims. Feminism empowers women, thus enabling 
them to participate in the culture rather than simply being subject to it. By examining the place of 
women in society, feminism changes the cultural context in which women live. It provides a 
theoretical framework within which women can challenge oppressive cultural practices. 
Feminism shifts the focus of women from that of object to one of subject. The rhetoric of cultural 
relativism, by depriving women of their ability to challenge existing systems of domination, 
effectively forecloses any opportunity that women might have to fully participate in their culture. 
(At p. 49-50) 
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family. Sensitivity towards traditions does not have to mean that scholars and 
activists are not required to be vigilant towards those practices which deny of rights 
to women in name of religion or traditions. 
 
 Emphasis on sanctity of marriage and family does not have to entail an endorsement 
of the view that women have to be submitting themselves to a set of norms received 
from Heaven or personal beliefs of those powerful in society about proper roles of 
women as wives and mothers. It also does not mean denying women freedom to 
decide whether to choose marriage as a means for serving the ‘interconnectedness’ 
or making one’s contribution to society.  
 
However, pursuing the above aims would undoubtedly require significant change in 
approaches by scholars and activists. It requires recognition that pursuing above 
aims may not result in achieving the kind of fundamental transformation in Indian 
society, which has so far been expected by scholars and activists since advent of 
colonial era.647 It requires taking cognizance of the fact that larger range of legal 
rights to women to choose their own way of life does not necessarily require 
devalorising institutions of marriage and family.  
 
It will need taking cognizance of the fact that while for women’s rights scholarship 
increasing concern for pluralism or difference between women is a new 
development, finding balance between rights and cultural diversity is an old 
challenge for the Indian State, especially the judiciary in India. If we consider the 
issue of rights of women in intimate relationships, for Indian judiciary the challenge 
to protect rights of individuals who opt to be or happen to be part of relationships 
which were once considered backward and oppressive is not new.648 Judges in India 
have always been dealing with the issue of rights of women and that of other 
individuals who decide or happen to establish intimate, personal relationships 
without fulfilling formal, legal requirements, or by defying legal restrictions and 
prohibitions. There are a large number of cases where judges have taken steps to 
																																								 																				
647   Supra chapter 4. 
648  For a detailed discussion on this point see: Pal, Matrimonial Laws and the Constitution. 
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protect the rights of such women who were in informal relationships,649 even in 
technically illegal and legally void relationships.650  However, for a long time socio-
legal scholars in India either ignored such attempts by judiciary or simply dismissed 
them as examples of poor implementation of progressive laws by the judges. Till 
few decades ago scholars were of the opinion that judges’ reluctance to strictly 
enforce progressive legislations or people’s insistence on engaging in prohibited 
practices was a mere reflection of non-progressive, patriarchal mindsets prevalent in 
India.651 It was then believed that these mindsets will ultimately change through 
activism, through a combination of strong legal measures and education. Gradually 
scholars’ perception towards diverse kinds of intimate relationships has changed 
significantly.  
 
With a significant shift in stance women’s rights scholarship now perceives these 
instances of individuals- men and women- engaging in prohibited practices (and or 
relationships) as signs of progressiveness. Those women, who were once viewed as 
perpetrators by legal system as well as by women’s rights scholars and were denied 
any kind of protection by law for being part of ‘backward practices, are now seen by 
scholars as victims of the system. Judicial interventions for upholding diverse kinds 
of relationships which were once decried by the scholarship as steps in maintaining 
backwardness are now appreciated as efforts to accommodate plurality- to take 
measures to protect rights of women in diverse kinds of legal or illegal personal 
relationships. However, what has remained obscured even with this shift is the fact 
that for Indian judiciary, protecting rights of women in diverse relationships, has not 
been about devalorising institutions of family and marriage. It has remained 
unnoticed by scholars that for Indian legal system and judges in India, rights of 
women in polygamous or adulterous relationships can co-exist with perceptions of 
marriage as sacrament.  
 
Moreover, while it is true that society in India and the legal system gives great 
importance to the idea of marriage as sacrament what is alien to many people is the 
																																								 																				
649 Supra chapter 4.   
650 For details see Menski, Hindu Law. (especially chapter 8-12) 
651  Supra chapter 2. 
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idea of marriage as site of sexual, moral or economic oppression of people. It is true 
that perceiving idea of marriage as sacrament, a section of society has frowned upon 
the idea of divorce, or in traditional societies divorce may emerge only as a remedy 
rather than right. However, what is problematic is the understanding which equates 
or rather reduces the idea of marriage as sacrament to certain specified rituals and to 
just one element- indissolubility of marriage. What has been completely ignored is 
the fact that marriage as a sacrament has been an important means available with 
families/communities and now also with judges and the Indian legal system for 
imposing on every man or the whole marital family responsibilities or duties 
towards woman, even after dissolution of marriage.652 Marriage as sacrament has 
been a means to ensure that idea of marriage as contract and importance to 
individual will do not become means for husband and marital family to escape 
responsibilities.653 While talking about equal legal rights to women in marriage or 
family, the issue is not whether to grant equality to women or not. Instead the cause 
of concern has been whether equality would mean reducing marriage to a mere equal 
exchange between two equally placed self-interested individuals who willingly 
																																								 																				
652  Futility of opposition between sacrament and contract is evident from the way issue of women’s 
rights to maintenance after dissolution of marriage has been debated in India. Indian family laws, 
especially Hindu laws, drawing on the concept of marriage tie as a sacrament, which cannot be 
severed for all purposes even after divorce, have had the concept of maintenance of woman. This 
concept imposes obligation on the marital family to maintain a woman (a wife or daughter in 
law) even after dissolution of marriage. In order to ensure effective enforcement, section 125 of 
the Criminal Procedure Code makes it possible to invoke criminal proceedings to seek 
maintenance from marital family. There has been a extensive debate in India about whether 
Muslim women can invoke above mentioned section to impose economic obligation of marital 
family. The Supreme Court of India, apparently unconcerned about the opposition between 
sacrament v contract, extended application of above section to Muslim women too in the famous 
case in 1984, Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum, 2 Supreme Court Cases 556 (Supreme 
Court 1985). However, the then ruling party yielded to political pressure and to assertions of 
marriage as contract for Muslims to pass a legislation focused on rights of Muslim which 
overruled the judgment of the Supreme Court. While act of the Center has been much criticized 
for giving into communal pressures, the special piece of legislation has ultimately been 
interpreted to protect economic rights of Muslim women. 
653  Pal, Matrimonial Laws and the Constitution. Pal succinctly challenges the ill-conceived 
dichotomy of sacrament v contract as he notes, 
 But call it a sacrament, if you like, or give it any other pompous nomenclature, a Hindu marriage 
at least after the Hindu Marriage Act, must originate in a contract, though after solemnization, 
the relationship no longer rests on contract alone, but confers on the parties legal status with 
statutory rights and liabilities. As has been well said by Lord Simon in Johnson v Morston 
[(1978)3All ER 37] even though Sir Henry Maine was right, when he wrote his classical treatise 
“Ancient Law” in mid-Nineteenth Century, that the movement of progressive societies was from 
status to contract, there is now a reverse swing from contract to status. (emphasis original) (At p. 
27) 
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assume certain rights and obligations through the instrument of contract merely to 
pursue one's own interests.654 
 
For rethinking relationship between indigenous traditions in India and rights of 
women what needs to be brought to forefront are the understandings that dharma 
does not have element of coercion inherent in it. It may be required to draw attention 
towards the concepts of atmanastushti and universe as a self-controlled order, which 
rules out the requirement of using coercion to impose religion or religion related 
beliefs. So even if different individuals or groups, as per their status in society, may 
have different understandings or different levels of authority in society to lay down 
what is dharma, it would be against the spirit of the Hindu worldview- the concept 
of cosmic order- to use coercion- the power of the State to impose that 
understanding.   
 
Sensitivity towards traditions does not require indifference, inaction, tolerance to 
intolerance. It is necessary to move forward, however, as Sinha pertinently pointed 
out, 655 
It is necessary to move forward, and that movement forward cannot be 
accomplished on the basis of the present single-catalog approach. Insisting 
upon this catalog, with its subsumptions of individualism, rights, and 
legalism, as the only possible means of human emancipation, leads us to two 
possible alternatives. One, we must ignore social order which are not based 
on individualism, rights and legalism. Two, we must force this conception of 
social order upon societies which are conceived differently. The first 
alternative has two consequences. On the one hand, it keeps most of the 
humanity outside its scope so that it really is incapable of relating to the 
																																								 																				
654  “Marriage as Contract and Marriage as Partnership: The Future of an Antenuptial Agreement.” 
Finding idea of marriage as contract not fully appropriate for the relationships of personal, 
intimate relationship this issue of HLR suggests a shift towards different conception of ‘marriage 
as partnership’. Menski, “Legal Pluralism in Hindu Marriage.” Describing Hindu marriage 
Menski writes, 
 The major concern is therefore not with the expectations of individuals per se, nor with those of 
a partially abstract legal entity like the modern state, but with the spouses as part of micro- and 
macro-cosmic constellations that force the individual to consider the needs and demands of 
others just as much as his or her own. (At p. 199) 
655  Sinha, “Human Rights.” (At p. 89-90) 
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peoples of the non-western social orders discussed above. On the other hand, 
and conversely, by its inability to relate to these societies it enlarges the 
scope of injustice inflicted by their governments upon their peoples. The 
second alternative of enforcing the individualist-rightist-legalist conception 
of social order on the societies which have not cast in this mould is, in the 
first place, impossible.................. What is required is a redefinition of the 
problem of human rights which would focus not so much upon a particular 
way of human emancipation but at the very issue of that emancipation, 
recognizing the fact that there are more than one way of achieving such 
emancipation. It is, therefore, necessary to separate the concept of human 
rights from any particular catalog thereof. What is universal is the former, 
not the latter. 
 
One couldn’t agree less with Sinha656 that ‘a movement forward’ is essential, 
inevitable. But if we really want to be sensitive to cultural and religious diversity, it 
would require a movement forward in the direction where it is accepted that the 
concept of human rights, with its tenets of rights, individualism and legalism is just 
one of the ways of protecting human dignity. It would require an understanding that 
different cultures in the world have had different ways of protecting human dignity 
with no claim for superiority over the other.657  
 
Problem lies with our incessant efforts to push religion to the realm of arbitrariness, 
irrationality, passive submission or oppression.658 We have committed ourselves to 
the understandings of traditions offered to us by a handful of people. It is we the 
scholars who have been responsible for creating a situation where standing against 
																																								 																				
656  ibid. 
657  Donnelly, The Concept of Human Rights. Emphasising human rights as only one of the ways of 
protecting human dignity Donnelly states, 
 If we are to try to assess whether human rights is a ‘better’ way to approach human dignity and 
organize a polity, we need to ask “Better than what?”…. Human rights are not entirely ends in 
themselves; among other things, as we have seen, they are means to realize human dignity. To 
the extent that they have instrumental value, the merits of human rights can, at least in principle, 
be assessed empirically. I would suggest that for most of the goals of developing countries, as 
defined by these countries themselves, human rights are as effective as or more effective than 
either traditional approaches or modern non-human rights strategies. (At p. 85) 
658  Volpp, “Talking Culture.” 
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traditions is a cost that needs to be paid for claiming rights. Rights scholars have 
been concerned about the fact that women have been saddled with the burden of 
carrying the ‘traditions’. However, nothing seems to have been done to liberate them 
from this burden. Burden, on the contrary, is much more tedious. Allegiance to 
traditions needs to be given up for anyone claiming rights. There is no space for 
those who do not see conflict between culture and rights or religion and rights, for 
whom claiming rights is not a way of making claims against family, community, 
culture or religion.659 There is no space also for those for whom faith in institution of 
marriage and family is intact, despite being a survivor of familial violence.660 Rights 
discourse currently creates no possibility of freedom to have one’s own 
interpretation of traditions and culture.661 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
659  For similar arguments see Minow, “Forming Underneath Everything That Grows: Towards a 
History of Family Law.” 
660  An excellent example of such scholarship is:  Oldenburg, Dowry Murder. 
661  A woman can remain a devout muslim or Hindu while choosing Special Marriage Act for 
marriage.  
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